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Abstract	  
This thesis investigates the phenomenon of polysemy: a single lexical form with two or 
multiple related senses (e.g. catch the rabbit/order the rabbit; lose a wallet/lose a relative; 
a handsome man/a handsome gift).  
I develop a pragmatic account of polysemy within the framework of Sperber and 
Wilson’s relevance theory, where new senses for a word are constructed during on-line 
comprehension by means of a single process of ad hoc concept construction, which 
adjusts the meanings of individual words in different directions. 
While polysemy is largely unproblematic from the perspective of 
communication, it poses a range of theoretical and descriptive problems. This is 
sometimes termed the polysemy paradox. A widely held view in lexical semantics is that 
word meanings must consist of complex representations in order to capture the sense 
relations involved in polysemy. Contrary to this view, I argue that a conceptual atomist 
approach, which treats word meanings as unstructured atoms and thereby avoids the 
range of problems associated with decompositional theories of word meaning, may be at 
least as able to account for polysemy when paired with an adequate pragmatic theory.  
My proposed solution to the polysemy paradox is to treat polysemy as a 
fundamentally communicative phenomenon, which arises as a result of encoded lexical 
concepts being massively underdetermining of speaker-intended concepts, and is 
grounded in our pragmatic inferential ability. According to this approach, the role of 
the linguistic system in giving rise to polysemy is to provide a minimal input, or clue, 
which the pragmatic system uses as evidence to yield hypotheses about occasion-
specific, speaker-intended meanings. I further show how this pragmatic approach can 
account for cases of ‘systematic polysemy’, usually seen as prime candidates for an 
analysis in terms of lexical rule application. Finally, I develop an account of metonymy 
within the overall framework of relevance-theory.  
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Chapter	  1 	  
INTRODUCTION	  
1.1 What is polysemy? 
That a single word form can be associated with several different meanings is a well-
known fact about language. Take the word run. Its meaning in the verb phrase run a 
half marathon is clearly different from the one it has in run some water, or, for that 
matter, in run on gasoline, run on empty, run a shop, run late, run away from 
responsibilities, run in the family, run for President, and so on. This phenomenon is 
described as polysemy, and it proliferates in natural languages. This is confirmed by the 
range of different senses (and/or uses) that any dictionary will have listed under a 
considerable number of its entries.1 On top of this comes the range of non-established 
senses that lexical items may be used to express on different occasions of use, which are 
contextually derived on the spot. 
Linguists, philosophers of language and psychologists have long been interested 
in the polysemy phenomenon due to the challenging issues it raises for theories of 
semantic representation, semantic compositionality, language processing and 
communication. Traditional approaches tend to regard polysemy as a matter of 
different senses being listed under a single lexical entry, with the comprehension of a 
polysemous word involving selection of the contextually appropriate sense from among 
the list of senses (so-called sense enumeration lexicons). Another traditional line of 
approach regards polysemy as being represented in terms of a single, maximally general 
meaning, from which the contextually appropriate senses are derived (so-called core 
meaning approaches). In more modern approaches, it is generally acknowledged that 
polysemy is the result of the interaction of several factors, some of which are linguistic, 
some cognitive, and some communicative, and the debate is more about which of these 
factors is the most important: Does polysemy have a primarily linguistic basis (an 
assumption held by most scholars working within computational semantic 
                                                      
1 For instance, according to (Byrd et al. 1987) almost 40 per cent of the entries in Webster’s Seventh 
Dictionary have two or more senses. 
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frameworks), is it essentially cognitive (as is claimed by scholars working within the 
cognitive grammar tradition), or is it a fundamentally communicative phenomenon? 
1.2 Background 
The fact that a word may be associated with several meanings was addressed at least as 
early as the writings of Aristotle (Barnes 1984). In the opening of Categories, Aristotle 
distinguishes between synonymy (‘univocity’) and homonymy (‘multivocity’, ‘being 
spoken of in many ways’). Two things, a and b, are synonymous or univocal if they are 
both called by the same name F, and the definition of F is the same for both of them, 
whereas a and b are homonymous if they are called by the same name F, but the 
definition of F for a does not completely overlap with the definition of F for b (Shields 
2009).2 An example of synonymy is the occurrences of human in ‘Socrates is a human’ 
and ‘Plato is a human’, where the things named by the word human are the same in both 
cases.3 An example of homonymy is the occurrences of bank in ‘John went to the bank 
to open a savings account’ and ‘Plato and Socrates had a picnic on the bank’, where the 
things that are named by bank (‘financial institution’, ‘riverbank’) have distinct 
definitions.4 Furthermore, as the definition above states, homonymy also includes those 
instances of things called by the same name that have partially overlapping definitions. 
Consider the occurrences of healthy below: 
(1) a. Socrates is healthy. 
b. Socrates’ exercise regimen is healthy. 
c. Socrates’ complexion is healthy. 
These three predications of healthy are non-univocal. In (1)a., the meaning of the 
predicate is roughly ‘is physically fit’, in (1)b. it means ‘promotes health’, and in (1)c., it 
means ‘is indicative of health’. As Aristotle observed, the meanings of healthy in (1)b. 
                                                      
2 In the classical approach of Aristotle, definitions describe necessary and sufficient application 
conditions. I return to this approach in section 1.4.2 below, as well as in detail in Chapter 2 in connection 
with the discussion of polysemy representation. 
3 Aristotle’s notion of synonymy is thus different from its contemporary usage where it describes different 
words with the same meaning. 
4 It should be noted that Aristotle’s theory is concerned with metaphysics, more specifically with the 
essences of things, and so his terms ‘synonymy’ and ‘homonymy’ apply in the first instance to things, and 
not to word meanings.  
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and (1)c. are both dependent on the meaning of healthy in (1)a, which is contained as 
part of their definitions. This is referred to as a kind of core-dependent homonymy 
(Shields 1999; Owen 1960 termed this 'focal meaning'), that is, an intermediate case 
between univocity and full homonymy. 
Until relatively recently, almost all theories of linguistic semantics were based on 
these classical ideas about necessary and sufficient application conditions for concepts, 
as manifested most notably by Katz’s semantic theory (1972; Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz 
and Postal 1964). As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, Katz’s approach 
takes word meanings to be constituted by definitions, and lists as many meanings for a 
word as there are sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. In 
contemporary linguistic theory this view is still held by a number of scholars, most 
notably by those working within Anna Wierzbicka’s (1996) theory of Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage (NSM). 
Another early mention of the issue of lexical meaning variation in the history of 
Western philosophy is Locke’s (1975 [1689]) discussion of the English connective but 
and Leibniz’s (1996 [1765]) subsequent critique of it (cf. Fieke Van der Gucht and De 
Cuypere 2007). Locke saw but as being associated with a number of different meanings 
(e.g. it may express opposition, coordination, etc.), and expressed doubts about the 
possibility that they could all be instantiations of a single more abstract meaning. 
Leibniz, on the other hand, took issue with Locke’s claim that but has several different 
meanings and argued that instead, we should try to reduce all the uses of a word to “a 
determinate number of significations” (Leibniz 1996 [1765]: III, §4), by searching for a 
‘paraphrase’ that is able to cover as much of the semantic variation of the word as 
possible.  
Interestingly, this short discussion between Locke and Leibniz sums up the 
broad lines of the traditional debate over polysemy. As I mentioned above, theories of 
polysemy representation are often divided into ‘sense enumeration lexicons’ and ‘core 
meaning approaches’. Sense enumeration lexicons, which take the representation of a 
polysemous lexical item to consist in a listing of all its uses, bear a clear resemblance to 
Locke’s position above, while core meaning approaches, which see polysemous lexical 
items as being represented in terms of a highly abstract ‘core meaning’, which remains 
constant across all its uses, strongly resembles Leibniz’s approach. 
  
 
12 
In general linguistics, Bréal (1924 [1897]) was the first to introduce the term 
‘polysemy’ (‘polysémie’) to describe single word forms with several different meanings 
(cf. Nerlich 2003). For Bréal, polysemy was primarily a diachronic phenomenon, arising 
as a consequence of semantic change. Words acquire new meanings through use, but 
these do not automatically eliminate the old ones. Polysemy, then, is the result of the 
parallel existence of new and old meanings in the language; it is the ‘synchronic side’ of 
lexical semantic change. However, Bréal also observed that, at the synchronic level, 
polysemy is not really an issue, since the context of discourse determines the sense of a 
polysemous word and eliminates its other possible meanings (Bréal 1924 [1897]: 157). 
These early insights of Bréal also underlie much contemporary research in lexical 
semantics and pragmatics. 
Following the advent of transformational-generative grammar in the late 1950s, 
with its main focus on syntax, polysemy received little attention for several years (some 
exceptions are Weinreich 1964, 1966; Anderson and Ortony 1975; Apresjan 1974; 
Caramazza and Grober 1976). However, with the development of cognitive grammar 
during the 1980s, polysemy reappeared on the research agenda as a central topic in 
lexical semantics, in particular as a result of the pioneering studies of prepositional 
polysemy conducted by Brugman (1988; Brugman and Lakoff 1988) and Lakoff (1987). 
A central claim of these studies was that polysemy is not so much a linguistic 
phenomenon as a cognitive one, resulting from the way in which our conceptual 
categories are structured. 
Today, there are broadly two main trends in the research on polysemy. One is 
the well of polysemy research conducted within the cognitive linguistics framework, 
which has grown out of the work by Brugman and Lakoff, as mentioned above, as well 
as Langacker’s (1987) foundational work in cognitive grammar (e.g. Geeraerts 1993; 
Tuggy 1993; Cuyckens and Zawada 1997; Dunbar 2001; Nerlich et al. 2003; Tyler and 
Evans 2003). The other is the polysemy research conducted within computational 
semantic frameworks, which includes most notably the generative lexicon account 
maintained by Pustejovsky (1995a), as well as several others (e.g. Copestake and Briscoe 
1996; Kilgarriff 1992, 1995; Kilgarriff and Gazdar 1995; Asher and Lascarides 2003; 
Asher forthcoming). In contrast to the cognitive linguistic approaches, such 
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computational approaches see polysemy as primarily a linguistic phenomenon, arising 
from lexicon-internal computational processes.  
However, as we are going to see in the coming chapters, in addition to these two 
main trends in the research on polysemy, much of the work conducted within the 
relatively new field of ‘lexical pragmatics’ has a direct bearing on the issue of polysemy 
(e.g. Recanati 1995, 2004; Carston 1997, 2002b, 2010; Blutner 1998, 2004; Wilson and 
Carston 2006, 2007). The main concern of these approaches is the communicative 
aspect of polysemy, that is, the interaction between linguistically-encoded content and 
contextual information in the derivation of speaker-intended lexical meanings.  
Recently, there have also been several psycholinguistic studies investigating the 
representation of polysemy (e.g. Klein and Murphy 2001, 2002; Klepousniotou 2002; 
Klepousniotou, Titone, and Romero 2008; Beretta, Fiorentino, and Poeppel 2005; 
Pylkkänen, Llinás, and Murphy 2006). I will consider some of these studies in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
1.3 The polysemy paradox 
Already Bréal had noted that when talking to each other we rarely get confused by the 
multiplicity of meanings that a word can have. Sometimes, of course, speakers may 
exploit the polysemous potential of a lexical item to create confusion or a humorous 
effect, for instance a pun, but generally, polysemy is unproblematic from the point of 
view of communication. In normal circumstances, speakers can trust hearers to use 
contextual cues to quickly and reliably figure out the meaning they intend to 
communicate when using a word that could take on a different meaning in a different 
context. So the potential ambiguity that polysemy creates (and the process of 
disambiguation that would follow such ambiguity) does not seem to be much of an issue 
in human communication; it is something that we handle effortlessly and 
unconsciously, for the vast majority of the time.  
In contrast, polysemy raises a host of challenging issues in semantic theory and 
semantic applications, such as lexicography, computational models of natural language 
processing and translation. This has led some scholars to talk of a ‘paradox’ in 
connection with polysemy, referring to the discrepancy between the relative ease with 
which it is used and understood in communication, and the range of theoretical and 
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descriptive problems it is associated with (Ravin and Leacock 2000; Taylor 2003). I 
outline the main issues in this section. 
A first issue concerns how polysemy should be defined, and (if desirable) 
distinguished from homonymy (accidental multiple encoding), on the one hand, and 
contextual modulation of lexical meaning, on the other hand. I will refer to this as the 
problem of definition. In lexicography, the problem of definition translates into a 
methodological issue of distinguishing between those cases of multiple encodings that 
should be listed as distinct entries in the dictionary (homonymy), and those that should 
be listed under a single entry (polysemy), and, in the latter case, of determining which 
senses are established (hence should be listed) and which are not (hence should not be 
listed). I return to discussion of the problem of definition in more detail in Section 1.4. 
A second issue is how polysemous lexical items are represented in the mental 
lexicon. The question is whether all the different senses of a polysemous lexical item are 
stored (as claimed by sense enumeration lexicons), or only a single representation is 
stored and all the other senses contextually derived, (as claimed by core meaning 
approaches), or only some senses are stored and the others contextually derived. I will 
refer to this as the problem of representation. A problem for fully encoding sense 
enumeration lexicons is that the mental lexicon would have to store indefinitely many 
semantic distinctions for each lexical item. A challenge for core meaning approaches is 
to decide on the appropriate level of abstraction for defining the core meaning of a 
lexical item, in order to capture what is common to all its possible, sometimes radically 
different, uses (cf. run above). A problem for more moderate approaches, which 
postulate only a limited number of senses of a word, is to distinguish between those 
meanings that are stored in the lexicon and those that are constructed on-line in 
language use. 
Traditionally, polysemy is described as the association of two or more related 
senses with a single word form. Thus, a further issue that an account of polysemy 
representation must address is how the relations between the polysemous senses are 
represented in the mental lexicon, that is, if they are represented at all. For instance, on 
the classical approach, where word meanings are represented as necessary and sufficient 
features, sense relations are accounted for in terms of relations between the features 
contained in the lexical representations (e.g. the meanings of healthy in (1) above are all 
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related by virtue of containing the core concept ‘physically fit’ as part of their 
definitions). In the cognitive linguistics tradition, where a common view is that 
polysemous lexical items are represented as a network of senses centred around a 
primary, prototypical sense (e.g. Lakoff 1987), sense relations concern, in the first 
instance, adjacent members of the network, while members that are only indirectly 
connected in the network may be very different in semantic content. 
The problem of polysemy representation is intimately connected to the broader 
question of what word meanings are, and, specifically, what kind of mental 
representation is encoded by a lexical form: Are lexical meanings complex, that is, do 
they consist of smaller units of meaning, and if so, what are these (necessary and 
sufficient features, conjunctions of basic concepts, lexical networks, or something else?), 
or are they more appropriately seen as simple, unstructured meanings (atomic 
concepts)? How one answers this question has significant consequences for an account 
of polysemy representation. In Chapter 2, I address this issue in detail. 
A third issue that the proliferation of polysemy in natural languages raises is the 
fundamental question of why it exists. What is it about our language systems, 
specifically their lexical component, that makes them so susceptible to polysemy? Why 
do we rather use the same word to describe a set of different things or properties than 
have a distinct word for each sense, and what are the mental abilities that allow us to do 
this? This issue, which I refer to as the problem of polysemy motivation, has received 
little attention outside the cognitive linguistics paradigm (where, as I mentioned above, 
polysemy is seen as a result of how cognitive categories are structured more generally). 
In particular, the role of our communicative abilities in motivating polysemy has, in my 
view, not received the focus it deserves. While polysemy (in fact, ambiguity quite 
generally) represents an almost insurmountable challenge for computational models of 
natural language processing and translation, it is, as I mentioned at the beginning of this 
section, largely unproblematic from the point of view of human communication. A 
pragmatic theory that is able to explain how and why this is so, is also likely to shed light 
on the issue of what motivates the proliferation of polysemy in natural languages in the 
first place. I return to consideration of this issue in Chapter 3.  
A final issue is how lexical meanings get extended into several different 
meanings. If we grant that some (possibly many) senses of polysemous lexical items are 
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derived or constructed during on-line processing, what are the processes or mechanisms 
involved, and how do they operate? This is a topic that has been widely studied, in 
particular by computational semanticists, cognitive linguists, and by pragmatists and 
philosophers of language interested in lexical meaning. Again, the main controversy is 
whether the mechanisms involved in meaning extension are primarily linguistic, 
cognitive or communicative (i.e. pragmatic). In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I take a pragmatic 
approach to the question of how lexical meanings are extended during utterance 
processing. 
1.4 The problem of definition 
A standard textbook definition of polysemy is “the association of two or more related 
senses with a single linguistic form” (Taylor 1989/2003: 144). In this section, I consider 
three issues which have a bearing on the definition and delimitation of polysemy, 
including (i) the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, (ii) the distinction 
between ambiguity and vagueness, and (iii) the connection between polysemy and 
contextual modulation of lexical meaning.  
1.4.1 Polysemy and homonymy 
Traditionally, polysemy is distinguished from homonymy.5 In polysemy, the different 
senses of a single lexical item are seen as being related in some non-trivial way, whereas 
in homonymy, the multiple encoding is a matter of historical accident. An example of 
homonymy is the lexical form coach, which encodes the entirely unrelated meanings 
‘bus’ and ‘sports instructor’. It is standard to see these as being represented as two 
different lexemes (COACH1 and COACH2) in the mental lexicon.  
However, drawing the distinction between related and unrelated senses of a 
lexical form is often far from a straightforward matter. The question is: What does it 
mean for two senses to be related? The criteria that have been suggested include 
etymology and speaker intuitions about unrelatedness vs. relatedness of meaning (Lyons 
1977b). According to the etymological criterion, two senses are homonymous if they are 
                                                      
5 The distinction between polysemy and homonymy corresponds to Weinreich’s (1964) distinction 
between complementary and contrastive ambiguity. 
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historically unrelated. On this approach, the linguistic form file would be an instance of 
homonymy, as the sense ‘folder or box for holding loose papers’ originates from the 
French word fil, and the sense ‘tool with roughened surface(s)’ comes from the old 
English word féol. That these two senses came to be associated with the same lexical 
form in contemporary English is thus a matter of historical accident. According to the 
same criterion, the noun position, which has the senses ‘a particular way in which 
someone or something is placed or arranged’ and ‘a person’s particular view or attitude 
toward something’, would be polysemous as a result of the shared etymological origin of 
its senses. 
However, this way of distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy is 
problematic if we are concerned with characterising the linguistic knowledge of speakers 
and hearers. To illustrate, consider the English word cardinal. This word encodes the 
meanings ‘leader of the Roman Catholic Church’ or ‘North American songbird of the 
bunting family’. The two senses are historically related; the male cardinals are mostly 
red in colour and so this bird was named cardinal by virtue of its resemblance in colour 
to the red cassocks worn by cardinals. According to the etymological criterion, then, 
cardinal would be polysemous. However, many speakers of English may not be aware of 
this historical connection, and to them the two senses may seem entirely unrelated (i.e. 
homonymous). So, distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy on the basis of 
etymology does not, in many cases, capture differences in speakers’ intuitions of 
semantic relatedness, and, although such etymological considerations are no doubt 
useful to lexicographers in the making of dictionaries, it is doubtful whether they are 
relevant to a synchronic analysis of polysemy. 
Another criterion that has been suggested as a way to distinguish between 
polysemy and homonymy is speaker intuitions about related and unrelated senses. 
According to this criterion, two senses are polysemous if they are judged by native 
speakers to be related, and homonymous if they are judged to be unrelated (or at least 
their meanings are considered to be further apart than polysemous senses as in, e.g., 
cardinal). Distinguishing polysemy from homonymy would thus depend on a sort of 
‘folk etymology’. A problem that arises in connection with this criterion is that sense 
relatedness appears to be a matter of degree, and, moreover, judgements about the 
relatedness of the senses of a given word are likely to be subjective (Lyons 1977b). For 
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instance, compare the different senses of the nouns right (‘morally correct’, ‘the right-
hand part, side or direction’), letter (‘symbol of the alphabet’, ‘written communication’), 
and position (‘a particular way in which someone or something is placed or arranged’ 
and ‘a person’s particular view or attitude toward something’). Intuitively, we feel that 
the senses of position are more closely related than those of right, whose semantic 
content is arguably quite distinct, and than those of letter, whose senses might 
nevertheless be considered to be more closely related than those of right. The senses of 
these words thus seem to be related to different degrees. Furthermore, it is possible that 
some speakers may claim to see a relation between the senses of a word form where 
others do not. An example is the different meanings of the noun ear, ‘organ of hearing’ 
and ‘seed-bearing head or spike of a cereal plant’. For some native English speakers, 
these senses may seem related, while others may not see any relation between them at 
all. Such facts make the prospect of drawing a clear-cut distinction between polysemy 
and homonymy on the basis of speaker intuitions slim.6 
Most importantly, however, it is not clear that speakers’ intuitions about 
relatedness and unrelatedness of senses have any bearing on the way in which 
individuals use and understand words (Lyons 1977b: 552), quite unlike, for instance, 
intuitions about grammaticality, which have been considered the basic data to be 
explained within generative grammar. This is because it seems that many of our 
intuitions about sense relations might be reflective (i.e. arrived at by thinking about 
language) and thus not a direct reflex of the way in which word meanings are 
represented in our linguistic systems. 
It is possible to argue that the distinction between polysemy and homonymy is 
of no theoretical significance, and to see them both as instances of a more general 
phenomenon of linguistic ambiguity. This is the position taken by Kempson (1977: 82), 
who treats the lexical form run as being represented as several distinct entries in the 
mental lexicon, one for each of its meanings, on a par with clearly homonymous forms 
such as file, coach or bank. Kempson sees this as the appropriate way to account for the 
fact that run creates an ambiguous sentence when more than one of its interpretations 
are possible. To this kind of approach it has been objected (in particular by scholars 
                                                      
6 That is, unless the distinction is allowed to vary across different I-languages, which it clearly should do. 
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working within the cognitive linguistics paradigm, cf. Taylor 1989/2003: 107) that it 
reduces polysemy to an arbitrary, unmotivated phenomenon, and thus makes it 
impossible to explain patterns of polysemy that are observed repeatedly across 
languages (e.g. Sweetser 1990). Although this is a reasonable objection, and a semantic 
(or pragmatic) theory that can explain these facts is clearly desirable, Kempson’s 
position may still be correct with regard to the representation of conventional polysemy, 
that is, the cases where the related senses of a lexical form have become established in 
the lexicon. What would be required, then, is an account of how polysemous senses are 
derived, and a means to distinguish between conventional and contextually derived 
instances of polysemy. 
1.4.2 Ambiguity and vagueness 
A much-discussed distinction in semantic theory is that between ambiguity and 
vagueness (e.g. Kempson 1977; Cruse 1986; Atlas 1989; Geeraerts 1993; Tuggy 1993; 
Williamson 1994). Traditionally, lexical ambiguity is seen as involving two or multiple 
lexemes with distinct senses (and may, as we saw above, include both homonymy and 
polysemy), and vagueness a single lexeme with a non-specific meaning (monosemy), 
which is contextually specified. Different kinds of vagueness are discussed in the 
literature, including ‘indeterminacy of meaning’, that is, cases in which the meaning of 
the lexical item appears to be quite intangible, and ‘lack of specification’, that is, cases in 
which the meaning of the lexical item is in principle quite clear but is very general 
(Kempson 1977: 125). The adjective good has been mentioned as an example of 
indeterminacy of meaning, due to the range of different senses it may express in 
describing different things (e.g. good knife/football player/student/weather, etc.), as well 
as in describing the same thing (e.g. a good job could be one that’s well paid, offers 
interesting tasks, has an inclusive social environment, gives a certain social status, etc.). 
Examples of vagueness due to lack of specification are terms such as teacher, cousin, 
neighbour, etc., all of which are unspecified with regard to gender.  
Several tests have been proposed for distinguishing between ambiguity and 
vagueness. These can be divided into the following types: (i) logical tests; (ii) linguistic 
tests, and (iii) definitional tests (Geeraerts 1993, 1994).  
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An example of a logical test is the one proposed by Quine (1960: 129), according 
to which a lexical item is ambiguous if it can at once be clearly true and clearly false of 
the same thing. For instance, an assertion of ‘Anne is wearing a light skirt’ would be true 
of a situation where Anne is wearing a black skirt made of a thin fabric of little weight, if 
light is taken to denote the property ‘of little weight’, and false if light is taken to denote 
the property ‘pale’. Thus, the adjective light is ambiguous according to the logical test.  
Linguistic tests involve semantic restrictions on sentences that contain two 
occurrences of the lexical item under consideration. If a grammatical construction 
requires semantic identity between the two occurrences, ambiguous expressions will 
give rise to several readings for the construction. For instance, Kempson’s (1977: 129) 
anaphora-based test involves the use of the expression do so too (or so did X, X 
did/has/will/is too), which demands identity of meaning of two verb phrases.7 A verb 
phrase, then, is two-ways ambiguous if conjoining a do so too phrase to it renders the 
whole sentence two-ways ambiguous, as in (2) and (3): 
(2) Anne wore a light skirt and Jane did so too. 
(3) Tom went to the bank and his mother did so too. 
Both sentences above have two readings because the same senses of light and bank must 
be selected in each of the conjuncts, indicating that the expressions are ambiguous. 
Compare with (4) and (5), where the expressions neighbour and good may be distinctly 
specified in the two conjuncts (that is, so-called ‘crossed’ readings are allowable):  
(4) John is my neighbour and Sue is too. 
(5) The book is good and the cake is too. 
According to Kempson’s test, then, neighbour and good are not ambiguous but vague, 
and should thus be represented as single lexemes. 
Another type of linguistic test is ‘co-predication’, which is taken as a diagnostic 
of ambiguity if it gives rise to ‘zeugma’, that is, the oddity that results when two or more 
                                                      
7 A similar kind of linguistic test for ambiguity is the so-called identity test proposed by Zwicky and 
Sadock (1975). 
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terms are inappropriately linked (Cruse 1986, 2000; Pustejovsky 1995b; Copestake and 
Briscoe 1996). Consider (6) and (7): 
(6) ? Peter went to the bank to deposit money and to watch the riverboats. 
(7) ? Susan’s grandfather and driver’s license expired last week. 
According to this test, the fact that we perceive both these sentences as odd is indicative 
of the ambiguity of the expressions bank and expire. 
Finally, according to the definitional test, a word is ambiguous if more than a 
single definition is needed to account for its meaning. This type of test was originally 
proposed by Aristotle in Topics (Barnes 1984), and presupposes the classical view of 
word meanings, where these are represented in terms of necessary and sufficient 
features. For instance, while two distinct definitions are required to account for the two 
meanings of bank (‘financial institution’, ‘riverside’), and for the meanings of healthy 
above, there may be only one definition needed to account for the meaning of 
neighbour. As mentioned above, in contemporary linguistic theory this view is espoused 
most notably by proponents of the ‘natural semantic metalanguage’ (NSM) method of 
semantic analysis (e.g. Wierzbicka 1996). Goddard (2000: 132) describes the NSM 
method for establishing polysemy as follows:  
One assumes to begin with that there is but a single meaning, and attempts to 
state it in a clear and predictive fashion in the form of a translatable reductive 
paraphrase. Only if persistent efforts to do this fail is polysemy posited. The next 
hypothesis is that there are two distinct meanings, and attempts are made to 
state both in a clear and predictive fashion, and so the process goes, until the full 
range of application of the word can be captured within the specified range of 
senses.  
On this approach, then, a lexical form has no more meanings than the number of 
maximally general definitions that are required to account for its range of applications.8 
A problem with these three types of tests for ambiguity, as Geeraerts (1993) has 
demonstrated in detail, is that different tests may not always agree with each other, and 
that by manipulating the context, they can be made to yield inconsistent results. One of 
                                                      
8 A problem with the definitional test for ambiguity is that it rests on a view of lexical semantics that has 
been shown to be largely untenable. As I will return to the classical theory (as well as the problems 
associated with it) in more detail in the next chapter, I say no more about it here. 
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the examples Geeraerts discusses is the word newspaper, which is standardly seen as 
being ambiguous (polysemous) between the senses ‘printed object’ and ‘the 
management of the organisation that publishes the newspaper’. This word would be 
ambiguous according to the logical and definitional tests but not so according to the 
linguistic test:  
(8) The newspaper decided to change its print. 
The grammatical construction in (8) requires identity of reference between the subject 
of the VP ‘decided to change its print’, and the subject (PRO) of the infinitival 
complement ‘to change its print’. However, although in (8) newspaper is first used in its 
‘management of organisation’ sense and then in its ‘printed material’ sense, this does 
not affect the acceptability of the sentence and so no ambiguity would be predicted 
(Geeraerts 1993).  
Several authors have discussed examples of contextual influence on ambiguity 
tests. Consider the following instances of co-predication (Norrick 1981: 115): 
(9) a. ? Judy’s dissertation is thought provoking and yellowed with age. 
b. Judy’s dissertation is still thought provoking though yellowed with age. 
The sentence in (9)a., is zeugmatic, due to the use of dissertation to refer to 
informational content in the first conjunct, and to a material object in the second 
conjunct. However, when the sentence is slightly altered, as in (9)b., no zeugmatic effect 
occurs. Cruse (1986: 65-66) discusses a similar case, involving uses of the noun door:  
(10) a. The door was smashed in so many times it had to be bricked up. 
b. ? Billy took the door off its hinges and walked through it. 
Given that door is used to refer to different objects in the two conjuncts (‘door-panel’, 
‘doorway’), the sentence in (10)a. should be zeugmatic; yet no such effect is obtained. In 
contrast, the sentence in (10)b., which appears to involve the same alternation in 
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meaning for door as in (10)a., is clearly zeugmatic. Thus, co-predication does not seem 
to be a reliable test for the ambiguity of an expression.9 
Geeraerts’s (1993) examination of the three types of ambiguity tests described 
above leads him to reach the following conclusion: Instead of presupposing, as the use 
of these tests does, that there must be a ‘true’ criterion for distinguishing between 
ambiguity (polysemy) and vagueness, it might be that the distinction itself is unstable; 
that is, it might not be possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between ambiguity and 
vagueness. If this is so, he argues, it should have consequences for a theory of lexical 
meaning: 
The tremendous flexibility that we observe in lexical semantics suggests a 
procedural … rather than a reified conception of meaning; instead of meanings 
as things, meaning as a process of sense creation would seem to become our 
primary focus of attention. (Geeraerts 1993: 260) 
Geeraerts’s conclusion is in accord with the approach to polysemy that will be put 
forward in this thesis, insofar as it acknowledges the central role of processes of sense 
creation in giving rise to polysemy. In the next section, I consider briefly this connection 
between polysemy and the pragmatic adjustment of lexical meaning (‘lexical 
modulation’, ‘sense creation’), and sketch the broad outlines of my approach. 
1.4.3 Polysemy and lexical pragmatics 
So far, we have looked at the traditional distinctions between polysemy (related senses) 
and homonymy (unrelated senses), on the one hand, and ambiguity (two or more stored 
senses, including homonymy and conventional polysemy) and vagueness (a single sense 
subject to contextual specification), on the other hand. With regard to the first 
distinction, we saw that neither etymological considerations nor speaker intuitions 
provide satisfactory criteria for distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy. As to 
the second distinction, we saw that the number of tests proposed to distinguish between 
                                                      
9 However, Cruse himself is more optimistic about using co-predication as a diagnostic of ambiguity. He 
explains the difference between (10)a. and (10)b. in the following way: In (10)a., door is used in a ‘global 
door’ sense, which includes both the doorway and the door-panel, and this is what prevents the 
appearance of zeugma in this case. However, the presence of zeugma in (10)b. shows that the meanings of 
door are in actual fact distinct. Therefore, Cruse concludes, in applying the co-predication test we should 
try to avoid contexts such as (10)a., which may lead us to draw a wrong conclusion as to whether or not a 
lexical item is ambiguous. 
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ambiguity (homonymy and conventional polysemy) and vagueness did not yield clear-
cut results. An important reason for this was the contextual influence on these tests, 
reflecting the fact that any lexical item, whether monosemous, homonymous or 
polysemous, may have its meaning modulated on a particular occasion of use by the 
linguistic or non-linguistic context in which it occurs. Consider (11)-(16): 
(11) Mary opened the shoebox. (‘performed the kind of action that causes a shoebox 
to become open’) 
(12) I didn’t get enough units. (‘university credit modules’) 
(13) The steak is raw. (‘grossly undercooked’) 
(14) My ex-wife is a ghost to me now. (‘distant memory’) 
(15) John just phoned the bank. She is willing to support him. (‘John’s mother’) 
(16) The violin is in a bad mood today. (‘The violin player’) 
In (11), the verb open expresses the specific action one performs when opening a 
shoebox, which is different from the kind of action involved, for instance, in opening a 
pair of curtains or a dishwasher. It seems unlikely that the lexicon should encode such 
fine-grained distinctions, when they can easily be inferred from the context; thus, the 
use of open above appears to be a case of contextual modification of lexical meaning. In 
(12) the noun units is used to communicate ‘university credit modules’, an 
interpretation clearly not derivable from the linguistic context. In (13), where the 
adjective raw is used to convey that the steak is grossly undercooked, we seem to have a 
case of (extra-linguistic) contextual modulation of the conventional ‘uncooked’ 
meaning of the adjective. The examples in (14) and (15) are both instances of 
metaphorical uses of a noun; in (14) ghost is used to communicate something along the 
lines of a ‘distant memory’, while (15) contains a highly creative (metaphoric) use of the 
noun phrase the bank to refer to John’s mother, derived on the basis of the encoded 
‘financial institution’ sense of this word. The use of the violin to refer to the player of the 
violin in (16) is a case of a metonymic use of a word, where the metonymic meaning is 
derived on the basis of a contextually salient relation holding between the conventional 
and the metonymic denotations. 
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There is no doubt that such pragmatic adjustment of lexical meanings plays a 
central role in giving rise to polysemy. In fact, leaving the metaphoric and metonymic 
uses above aside, the kind of contextual modulation of encoded lexical meanings 
involved in the uses of open, unit and raw above is often described as a kind of 
polysemy. For instance, Sperber and Wilson (1998) discuss the range of meanings that 
the verb open may be used to express as an instance of polysemy. Other scholars may see 
open as an instance of vagueness, or indeterminacy of meaning, as described above, and 
restrict the term ‘polysemy’ to cases where the related senses of a lexical form are 
(hypothesised to be) encoded.  
In this thesis, my aim is to investigate the close connection that exists between 
the cases commonly discussed under the heading ‘polysemy’ in the literature, and cases 
of on-line contextual modulation of meanings due to pragmatic processes operating at 
the level of individual words. More specifically, I will develop a pragmatic account of 
polysemy within the framework of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; 
Carston 2002b). The argument presented in this thesis is that polysemy is a 
fundamentally communicative phenomenon, which arises (mainly) as a result of 
encoded lexical concepts being massively underdetermining of speaker intended 
concepts, as illustrated by the examples in (11)-(16), and grounded in our pragmatic 
inferential capacity. As mentioned above, while most accounts of polysemy either take it 
to be a linguistically driven phenomenon or, as in cognitive linguistic frameworks, a 
result of how cognitive categories are structured quite generally, this thesis provides a 
novel perspective on the phenomenon by highlighting its communicative aspect, which 
is claimed to be essential to its development and proliferation in language. The specific 
pragmatic processes responsible for the construction of occasion-specific lexical 
meanings have recently been described in much detail in the relevance-theoretic 
framework (Carston 1997, 2002b; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson and Carston 2006, 
2007). This thesis endorses the account of lexical pragmatic processes proposed by 
relevance theory, and shows how it can be used to account for the construction (and the 
subsequent establishment) of polysemous senses for a lexical item. The thesis extends 
the relevance-theoretic analysis by developing an account of instances of systematic 
polysemy and metonymically derived polysemy, previously unexplored within the 
relevance-theoretic approach to lexical pragmatics. 
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Throughout this thesis, I will operate with a broad notion of polysemy, using it 
as a cover term for conventional polysemy (which nonetheless, arguably, has a 
pragmatic basis) and cases of clearly context-dependent, hence pragmatically derived, 
lexical meanings. Thus, this will include the cases of vagueness described as 
‘indeterminacy of meaning’ (e.g. open, good), but exclude those cases of vagueness that 
involve a ‘lack of specification’ (e.g. cousin, neighbour, teacher, etc.), in which the 
contextual specification does not seem to involve an actual modulation of the encoded 
meaning. In cases where it is relevant, I will operate with an intuitive distinction 
between conventional (i.e. ‘encoded’, ‘semantic’) polysemy and contextually-derived 
polysemy, acknowledging that there may be no clear-cut way of drawing this 
distinction. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, I address the problem of polysemy representation, as described above. I 
consider several influential approaches to word meaning and assess their implications 
for polysemy representation. I also discuss some relatively recent psycholinguistic 
studies that apply experimental methods in order to glean evidence from on-line 
processing that may bear on the question of whether polysemous lexical items are 
represented as multiple or single entries in the lexicon. In Chapter 3, I consider the 
problem of polysemy motivation. I take a pragmatic approach to polysemy and argue 
that it is, at the deepest level, a consequence of how communication works; it results 
from our capacity to infer speaker meanings on the basis of not fully determining 
linguistic evidence. In Chapter 4, I address the nature of the pragmatic processes that 
are involved in the construction of polysemy. I outline the relevance-theoretic approach 
to lexical pragmatics (e.g. Carston 2002b; Wilson and Carston 2007), according to 
which there is a single pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction that can adjust 
the meanings of individual words in different directions and show how it can account 
for the construction of polysemy during utterance comprehension. Chapter 5 is devoted 
to a discussion of so-called systematic polysemy (e.g. count-mass alternations such as 
‘The chicken pecked the ground’/’We had chicken in bean sauce for dinner’), which is 
usually taken as a prime case of linguistically generated polysemy. My main claim with 
regard to such cases is that, although they clearly have a linguistic component, the 
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contribution of the linguistic system to their generation and interpretation is less central 
than is often thought. In the final Chapter 6, I consider the process of lexical meaning 
extension referred to as metonymy, and discuss two possible directions for a relevance-
theoretic account of this phenomenon. 
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Chapter	  2 	  
LEXICAL	  SEMANTICS	  AND	  POLYSEMY:	  THE	  PROBLEM	  OF	  
REPRESENTATION	  
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that one component of the so-called polysemy paradox 
was the issue of how polysemous lexical items are represented in the mental lexicon, 
which we called the problem of representation. This will be the topic of the present 
chapter. 
There are broadly two ways in which one might approach this problem. The 
question of how polysemy is mentally represented is intrinsically connected to the more 
general question of what word meanings are, and, specifically, what kind of mental 
representation is encoded by a lexical form. A fundamental debate in lexical semantics is 
whether word meanings decompose into smaller units of meaning, and, if so, how 
(lexical decomposition approaches), or whether word meanings are unstructured atoms 
(non-decompositional approaches). Thus, one way to approach the problem of 
polysemy representation is to situate it within the larger context of this debate between 
decompositionalists and non-decompositionalists. A widely held view among 
decompositionalists is that in order to capture meaning relations between words (e.g. 
synonymy, analyticity, entailment) word meanings must consist of complex 
representations, and some scholars further think that this is also required in order to 
handle polysemy (Jackendoff 1992b, 2002; Murphy 2002; Vicente and Martínez 
Manrique 2008, 2010). As the psychologist Gregory Murphy writes:  
The fact that people use words like paper to refer to a substance, a copy of a daily 
publication, and an editorial policy means that the word’s representation must 
be complex. (Murphy 2002: 413).  
Another way to approach the problem of polysemy representation is from the 
perspective of the overall structure of the mental lexicon. As I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it is widely agreed that the meanings of a homonymous word form (e.g. bank) 
are represented as separate entries in the lexicon. Some scholars, most notably within 
the field of psycholinguistics, have therefore asked whether this is also the case for 
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polysemous lexical items, or if they should rather be seen as being represented as single 
entries in the mental lexicon (and the different meanings derived on the basis of lexical 
rules or pragmatic procedures). Based on these two options, lexical semantic theories of 
polysemy representation are often divided into two types (as we saw in the previous 
chapter): (i) sense enumeration lexicons (e.g. Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz 1972; Weinreich 
1966; Lakoff 1987; Brugman 1988; Taylor 1989/2003), and (ii) core meaning approaches 
(Caramazza and Grober 1976; Allerton 1979; Ruhl 1989; Pustejovsky 1995a). As we are 
going to see, this is a very crude distinction, but it nevertheless singles out a question 
that arises largely independently of the debate concerning the internal representation of 
lexical meanings (or senses), and, in principle, whose answer might be compatible with 
both decompositional and non-decompositional approaches to lexical semantic 
representation.  
The chapter will be organised in the following way. In the first part I discuss 
some influential decompositional approaches to word meaning, and assess their 
implications for polysemy representation (section 2.2). In the second part I discuss 
Fodor’s (1998) non-decompositional approach, and consider the possibilities for 
accounting for polysemy within this framework (section 2.3). On the basis of the 
accounts reviewed in this chapter, I argue that a conceptual atomist approach, which 
treats word meanings as unstructured atoms, may be at least as able as decompositional 
approaches to account for polysemy when paired with an adequate pragmatic theory. In 
the final part of the chapter I discuss some relatively recent psycholinguistic studies that 
address the question of whether polysemous words are represented as multiple or single 
entries in the mental lexicon (section 2.4). 
2.2 Lexical decomposition approaches 
By far the majority view in linguistics is that most word meanings decompose into 
smaller units of meaning. There is, however, considerable variation as to how the 
internal structure of word meanings is conceived, whether it is taken to consist in, e.g., a 
definition, a prototype structure or semantic network, an underspecified template or a 
partial definition. In this section, I consider some of these approaches in more detail, as 
well as the implications of each of them for polysemy representation. 
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2.2.1 The classical theory 
The classical theory of concepts, traceable back to at least the time of Socrates,10 takes 
lexical semantic representations to be constituted by definitions. The definition of a 
complex concept C specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for something in the 
world to be a C. This kind of approach divides the lexicon into definable (complex) 
terms, on the one hand, and a set of primitives, on the other hand, typically acquired 
through the senses.11 The primitives form the inventory from which complex concepts 
are constructed, on the basis of a set of combinatorial processes (conjunction, negation, 
etc.). The paradigmatic classical concept is encoded by the word bachelor, and can be 
defined as follows: 
(1) [¬MARRIED & MALE & HUMAN & ADULT] 
Each of the conjuncts in (1) is a necessary condition for a thing in the world to be a 
bachelor, and jointly they are sufficient, so that anything that meets all of these 
conditions is indeed a bachelor and anything that does not is not a bachelor. 
A great advantage of the classical theory is that it appears to have considerable 
explanatory power. For one thing, it provides a natural explanation of categorisation, 
reference determination and concept acquisition, all of which are explained in terms of 
lexical semantic representations having definitional structure: Categorisation is a matter 
of checking whether the set of necessary and sufficient conditions specified by the 
definition of a concept is indeed satisfied by an object, a concept refers to the things that 
satisfy its definition, and acquiring a concept involves learning its definition. For 
another, it captures our intuitions about semantic relations, including synonymy (e.g. of 
bachelor and unmarried man), ‘analytic’ inferences (i.e. inferences drawn solely on the 
                                                      
10 Cf., for instance, Socrates’s search for the definition of mud (which he ends up deciding is ‘earth mixed 
with water’) in Plato’s (1987) Theaetetus. Cf. also the works of Aristotle (Barnes 1984), mentioned in the 
previous chapter. 
11 On strictly empiricist versions of the classical theory, the concepts occurring in a definition should 
ultimately decompose into basic, perceptual or sensory concepts, following Leibniz’s (1996 [1765]) 
‘Empiricist Maxim’, stating that there is nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses. More 
recent manifestations of this view are found in Wierzbicka (1996) and Prinz (2002). 
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basis of the meanings of the words used, e.g. John is a bachelor → John is unmarried),12 
and entailment (e.g., on the assumption that the definition of kill is CAUSE TO DIE, it 
explains informally valid arguments of the type John killed Harry → Harry died). 
There are two main options for describing polysemy within a framework based 
on the classical assumptions about word meanings: (i) the meaning of a polysemous 
lexical item is represented as a single (abstract) definition, and the different senses are 
contextually determined (the 'monosemy view', cf. Allerton 1979; Ruhl 1989); and (ii) 
each meaning of a polysemous word is associated with its own set of necessary and 
sufficient application conditions (Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz 1972; Wierzbicka 1996; 
Goddard 2000). The most influential of these has undoubtedly been (ii), largely due to 
the pioneering work in lexical semantics by Jerrold Katz (1972; Katz and Fodor 1963; 
Katz and Postal 1964), which I consider below. 
Katz’s semantic theory 
Katz’s semantic theory (Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz and Postal 1964; Katz 1972) is a 
modern linguistic embodiment of the classical theory. Katz’s primary aim was to 
provide a theory of natural language semantics that was able to explain semantic 
relations and contrasts between word meanings (e.g. synonymy, antonymy, 
contradiction, analyticity, entailment, etc.), and the relation between word meanings 
and sentence meanings, in a description of the ‘semantic component’ of the grammar. 
In his view, the only way to achieve this was by means of lexical decomposition of the 
sort provided by the classical theory.  
On Katz’s (1972: 36) account, the semantic component of the grammar is seen as 
containing (i) a dictionary, comprising a list of the meanings of the words in the 
language; and (ii) a set of projection rules, reflecting the speaker’s ability to construct 
sentence meanings from word meanings. The dictionary lists under a single lexical entry 
the different senses of a word (which together constitute the meaning of that word), 
                                                      
12 In this case, principles of valid inference are taken to apply to the semantic representation and not to 
the (surface) form of the sentence, and so this argument has the underlying form John is a man and 
unmarried. So John is unmarried, and is a case of conjunction elimination (p & q → q).  
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each of which can be broken down into semantic markers (or primitives), as in Katz and 
Fodor’s (1963: 198) suggestion for the dictionary entry for the noun ball:13                                     
(2) ball  
1. Ball → Noun concrete → (Social activity) → (Large) → (Assembly) → [For 
the purpose of social dancing] 
2. Ball → Noun concrete → (Physical Object) → [Having globular shape] 
3. Ball → Noun concrete → (Physical object) → [Solid missile for projection by 
engine of war] 
On Katz’s theory, the noun ball is (at least) three ways ambiguous. When put into 
linguistic context, the projection rules operate to disambiguate its meaning, by 
amalgamating the features of the different senses of the word with those of other words 
in the surrounding linguistic context to check which features are compatible and which 
are not. Thus, an NP such as large ball would retain the three-way ambiguity, metal ball 
would exclude the reading of ball as a social activity, while sponge ball would be fully 
disambiguating, only picking out the second reading according to which ball refers to a 
physical object having globular shape. 
Katz’s theory is a prime example of a sense enumeration lexicon, where different 
senses of a lexical item are listed under a single dictionary entry. As shown by the 
dictionary entry for ball in (2) above, a single entry may contain both polysemous and 
homonymous readings of a lexical item. While the second and third senses of ball are 
polysemous (the ‘globular shaped object’ and ‘type of missile’ senses), the first sense 
(where ball means ‘social activity’) is homonymous with both of them. Katz (1972: 69) 
suggested that the distinction between homonymy and polysemy could be drawn on the 
basis of the notion of ‘semantic similarity’. According to his definition (1972: 48), two 
constituents are similar (on a sense) if they have a semantic marker in common. 
Applying this to the dictionary entry for ball, we see that the polysemous senses under 2. 
and 3. share the semantic marker (Physical Object), and are thus similar according to 
the definition. Moreover, neither of them shares any semantic markers with the 
                                                      
13 The semantic markers are given in parentheses. The square brackets indicate what Katz and Fodor 
(1963: 187) called ‘distinguishers’, which were supposed to reflect idiosyncratic aspects of word meanings.  
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homonymous sense in 1. However, although it might work to distinguish polysemy 
from homonymy in this particular case, semantic similarity does not seem to be an 
adequate diagnostic of polysemy, as there would arguably be a number of instances of 
homonymy which exhibit semantic similarity as well (e.g. the homonymous senses of 
the noun file, ‘folder or box’ and ‘tool’ would also share the semantic marker (Physical 
Object)), and there are polysemous senses which do not share any semantic markers at 
all (as shown by Katz’s dictionary entry for the adjective handsome (ibid. 43)). So, unlike 
the other cases of semantic relations (for instance, synonymy, antonymy, analyticity and 
entailment) that can be ‘read off’ elegantly from the theory by means of sameness, 
overlap or incompatibility of semantic markers contained in the semantic 
representations of words, it appears that polysemy (and ultimately the distinction 
between polysemy and homonymy) is not so easily accounted for this way. Thus, it 
appears that, at least in the particular version of lexical decomposition that Katz was 
offering, there would be little support for the claim that lexical decomposition is a 
requirement for a proper treatment of polysemy.14  
In addition to the more specific problems concerning polysemy and homonymy 
representation in Katz’s theory, philosophers have pointed out a number of more 
general problems related to the view that words meanings can be given in terms of 
necessary and sufficient application conditions, which, taken together, have made it 
nearly impossible to maintain the classical theory as an account of lexical semantic 
representation. Some of them are considered below. 15 
Problems with the classical theory 
Perhaps the most basic problem for the classical theory is that there are in fact very few 
words or concepts that have proper definitions, referred to as Plato’s Problem (Laurence 
and Margolis 1999: 14). Two and a half millennia of philosophical investigations into 
the meanings of various important concepts such as KNOWLEDGE, JUSTICE, GOODNESS, 
                                                      
14 A further problematic aspect of Katz’s dictionary entries is that they list homonymous senses under 
single lexical entries (cf. the dictionary entry for ball), suggesting that this is also how such senses are 
psychologically represented (although, given Katz’s (1981) Platonist view of language, it is not clear that 
he is committed to this view). This would run counter to the widely accepted view that homonymous 
senses are psychologically represented as distinct lexical entries. 
15 Much of what I will have to say in the next section is based on the excellent discussion of the classical 
theory in Laurence and Margolis (1999). 
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TRUTH and BEAUTY have shown that it is notoriously difficult to come by definitions that 
capture all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept (not 
to mention the increase in difficulty if these have to be given in a vocabulary of sensory 
or perceptual terms), and so bachelor and a few other clearly definable concepts may be 
exceptional rather than typical. For most concepts, it appears that it is only possible to 
specify some necessary conditions, a point which is particularly clear in the case of 
natural kind terms. As pointed out by J. D. Fodor et al. (1975), for a colour term like red, 
the property COLOUR is a necessary condition for something to be red, but there is no 
property (other than the property RED itself) with which the property COLOUR can 
combine in order to provide a definition of red.16 For other concepts, there may not even 
be any clearly necessary conditions, as shown by Wittgenstein’s (1953, sections 65-78) 
discussion of game (e.g. board-games, card-games, ball-games, etc.): There is probably 
no property that the range of phenomena falling under the concept GAME have in 
common.17 
A related argument that has been advanced against definitional accounts of word 
meaning is that, even for apparently definable terms, definitions appear to be 
psychologically irrelevant. For instance, according to the definitional approach, a 
sentence such as ‘John is a bachelor’ should be representationally more complex than the 
corresponding sentence ‘John is unmarried’, since the definition of unmarried is a 
                                                      
16 J. A. Fodor and colleagues (Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975; Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 1970, 1981) have 
provided a range of arguments against definitional approaches to lexical semantic representation (and, 
more recently, against decompositional approaches more generally, cf. Fodor 1998; Fodor and Lepore 
2002)). In particular, their arguments were directed at definitional analyses of causative verbs (McCawley 
1968; Lakoff 1970, 1976; Faarlund 1978), which, in the early days of generative (transformational) 
grammar were treated as being represented by two events at the deep structure level (e.g. kill was 
represented as CAUSE TO DIE, paint as CAUSE TO BECOME COVERED IN PAINT, etc.). This made it possible to 
account for adverb scope ambiguities of the type ‘John almost killed Harry’ in terms of the adverb 
modifying both events (long scope), giving rise to the interpretation that John almost brought about 
Harry’s death, or only the second event (short scope), giving rise to the interpretation that John brought it 
about that Harry almost died. What Fodor and colleagues convincingly showed was that the causal 
subcomponents that are clearly entailed by such causative verbs are only necessary application 
conditions, i.e. one-way entailments, rather than the two-way entailment relations required by 
definitions. In other words, every case of killing is indeed a case of causing to die, but not every case of 
causing to die is a case of killing (Fodor 1970). 
17 Rather, Wittgenstein notes, the various activities subsumed under this label are “related to one another 
in many different ways” (1953: section 67). He introduces the term ‘family resemblances’ to characterise 
this situation. Various types of games form a family, and so the word game can be seen as giving access to 
a ‘family of meanings’. This idea became central to the later developments of ‘prototype theory’ (Rosch 
and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1999 [1978]), which I return to in section 2.2.2. 
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proper part of the definition of bachelor. However, this prediction is not supported by 
the available experimental evidence, which suggests that definitions do not affect 
processing (Kintsch 1974; Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975; Fodor et al. 1980; de Almeida 
1999).18 
A further problem for the classical theory is the vagueness of many concepts, 
which may pose difficulties in categorisation. For instance, does a carpet belong to the 
category of furniture or to some other category? The classical theory does not allow for 
such indeterminacy in category membership, nor does it allow for indeterminacy in our 
knowledge about category membership (that is, that we may be uncertain as to whether 
something belongs to a category or not). A related problem is that it is possible to have a 
concept in spite of being ignorant or mistaken about the properties we take its instances 
to have. For instance, although there are many people who think that whales are a kind 
of fish, the fact that they are mistaken about this does not mean that they do not have 
the concept WHALE. 
The appeal of the classical theory has been largely owing to its ability to account 
for semantic relations, and analytic inferences in particular. However, Fodor et al. 
(1980) have shown that there are several cases of informally valid arguments whose 
validity cannot be reconstructed by reference to definitions. For instance, on the 
assumption that kill can be defined as CAUSE TO DIE, there is no rule of standard logic 
that guarantees the validity of the inference from John caused Harry to die to Harry died. 
In fact, it appears to rely on a further (non-standard) inference rule that allows for the 
elimination of the causal element in the definition (CAUSE P → P).19 Furthermore, the 
very idea that there are statements that are analytic, that is, statements that are true a 
                                                      
18 There is another psychological fact that goes against the classical theory as concerns its account of 
lexical acquisition, called the ‘basic-level advantage’ (Rosch et al. 1976). Children have been shown to 
acquire the words for basic, middle-level concepts (e.g. DOG) before the words for more general, 
superordinate concepts (e.g. ANIMAL) and those for more specific, subordinate concepts (e.g. POODLE) 
(Brown 1958; Rosch et al. 1976; Horton and Markman 1980; Bloom 2000). This fact does not mesh well 
with the idea that learning a concept involves learning its definition: For instance, in order to acquire a 
(basic-level) concept such as DOG, the child has to already have the (superordinate) concept ANIMAL, as 
this concept would be part of its definition. 
19 Fodor’s suggestion, then, was that instead of treating our intuitions about analytic inferences as resting 
on underlying definitions, they could be accounted for in terms of inference rules (or meaning postulates) 
attached to concepts (Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 1981). On this view, the inference from John killed Harry to 
Harry died would rely on stipulated inference rules attached to the concept KILL (KILL → CAUSE TO DIE) 
and CAUSE (CAUSE P → P). I return to the issue of meaning postulates in section 2.3 in the discussion of 
conceptual atomism. 
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priori, has come under serious attack, in particular by Quine (1999 [1953]). On Quine’s 
view, it is impossible to determine in advance of empirical investigation the conditions 
under which a particular statement would be confirmed, nor is any statement immune 
to revision. Thus, it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between those 
inferences that are content-constitutive (analytic, a priori) and those that are merely 
contingent (synthetic, a posteriori). If Quine is right about there being no such thing as 
an analytic statement, this would undermine the whole basis for the classical theory, 
which is built on the assumption of the existence of analytic relations between concepts. 
Finally, the psychological evidence for so-called typicality effects seems hard to 
reconcile with the classical theory. There is a robust body of experimental results 
showing that people have little difficulty ranking items with respect to how ‘typical’ 
members of a category they are (Rosch 1973, 1999 [1978]; Rips, Shoben, and Smith 
1973; Rosch and Mervis 1975). For instance, a robin is considered to be a more typical 
member of the category BIRD than a chicken, or an ostrich, is. Such typicality effects 
have been found to correlate with speed of categorisation (typical members are 
categorised faster than non-typical members) and error rates (the more typical a 
member of a category, the less errors people make in categorising it). However, if 
category membership is a matter of satisfying a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, there is no reason to assume that all members should not be on equal 
footing, or that certain members should be faster, or easier to categorise, than others. 
Thus, typicality effects raise serious explanatory problems for the classical theory. 
2.2.2 Prototypes, cognitive semantics and polysemy 
The label ‘prototype theory’ describes a set of theories that build on the assumption that 
categories exhibit typicality effects (Rosch 1973, 1975a, 1975b; Rosch and Mervis 1975; 
Smith, Shoben, and Rips 1974; Osherson and Smith 1981; Smith and Medin 1981). On 
this view, rather than being represented as necessary and sufficient conditions, most 
concepts are structured in terms of ‘prototypes’; based on a statistical analysis of the 
properties (features) that the members of a category tend to have.20 Something falls 
                                                      
20 The notion of a ‘prototype’ is used in (at least) two ways; as describing, for a given category (e.g. BIRD), 
(i) sets of features (e.g. has wings, flies, lays eggs, sings, is of such and such a size, colour, shape, etc.) (cf. 
Rosch 1975a), or (ii) exemplars (e.g. robins as best examples of birds) (cf. Smith and Medin 1981). 
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under a concept if it satisfies a sufficient number of features, where some features may 
be weighed more significantly than others. For instance, a robin is a member of the 
category BIRD by satisfying a large number of the features determined by this category, 
e.g. ‘has wings’, ‘flies’, ‘nests in trees’, ‘sings’, etc. (and hence is a typical instance of the 
category). A peacock, although satisfying less of them, still satisfies a sufficient number 
of features for it to belong to the category BIRD (and hence is a less typical instance of the 
category). In this way, prototype theory avoids the problems that the classical theory 
faced concerning the lack of definitions and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Typicality 
effects can be explained in terms of a member’s similarity to the prototype of a category 
(Rosch and Mervis 1975).21 On this approach, category membership is a matter of 
degree; there are more or less typical members, better and poorer examples of a 
category, and the boundaries between categories are not necessarily clear-cut. 
Prototype semantics 
In linguistics, the prototype approach to categorisation has formed the basis for many 
accounts of word meaning and of polysemy, in particular within the cognitive linguistics 
paradigm (e.g. Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1987; Brugman 1988; Brugman and Lakoff 1988; 
Taylor 1989/2003; Geeraerts 1997). In an early account, Fillmore (1982) suggested 
treating word meanings as being represented as ‘semantic prototypes’, which could be 
realised in several different ways. For instance, he took the meaning of the verb climb to 
be composed of the disjunction of two mutually compatible conditions, ‘clambering’ 
and ‘ascending’. In its prototypical uses, both conditions are satisfied (e.g. a person 
climbing up a rock wall), while in less central uses only one of the conditions may be 
present (e.g. a gecko climbing up a wall (no clambering), or a cat climbing down a tree 
(no ascending)).22 In other cases, there is a disjunction of two conditions, but one of 
them has a more privileged status, and is satisfied in prototypical uses (e.g. the adjective 
                                                      
21 It has been noted that typicality effects do not in themselves provide evidence for concepts being 
structured in terms of prototypes, as even apparently well-defined categories may exhibit typicality 
effects. For instance, in a series of experiments, Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1999 [1983]) found 
that subjects judged the number 7 to be a better example of the category ODD NUMBER than, e.g., the 
number 57, and that a housewife was a better example of the category FEMALE than were both waitress 
and comedienne. They concluded that there cannot be any incompatibility between the definability of a 
concepts and its having a prototype structure. 
22 See Coleman and Kay (1981) for a similar analysis of the verb lie. 
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long, where the spatial sense is privileged over the temporal sense). Thus, the polysemy 
of long is captured in the semantic representation of this word. In yet other cases, the 
meaning of a word consists in a fixed set of conditions (e.g. bird), and the most 
prototypical examples are those that satisfy the most conditions; the ones that come 
close to an idealisation of the category (e.g. robins) (cf. Rosch 1975a).  
A widely discussed objection to prototype semantics as it is manifested in 
Fillmore’s early approach, as well as against prototype theory as a theory of concepts 
more generally, is its inability to account for the composition of complex concepts 
(Fodor 1998; Fodor and Lepore 2002). The issue is not whether typicality effects are 
psychologically real or not (there are few scholars who would dispute that) but what role 
(if any) they should play in a semantic theory. The compositionality problem for 
prototype theory is that the meaning of a complex concept is generally not a complex 
prototype built up from the prototypes of its constituents. For instance, while a guppy 
may be a prototypical instance of the category PET FISH, it is not a prototypical instance 
of either the category PET or the category FISH. Several sophisticated suggestions have 
been made for ways to account for conceptual combination within prototype theory 
(Osherson and Smith 1981; Smith and Osherson 1984; Smith et al. 1999 [1988]; 
Huttenlocher and Hedges 1994; Kamp and Partee 1995), most of which, however, seem 
to be able to handle only a very limited range of data. Moreover, a range of further 
problems have been pointed out with prototype theory as a theory of conceptual 
representation, including the lack of prototypes for many concepts (e.g. THE NORWEGIAN 
PRESIDENT, NEW SPECIES, BELIEF), the possibility of having a concept without knowing its 
prototype (e.g. someone could have the concept THE WORKS OF VIRGINIA WOOLF without 
knowing any of the properties associated with it), and the difficulty of providing an 
adequate account of reference determination, in that concepts with prototype structure 
may fail to cover atypical instances (e.g. a zebra without stripes) and incorrectly include 
non-instances (e.g. dingoes and wolves could fall under the category DOG). 
In view of these problems, it seems clear that an adequate theory of lexical 
semantics cannot be based on prototype structure alone. Indeed, some scholars have 
proposed a ‘dual theory’ of concepts, where concepts are composed of a classical core 
(i.e. a definition) plus an optional identification function with prototype structure (e.g. 
Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman 1999 [1983]). Lakoff (1999 [1987]), on the other 
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hand, has claimed that the very idea that categories are structured in terms of prototypes 
is a wide-spread misunderstanding of prototype theory.23 Instead, he argues, typicality 
effects are surface phenomena, and result from the organisation of knowledge in terms 
of so-called ‘idealised cognitive models’. Lakoff’s theory of knowledge representation, 
with its account of word meaning and polysemy, has been immensely influential within 
the cognitive linguistics framework, and we will spend the rest of this section looking at 
this approach.  
Radial categories and polysemy 
In Lakoff’s (1987) framework, idealised cognitive models (ICMs) are relatively stable 
mental structures that represent theories about the world with respect to a particular 
domain, and which guide categorisation and reasoning. They are ‘idealised’ in the sense 
that they are abstractions across a range of experiences, and may give rise to typicality 
effects in several different ways. The simplest type of prototype effect is illustrated by the 
concept BACHELOR (Lakoff 1987: 70-71). For instance, the ICM with respect to which a 
bachelor is defined includes information about the institution of marriage, a typical 
marriageable age, etc. The concept BACHELOR itself is not a graded category (either a 
man is unmarried or he isn’t), but against the background conditions specified by the 
ICM, some unmarried men may be considered typical bachelors, some less typical 
bachelors (e.g. the Pope). A second source of typicality effects is so-called ‘cluster 
concepts’, consisting of a combination of number of individual ICMs, illustrated by the 
concept MOTHER (Lakoff 1987: 74). A mother could be the person who gives birth (THE 
BIRTH MODEL), the female adult who nurtures and raises a child (THE NURTURANCE 
MODEL), the wife of the father (THE MARITAL MODEL), etc. More than one of these 
conditions may characterise a mother, and any one of them can be absent from such a 
characterisation. Typicality effects arise when one of the submodels is viewed as 
primary.24 In addition, Lakoff claims, the concept MOTHER is an instance of a ‘radial 
category’ where there is a central subcategory (the cluster concept, including the birth 
                                                      
23 In fact, Rosch (1999 [1978]: 200) herself had warned against this misunderstanding of the notion of a 
prototype for a category: “to speak of a prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is 
really referred to are judgements of degree of prototypicality. … Prototypes do not constitute a theory of 
representation of categories.” 
24 Lakoff (1987: Chapter 4) further identifies ‘metonymic models’ as a way in which typicality effects may 
arise on the basis of ICMs. I return to this issue in Chapter 6.  
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model, the nurturance model, etc.), combined with a set of non-central extensions, or 
variants, of the central category (e.g. adoptive mother, stepmother, surrogate mother, 
etc.) (ibid. 83-84). Rather than being generated by the central subcategory, the variants 
are extended by convention from the central category (i.e. they must be learned), on the 
basis of general principles of extension. 
The notion of radial categories forms the basis for Lakoff’s account of polysemy 
(Lakoff 1987; Brugman 1988; Brugman and Lakoff 1988), which has inspired a host of 
studies of polysemy within the strand of linguistics known as ‘cognitive semantics’. On 
this approach, which takes linguistic categories to be no different from other kinds of 
conceptual categories, most word meanings are seen as a type of radial category in 
which the different senses of a word are organised with respect to a prototypical sense. 
The paradigmatic example is the preposition over, first discussed by Brugman (1988): 
(3) a. The bird flew over the house. (‘above and across’)  
b. The painting is over the couch. (‘above’) 
c. The truck ran over the rabbit. (‘across’) 
d. Sarah lives over the hill. (‘on the other side’) 
e. Mary nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. (‘covering’) 
f. I will read the papers over the weekend. (‘temporal’) 
g. John has a strange power over Mary. (‘control’) 
The idea is that over constitutes a radial category composed of a range of distinct but 
related senses, organised around the prototypical, or central, sense (which Brugman 
(1988) and Lakoff (1987) take to be the ‘above and across’ sense in (3)a.), in a lexical 
network structure.25 The different senses of over exhibit typicality effects; more typical 
senses are located ‘closer’ to the prototypical sense in the network, while less typical 
senses are located in its periphery. Such peripheral senses are derived from more typical 
senses by a set of cognitive principles for meaning extension (e.g. 'conceptual 
metaphors', cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980), giving rise to meaning chains (e.g. sense A is 
related to sense B in virtue of some shared attribute(s), sense B is related to sense C, 
                                                      
25 A slightly different, albeit similar manifestation of the network model of polysemy representation is 
given by Langacker (1988). For reasons of space, I cannot get into the details of his approach here. 
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which is related to sense D, and so on). For instance, the ‘control’ sense in (3)g. is seen as 
being derived from the ‘above’ sense in (3)b. on the basis of the metaphorical schema 
CONTROL IS UP, LACK OF CONTROL IS DOWN (Lakoff 1987). Sense relations, then, concern, 
in the first instance, adjacent members of the category, while members that are only 
indirectly connected in the semantic network may be very different in semantic 
content.26  
A central aspect of Lakoff and Brugman’s cognitive semantic approach is that 
radial categories such as that associated with over are stored in the long-term semantic 
memory of speakers. This means that the different senses associated with a polysemous 
lexical form are taken to be conventional, rather than generated on the basis of a 
linguistic or pragmatic mechanism. In this respect, the radial category account of 
polysemy is a radical version of the type of approach we referred to above as sense 
enumeration lexicons, in that the full range of senses are taken to be stored as part of a 
semantic network (hence, it is sometimes referred to as the 'full-specification approach' 
to lexical semantics, cf. Evans and Green 2006). A common criticism of the full-
specification approach is that it entails a (potentially) indefinite proliferation of mentally 
stored senses in order to cover the range of uses of lexical forms (for instance, Brugman 
(1988) identifies nearly a hundred different uses of over). In addition to the consequence 
of an enormous demand on the storage capacity of the language user, this account fails 
to distinguish between those aspects of meaning that are part of the word meaning 
proper and those that result from its interaction with the context, a problem that is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘polysemy fallacy’ (Sandra 1998). Indeed, the polysemy 
account of Lakoff and Brugman appears to ignore the contribution of pragmatics to the 
derivation of word senses altogether. A further criticism against the sense network 
accounts is their lack of methodological constraints in postulating different senses of a 
word. Sandra (1998: 370-371) writes: 
When looking at such [semantic network] analyses one has the strong 
impression that many of the distinctions are unnecessary – at least the authors 
typically do not provide proof, linguistic or other, of the necessity for making 
                                                      
26 Thus, Wittgenstein’s (1953) metaphor ‘family resemblance’ (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975) is often used to 
describe such polysemous categories within the cognitive linguistics framework (Taylor 1989/2003). 
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their distinctions. One can only conclude that the analysis reflects the particular 
approach of the individual linguist and that different linguists would probably 
come up with different analyses at different points in time. 
More recently, several scholars working within the cognitive linguistics paradigm have 
taken a more moderate approach to polysemy, acknowledging the context dependency 
of word meanings (Tyler and Evans 2001, 2003; Allwood 2003; Zlatev 2003; Evans 2005, 
2009; Taylor 2006). In particular, Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003) have developed an 
account of polysemy that, while espousing the Lakoff-Brugman idea that polysemous 
senses are represented in terms of sense networks centred around a prototypical sense, 
proposes a set of criteria that makes it possible (i) to determine whether a particular 
sense of a word counts as a distinct sense; and (ii) to establish the central sense of a 
polysemous lexical item. This account, termed ‘the Principled Polysemy approach’ by its 
authors, seeks to avoid the polysemy fallacy by distinguishing between those senses that 
are stored in semantic memory and those that are pragmatically constructed during ‘on-
line’ processing. I return to consideration of the Principled Polysemy approach in 
Chapter 4, in a further discussion of prepositional polysemy. 
2.2.3 The generative lexicon 
The generative lexicon (Pustejovsky 1991, 1995a, 1998a, 1998b) stands out from the 
other theories covered in this chapter by being designed with the sole purpose of 
accounting for polysemy. Pustejovsky sought to provide a more explanatory account of 
polysemy than that given by sense enumeration lexicons. In his view, accounts that 
describe polysemy in terms of multiple listings of senses in the lexicon are inadequate, 
primarily because they are unable to explain how words may take on an infinite number 
of meanings in novel contexts. Not only is it impossible for such accounts to list all the 
possible meanings of a lexical item, they also miss the generalisations that can be made 
on the basis of what appear to be regular patterns of sense alternations, and fail to 
capture how polysemous senses may partially overlap and be logically related to one 
another (Pustejovsky 1995a: Chapter 4). A more promising approach, he argues, which 
is able to meet these explanatory requirements, is a lexicon where items are decomposed 
into templates (rather than sets of features), combined with a generative framework for 
the composition of lexical meanings (ibid. 58).  
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It is clear that when faced with Pustejovsky’s requirements for an adequate 
theory of lexical semantics, a sense enumeration lexicon such as Katz’s (1972) would be 
unsuccessful on all counts. For network theories, the central worries (as discussed in the 
previous section) would be the issue of indefinite proliferation of senses and the failure 
to account for the interaction of word meaning with the context, as the main force of 
these theories is precisely their ability to provide generalisations over patterns of 
meaning extension and to account for relations between different senses of a word. 
However, it is a genuine question whether we want our semantic theory to handle all 
this, that is, whether we should expect it to account for the range of possible (context-
dependent) meanings of a word (as well as the number of ways in which these meanings 
may be related), without the intrusion of pragmatics, which is in effect what Pustejovsky 
is suggesting. Before I discuss this issue in more detail, I would like to look in some 
detail at the central aspects of his generative lexicon theory. 
On Pustejovsky’s account, the semantics of a lexical item is viewed as a structure 
consisting of four components, described as argument structure (number and type of 
arguments), event structure (event type of a lexical item, including subevents), qualia 
structure (a structured differentiation of the meaning of a lexical item), and lexical 
inheritance structure (the ways in which a lexical item is related to other lexical items in 
the lexicon) (Pustejovsky 1995a: 61). The qualia structure of a lexical item is the 
hallmark of Pustejovsky’s theory, and consists in a specification of four different roles: 
The constitutive role captures the relation between an object and its constituents, or 
proper parts; the formal role specifies what distinguishes the object within a larger 
domain; the telic role defines the purpose and function of the object (if there is one); and 
the agentive role describes the factors involved in the origin or coming into existence of 
the object.27 In (4), we have a simplified description of the qualia structure for the noun 
novel, including values for each of the qualia roles (adapted from Pustejovsky 1991: 
                                                      
27 Although the notion of ‘qualia structure’ seems to apply mainly to the meanings of nouns (and to 
nouns denoting concrete objects in particular), Pustejovsky maintains that a qualia structure can be 
defined for all types of lexical items, but that not all lexical items need carry a value for each role. 
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427), specifying that a novel is a narrative, it has the form of a book, its purpose is to be 
read and it comes into being by a process of writing:28 
(4) novel  
QUALIA STRUCTURE: 
CONSTITUTIVE ROLE = narrative 
FORMAL ROLE = book 
TELIC ROLE = read 
AGENTIVE ROLE = write 
Complementing these underspecified lexical entries is a set of generative mechanisms, 
described as type coercion, co-composition and selective binding, which operate to yield 
compositional interpretations. The process of ‘type coercion’ is defined as a “semantic 
operation that converts an argument to the type that is expected by a function, where it 
would otherwise result in a type error” (Pustejovsky 1995: 111). Consider (5): 
(5) a. Mary began reading a novel. 
b. Mary began a novel.  
In (5)a. the VP complement of begin is of the semantic type ‘event’, and in (5)b. its NP 
complement specifies an object. Instead of there being different lexical entries for begin, 
that is, one for each complement type the verb may select for, it is treated as having a 
single lexical entry, its argument being specified as an event (Pustejovsky 1995a: 116). In 
cases where this requirement is not directly satisfied by the surface syntactic structure, 
as in (5)b., coercion applies in order to change the type of the complement NP into an 
event, consistent with event information contained in the qualia structure for the noun. 
Thus, the denotation of the NP a novel is ‘coerced’ into an event denotation compatible 
with either of the interpretations ‘Mary began to write a novel’ and ‘Mary began to read 
a novel’ (cf. the qualia structure for novel in (4) above). 
The generative operation referred to as ‘co-composition’ enables the information 
carried by a complement to act on the governing verb, by taking the verb as argument 
                                                      
28 For instance, this very schematic representation does not indicate that novel belongs to a group of 
nouns that are seen as being polysemous between a ‘physical object’ sense and an ‘information type’ 
sense. These cases will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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and shifting its event type (Pustejovsky 1995a: 123). Consider the uses of bake in (6) 
below: 
(6) a. John baked a potato. 
b. John baked a cake. 
Rather than treating the different senses of bake as separate lexical entries, Pustejovsky 
sees the change-of-state meaning in (6)a. as basic, and the creative meaning in (6)b. as 
being derived by co-composition, applying at the level of the entire verb phrase. When 
combined with the complement potato, whose agentive role is specified as ‘natural kind’, 
the change-of-state interpretation of bake remains unchanged. The semantics of the 
complement cake however, shifts the change-of-state meaning of bake to a creation 
sense, a result of the agentive role of cake being specified as an artefact (i.e. originating 
out of the act of baking).  
Finally, ‘selective binding’ is described as a generative process whereby an 
adjective “is able to make available a selective interpretation of an event expression 
contained in the qualia for the head noun” (Pustejovsky 1995: 128). Consider the uses of 
good below:  
(7) a. Every chef needs a good knife. 
b. ‘American Pastoral’ is a good novel.  
In (7), good selectively modifies the event description given by the telic roles of the 
nouns; in the case of knife the action of cutting (giving rise to the interpretation ‘a knife 
that cuts well’) and in the case of novel the action of reading (giving rise to the 
interpretation ‘a good read’).  
Problems with the generative lexicon 
There is little doubt that Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon provides a considerably more 
explanatory account of polysemy than sense enumeration lexicons of the kind 
advocated by Katz (1972). The problems associated with this approach, however, are 
numerous (Fodor and Lepore 1998, 2002; Blutner 2002; de Almeida 2004; de Almeida 
and Dwivedi 2008; Willems 2006). First, it cannot avoid making a range of wrong 
predictions concerning the construction of compositional interpretations. For instance, 
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it predicts that Mary baked the pizza should have a creative reading, while it seems that a 
non-creative reading (on which Mary is heating up a frozen pizza) is just as likely to be 
the preferred one. Similarly, there are several other (context-dependent) ways in which a 
knife could be good that do not involve ‘cutting’ (e.g. ‘good for stabbing people with, 
‘good for threatening people with’, ‘good for holding’, etc.). To solve this problem, 
Pustejovsky could allow for default interpretations to be defeasible, so that specific 
(linguistic) contexts may suggest other interpretations not inherent to the qualia of the 
lexical item, as suggested by Copestake and Briscoe (1996). However, incorporating 
defeasibility into the semantic system would not help with the cases of clearly 
infelicitous interpretations generated by it. It predicts, for instance, that a VP such as 
begin a car should be interpreted as ‘begin to drive a car’ and that a fast cake should 
mean ‘a cake that is fast to eat’, based on the telic roles for car and cake. Moreover, there 
are cases of uses of evaluative adjectives for which the generative system makes no 
interpretive predictions at all, due to the lack of a telic role for the adjective to selectively 
modify, as in good weather and good children. Yet there is little doubt that in these cases 
the compositional process proceeds as normal, giving rise to a different sense of good in 
each case.  
Another criticism that has been levelled against the generative lexicon theory is 
that it lacks a distinction between linguistic knowledge and general world knowledge. 
The claim is that Pustejovsky’s lexical entries contain a considerable amount of 
information that is more likely to belong to the conceptual system than to the level of 
linguistic representation. For instance, as Fodor and Lepore (1998) argue, although 
trolley cars and knives are both artefacts, the VPs bake a trolley car and bake a knife 
resist a creative reading just as much as bake a potato does, and the reason they do this 
must lie in our real world knowledge about these objects. Further, the lack of a 
principled distinction between linguistic and conceptual knowledge paves the way for a 
range of ad hoc solutions to interpretive problems of the kind discussed above, as there 
is nothing in the theory that prevents us from building in all sorts of information in the 
lexical entry for an object. In principle, a preference for a change-of-state interpretation 
of bake the pizza could be explained in terms of the lexical representation of pizza 
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containing a distinction between home-made and pre-fabricated exemplars (and then 
linguistic cues could be used to choose between them), which would be clearly absurd. 29 
A final theoretical consideration is the significant amount of work that the 
generative lexicon leaves for the pragmatic interpretive system to do, despite its 
information-rich lexical entries and elaborate generative-semantic mechanisms. In 
principle, as Žegarac (2006) has argued, a pragmatic theory that can serve this purpose 
(i.e. one that is capable of overriding default interpretations in the absence of linguistic 
cues and correcting the clearly wrong interpretations generated by the system) should 
also be capable of handling that part of the interpretive work that the generative lexicon 
does adequately. The question, then, is whether this would not in fact make the 
generative lexicon redundant. It seems unnecessary to expect the semantic system to do 
all this interpretive work, if we have a pragmatic system that can perform all the same 
tasks, only better and more accurately. I will discuss this issue further in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5.  
2.2.4 Neo-classical theories 
The label ‘neo-classical theories’ describes a rather heterogeneous group of approaches 
that take word meanings to be constituted by partial definitions (Laurence and Margolis 
1999). In this section I discuss two linguistic manifestations of the neo-classical 
approach, proposed by Pinker (1984, 1989, 2007) and Jackendoff (1983, 1992b, 1997, 
2002, 2010).  
Pinker’s theory of verbal decomposition 
Pinker (1984, 1989, 2007) espouses a decompositional account of verb meaning, where 
verbs are partially defined in terms of a small set of universal, recurring, grammatically 
relevant elements. One of his main arguments for this approach is that it provides a 
                                                      
29 A further problem, related to the previous discussion of the classical theory, is the inability of 
Pustejovsky’s lexical-semantic representations to pick out correct denotations. Despite being rich in 
conceptual content, in some cases they do not distinguish between what are obviously distinct 
denotations (for instance, the lexical-semantic representation for the noun cake (Pustejovsky 1995a: 123) 
would cover a range of similar objects as well, e.g. pizza, bread, muffin, etc.). In other cases, they predict a 
narrower denotation than is in fact the case (e.g. good knife), and sometimes, as we have seen, they predict 
a wrong denotation (e.g. begin a car). Moreover, Plato’s Problem equally applies to Pustejovsky’s theory; 
for many concepts, it will be difficult to give any precise values for the qualia roles (try, for instance, to 
provide qualia structures for abstract nouns such as semantics, freedom, justice, etc.), or indeed for any of 
the other levels of linguistic representation proposed by the theory. 
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solution to ‘Baker’s Paradox’ (1989: 7-9); the problem of explaining how children 
acquire syntactic properties of verbs (e.g. how they learn which verbs are dativisable, 
passivisable, and so on, and which are not), faced with the lack of parental correction 
and the (apparent) arbitrariness of such syntactic properties (e.g. near-synonyms may 
have different argument structures, e.g. give/donate), indicating that there is no simple 
semantic criterion guiding them. 
In his proposal for a resolution to the paradox, Pinker suggests that verb 
alternations are in fact not based on arbitrary rule applications, but that the child is 
using semantic criteria to constrain the application of alternation rules (1989: 30). Based 
on the work by Beth Levin (1985; 1993), he suggests treating verbs as being divided into 
‘lexical subclasses’, “defined by a distinctive, grammatically relevant subset of the 
semantic structures that constitute the meaning of a verb” (Pinker 1989: 103). A verb’s 
syntactic behaviour with respect to a given alternation is predictable on the basis of 
membership in a lexical subclass. 
Pinker’s point of departure is simple, transitive action verbs, in which X does 
something to Y. On the basis of the various alternations that they enter into, he 
identifies a set of grammatically relevant bits of meaning that he takes to be components 
of the semantic representations of the verbs. For instance, he shows that some verbs 
enter quite naturally into the ‘conative alternation’ (which conveys attempting), e.g. cut 
(Mary cut the rope/Mary cut at the rope) and hit (John hit the wall/John hit at the wall) 
while other verbs that convey actions which, on cognitive grounds, should also be 
eligible for entering into this alternation, do not, e.g. touch (Susan touched the 
cat/*Susan touched at the cat) and broke (Bill broke his bicycle/*Bill broke at his bicycle). 
He concludes that the kind of verbs compatible with this construction must express a 
motion resulting in a kind of contact. This includes verbs of cutting (cut, slash, chop, 
hack, chip, etc.) and verbs of hitting (hit, beat, elbow, kick, punch, poke, rap, slap, strike, 
etc.), but excludes verbs of touching (touch, kiss, hug, stroke, contact, etc.) and verbs of 
breaking (break, shatter, crack, split, crumble, etc.) (Pinker 1989: 104). 
In the ‘part-possessor ascension’ (involving a shift from construing the object as 
a ‘possessor of body part’ to ‘person as body part’), only the subclass of verbs that denote 
physical contact may alternate, including verbs of cutting (Sam cut Brian’s arm/Sam cut 
Brian on the arm), hitting (Mary hit the dog’s leg/Mary hit the dog on the leg), and verbs 
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of touching (Richard touched Jane’s cheek/Richard touched Jane on the cheek). Verbs of 
breaking, however, do not alternate (*Jim broke Mary on the arm) (ibid.: 105). As 
regards the ‘middle alternation’ (specifying the ease with which an action can be carried 
out on a patient), only the verbs that denote an effect may alternate (ibid.: 106). Thus, 
the alternation applies to the breaking and cutting sub-classes (I broke the glass/The glass 
breaks easily, I cut the bread/This bread cuts easily) while not to the verbs of hitting and 
touching (He hit the wall/*This wall hits easily, The touched the wire/*This wire touches 
easily) Based on these, and a set of other alternations involving transitive verbs (see 
Pinker 2007: 103-107 for a summary), Pinker sorts verbs in to classes, depending on the 
type of concepts they express: 
(8) hit: MOTION, CONTACT 
cut: MOTION, CONTACT, EFFECT 
break: EFFECT 
touch: CONTACT 
(8) suggests that the reason why break and touch do not enter into the conative 
alternation is that their lexical representations do not contain both the concepts MOTION 
and CONTACT. Similarly, break, failing to express the concept CONTACT, does not enter 
into the part-possessor ascension, while touch, and hit, which do not express EFFECT 
may not enter into the middle alternation.30 
On Pinker’s approach, the features that sort verbs into classes (and hence 
alternations) in (8) are “not arbitrary markers” (2007: 107), but part of their necessary 
application conditions. Furthermore, membership in one of the lexical subclasses is seen 
as a sufficient condition for a verb to alternate (1989: 103).31 However, verbal polysemy 
appears to pose a difficulty for this view. Compare the uses of cut in (9): 
                                                      
30 The status of these elements included in Pinker’s semantic vocabulary is not entirely clear. For instance, 
do concepts such as MOTION, CONTACT and EFFECT decompose into smaller units of meaning, or are they 
primitive? Do they have lexical counterparts, or are they abstract semantic features, as, for instance, in 
Jackendoff’s framework (1983, 1990, 1992b, 2002)? 
31 Pinker denies the possibility that inferential relations of the sort hit → MOTION could be part of our 
general reasoning system (in the form of meaning postulates) instead of part of the lexical-semantic 
representation of the verbs. If they determine the syntactic constructions that the verb may enter into, 
they must be “part of the language engine proper” (Pinker 2007: 107). On the face of it, this seems to 
provide an argument in favour of lexical decomposition, at least in terms of partial semantic 
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(9) a. John cut the rope./John cut at the rope. 
b. The bank cut its interest rates/*The bank cut at its interest rates. 
As we have seen, the theory predicts that cut should enter into the conative alternation 
as a result of its semantics specifying ‘a motion resulting in a kind of contact’, as in (9)a. 
above. As to (9)b., Pinker might say that in this particular sentence cut does not express 
‘a motion resulting in a kind of contact’, hence does not alternate. This would leave him 
with two possibilities concerning the meaning of the linguistic form cut. The first is that 
it encodes more than one meaning, so that the cut in (9)b. differs from the cut in (9)a. by 
having its own set of application conditions (whatever these might be). Only the cut in 
(9)a. would be a member of the group of ‘cutting’ verbs, and enter into the conative 
alternation. This solution, although possible, misses the intuition that the two uses of cut 
are closely related in meaning – they seem very much like different uses of the same 
word. Alternatively, Pinker could modify his claim about the semantics of cut, and say 
that the cuts in (9)a. and (9)b. are both instances of a single lexical item, and that the 
(linguistic) context determines whether or not cut in fact expresses ‘a motion resulting 
in a kind of contact’ (for instance, when its object denotes an abstract entity it follows 
that cut cannot express this meaning). This would amount to a modification of the 
claim that the features MOTION and CONTACT are part of the necessary application 
conditions for the verb cut (i.e. they are only necessary for the verb to enter into the 
alternation). 
The polysemy of hit in (10) poses a perhaps more serious problem for Pinker’s 
account, as it seems to challenge the claim that membership in a lexical subclass is in 
fact a sufficient condition for a verb to alternate: 
(10) a. The woman hit the mugger with her umbrella/The woman hit at the mugger 
with her umbrella. 
b. The driver hit a pedestrian/*The driver hit at a pedestrian.  
c. The sniper hit a policeman./*The sniper hit at a policeman. 
                                                      
representations, and against an account that treats such inferential relations as part of the conceptual 
system, where there is no prediction that they should have any syntactic reflexes. However, as I will argue 
shortly, there is at least reason to question whether this link between the verbal semantic properties he 
postulates and the syntactic alternations they enter into is as neat as Pinker claims. 
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The verb hit has slightly different, but clearly related meanings in these examples: in 
(10)a., it conveys ‘direct a blow at’, in (10)b., it expresses ‘come into contact with 
(something/someone) quickly and forcefully’, and in (10)c., it conveys ‘strike’. The 
problem is that in all three cases hit expresses a motion resulting in a kind of contact, yet 
it is only the use of hit in (10)a. that licences the conative alternation. (On cognitive 
grounds, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a driver attempts to hit a 
pedestrian, or where a sniper attempts to hit a policeman). I believe this poses a real 
problem for Pinker’s account, since it seems that in order to get around it, he either has 
to propose a more fine-grained semantic requirement for a verb to enter into the 
conative alternation (i.e. one that might distinguish between different senses of a 
polysemous verb), or he has to modify the claim that membership in one of the lexical 
subclasses is a sufficient condition for a verb to alternate. 
Jerry Fodor, who is an ardent critic of lexical decomposition (defending himself 
an atomist position on word meanings, cf. section 2.3), has claimed, in a discussion of 
Pinker’s account of verbal decomposition, that although there might be semantic facts 
that have syntactic reflexes, this is not in itself an argument for lexical decomposition 
(Fodor 1998: Chapter 3). His argument is that it is fully compatible with a non-
decompositional (i.e. atomist) account of word meaning to say that a lexical entry may 
contain features which are capable of affecting its syntactic behaviour, but that this is 
not the same as claiming that there is a semantic level at which only semantic properties 
of expressions are specified.32  
However, further to this comment of Fodor’s, I believe that the challenge from 
polysemy weakens Pinker’s claim about the necessary connection between verbal 
semantic features and syntactic alternations, and, as a consequence, his claim about the 
necessity of lexical decomposition. At least, it seems that this cannot be the whole story 
with regard to these alternations, and that the role of context (linguistic and extra-
linguistic) in licensing them needs to be further explored. So I agree with Fodor in that, 
although Pinker has undoubtedly provided a valuable account of a range of 
generalisations among aspects of verb meanings and their acquisition, he hasn’t 
necessarily shown that verb meanings need be decompositional. Moreover, as to the 
                                                      
32 Borg (forthcoming), who also defends an atomist approach to word meaning, makes a similar point. 
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claim that lexical decomposition is required for an adequate theory of polysemy, it 
seems clear at least that the kind of decomposition proposed by Pinker does not get us 
much closer to an explanation of the phenomenon. 
Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics 
While Pinker is explicit that his goal is not to capture the totality of a verb’s meaning, 
Jackendoff’s theory of partial decomposition (Jackendoff 1983, 1990, 1992b, 2002, 2010) 
is intended as a full-fledged theory of concepts. Jackendoff’s primary argument for a 
decompositional account of word meaning comes from the creativity of language (1983: 
Chapters 5 and 7; 1990, 1992b, 2002). In generative grammar, this refers to the infinite 
generative power of the human language capacity, enabling language users to produce 
and understand, in principle at least, an infinitely large number of sentences, most of 
which they have not heard before. Given that our brains are finite, this creativity is 
explained in terms of syntactic knowledge being represented as a finite set of primitives 
and combinatorial principles that together generate all the possible sentences of a 
language. Extending this argument to the conceptual domain, Jackendoff claims that, 
given the indefinitely large class of possible concepts, these must also be constructed 
from a set of primitives and principles of combination contained in an innate ‘grammar 
of lexical concepts’ (1992b: 25-26).  
In Jackendoff’s framework, the thoughts expressed by language are structured in 
terms of a level of representation called conceptual structure (CS), which is linked to the 
syntactic component through a set of correspondence rules. The primitives of CS are 
described as a set of ‘major ontological categories’, including features such as THING, 
PLACE, DIRECTION, ACTION, EVENT, MANNER, AMOUNT (Jackendoff 1983: 50), which need 
not have any direct linguistic realisation. In this respect, the conceptual primitives are 
similar to phonological features in that we have no conscious access to them.33 CS 
                                                      
33 This is, according to Jackendoff (2002: 336), what makes it so hard to expound on word meaning on the 
basis of raw intuition. On his view, the principles governing the combination of conceptual features into 
word meanings need not be the same as the principles determining the combination of word meanings 
into phrase meanings. So, even if some of the primitives that compose a word meaning could, in 
principle, be expressed as words, there would be no phrase composed of those words that could express 
what the original word expresses. This would make concepthood a property of conceptual constituents, 
and not of conceptual features. This approach to lexical decomposition distinguishes itself clearly from 
the definitional approaches that Fodor (1998) criticises, on which word meanings are composed out of 
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contains no formal distinction between semantic and pragmatics (Jackendoff 2010: 8). 
Instead, ‘semantics’ is viewed as providing “the part of conceptual structure of an 
utterance that is related directly to linguistic expressions” and ‘pragmatics’ as providing 
“the part that arises though inference, heuristics, world knowledge, and understanding 
of the context”. 
Jackendoff acknowledges the range of arguments against classical 
decompositional accounts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (1983: 121), 
and agrees that word meanings decompose only into necessary conditions (for instance, 
COLOUR is part of the conceptual representation of red), but include other information 
as well. In addition to CS, Jackendoff (1992b, 2002) envisages a further level of 
representation, called spatial structure (SpS), at which the spatial understanding of the 
physical world is encoded. Jackendoff’s suggestion is that the lexical entry for a physical 
object word includes, in addition to its conceptual structure, a sophisticated 3D-model 
representation (in the sense of Marr 1982), which can be thought of as an imagistic 
representation of the prototypical instance of a category. On this view, dog may be 
represented in conceptual structure as a kind of animal, typically domestic, a member of 
the canine family, etc., while its spatial structure may include a 3D-representation 
specifying information about its shape, coat, how it moves, etc. Words that encode 
perceptual concepts can be encoded directly in SpS, so for instance, red is represented as 
KIND-OF-COLOUR in conceptual structure, while the perceptual distinction between it 
and all the other colours is encoded in SpS.34 Furthermore, although this possibility is 
not explored by Jackendoff himself, the assumption that there are SpS representations to 
word meanings provides an account of ‘systematic polysemy’ of the kind in (11): 
                                                      
lexical concepts using a subset of the principles required for the composition of word meanings into 
phrases. 
34 This would appear to solve the ‘problem of completers’, associated with partial decompositional 
approaches (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 54): With only partial definitions they have no account of 
reference determination, but, if their definitions are ‘fleshed out’, all the problems of the classical theory 
return. Supplementing necessary conditions with SpS in the representation of word meanings makes it 
possible to determine which things fall under a concept without having to specify this in terms of actual 
primitives. In particular, it appears to provide a solution to Fodor et al.’s (1975) problem of ‘missing 
properties’ in the case of natural kind terms (red → COLOUR & X) . However, Laurence and Margolis 
(1999: 56) note that spatial structure does not in fact offer a satisfactory solution to the reference 
determination problem, because, just as is the case with prototypes, something can satisfy the spatial 
properties specified by a concept without falling under it (e.g. an Australian dingo looks very much like a 
dog) and something can fall under the concept without satisfying the spatial properties (e.g. a hairless 
dog). 
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(11) a. John opened the window. (physical object) 
b. Mary went through the window. (aperture) 
c. Susan broke the window. (pane) 
In particular, the uses of window in (11)b. and (11)c. would make reference to different 
aspects of the 3D-representation stored for this object, specifying spatial knowledge 
about the various parts that compose a window. I return to consideration of this analysis 
in Chapter 5. 
The notion of ‘semantic field features’ is central to Jackendoff’s analysis of verbal 
and prepositional polysemy (1992b: 37). The evidence for the existence of semantic field 
features is taken to be provided by the following kinds of examples (where the 
polysemous words go, change, be, keep, from, and to appear in different semantic fields):  
(12) a. Spatial location and motion 
i. The bird went from the ground to the tree. 
ii. The bird is in the tree. 
iii. Harry kept the bird in the cage. 
b. Possession 
i. The inheritance went to Philip. 
ii. The money is Philip’s. 
iii. Susan kept the money. 
c. Ascription of Properties 
i. The light went/changed from green to red. 
Harry went from elated to depressed. 
ii. The light is red. 
Harry is depressed. 
iii. Sam kept the crowd happy. 
d. Scheduling of activities 
i. The meeting was changed from Tuesday to Monday. 
ii. The meeting is on Monday. 
iii. Let’s keep the trip on Saturday.
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In (12), each of the sets contains a sentence involving the verb go or change, expressing a 
change of some sort, the verb be, describing the resulting states of the changes in 
question, and the verb keep, which, in all of the sentences in which it occurs, denotes 
‘the causation of a state that endures over a period of time’ (ibid.). Thus, Jackendoff sees 
the sets in (12) as having parallel conceptual structures, as schematised below (ibid. 38): 
(13) a. [Event GO ([ ],      FROM ([ ])     )] 
          Path TO ([ ]) 
b. [State BE ([ ]), [Place ])] 
c. [Event STAY ([ ], [Place ])] 
What distinguishes them is a semantic field feature that specifies the field in which the 
EVENT or STATE is defined, and associates it with a particular inference pattern. This is 
supposed to explain how different occurrences of a word can license different 
inferences, and at the same time be similar in meaning. Consider again the keep 
examples in (12) above. Although the verb keep arguably expresses slightly different 
kinds of processes in each of the sentences in (12), keep denotes the ‘causation of a state 
that endures over time’ in all of them. The different uses are distinguished only by the 
kind of semantic field feature that it carries in each case.  
Fodor (1998: 49-56) objects to the analysis of the intuitive polysemy of verbs 
such as keep in terms of semantic field features, claiming that it leads to infinite regress. 
His argument goes as follows: If the univocal meaning of keep is CAUSE A STATE THAT 
ENDURES OVER TIME, then the concepts contained in the definition, ‘CAUSE’, ‘STATE’, 
‘TIME’, ‘ENDURE’, must also be univocal across semantic fields. Fodor asks if it is 
reasonable to take ‘CAUSE’ to be univocal in ‘CAUSE THE MONEY TO BE IN SUSAN’S POCKET’ 
and ‘CAUSE THE CROWD TO BE HAPPY’, and claims that Jackendoff faces difficulties no 
matter what his response is. It seems clear that he would avoid the first option, that is, to 
say that ‘CAUSE’ means different things in the two cases, as this would lead to regress (in 
order to explain the intuitive univocality of keep we need to provide a definition ‘X’ of 
CAUSE that explains its univocality across fields, and then a definition ‘Y’ of X that 
explains the univocality of X, and so on). The second option, to hold that CAUSE is a 
primitive, Fodor argues, must be as unappealing to Jackendoff as the first one, since it 
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implies that definitions are not required to explain a word/concept’s univocality; CAUSE 
would be a case to the contrary. Thus, there would be no reason to believe that we need 
a definition to explain the univocality of keep across semantic fields either. On Fodor’s 
view, keep is univocal because it always means KEEP, cause is univocal because it always 
means CAUSE, and, furthermore, “all words are univocal across semantic fields because 
semantic fields don’t affect meaning” (1998: 52, Fodor's italics). I return to 
consideration of Fodor’s analysis of keep in the next section. 
However, Laurence and Margolis (1999: 59) do not think this critique of Fodor’s 
need worry Jackendoff too much. In their view, Jackendoff should choose the second 
option, and admit that partial definitions are not necessary for a word to retain its 
meaning across semantic fields; in other words, that polysemy does not require partial 
decomposition. This does not mean that there may not be an explanatory advantage to 
postulating partial definitions in some cases (for instance, a partial definition may be 
invoked to explain the polysemy of keep but not of CAUSE), but this remains for 
Jackendoff to demonstrate. In my view, what is needed is a further specification of the 
conditions under which a semantic field feature applies to affect the meaning of a word 
(i.e. the contribution of context), as well as a more precise specification of what counts 
as a semantic field. If a new field feature can be postulated for each distinct sense of a 
word, Jackendoff’s theory of polysemy would, in principle, not be much different from a 
sense enumeration account. 
2.3 Conceptual atomism 
Despite their significant differences, all the theories that we have looked at so far are 
versions of the containment model of conceptual structure (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 
5): they take concepts to have their components (definitions, prototype structures, 
qualia structure, partial definitions) as proper parts. Conceptual atomism, on the other 
hand, takes most lexical concepts to be primitive; that is, to have no proper parts. There 
are (at least) two versions of this view, which I will consider (briefly) in this section: (i) 
‘pure’ conceptual atomism, as recently defended by Fodor (1998; 2004a, 2004b; 2008), 
and (ii) atomism with meaning postulates (Fodor 1975; Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975; 
Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 1981; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; de Almeida 1999; Horsey 
2006). The latter is a version of what is sometimes called the inferential model of 
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conceptual structure (Laurence and Margolis 1999: 5), on which there may be content-
constitutive inferences that capture the logical properties of concepts, but which do not 
arise from definitions. I will also discuss the implications of conceptual atomism for 
polysemy representation. 
Conceptual atomism claims that lexical concepts have no internal structure. On 
this view, the content of a primitive concept is determined by a constitutive link 
between the mind and the world; for Fodor (1998), this link is a nomic (lawful) relation 
that reliably locks the concept to a mind-external entity. For instance, the word cat 
encodes the concept CAT because there is a lawful relation between the property of being 
a cat and the mental entity CAT. In his early writings, Fodor argued (on the basis of the 
failure of the definitional approach to provide adequate definitions for, inter alia, 
natural kind terms and causative verbs), that analyticities such as cat → ANIMAL, red → 
COLOUR, kill → CAUSE TO DIE, etc. could be captured in terms of ‘meaning postulates’, 
that is, principles of inference that constitute one-way entailment relations between 
lexical concepts (Fodor 1975; Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett 1975; Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 
1981). For instance, on this approach, ANIMAL could be constitutive of the meaning of 
cat by standing in an inferential relation to the concept CAT, but would not be contained 
as part of its semantic representation. This made it possible to maintain an atomist 
account of lexical concepts while capturing intuitions about analytic relations between 
concepts.  
On Fodor’s recent account, however, the content of a concept is seen as being 
exhaustively determined by the property it denotes (e.g. the content of CAT is exhausted 
by the property of being a cat, or ‘cathood’), hence the term ‘pure’ conceptual atomism 
(Fodor 1998; Fodor 2004a, 2004b; Fodor 2008). This position denies that a concept has 
its content in virtue of its relation to other concepts; in particular, it denies any role at all 
for necessary, or ‘analytic’ connections between concepts (for instance, between being a 
cat and being an animal). Fodor’s (1998) reason for rejecting meaning postulates comes 
mainly from Quine’s (1999 [1953]) convincing arguments against the possibility of 
drawing a principled analytic/synthetic distinction between those inferences that are 
content-constitutive of a concept and those that are not. Fodor’s recent approach has a 
clear advantage in that it sidesteps many of the problems associated with 
decompositional theories (in addition to Plato’s Problem and the analyticity issue, the 
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problem of ignorance and error does not arise: so long as CAT is appropriately 
connected to ‘cathood’ someone’s beliefs about cats are irrelevant to the possession of 
the concept).  
A problem with pure conceptual atomism, however, is that, barring the issue of 
whether or not there are such things as analytic truths, it lacks an account of people’s 
clear intuitions about analyticities (Rey 1993). Horsey (2006) uses this as an argument to 
reinstate meaning postulates in an atomistic theory of lexical concepts. On his view, the 
notions of content constitutivity and analyticity must be pulled apart, the reason being 
that “it is perfectly possible for an inference to be content constitutive for a subject if the 
subject regards the inference as valid” (ibid.: 25). But, he notes, this does not require that 
the inference is in fact valid (i.e. analytic).35 Thus, Horsey argues in favour of a 
psychological conception of meaning postulates, where these are seen as mentally 
represented inference rules, which provides no guarantee of their analyticity. 
2.3.1 Radical nativism? 
However, with or without (mentally represented) meaning postulates, a standard 
objection to conceptual atomism is its (apparent) commitment to radical nativism (e.g. 
Jackendoff 2002; Pinker 2007). A widely held view in cognitive science, defended also by 
Fodor himself (1981; Fodor et al. 1980; Jackendoff 1992b, 2002; Pinker 2007) is that 
primitive concepts are innate. The argument is that when we learn something, we 
construct it from previously known parts, using previously known means of 
combination. Since primitives have no parts, it follows that they cannot be learned; 
hence they must be innate. Both Jackendoff (2002) and Pinker (2007) take this to be a 
strong argument in favour of (partial) decomposition; in their view, it shows that lexical 
learning must also be a case of constructing word meanings form previously known 
parts. However, the conceptual atomist claim that most lexical concepts are primitive 
thus amounts to a claim that most lexical concepts are innate, including such unlikely 
candidates as TELEVISION, KIMONO, and NEURON. A possible way out of this problem, 
however, is to claim that it is not the concepts themselves that are innate; rather, we 
have innately-determined concept-acquisition mechanisms which are triggered by 
                                                      
35 For instance, for some people, the inference from WHALE to FISH may be content constitutive of their 
concept WHALE, but the inference is not valid. 
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experience and which construct (atomic) concepts that go well beyond the available 
evidence. I cannot go into the details of how the mind-world relations that constitute 
conceptual content may come to obtain here, but some interesting proposals are given 
by Fodor himself (1998: Chapters 6 and 7), Margolis (1998), Sperber (1994b) and, in 
particular, Horsey (2006). 
Another criticism against conceptual atomism is its ‘explanatory impotence’. 
(Laurence and Margolis 1999: 64). If we treat concepts as atoms, how are we, for 
instance, to make sense of typicality effects in categorisation, or make generalisations 
among inferential properties of different lexical items (e.g. the element shared by 
causative verbs) (Jackendoff 1992b: 50)?36 The aspect of this criticism that is most 
important to our purposes here is that conceptual atomism has, it appears, no account 
of polysemy. In the remainder of this section I will look at this apparent problem. 
2.3.2 Conceptual atomism and polysemy 
In Concepts (1998: 53) Fodor explicitly states, “there is no such thing as polysemy”. 
Recall the discussion of keep in the previous section, where Fodor denied the apparent 
polysemy exhibited by this verb (which, on Jackendoff’s account, involved the supposed 
core meaning of the verb, ‘causation of a state that endures over time’, carrying different 
‘semantic field features’, e.g. spatial location and motion, possession, ascription of 
properties, scheduling of activities). The examples are repeated in (14): 
(14) a. Harry kept the bird in the cage.  
b. Susan kept the money.  
c. Sam kept the crowd happy. 
d. Let’s keep the trip on Saturday. 
On Fodor’s view, keep is univocal; it expresses nothing more than ‘keeping’ in all of its 
uses above. However, recognising the intuitive polysemy of keep, Fodor (1998: 54) 
suggests that the apparent differences in meaning between (14)a.-d. do not have to arise 
from its being polysemous. What distinguishes, for instance, Susan kept the money in 
                                                      
36 In fact, conceptual atomism is fully compatible with the existence of prototypes, if these are seen as 
being represented as part of an individual’s general world knowledge about conceptual denotations, and 
not as part of their lexical-semantic representations.  
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(14)b. and Sam kept the crowd happy in (14)c. is that in (14)b., the ‘keeping’ relation 
holds between the NP and the money, and in (14)c. it holds between the NP and the 
crowd’s being happy. These are clearly different things; hence the difference in meaning 
between (14)b. and (14)c. 
As a possible objection to this univocality view, Fodor considers the case where a 
language A has a single unambiguous word, which may be translated into either of two 
words in another language B, depending on the context, and asks: Shouldn’t this be 
taken as evidence that the language A word is polysemous? No, he argues. He gives the 
following example to back up this claim (Fodor 1998: 55):  
Suppose English has two words, ‘spoiled’ and ‘addled,’ both of which mean 
spoiled, but one of which is used only of eggs. Suppose also that there is some 
other language which has a word ‘spoilissimoed’ which means spoiled and is 
used both of spoiled eggs and of other spoiled things. The right way to describe 
this situation is surely not that ‘spoiled’ [sic.] is ipso facto polysemous. Rather the 
thing to say is: ‘spoiled’ and ‘addled’ are synonymous and are (thus) both 
correctly translated ‘spoilissimoed’. 37 
Although the situation Fodor describes is clearly possible (but would probably strike 
most speakers of more than one language as being rather exceptional), it does not take 
much by way of cross-linguistic investigation to see that the conclusion that the two 
language B words have to be synonymous does not hold. For instance, consider the 
Norwegian translations of the keep sentences in (14) below: 
(15) a. Harry holdt fuglen i buret. [Harry kept the bird in the cage.] 
b. Susan beholdt pengene. [Susan kept the money.] 
c. Sam underholdt publikum. [Sam kept the crowd happy.] 
d. La oss fastholde turen på lørdag. [Let’s keep the trip on Saturday.] 
In the Norwegian sentences, the processes expressed by keep in the English equivalent 
sentences are all expressed by different verbs. So this would be an actual instance of 
Fodor’s scenario above, where language A (English) has a single (‘unambiguous’) word, 
which translates into several different words in language B (Norwegian), in lack of a 
single language B word that covers the meaning of the language A word. However, on 
                                                      
37 According to the scenario we are presented with it is the word spoilissimoed that could be argued to be 
polysemous, not spoiled. I take it that Fodor has made a slip here. 
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no account would the meanings of the Norwegian verbs holde, beholde, underholde and 
fastholde be claimed to be synonymous.38 Rather, it would be correct to say that their 
meanings are related (in fact, they all denote the ‘causation of a state that endures over 
time’),39 but there is clearly a different kind of process involved in each case.40 This 
appears to give Jackendoff’s analysis of keep, where such cross-linguistic differences may 
be predicted on the basis of the different meanings this verb may be used to express, an 
advantage over Fodor’s, where the assumption that keep expresses nothing more than 
KEEP renders such differences unexplainable.41  
Contrary to Fodor, I believe that there is such a thing as polysemy, if what is 
meant by this is that words can be used to express different meanings in different 
contexts. There are two ways in which this situation could be described in Fodor’s 
framework: (i) in the case where the senses are conventionalised (e.g. paper, meaning 
‘sheet of paper’, ‘newspaper’), they could be represented as separate lexical entries with 
the same linguistic form (e.g. PAPER1, PAPER2), on a par with homonymous senses (cf. 
                                                      
38 This includes Fodor’s own account, where the words holde, beholde, underholde and fastholde would 
encode the unstructured concepts HOLDE, BEHOLDE, UNDERHOLDE, FASTHOLDE. 
39 All the verbs contain the stem holde, which corresponds to English hold/keep. 
40 Note that Fodor could not reasonably respond to this that the differences in meaning between the 
Norwegian verbs in (15) are all governed by the object (bird in cage, money, crowd), that is, that all of 
them simply mean ‘causation of a state that endures over time’ (i.e. encode the concept HOLDE) with 
different usage constraints on each one (just as addled has the usage constraint that it can only be applied 
to eggs). The Norwegian verbs clearly encode different concepts and have a range of other uses than those 
in (15) above. 
41 In fact, such cross-linguistic differences illustrate a further problematic aspect of conceptual atomism, 
which is seldom discussed: As we have seen, on Fodor’s account, keep means KEEP, and the Norwegian 
verbs holde, beholde, underholde, and fastholde would have to be treated in the same way; as giving access 
to the lexical concepts HOLDE, BEHOLDE, UNDERHOLDE, FASTHOLDE. Given conceptual atomism, the 
meaning of keep and its Norwegian cognates would bear no relation to each other (e.g. the English 
concept KEEP and the Norwegian concept HOLDE would be no more similar in meaning than, e.g., KEEP 
and LOSE are in English). It thus seems to follow from the theory that speakers of different languages 
would have entirely different conceptual repertoires, depending on the respective vocabularies of their 
languages. This would imply a linguistic determinism very much in opposition with Fodor’s own 
‘Publicity Constraint’ on a theory of concepts, on which concepts are seen as public entities, which people 
share: “all sorts of concepts (…), are ones that all sorts of people, under all sorts of circumstances, have 
had and continue to have” (1998: 29). It is hard to see how this claim could be reconciled with speakers of 
different languages having different conceptual repertoires. 
 It may be, however, that Fodor’s Publicity Constraint is too strong; perhaps we need to allow for 
some linguistically-determined differences in conceptual repertoires, cf. Gentner and Goldin-Meadow 
(2003). In any case, it seems that what Fodor would need is to give an account of how we compare and 
match lexical meanings in moving between different languages (otherwise, second language acquisition 
would be an even more laborious affair on this account than it already is); and if this cannot be done on 
the basis of atomic lexical concepts (which, as far as I can tell, it can’t), it has to be described in terms of 
some other level of representation (e.g. in terms of real-world knowledge about the denotations of lexical 
concepts). 
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Fodor and Lepore 2002); (ii) in all other cases, there would be a single encoded meaning 
of the word, and the differences in meaning perceived between its uses in different 
contexts could be treated as instances of pragmatic adjustment of the encoded meaning. 
Thus, pairing the atomist account of lexical semantics with an adequate theory of 
pragmatics would help solve the problem posed by keep above. If the different meanings 
of keep are seen as instances of pragmatic adjustment of the concept KEEP, then Fodor 
would be right to say of keep that its semantic encoding amounts to nothing more than 
KEEP. The cross-linguistic differences between English and Norwegian observed in (15) 
could be explained as an instance where a set of meaning distinctions which are derived 
pragmatically (on the basis of keep) in English, are lexicalised in Norwegian. That there 
is this kind of asymmetry between the vocabularies of different languages is hardly 
controversial (cf. Falkum 2007). 
2.4 Psycholinguistic perspectives on polysemy 
In the previous sections, we have been looking at a range of theoretical approaches to 
the nature of word meaning and polysemy. The central issue has been whether word 
meanings are mentally represented in terms of smaller units of meaning (lexical 
decomposition), and if so, what the nature of these units is, or if they are represented in 
terms of unstructured concepts (conceptual atomism). A further related issue has been 
to what extent the various approaches to lexical semantics are able to account for 
polysemy, and whether the claim that lexical decomposition is required for a proper 
account of polysemy is warranted (which, I think we may conclude at this stage, it is 
probably not).  
In this section, I will approach these issues from a different angle by discussing 
some recent psycholinguistic investigations into the representation of polysemy. The 
main focus of the psycholinguistic literature on this topic has been the overall structure 
of the mental lexicon; how it represents polysemy compared with homonymy (cf. 
Chapter 1). On the assumption that the meanings of a homonymous word, e.g. bank 
(‘financial institution’, ‘riverside’), are represented as separate entries in the lexicon, 
psycholinguistic studies have sought to find out whether this is also true of polysemous 
words, or if only a single meaning is represented and the others derived (either lexicon-
internally or pragmatically). This question is largely independent of whether or not 
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represented meanings are decompositional, but has a bearing on the adequacy of the 
accounts of polysemy considered thus far. This section will be devoted to a discussion of 
some of the studies addressing this issue.  
2.4.1 Core meanings or separate entries? 
Empirical studies of polysemy representation are few in number and have, to some 
extent, yielded conflicting results. While the main body of experimental evidence points 
to a differential representation of homonymy and polysemy (Frazier and Rayner 1990; 
Williams 1992; Pickering and Frisson 2001; Klepousniotou 2002, 2007; Klepousniotou 
and Baum 2007; Klepousniotou, Titone, and Romero 2008; Beretta, Fiorentino, and 
Poeppel 2005; Pylkkänen, Llinás, and Murphy 2006; Brown 2008), some studies have 
found no difference between the processing of homonymous and polysemous lexical 
items (Klein and Murphy 2001, 2002). In a set of recent publications, Klepousniotou 
and colleagues (2002; Klepousniotou and Baum 2007; Klepousniotou, Titone, and 
Romero 2008) have suggested that the diverging results could be due to the type of 
polysemous stimuli used, and further that degree of sense relatedness may have an effect 
on processing. I consider some of the studies that have given rise to this debate in more 
detail here. 
Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002) ran a series of experiments designed to 
investigate whether polysemous words are represented in terms of a common core 
meaning, from which the various senses are derived in context (the 'core meaning' or 
'monosemy' view, cf. Caramazza and Grober 1976; Ruhl 1989; Pustejovsky 1995a), or if 
they are represented in the same way as homonymy, involving separately stored senses. 
Klein and Murphy (2001) used memory performance and lexical decision as measures 
of the representation of polysemous senses. Their experiments involved two phases. In 
phase 1, subjects were presented with a set of phrases which they were told to study for a 
later memory test. The phrases included polysemous words that were biased in 
interpretation toward one of the senses (e.g. the phrases daily paper and liberal paper 
biased the ‘newspaper’ sense of paper, while wrapping paper and shredded paper biased 
the ‘sheets of material’ sense). In phase 2, subjects viewed similar phrases in which one 
of the two words was capitalised: In the memory task, they were asked to judge whether 
they had seen the word in the previous task; in the lexical decision task they were asked 
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to make a sense/nonsense judgement (a ‘sensicality judgement’). There were three 
experimental conditions: (i) ‘repeated items’; the capitalised polysemous word occurred 
in the same phrase as in phase 1 (e.g. [daily paper], daily PAPER); (ii) ‘consistent sense 
phrases’; the capitalised word occurred in a different phrase but with the same sense 
(e.g. [daily paper], liberal PAPER); and (iii) ‘inconsistent sense phrases’; the capitalised 
word occurred in a phrase biasing the alternative sense (e.g. [daily paper], shredded 
PAPER). Klein and Murphy (2001) found that in the memory task, the repeated items 
were the most accurately evaluated, and the consistent sense phrases were more 
accurately evaluated than inconsistent sense phrases. Similarly, in the lexical decision 
tasks, subjects were faster and more accurate in their sensicality judgements in the 
consistent condition than in the inconsistent condition. Klein and Murphy took these 
results to suggest that polysemous senses are stored separately in the lexicon. If 
polysemous senses had a common core meaning, there should be no difference in 
memory performance or in reaction times for the consistent and inconsistent senses.  
Klepousniotou (2002) conducted an experiment that aimed at testing the specific 
predictions about the processing and representation of polysemy made by sense 
enumeration lexicons (SELs) (e.g. Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz 1972; Weinreich 1966) 
and generative lexicons (e.g. Pustejovsky 1995a). As we saw in section 2.2.1, SELs list 
each meaning of an ambiguous word under a single entry. They contain no distinction 
between homonymy and polysemy, and thus predict that all ambiguous words should 
be processed in the same way. Generative lexicons list homonyms separately, while the 
senses of a polysemous word are derived compositionally on the basis of a single 
semantic representation and the operation of generative mechanisms (cf. section 2.2.3). 
This approach predicts a differential processing depending on the type of ambiguity. 
The study used a cross-modal priming lexical decision task. Participants heard a 
sentence that primed one of the meanings of an ambiguous target word (not 
incorporated in the sentence primes), e.g. ‘He cannot read small print’ (eye, ‘body part’, 
‘hole in a needle’). At the offset of the sentence, either a real word (the ambiguous target 
or an unrelated control, e.g. mop) or a phonologically legal nonword (e.g. scling) was 
presented on the computer screen for lexical decision. The ambiguous words were 
divided into four conditions: (i) homonymy condition (e.g. coach); (ii) metaphor 
condition (e.g. eye); (iii) metonymy (or count-mass polysemy) condition (e.g. turkey, 
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‘animal’/’meat’);42 and (iv) name condition (e.g. the producer/product metonymic 
extension, such as Dalí, ‘the artist’/’a painting by that artist’).43 Priming was measured as 
time to recognise the primed ambiguous word relative to the unrelated control words. 
The results showed a significant difference between reaction times for conditions (i) and 
(iii) – the latter were responded to significantly more quickly than the former – 
indicating a differential processing of homonymy and count-mass polysemy. No 
significant differences were found between the homonymy and metaphor conditions, or 
between the metaphor and the count-mass polysemy conditions.44 The results, in 
particular the faster reaction times and greater priming effects that were observed for 
the count-mass polysemy than for homonymy, were interpreted as supporting the 
hypothesis that type of ambiguity has an effect on processing, and to rule out a SEL 
account of homonymy and polysemy (predicting that all types of ambiguity should be 
processed in the same way), and to be consistent with the generative lexicon approach 
(associating homonymy with separate entries and polysemy with single entries, and 
where extended senses are generated by means of lexical rules).45 Klepousniotou’s (2002) 
results were thus directly conflicting with those obtained by Klein and Murphy (2001), 
by suggesting a processing difference between homonymy and polysemy (of a certain 
kind). However, it is hard to see that any specific conclusion concerning the adequacy of 
the generative lexicon theory was warranted by them; they would be consistent with any 
theory that distinguishes between homonymy and polysemy representation.46 Also, the 
                                                      
42 Klepousniotou (2002) treats such count-mass alternations as a form of ‘metonymic polysemy’. I am not 
certain that this is the right way to characterise them. See my Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of 
systematic polysemy and the count-mass distinction. 
43 The choice to distinguish between ‘metaphorically ambiguous words’ and ‘metonymically ambiguous 
words’ (a distinction originally drawn by Apresjan 1974) reflects the assumption that the kind of process 
motivating the polysemy has a bearing on processing. Although this may be correct at a general level, it is 
possible that within each of these categories, there may be differences between individual words with 
regard to how they are stored in the lexicon (and, consequently, with regard to how they are processed). 
For instance, while the metaphorically generated polysemy of foot (‘body part’, ‘base or bottom of 
something’) is conventional and likely to be stored in the lexicon of many speakers, so could the 
meanings of chicken (‘animal’, ‘meat’). If this were the case, we would not predict any processing 
differences between them.  
44 As to the ‘name’ condition, it had the largest error rate, and did not show any priming effects compared 
to controls. Klepousniotou attributes this result to a different cognitive process being involved in the 
recognition of proper names compared to the one(s) involved in the recognition of regular nouns. This 
seems correct. I return to consideration of the metonymy of proper names in Chapter 6.  
45 However, it is not entirely clear that the generative lexicon account gets much support from the results, 
as it might take time for the lexical rules to operate. See footnote 60. 
46 For instance, a theory where polysemous senses are derived via pragmatic (inferential) processes. 
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lack of a significant difference between the homonymy and metaphor conditions could 
be taken to indicate that certain types of polysemy do, in fact, behave similarly to 
homonymy.  
Klepousniotou, Titone, and Romero (2008) sought to uncover the reasons 
behind the conflicting results obtained by Klepousniotou (2002) and Klein and Murphy 
(2001, 2002). They hypothesised that the type of polysemous words studied could be a 
contributing factor, as Klein and Murphy (2001) had deliberately chosen stimulus words 
that had fairly distinct senses. Klepousniotou et al. (2008) employed the sense decision 
task of Klein and Murphy (2001). The experimental stimuli consisted of three groups of 
words: low overlap polysemes (e.g. control panel/advisory panel), moderate overlap 
polysemes (e.g. laser beam/wood beam), and high overlap polysemes (e.g. marinated 
lamb/baby lamb), divided into sub-groups of dominant and subordinate senses.47 Sense 
dominance was manipulated as a between-subjects factor; one group of subjects were 
presented only with pairs of dominant senses, and the other group only with pairs of 
subordinate senses. Klepousniotou et al. (2008) found that for dominant senses, 
moderate and low overlap polysemes were responded to faster in a consistent context 
(e.g. laser beam/shining beam) than in an inconsistent context (e.g. laser beam/balance 
beam), but no such difference was observed for high overlap polysemes. In contrast, for 
subordinate senses, there were no significant differences found in reaction times 
between the polysemy categories; participants were significantly faster in the consistent 
contexts regardless of the degree of sense relatedness. Klepousniotou et al. (2008) took 
their results to suggest that degree of sense relatedness of polysemous words affects their 
processing, and thus, reveals differences in how they are mentally represented. More 
specifically, their results suggested that ‘high overlap’ words are processed differently 
from ‘moderate-’ and ‘low overlap’ words. This is an interesting finding, which indicates 
that not all polysemous words need be represented in the same way. As Klepousniotou 
et al. (2008) point out, it is compatible with their results that the senses of ‘high overlap’ 
words (e.g. lamb, book, newspaper) are represented as single lexical entries (e.g. in the 
form of a ‘core’ meaning) while the senses of ‘moderate-’ and ‘low’ overlap words (e.g. 
                                                      
47 The stimuli were grouped on the basis of a pre-experimental norming study where subjects had rated 
polysemous senses in terms of degree of relatedness, and of dominance-subordinance. 
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panel, patient, beam, orange) are represented in a similar way as homonymy (i.e. 
separately), as originally suggested by Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002).  
Beretta, Fiorentino, and Poeppel (2005) conducted an MEG48 study to examine 
the neural correlates of homonymy and polysemy. They measured changes in MEG 
recordings during a visual lexical decision task, which included both homonymous and 
polysemous words. The aim of their study was to test the competing separate entries 
and single entry hypotheses about polysemy, using a more fine-grained on-line measure 
of lexical processing than that used in behavioural studies, which had given rise to the 
conflicting results of Klein and Murphy (2001) and Klepousniotou (2002). The ‘M350’, 
which is a response component produced in the left superior temporal cortex at 300-400 
ms after the onset of a visual word, is hypothesised to be an index of initial lexical 
activation. Beretta et al. (2005) predicted that if the separate entries account was correct, 
polysemy and homonymy should behave in the same way at the initial stage of lexical 
access shown by the M350. However, if the single entry account for polysemy was 
correct, homonymy should yield distinct processing behaviour from polysemy.  
Participants were presented with a word (a homonym, a word with multiple 
senses, few senses, or a single sense) on a screen and asked to make a lexical decision as 
quickly and accurately as possible. In this behavioural task, homonyms were responded 
to more slowly than monosemous words, while multiply polysemous words were 
responded to more quickly than words with few senses. Thus, homonymous words 
appeared to slow access (possibly due to competition between the senses) relative to 
words with one meaning, while words with many polysemous senses appeared to speed 
access relative to words with few senses. In this way, the behavioural results supported 
the single entry account of polysemy and the separate entries account for homonymy 
(thus contradicted the results obtained by Klein and Murphy (2001)).  
The MEG results showed that homonyms elicited a later M350 peak latency than 
words with a single meaning, while polysemous words elicited an earlier peak than 
words with few senses. These results mirrored the behavioural results obtained at 
around 600-650 ms, and showed that the effect also held prior to the reaction time 
                                                      
48 MEG (Magnetoencephalography) is an imaging technique used to measure the magnetic fields 
produced by electrical activity in the brain. 
  
 
68 
judgements, at around 300 milliseconds earlier. Thus, Beretta et al. (2005) took their 
study to support a single entry account of polysemy and a separate entries account of 
homonymy. The competition between homonyms could be what caused the delay in the 
M350 latency for these items.  
Beretta et al.’s (2005) study had an additional finding: It showed an apparent 
processing advantage for multiply polysemous words compared with words with few 
senses. This finding replicated an earlier result obtained by Rodd, Gaskell and Marslen-
Wilson (2002), who had found a significant advantage for many senses in both response 
time and accuracy compared with monosemous words. Rodd et al.’s study (2002) had 
been designed to test the so-called ‘ambiguity advantage’; the finding that visual lexical 
decision is faster for semantically ambiguous words than for monosemous words 
(reported by Rubenstein, Lewis, and Rubenstein 1971; Jastrzembski and Stanners 1975; 
Jastrzembski 1981; Millis and Button 1989; Borowsky and Masson 1996, among others). 
In three lexical decision experiments, Rodd et al. (2002) showed that the ambiguity 
advantage was entirely due to polysemy, and that homonymous words in fact delayed 
access. They suggested as a possible explanation of the multiple senses advantage that 
words with many senses could be semantically richer than words with few senses. The 
additional semantic information may produce more stable representations, which in 
turn lead to faster recognition times. Another possible explanation is that the advantage 
is due to a so-called ‘context availability effect’: This has been proposed as an 
explanation of the faster processing of concrete compared with abstract words 
(Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, and Stowe 1988). The hypothesis is that comprehension 
is facilitated by the addition of contextual information (retrieved from the hearer’s 
encyclopaedic knowledge or from the stimulus environment) to the materials that are to 
be understood. Since contextual information can usually be accessed more easily for 
concrete than abstract words, the former are processed with greater ease than the latter 
(also when controlled for effects of frequency and familiarity). Relating this to polysemy, 
it may be that words that have many senses, and are used in a wider range of contexts, 
have contextual information more accessible to them, and that this is what causes the 
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processing advantage. Note that this explanation does not imply that this information 
needs to be part of the semantic representation of the polysemous word.49  
Klepousniotou and Baum (2007) replicated Rodd et al. (2002) and Beretta et al.’s 
(2005) results, and found, in addition to a significant processing advantage for 
polysemous words compared with homonymous words, that count-mass polysemous 
words (e.g. turkey) were recognised significantly faster than metaphorically motivated 
polysemy. This result adds to the evidence suggesting that not all types of polysemy are 
necessarily processed (or represented) in the same way.  
Pylkkänen, Llinás, and Murphy (2006) conducted a MEG study in a 
reinvestigation of the core meaning and the separate entries hypotheses of polysemy 
representation. They started out with the following hypotheses: Given that semantic 
relatedness is often facilitatory, and phonological relatedness inhibitory (similar-
sounding words may compete in recognition), on the separate entries hypothesis, 
different senses of a polysemous word (green book-interesting book) should be expected 
to prime each other less (due to form-based inhibition) than purely semantic controls 
(green novel-interesting book). On the core meaning proposal, where polysemous senses 
should share a morphological root (cf. Halle and Marantz 1993) polysemous senses 
should not show the effects of sound and meaning relatedness that are found in 
competing words. Rather, they should show repetition priming (of the morphological 
root), and, potentially, sense competition. For instance, seeing the word paper used in 
two different senses should activate a single lexical entry, and thus reveal repetition 
effects. Pylkkänen et al. (2006) employed a priming paradigm, where polysemy was 
contrasted with homonymy and semantic relatedness. The stimuli had the following 
design (ibid. 99): 
 
                                                      
49 A further, related explanation of the multiple sense advantage may be that it is a direct result of using a 
lexical decision task in which the words are presented in isolation. The great number of contexts in which 
a polysemous word may be adequately used may result in the development of a relatively context-
independent representation of the word. As words with few senses may be used in a more restricted range 
of contexts, it may be that their access is more dependent on the word appearing in the appropriate 
context. Making a lexical decision would presumably be more difficult for these words than for the 
polysemous words when presented in the absence of a context. 
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 Related Prime Unrelated Prime Target 
Homonymous river bank salty dish savings bank  
Polysemous lined paper military post liberal paper 
Semantic lined paper clock tick monthly magazine 
This design was similar to that used by Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002), who, as we saw, 
found that using a word in the same sense twice led to faster judgements than switching 
senses. This result was replicated by Pylkkänen et al. (2006) in a behavioural study using 
the above materials. Thus, prior to the MEG study, their behavioural evidence still 
pointed in favour of the separate entries hypothesis. 
As already mentioned, the M350 component has been taken to reflect initial 
stages of lexical activation. It is also argued to be the first MEG component in response 
to visual words that is sensitive to repetition (Pylkkänen et al. 2000). Furthermore, it has 
been claimed that the M350 tracks morphological constituent frequency rather than 
whole-word frequency in compound processing, suggesting that it is an index of 
morphological root access (Fiorentino and Poeppel 2004). In view of this, Pylkkänen et 
al. (2006) expected polysemy, if involving distinct sense representations but 
morphological root sharing, to show shorter M350 peak latencies for targets preceded 
by sense-related primes, compared to unrelated controls. On the other hand, if 
polysemy is represented as homonymy, they expected the M350 effects obtained in the 
polysemy condition to be explainable as a combination of the effects elicited in the 
homonymy and semantic conditions.  
The M350 results showed priming for the semantic targets, with M350 sources 
peaking earlier for related targets than for unrelated controls. Homonymous targets 
elicited a later M350 peak than unrelated controls, indicating competition. However, no 
such delay was found for the polysemous targets at M350, whose amount of priming 
was comparable to the priming observed for the semantic targets. Also, polysemous 
targets peaked earlier than unrelated targets. The results contradicted the previous 
behavioural data obtained by Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002) and pattern, like Beretta et 
al.’s (2005) findings, in favour of a single entry account of polysemy.  
Taken together, the studies considered in this section indicate that type of lexical 
ambiguity affects processing, and, by inference, representation. Assuming that 
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homonymous words are represented separately, this does not seem to be the case for at 
least certain kinds of polysemy. As we have seen, the results are to some extent 
conflicting. In large part, this seems to be due to differences in the kind of polysemous 
stimuli used, as pointed out by Klepousniotou and her colleagues (Klepousniotou 2002; 
Klepousniotou and Baum 2007; Klepousniotou, Titone, and Romero 2008). For 
instance, Klein and Murphy (2001) used polysemous words that had fairly distinct 
senses (e.g. liberal paper, shredded paper), giving them a ‘homonymic character’, and 
found no differences in processing between homonymous and polysemous words. 
When dividing the polysemous stimuli into different categories, Klepousniotou et al. 
(2008) found a significant difference between the processing of homonymy and count-
mass polysemy but no significant difference between homonymy and metaphorically-
based polysemy. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that not all polysemous 
words are represented in the same way. Rather than storing only a single core meaning 
or a total list of all the possible distinct senses, the lexicon may store some reasonable 
number of senses. In some cases, the senses of a polysemous word may have become 
conventional to the extent that they are not obviously distinct from homonymy (as in 
many cases of metaphorical polysemy, e.g. foot). In other cases, only a single meaning 
may be stored and the other meanings contextually derived (either lexicon-internally or 
pragmatically). This view of polysemy representation is directly incompatible with a 
Katz-style sense enumeration lexicon that lists homonymous and polysemous senses of 
a linguistic form together under a single lexical entry. Nor does it mesh well with Lakoff 
(1987) and Brugman’s (1988) ‘full-specification’ approach, which takes all the senses 
associated with a polysemous lexical form to be represented as part of a semantic 
network. However, the experimental evidence is, in principle, compatible with several of 
the other lexical semantic accounts discussed in the first part of this chapter, including 
the generative lexicon theory (Pustejovsky 1995a), Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics 
(1992b, 2002), and conceptual atomism (despite Fodor’s (1998) claims to the contrary). 
Given the lack of more specific empirical evidence, a choice between these accounts has 
to be made largely on theoretical grounds.50  
                                                      
50 Recently there has been a string of publications investigating the processing of so-called type shifting 
constructions (e.g. begin a memo, finish a play, enjoy an ice-cream), discussed in connection with 
Pustejovsky’s (1995) generative lexicon account in section 2.2.3. These studies address the issue of 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have looked at the problem of polysemy representation. Two central 
questions were: (i) Does an adequate account of polysemy representation require lexical 
decomposition? (ii) Are polysemous lexical forms represented as separate lexical entries 
(sense enumeration) or as a single entry (core meaning)? 
Starting with the second question, we have seen that the experimental evidence, 
although far from conclusive, indicates that not all instances of polysemy are necessarily 
represented in the same way. While conventionally polysemous lexical forms might be 
represented in a similar way to homonymous forms, less established cases of polysemy 
seem to be represented as a single entry with other senses pragmatically derived in on-
line interpretation. This view of polysemy representation does not support the Katz-
style sense enumeration lexicon or Lakoff and Brugman’s ‘full-specification’ approach, 
but is, in principle, compatible with both the rich lexical entries approach of 
Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon theory or Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics, and with 
the much leaner approach of conceptual atomism.  
With regard to the first question, I think we can conclude that lexical 
decomposition is not required for an adequate account of polysemy representation. 
Recall that the main reason for postulating complex lexical representations for 
polysemous forms is that it is seen as a way to capture relations between their senses. 
However, in the course of this chapter we have seen that it is not always clear that this is, 
                                                      
whether the processing of such constructions involves the application of a lexicon-internal generative 
mechanism to a semantically complex lexical entry (McElree et al. 2001; Traxler, Pickering, and McElree 
2002; Pickering, McElree, and Traxler 2005; McElree, Frisson, and Pickering 2006), or the operation of a 
general pragmatic-inferential process to atomic concepts (de Almeida 2004; de Almeida and Dwivedi 
2008). Some psycholinguistic studies are taken as providing support for so-called ‘type shifting effects’ 
(i.e. an extra processing load hypothesised to result from the operation of a type coercion mechanism in 
the processing of type shifting constructions). For instance, McElree et al. (2001) found, on the basis of a 
self-paced reading experiment, that type shifting constructions (e.g. ‘The secretary began the memo 
before the annual sales conference’) induced longer reading times (hence were associated with greater 
processing complexity) compared to preferred constructions (e.g. ‘The secretary typed the memo before 
the annual sales conference’) and non-preferred constructions (e.g. ‘The secretary read the memo before 
the annual sales conference’). However, this result was not replicated by de Almeida (2004). In two self-
paced reading experiments, type shifting effects were not obtained when no context was provided before 
the sentence, or with sentences embedded in contexts that specified the nature of the activity performed 
over the complement VP. In a recent survey of empirical studies of the processing of type shifting 
constructions, de Almeida and Dwivedi (2008) claim that the empirical results favouring a type coercion 
mechanism are, at best, weak, and that even if there exist such ‘coercion’ effects, there are other possible 
explanations for them (e.g. they could result from verbal gaps in the logical form of such constructions, 
which require contextual saturation). I return to this possibility in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.1). 
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in fact, achieved by all decompositional theories. For instance, in Katz’s ‘classical’ theory 
of semantics, one of whose primary aims was to explain semantic relations and contrasts 
between word meanings (e.g. synonymy, antonymy, analyticity, entailment, etc.), it 
appears that the distinction between polysemy (related senses) and homonymy 
(unrelated senses) cannot be so easily drawn by reference to underlying semantic 
markers. It is also unclear how verbal polysemy can be handled in Pinker’s theory of 
partial verbal decomposition. However, relations between polysemous senses are 
captured by the lexical network theory proposed by Lakoff and Brugman, and to a 
certain extent also by Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon theory. A problem with both 
these approaches was that they appeared to ignore (or at least, drastically downplay) the 
contribution of pragmatics in the derivation of word senses.  
Among the decompositional accounts discussed here, Jackendoff’s theory of 
partial definitions seems, in my view, to be the one best suited to handle polysemy (e.g. 
the polysemy of physical object words such as window could be treated in terms of 3D-
representations contained in their lexical representations; verbal and prepositional 
polysemy could be handled in terms of his theory of semantic field features). However, 
as Fodor has pointed out, this does not mean that Jackendoff has shown that polysemy 
requires lexical decomposition. 
Another question is whether all of our intuitions about semantic relatedness 
need be captured at the level of lexical semantic representation. For instance, as 
discussed in the Introduction, the reason it is difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction 
between homonymy and polysemy is that it is not entirely clear what we mean when we 
talk of two senses being related (is it to do with etymology or speaker intuitions?). 
Furthermore, since it does not seem to be the case that our intuitions about relatedness 
and unrelatedness of senses have any bearing on the way in which we use and 
understand words, they can probably not be taken as a direct reflex of the way in which 
word meanings are represented in our linguistic systems. 
To sum up, I do not think that the existence of polysemy provides a very strong 
argument in favour of a decompositional approach to word meaning. With regard to the 
possibilities of giving an account of polysemy representation, I cannot see why a 
conceptual atomist approach, if paired with an adequate theory of pragmatics, should 
not be at least as able as decompositional approaches to provide an account of 
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polysemy. In Chapter 4, I show how this can be achieved within the context of Sperber 
and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance theory. Adding to this are the range of theoretical 
problems associated with decompositional accounts in general, some of which have 
been considered in this chapter (e.g. the incompleteness of many decompositions, the 
vagueness of many concepts, the fact that we may be ignorant or mistaken about the 
properties we take the instances of a concept to have, etc.). Conceptual atomism has a 
clear advantage in that it avoids many of the problems associated with decompositional 
approaches, although, as we saw in section 2.3, it is associated with some problems of its 
own.  
An implicit assumption of the decompositional accounts that we have 
considered in this chapter is that a theory of lexical semantics should be able to explain 
much of what we would consider to be aspects of language meaning in use. However, I 
think it is an open question how much of the interpretive work should be attributed to 
the linguistic system itself, given that we have an independently motivated pragmatic 
interpretation system, automatically activated by verbal utterances, which is capable of 
rapidly generating new senses in contexts. This question will be addressed in detail in 
the next chapters. 
  
 
75 
Chapter	  3 	  
LANGUAGE,	  THEORY	  OF	  MIND,	  AND	  INFERENTIAL	  
COMMUNICATION:	  SOLVING	  THE	  PROBLEM	  OF	  POLYSEMY	  
MOTIVATION?	  
3.1 Introduction 
In The Big Book of Concepts, Murphy (2002: 405) identifies (i) and (ii) as the main 
questions that a theory of polysemy has to answer:  
(i) How do we represent the meanings of a polysemous word so that we are able to 
understand its different uses? 
(ii) Why and how is it that word meanings get extended to have these different 
senses? 
The first question, concerning the representation of polysemous words, was addressed in 
Chapter 2, and is, together with the definitional problem discussed in Chapter 1, the one 
that lexical semanticists, and psychologists to some degree, have been mainly concerned 
with. As to Murphy’s second question about polysemy, the why question has to be 
distinguished from the how question. The latter has been widely studied, in particular 
within the cognitive linguistics tradition (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; 
Brugman 1988; Taylor 1989/2003; Dirven and Pörings 2003; Tyler and Evans 2003), 
computational semantics (e.g. Kilgarriff 1992; Pustejovsky 1995a; Copestake and Briscoe 
1996) and in the relatively new field of lexical pragmatics (e.g. Recanati 1995, 2004; 
Carston 1997, 2002b; Blutner 1998, 2002, 2004; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007). I will 
address the question of how word meanings get extended in detail in the next chapter. 
However, the question as to why it is that word meanings get extended, or, more 
fundamentally, what it is about our language systems, specifically their lexical 
component, that makes them so susceptible to polysemy, has not received nearly as 
much focus in the literature.51 
                                                      
51 Lakoff (1987), as discussed in Chapter 2, sees polysemy as a consequence of our cognitive organisation, 
where word meanings are a subtype of ‘radial category’ in which different concepts are organised with 
respect to a prototype, and extended by convention on the basis of general principles (e.g. metaphor). 
Although, for reasons stated in that chapter, I do not think that his account of polysemy is tenable, I agree 
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This question, which we called the problem of polysemy motivation in Chapter 1, 
will be the topic of this chapter. What makes our languages exhibit polysemy? What is 
the motivation for it? Is it fundamentally linguistic, communicative or cognitive, or 
some combination of these? Why do we rather use the same word to describe a set of 
different things than have a distinct word for each sense? I will take the ‘polysemy 
paradox’ as a starting point. As I mentioned in the Introduction, polysemy (in fact, 
ambiguity quite generally) represents an almost insurmountable challenge for 
computational models of natural language processing and translation, but is largely 
unproblematic from the point of view of human communication. A pragmatic theory 
that is able to explain how and why this is so, is also likely to shed light on the issue of 
what motivates the proliferation of polysemy in natural languages in the first place. 
Most existing theories of polysemy (with the notable exception of the cognitive 
linguistic paradigm) either explicitly or implicitly take polysemy to be a fact about 
language, that is, a phenomenon requiring an analysis in terms of the functioning of the 
linguistic system, with little, or no attention devoted to how it arises in communication. 
In this chapter, I question this mainstream lexical semantic view, and argue that 
although there is, needless to say, an important linguistic aspect to polysemy, it is, at the 
deepest level, a consequence of how communication works; it results from our capacity 
to infer speaker meanings on the basis of not fully determining linguistic evidence.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, I present a model of 
communication, the code model, which has been the basis for many linguistic 
approaches over the years. I show its implications for the interpretation of polysemy, 
exemplified by Pustejovsky’s generative theory, and argue that, faced with the challenge 
of linguistic underdeterminacy (the systematic gap between speaker meanings and 
linguistic meanings), it does not provide a workable account. In section 3.3, I consider 
the issue of linguistic underdeterminacy in more detail, discussing two possible views on 
the relation between linguistic meanings and the propositions that are communicated 
by them, both of which have important consequences for an account of polysemy. In 
                                                      
with Lakoff in that polysemy is dependent on the cognitive processes that enable us to construct, inter 
alia, metaphorical and metonymic meanings. While my focus in this chapter is the communicative aspect 
of polysemy, which I take to be fundamental, I will consider the specific processes of meaning extension 
responsible for the production of polysemy in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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section 3.4, I present a viable alternative to the code model of communication, the 
inferential model, on which verbal comprehension involves the inferential attribution of 
speaker meanings on the basis of the linguistic evidence provided. I argue, on the basis 
of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance-theoretic framework, that only within 
this kind of approach can an appropriate account of polysemy comprehension be given. 
Finally, in section 3.5, I consider two hypotheses about the evolutionary basis for our 
ability to attribute speaker meanings, and suggest that the development and 
proliferation of polysemy in natural languages are best accounted for within an 
approach that takes public languages to have evolved against the background of an 
already existing cognitive capacity for attributing mental states to others (our ‘theory of 
mind’, or ‘metarepresentational’ capacity), specifically, communicative intentions, as 
argued by Sperber (2000) and Carston (2002b). The theme of ‘language does not create 
polysemy, but polysemy is created by use of language’ will recur throughout this 
chapter. 
3.2 The code model of communication 
Before Grice ([1967] 1989), virtually all theories of communication were based on the 
so-called code-model. The guiding assumption of this model is that communication is a 
matter of encoding and decoding of messages in the form of signals (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949; Peirce 1955; Saussure 1974; Vygotsky 1986, and many others). On this 
approach, linguistic communication proceeds by a speaker encoding a thought into a 
sentence of a language – where a language is seen as a code that pairs phonetic and 
semantic representations of sentences – and by the hearer decoding the uttered sentence 
into an identical thought. For instance, if Mary, a speaker of Norwegian, wants to 
communicate to John that their daughter Susanne is hungry, she looks up in her mental 
grammar of Norwegian to find the appropriate sound-meaning pairs, and produces an 
utterance of (1): 
(1) Susanne er sulten. 
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John decodes this utterance by looking up the meanings of the sounds that Mary has 
produced in his mental grammar of Norwegian, applies the appropriate compositional 
rules to them, and ends up representing the meaning SUSANNE IS HUNGRY.  
A well-known problem with the code model of communication is that linguistic 
utterances typically contain context-sensitive and/or linguistically ambiguous 
expressions. Consider (2): 
(2) I lost my bat yesterday. 
In order to figure out what the speaker has expressed by uttering (2), the hearer has to 
assign the appropriate referents to the indexical expressions I, my and yesterday, and 
disambiguate between the linguistically-encoded meanings of bat (e.g. does the speaker 
have a ‘wooden instrument’ or a ‘flying rodent’ in mind?). In addition, he has to 
determine whether the conventionally polysemous verb lost is used in its ‘deprived of’ 
sense or its ‘deprived of through death’ sense. In such cases, the hearer has to use 
information from the context (linguistic or extra-linguistic), information that it is 
reasonable to suppose the speaker intended him to use, to form a representation of 
‘what is said’ by the utterance, as these context-sensitive elements make reference to the 
discourse situation in which they have been uttered.52 Thus, code-models of 
communication need some way to account for how the hearer fixes the referents of 
indexical expressions and resolves instances of lexical ambiguity, including conventional 
polysemy.  
One possibility would be to supply the code model with a set of rules for 
pragmatic interpretation. For instance, language users could be equipped with rules 
telling them that every occurrence of I should be substituted by a reference to the 
speaker, and every occurrence of yesterday should be substituted by a reference to the 
day before the utterance. Similar rules would have to be postulated for every other 
indexical expression of the language.53 Much less straightforward is the postulation of a 
                                                      
52 The notion of ‘what is said’ here refers to the proposition that is directly expressed by the utterance, i.e. 
something truth-evaluable. 
53 Within formal semantic approaches (e.g. Kaplan 1989 [1977]; Predelli 2005), which are not concerned 
with explaining how indexical reference is resolved but with providing truth-conditional contents to 
natural language sentences, it is common to treat indexicals as encoding not fully-fledged contents but 
rather functions from contexts to contents (Kaplan 1989 [1977]). This makes it possible to abstract away 
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rule for the resolution of lexical ambiguity (e.g. one that might account for how the 
hearer derives the contextually appropriate meanings of bat and lost in (2) above). 
When taken in isolation, natural language sentences often do not contain any linguistic 
indicators of the correct meaning of an ambiguous lexical form. Within computational 
semantic approaches (Asher and Lascarides 1995; Lascarides, Copestake, and Briscoe 
1996), it has been suggested that lexical ambiguity is resolved by the hearer choosing the 
interpretation that is coherent with the discourse context (possible coherence relations 
being temporal succession, causal relation, elaboration, etc.). On this view, lexical 
ambiguity is resolved by means of pragmatic rules that operate on the linguistically 
expressed discourse context.54  
3.2.1 The generative lexicon 
A modern, sophisticated version of the code-based approach to communication applied 
to the interpretation of polysemy is the generative lexicon theory (Pustejovsky 1991, 
1995a), discussed in the previous chapter. On this approach, the polysemy 
interpretation involves a combination of decoding of the semantic content (qualia 
structure) of the lexical items in the utterance, and application of a set of lexicon-
internal generative mechanisms. For instance, recall that the interpretation of so-called 
type shifting constructions (‘Mary began a book’), was seen as a function of the 
interaction between the requirements of the argument structure of the verb (begin takes 
an event as its second argument) and the semantics of the complement noun (book 
contains the event ‘read’ as part of its qualia structure, thus yielding the interpretation 
‘Mary began reading a book’), a process referred to as ‘type coercion’. The polysemy of 
                                                      
from the context-sensitivity of indexical expressions, and to capture the truth-conditional content of 
utterances in terms of their semantics (i.e. linguistically-encoded content). 
54 Sperber and Wilson (1987, 1982; 1986/1995: Chapter 1, Section 3) have argued that, given that language 
contains context-sensitive elements such as indexicals and ambiguity, for the code model of 
communication to work, the context used by the hearer in understanding an utterance should always be 
identical to the one envisaged by the speaker. On their view, this ‘mutual knowledge hypothesis’ is 
intuitively incorrect, given our everyday experience with communication, and leads to infinite regress: In 
order to distinguish the assumptions they share and those they do not share, speakers and hearers must 
each make first-order assumptions about the assumptions they share (I know that p), then second-order 
assumptions about the first order assumptions they share (I know that B knows that p), then third-order 
assumptions about the second-order assumptions they share (I know that B knows that I know that p) 
and so ad infinitum. This ‘mutual knowledge paradox’ was first discussed by Lewis (2002 [1969]) and 
Schiffer (1972), and various solutions have been proposed to it, in particular by Bach and Harnish (1979), 
and Clark and colleagues (Clark 1992, 1996). 
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bake (‘creative’ vs. ‘change-of-state’) was generated as a function of the semantics of its 
complement, giving rise to a creative interpretation of bake a cake (artefact), a result of 
the process of ‘co-composition’, and a change-of-state interpretation of bake a potato 
(natural kind). The process of ‘selective binding’ generated different interpretations of 
evaluative adjectives (e.g. good in good knife, good novel), by allowing them to modify 
event descriptions contained in the semantic representation of the head nouns (‘good 
for cutting’, ‘good read’). 
A problem that was pointed out in connection with the generative lexical 
semantic approach was that, by modelling polysemy interpretation entirely in terms of 
lexicon-internal processes, it is unable to account for its inherently flexible nature, and 
thus makes a range of wrong predictions. For instance, while it is clear that the tendency 
to interpret ‘type shifting’ constructions such as begin a book as ‘begin reading a book’ 
holds when the VP is considered in isolation (in a ‘null context’), a more specific context 
may easily serve to point the hearer towards a different interpretation. Consider (3): 
(3) Mary, John and Sue work as book conservators at the British Museum. They are 
working on restoring a collection of medieval books, all of which are in a poor 
condition after having been stored on the shelves for many years. Since they are 
completely covered in dust, each book has to be carefully dusted before being 
rebound. One day, after hours of hard work, John asks if they should all take a 
break and go for coffee. Sue has just finished her pile and is ready to follow John to 
the coffee bar in the Great Court, when Mary utters:  
‘Hang on a minute! I’ve just begun a huge old book.’ 
The most accessible interpretation of the last part of Mary’s utterance above is clearly 
that she began dusting a book, not reading it, as would be the default interpretation 
predicted by the generative account, which would have to be overridden by context in 
this case. It does not take much imagination to think of other contexts in which the 
correct (speaker-intended and easily retrieved) interpretation of the VP begin a book is 
‘began binding a book’, ‘began mending a book’, ‘began ripping up a book’, and so on. 
The problem for the generative, code-based account is that it is unable to predict such 
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interpretive flexibility, which would involve taking speaker intentions into account, even 
if the predictions it makes are in many cases correct.55 
The existence of clear interpretive tendencies for type shifting constructions in 
null contexts has been taken as evidence of a linguistic-semantic process (Copestake and 
Briscoe 1996). However, as we saw in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3), the type coercion 
mechanism makes heavy use of information that, on most accounts, would count as 
general world knowledge (i.e. not linguistic knowledge). Therefore, it is possible that 
interpretive preferences (e.g. the preference for interpreting begin a book as ‘begin 
reading a book’) in the absence of further context may stem from highly accessible real-
world knowledge about the denotations of the lexical concepts in the utterance (e.g. that 
books are typically read), and not from lexically stored information.  
However, there are cases of polysemy for which there seems to be a prima facie 
reason to take the polysemy to be derived linguistically. One such case is the meaning 
alternations that appear to depend on whether a noun is used with count or mass 
syntax. An example is terms for animals. When they are used as count nouns, they 
designate the animal (e.g. The chicken pecked the ground), and when they are used as 
mass nouns, they tend to designate the meat (e.g. We ate chicken in bean sauce for 
dinner). Copestake and Briscoe (1996) suggest that this occurs due to a lexical rule of 
‘meat grinding’, which creates meat-denoting mass nouns from animal-denoting count 
nouns. For instance, on the basis of this rule, we can predict that chicken will have a 
meat sense in (4) below: 
(4) I love chicken. 
In this case, an important indicator of the meat sense of chicken is that the noun occurs 
with mass morpho-syntax. But, unfortunately, syntax can only be part of the story of 
how this sense is derived. We can also get the meat sense when the word is used with 
count syntax, and the animal sense when it is used with mass syntax. Consider (5) and 
(6): 
(5) John went to the store and came home with a chicken. 
                                                      
55 For more detail, see the discussion of Pustejovsky’s account in Chapter 2. 
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(6) To raise chicken in the backyard has become a new trend in many cities in the 
United States. 
The use of chicken in (5) is compatible with both a ‘bird’ and a ‘meat’ sense. If the 
correct interpretation is the meat sense, which is arguably the most accessible one, it 
cannot be derived via a lexical rule of ‘meat grinding’, but has to be derived via some 
other (preferably pragmatic) mechanism that is capable of adjusting the count sense of 
the noun. As to the use of chicken in (6), it provides a counter-example to the rule of 
‘meat-grinding’, as, in this case, the lexical inference from animal-denoting count nouns 
to meat-denoting mass nouns does not hold. So even in cases where, on the face of it, 
there is good reason to take an alternation in meaning to be linguistically-motivated, 
matters are rarely this straightforward. 56 
3.3 Linguistic underdeterminacy 
The challenge for code models of communication, even of the highly sophisticated kind 
proposed by Pustejovsky and others, is that what is conveyed by linguistic 
communication generally goes well beyond what can be coded, and does so in a highly 
flexible way. Since Grice’s influential work ([1967] 1989), the view that sentence 
meanings typically underdetermine the implicit content of a speaker’s meaning (‘what is 
implicated’), has been quite uncontroversial in philosophy of language and linguistics.57 
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that the decoded sentence meaning 
may also underdetermine the explicit content of an utterance (‘what is said’), beyond 
containing indexical references and linguistic ambiguities (Searle 1978, 1983, 1992; 
Travis 1981, 1985, 1997; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Recanati 1989, 1993, 1995, 
                                                      
56 See Chapter 5 for extensive discussion of the interaction of polysemy and the count-mass distinction, 
including a critique of Copestake and Briscoe’s (1996) approach. 
57 One of Grice’s famous examples of the sentence meaning underdetermining the implicit content is B’s 
utterance in the following exchange: 
A. I’m out of petrol. 
B. There is a garage around the corner. 
On the assumption that B is being relevant, A is warranted to infer from B’s utterance that he thinks the 
garage is open, that it has petrol to sell, and so on, even though these meanings are not explicitly indicated 
by the decoded sentence meaning (‘what is said’); rather, they are conversational implicatures of B’s 
utterance (Grice [1967] 1989: 32). 
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2004; Carston 1988, 2002b).58 A number of other sources of linguistic 
underdetermination of the explicitly communicated meaning of an utterance have been 
discussed, including, following Carston (2002b: 22-28), (i) unarticulated constituents; 
(ii) underspecified scope of elements; (iii) underspecificity or weakness of encoded 
conceptual content; and (iv) overspecificity or narrowness of encoded conceptual 
content.59 Examples are given below: 
(7) a. She’s leaving. 
b. She didn’t butter the toast in the bathroom with the knife. 
c. Susan is happy. 
d. The steak is raw. 
The utterance in (7)a. is fully sentential, but the location from where the person is 
leaving is unarticulated and must be supplied in order for the utterance to express a 
complete truth-evaluable proposition (e.g. ‘Mona’s leaving Oslo’). On the basis of this 
kind of example, several pragmatists have argued for the existence of a process of ‘free’ 
pragmatic enrichment that provides such unarticulated constituents to the proposition 
expressed when these are appropriately relevant (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; 
Carston 1988, 2002b; Bach 1994; Stainton 1994; Recanati 2002b; Hall 2008).60 The 
utterance in (7)b. has several different interpretations depending on which constituent 
the negation takes scope over (e.g. ‘the toast in the bathroom with a knife’, ‘in the 
bathroom’, ‘with a knife’, etc.), each of which is associated with its own set of truth-
conditions. The speaker-intended interpretation in a given context needs to be 
                                                      
58 Grice’s ([1967] 1989) treatment of indexical references and linguistic ambiguity as contributing to the 
proposition explicitly expressed by an utterance (‘what is said’) recognised their context-sensitivity but 
gave no account of how they were resolved. It is only in more recent years that it has been fully 
appreciated how these two components of context-sensitivity are not at all trivial, and that giving an 
account of how they are resolved must employ a fully pragmatic apparatus (e.g. of maxims, etc.). 
59 However, some scholars, most notably within the ‘minimalist’ camp of philosophy of language, make a 
distinction between what they call ‘the proposition semantically expressed’, which is a minimal 
proposition determined by linguistic meaning (and narrow context), including linguistically-mandated 
processes such as indexical reference resolution and disambiguation, and what the speaker said (which is 
very much pragmatically permeated) (e.g. Borg 2004; Cappelen and Lepore 2005). 
60 Recently, however, a group of authors have rejected this view, maintaining instead a more semantically 
oriented analysis, on which the interpretation of utterances such as (7)a. depends on the presence of 
covert indexicals in the logical forms of sentences, which are assigned values in context by a pragmatic 
process of saturation similar to that involved in assigning a referent to a pronoun (e.g. Stanley 2000, 2005; 
King and Stanley 2005). For instance, the logical form of the utterance in (7)a. would contain a location 
variable, which could be assigned the value ‘Oslo’. 
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pragmatically inferred (at least in the absence of prosodic cues, as when the utterance 
occurs in written form) (Carston 2002b: Chapter 4). In (7)c., the adjective happy 
denotes a general concept that is usually made more specific in context (expressing, for 
instance, that Susan is ‘happy in a low-key, peaceful sort of a way’, ‘happy in an ecstatic, 
excited sort of a way’, etc.), while the encoded ‘uncooked’ meaning of raw in (7)d. could 
be relaxed in order to describe food that has had some, but grossly insufficient, cooking. 
This kind of data has been used to argue for the existence of a pragmatic process that 
adjusts the meaning of individual words (Recanati 1995, 2004; Carston 1997, 2002b; 
Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007). Carston (2002b: 28) notes that, although in cases such 
as (7)c. and (7)d. the operation of this pragmatic process is not necessary in order for 
the utterances to express full propositions, it “seems to be required if we are interested 
in finding that proposition which it is rational to assume that the speaker intended to 
express”. In Chapter 4 I argue that this pragmatic process, which constructs context-
dependent lexical meanings on the basis of their encoded meanings, plays a central role 
in giving rise to polysemy.  
There are at least two possible views one might take on the nature of linguistic 
underdeterminacy, described by Carston (2002b: 29) as the convenient abbreviation view 
and the essentialist view. On the convenient abbreviation view, underdeterminacy is a 
matter of effort-saving convenience for the speaker. Although sentence meaning more 
often than not underdetermines the proposition expressed by it, a sentence that fully 
encodes the speaker’s meaning could always be supplied. This is the view held by Quine 
(1960) and Katz (1972, 1976, 1981), who argued that every proposition expressed (or 
‘statement made’) by a natural language sentence was describable in terms of a context-
independent, ‘eternal’ sentence. Katz termed this the principle of effability (1972, 1976, 
1981). Crucial to the transformation of a non-eternal sentence into an eternal sentence 
is the replacement of each indexical element with a description that picks out, for each 
indexical nominal expression, the intended referent in a unique context-independent 
way, and for each indexical tense indicator, a referentially unique time designation. 
Below is a suggestion for a fully encoding ‘eternal sentence’ counterpart for the 
utterance in (2) above, repeated as (8) for convenience: 
(8) a. I lost my bat yesterday. 
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b. ‘Ingrid Lossius Falkum caused Ingrid Lossius Falkum to be deprived of the 
wooden implement with a handle and a solid surface used for hitting the ball in 
baseball that belonged to Ingrid Lossius Falkum, between 2pm and 4pm on 22nd 
of August 2010 somewhere in the Majorstua area, Oslo, Norway’. 
On the convenient abbreviation view of underdeterminacy, the idea would be that a 
speaker, in order to save herself the effort of having to express a long, complex sentence 
such as that in (8)b., can choose to use a sentence which does not fully encode her 
intended meaning, and rely on the hearer using his pragmatic inferential capacity to 
turn it into a fully propositional representation. On this approach, Carston (2002b: 35) 
points out, our pragmatic ability would be a ‘useful add-on’ to our language capacity, 
but its contribution would not be strictly essential in enabling us to express ourselves 
and communicate the way we do. 
On the essentialist view, however, linguistic underdeterminacy is seen as an 
essential feature of the relation between sentence meanings and speaker meanings 
(Carston 2002b: 29). The view is that, given the complexity and fine-grainedness of the 
thoughts that speakers can entertain and communicate to each other, they generally do 
not lend themselves to a full encoding by natural language sentences. So although the 
sentence in (8)b. comes closer to encoding the speaker-intended meaning than (8)a., 
any attempt to be fully explicit (by providing uniquely denoting descriptions for entities 
and properties) is bound to fail. The essentialist view comes in a weak and a strong 
version. The weak version takes underdeterminacy to be the rule but a full encoding 
may be possible in a small number of cases (possible candidates are so-called analytic, 
i.e. context-free, sentences, e.g. ‘Cats are animals’). The strong version takes 
underdeterminacy to be universal and denies that a full encoding is possible in any 
circumstances. On either of these versions, our ability to make pragmatic inferences 
about speaker-intended meanings would provide the essential foundation for our 
expressive and communicative abilities. 
Both the convenient abbreviation view and the essentialist view of linguistic 
underdeterminacy provide a basis for polysemy. On the first view, polysemy could be 
motivated by a goal of ‘economy of expression’, representing an effort-saving 
convenience for the speaker. Instead of having to go through the laborious task of fully 
  
 
86 
encoding the sense she has in mind (which she could do, if she wanted to), the speaker 
can rely on the hearer’s pragmatic abilities enabling him to arrive at the intended 
interpretation (for instance, the expression mouth of the river, containing the 
polysemous expression mouth, could be seen as a convenient shorthand for the fuller 
encoding the place where the river enters the sea). On the second essentialist view, 
however, where the linguistic codes that modern humans make use of in 
communication are not capable of fully encoding speaker meanings (and have to be 
supplied by pragmatic inference), polysemy would be a necessity. That the sentences of 
our languages can be used to express a number of different propositions depending on 
the context would, on this approach, be a necessary consequence of the nature of our 
linguistic codes. At the lexical level, if the vocabularies of our languages are not capable 
of encoding the range of concepts we can entertain and communicate, polysemy – 
understood as the ability of words to express different meanings in different contexts – 
would then follow as a necessary consequence. 
3.3.1 The (in)effability of thought 
The question as to whether there exist ‘eternal sentences’, which underlie Katz’s 
effability principle, is central to the evaluation of the two positions on linguistic 
underdeterminacy presented above. In a recent survey paper, von Fintel and 
Matthewson (2008) examined the evidence for potential semantic universals on the 
basis of a range of cross-linguistic data. Comparing the expressive powers of different 
languages had been suggested by Katz (1972, 1976) as a way his effability principle could 
be tested: 
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[I]t follows from the effability thesis that each natural language is capable of 
expressing the same body of thoughts … for any sentence of one natural 
language, there is at least one sentence in every other natural language that 
expresses the same proposition. Accordingly, if we find one sentence in one 
natural language that has no translation in some other natural language, the 
thesis is false.61 (Katz 1972: 20)  
Von Fintel and Matthewson (2008) conducted investigations in three areas: (i) the 
lexicon (content morphemes); (ii) functional morphemes/categories and composition 
principles; and (iii) pragmatics. Acknowledging that cross-linguistic uniformity cannot 
be found at any kind of structural level (e.g. what is encoded by means of a simple 
expression in one language may be encoded by a complex expression in another 
language), they allowed for cross-linguistic equivalence to be understood as “what 
language X expresses [= encodes] is also expressible in language Y but at the price of 
some complexity” (von Fintel and Matthewson 2008: 144). Their results were as follows: 
They found no convincing examples of semantic universals at the level of the lexicon 
(e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives); no individual lexical items are universally attested. Cross-
linguistic differences were found both with regard to inventories of functional categories 
(e.g. some languages ‘lack’ certain quantifiers), and in the distinctions encoded by 
functional morphemes (e.g. apparently equivalent modals in two languages may differ 
with regard to their encoded content). While they found reason to agree with the view 
that there exists a small set of universally available composition principles, they point 
out that more work is needed to determine exactly what those principles consist of. As 
to the domain of pragmatics, considering the phenomenon of presupposition, von 
Fintel and Matthewson observe that although the literature devoted to presupposition 
concentrates almost exclusively on English, the existing empirical evidence indicates 
that languages may differ in their ability to express certain aspects of meaning as 
presuppositions (e.g. the existence of non-presuppositional it-clefts). On this basis, von 
                                                      
61 There are two ways in which this claim could be interpreted, depending on what is meant by 
‘expressed’. Either it could mean that for any sentence of one natural language, there is at least one 
sentence in every other language that encodes its meaning, which is the interpretation likely to be 
intended by Katz. Or it could mean that for any sentence of one natural language, there is a least one 
sentence in every other language that communicates its meaning. In this case, one would be making a 
much weaker claim, allowing for non-equivalence at the level of encoded content, but assuming 
equivalence of content at the level of proposition/thought. Under this interpretation, the principle seems 
much more plausible. 
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Fintel and Matthewson conclude that Katz’s effability principle (1972, 1976, 1981) 
cannot be maintained.62 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 191-192) and Carston (2002b: 30-42) argue 
against Katz’s principle of effability and the existence of ‘eternal’ sentences on 
psychological and philosophical grounds. Sperber and Wilson maintain that the strong 
version of Katz’s principle, on which it entails that every human thought corresponds to 
a fully encoding natural language sentence, is incompatible with the psychological, 
individualist notion of thought. Thoughts, in this sense, are likely to contain private 
references, to time, space, people, events, and so on, fixed in terms of a ‘private logbook’ 
and ‘ego-centred map’. For instance, my mental representation of the man who is my 
husband contains a number of such private references, and is likely to differ from the 
representation his mother has of him, and the representation a person who has watched 
him give a talk at a political meeting may have of him. Sperber and Wilson’s point is 
that thoughts that contain such private references do not seem amenable to a full 
encoding in a natural language.  
Carston argues against a weaker version of the effability principle, on which it 
entails that only the proposition expressed by a natural language sentence (not thoughts 
in general) can be fully encoded by another natural language sentence,63 drawing on 
arguments from Wettstein (1979) and Recanati (1987, 1994). She maintains that it is 
impossible to provide eternal sentences that correspond to propositions expressed by 
sentences containing indexical, referential, and predicate expressions. As observed by 
Wettstein (1979), the object referred to by an indexical expression can be picked out by 
a number of non-synonymous (i.e. truth-conditionally distinct) descriptions. For 
                                                      
62 However, von Fintel and Matthewson (2008: 191) are optimistic about the prospect of discovering 
‘purely semantic’ universals, given their observation that “languages often express strikingly similar truth-
conditions, in spite of more trivial differences in lexical semantics or syntax”. Thus, they seem to espouse 
a view of effability on which there may be cross-linguistic differences in presuppositions (and 
implicatures, expressive content, etc.), but where, “at the level of core truth-conditional content, what one 
language can express any other can as well” (ibid. 7). I cannot assess this weakened effability claim here, 
or whether there is any psychological basis for postulating a level of ‘core truth-conditional content’ in 
this strictly semantic sense. What seems highly plausible, however, is that given our pragmatic abilities, 
for any given proposition expressed by use of a sentence in a language there is a sentence that can be used 
to express (= communicate) that proposition in every other language, in spite of the considerable 
differences between the linguistic codes used.  
63 Carston (2002b: 34) refers to this as the ‘Third Effability Principle’, originally considered (and rejected) 
by Recanati (1994: 157). 
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instance, the indexical expression She in an utterance of ‘She arrived late’ can be 
uniquely described as ‘The woman who danced with the Norwegian Crown Prince at t1’ 
‘The female teacher in the pink dress with a white waistband who was at Oslo Castle 
between t2 and t3’, ‘The brown-haired Labour Party representative who smoked three 
cigarettes outside Oslo Castle between t4 and t5’, etc. It is not clear which of these 
expressions should be taken to be a constituent of the eternal sentence, i.e. that which is 
an actual formulation of the proposition that the speaker has asserted. Carston (2002b: 
36) writes: 
Indexical reference … appears to be irrevocably context-bound; it is not 
reformulable in terms of a uniquely denoting expression, but depends on the 
addressee’s capacity to identify the intended entity by some means which is non-
linguistic, or at least, not wholly linguistic. 
Furthermore, Recanati (1987) has claimed that it is not only indexical expressions that 
are referentially context-dependent; quite generally, there cannot be reference without a 
context (and thus no uniquely denoting descriptions). For instance, if proper names are 
treated as a variety of indexical (a position that both Recanati and Carston seem to 
endorse), it is, in view of Wettstein’s argument above, unlikely that they can be given 
eternal descriptions. In the case of apparently complete definite descriptions (e.g. ‘The 
Crown Prince of Norway’), Recanati (1987: 62) argues that their reference always 
depends on the ‘domain of discourse’, which is “that with respect to which the speaker 
presents his or her utterance as true”.64 Carston, following Travis (1985) and others, 
shows that this also includes the predication function of language. For instance, in cases 
where a communicated predicate is more specific than the concept it encodes (e.g. an 
utterance of ‘Susan is happy’ in a context where she has just learned the result of her 
exam) it would often be difficult to find a description that fully encodes this concept 
(e.g. Susan could be happy to the extent that she would consider continuing her studies, 
                                                      
64 Recanati (1987: 63) discusses the following kind of example. Consider a situation where an old person, 
who is suffering from dementia, insists, in 2010, that the Crown Prince of Norway is still Harald (when he 
is, in fact, Håkon Magnus). It is conceivable that, for instance, his children could use the apparently 
complete definite description ‘the Crown Prince of Norway’ to refer to the previous crown prince, Harald, 
in a conversation with each other. In this case, the interpretation of this definite description would 
depend on the identification of the domain of discourse with respect to which it is intended to be 
evaluated (i.e. the belief world of their father). 
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but not happy enough to want to go out celebrating, etc.).65 Moreover, cases where the 
concept communicated by a predicate depends on contextually-determined standards of 
precision (e.g. ‘France is hexagonal’, ‘The steak is raw’, etc.) are unlikely to have eternal 
sentence counterparts, as the approximate values of the predicates do not seem to be 
possible to express in words.66  
Taken together, these arguments point to the non-existence of eternal sentences 
in natural languages, on the basis of which Katz’s effability principle must be rejected. It 
follows that, rather than being just an effort-saving convenience for the speaker, 
linguistic underdeterminacy is an essential feature of the relation between linguistic 
codes and the thoughts/propositions that can be expressed by them (Carston 2002b: 42). 
At the lexical level, this would make polysemy a necessary consequence of the fact that 
the concepts that are lexically encoded are far fewer than the range of concepts that can 
be communicated by use of them. In a sense, the meanings of polysemous lexical items 
are intrinsically ineffable in that, in most cases, it will be impossible to describe in 
natural language terms the full range of meanings a polysemous lexical item may be 
used to express in different contexts (e.g. happy, good, over, run, open, etc.). In addition, 
the sense that is communicated by use of a polysemous lexical item in a given context 
will arguably be subject to the more general issue of ineffability of reference and 
predication, as described above. In fact, the examples discussed by Carston (2002b: 40-
41) of communicated concepts being more specific than the encoded concepts (e.g. 
happy), or those communicated concepts depending on a contextually relevant standard 
of precision (e.g. hexagonal, raw) are good candidates for polysemy.  
In the next section, I present an alternative to the code model of communication, 
the inferential model, in which the essential nature of linguistic underdeterminacy can 
be accommodated. I claim that the inferential model, more specifically the relevance-
theoretic pragmatic approach developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), also 
provides a natural framework for analysing polysemy comprehension. 
                                                      
65 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of such cases. 
66 However, some philosophers of language, following Lewis (1979), will maintain that predicates such as 
hexagonal have the same content throughout, but come with standard of precision parameters that have 
to be fixed in context. 
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3.4 The inferential model of communication 
Grice ([1957], [1967] 1989) was the first to hold the view that instead of being a matter 
of encoding and decoding of meanings, communication is inferential, and involves a 
kind of mindreading: A speaker provides evidence of her intention to communicate a 
certain content to the hearer, and the hearer recovers this intention by a rational 
maxim-guided inferential process using the evidence provided. Grice’s claim was that 
recognising the intentions of others in this way is a form of inference to the best 
explanation, that is, to the explanation that best accounts for the available evidence. On 
this approach, communication can be achieved just by expression and recognition of 
intentions, even in the absence of a code (e.g. by pointing, gazing, eyebrow raising, etc.). 
However, using a language allows for a degree of precision and complexity that can 
usually not be achieved in non-verbal communication. 
3.4.1 Relevance theory 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) draw on Grice’s central insight about communication 
as an inferential process that requires the attribution of speaker intentions, in their 
formulation of relevance theory. On their approach, inferential communication, or 
ostensive-inferential communication, involves two layers of intention: (i) an informative 
intention, which is the intention to inform an audience of something; and (ii) a 
communicative intention, which is the intention to inform an audience of one’s 
informative intention (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 611). To communicate this way, the 
communicator has to use an ostensive stimulus, that is, a stimulus “designed to attract an 
audience’s attention and focus it on the communicator’s meaning”, which provides 
evidence that she intends the audience to come to a certain conclusion (ibid.). Proper 
understanding depends on the fulfilment of the communicative intention, that is, on the 
hearer recognising the speaker's informative intention. In this way, utterance 
interpretation is seen as involving the attribution of several layers of intention; it is a 
sophisticated form of mindreading.  
Relevance theory addresses a fundamental problem for human cognition. Given 
the vast amounts of information that our senses monitor, that are stored in our 
memories, and the possible conclusions that our inferential system can draw from all 
this information at any given time, the question is: how do we select which inputs from 
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the environment to attend to, and how do we, when processing the inputs, decide which 
contextual assumptions we should bring to bear, and what conclusions we should draw? 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 260) claim that there is a single answer to these 
questions, stated in their Cognitive Principle of Relevance: “Human cognition tends to be 
geared to the maximisation of relevance”. Relevance is defined as a potential property of 
all types of input to cognitive processes, and may be assessed in terms of the amount of 
effort (of perception, memory and inference) it takes to process the input, and the 
positive cognitive effects the individual may derive from it (where a ‘positive cognitive 
effect’ is described as a ‘worthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of the 
world’, and may include strengthening or elimination of existing assumptions, 
derivation of contextual implications). Other things being equal, the more cognitive 
effects an input yields to an individual and the less effort it takes to process it, the higher 
the degree of relevance of that input to that individual at that time.  
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) further claim that ostensive stimuli (utterances) 
create expectations of relevance not raised by other types of stimuli, which are precise 
and predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the communicator’s meaning. This is 
stated in their Communicative Principle of Relevance: “Every act of ostensive 
communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (ibid. 260). 
By requesting the addressee’s attention, the communicator conveys that her ostensive 
act is more relevant than alternative stimuli competing for his attention at the time. An 
utterance is optimally relevant if (a) it is at least relevant enough to be worth processing, 
and (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences (ibid. 270).67 To make her utterance optimally relevant, the speaker should 
achieve at least enough cognitive effects to make the utterance worth processing while 
avoiding causing the hearer any gratuitous effort in achieving those effects. The hearer’s 
goal in communication is to find an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning that meets 
the expectations of relevance raised by the ostensive stimulus itself. 
                                                      
67 Expectations of relevance vary across speakers and times, depending on what alternative inputs are 
available. In general, to be worth processing, the relevance of the utterance must be higher than other 
inputs that the hearer could have been attending to at the time. Clause (b) takes into account that the 
speaker may be unable or unwilling to make her utterance more informative or economical (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: 266ff.).  
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In modern pragmatic theory, and relevance theory in particular, the capacity to 
infer speaker meanings on the basis of the evidence provided is taken to be closely tied 
to, and reliant on, the more general capacity to infer and attribute contentful mental 
states to others: our ‘theory of mind’, ‘mindreading’, or ‘metarepresentational’ capacity 
(Premack and Woodruff 1978; Wimmer and Perner 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and 
Frith 1985; Leslie 1987; Baron-Cohen 1995, and many others).68 The claim is that the 
theory of mind capacity provides the foundation for the kind of ostensive-inferential 
communication that humans engage in; it is what enables us to bridge the gap between 
not fully encoding linguistic meanings and intended speaker meanings, including 
inferring speaker-intended concepts that differ from the concepts lexically encoded by 
the words used. Within this view, as Carston (2002b: 46) has pointed out, there would 
be a good reason for our having linguistic codes that do not fully encode the thoughts 
we communicate to each other: it would just not be necessary.69 
The role of the pragmatic inferential capacity in bridging the gap between 
lexically encoded concepts and communicated concepts is rarely explicitly considered in 
connection with polysemy (but cf. Tyler and Evans 2003, to be discussed in Chapter 4). 
This is, of course, understandable if the goal is to capture polysemy in terms of the 
semantic content of lexical items and linguistic operations over this content. However, 
on the view that linguistic underdeterminacy is a necessary aspect of the relation 
between linguistic meanings and speaker meanings, and where polysemy is seen as an 
instance of underdeterminacy applying at the level of individual lexical items, providing 
a full account of polysemy in terms of the workings of the linguistic system should, in 
principle, not be feasible. At least, there would be no need for polysemy to be entirely 
                                                      
68 According to Sperber and Wilson (2002a), pragmatics is, in fact, a submodule of the mental system that 
is responsible for our ability to attribute mental states to each other. 
69 A real alternative to the inferential view of communication can be found in Millikan’s (1984, 1987, 
2005) theory of utterance comprehension. Millikan rejects the Gricean (and relevance theory) assumption 
that utterance interpretation is a matter of inference about the speakers’ intentions, and argues that it 
should rather be modelled as a form of ‘direct perception of the world’, much like the way we perceive the 
world through vision. Her claim is that when we understand language, “it is the world, not meanings, and 
not speaker intentions, that is immediately perceived” (Millikan 2005: 206). Recanati (2002a, 2004, 2007) 
holds a similar view with regard to the derivation of the explicit content of an utterance (‘what is said’). 
Relevance-theorists, on the other hand, take the process of verbal comprehension to be entirely 
inferentially based, including the derivation of the proposition explicitly expressed. I cannot get into the 
details of the debate between Millikan/Recanati and the relevance-theorists here, but the question of 
whether explicit content is inferentially derived comes up again in Chapter 6, in the discussion of 
metonymy. 
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linguistically generated if communicators possess a powerful enough pragmatic 
inferential capacity. In the next section, I outline how the comprehension of polysemy, 
both of the conventional and non-conventional kind, can be naturally analysed within 
the relevance-theoretic framework presented above, as part of the overall inferential 
process of constructing hypotheses about speaker-intended meanings on the basis of the 
linguistic evidence provided. 
3.4.2 Polysemy and utterance comprehension70 
Consider the following example. On 27 January 1967, the command module of the 
Apollo 1 spacecraft was destroyed by a fire during a test and training exercise. The three 
astronauts aboard were killed. When one of the control centre employees called up 
another NASA astronaut to tell him about the tragedy that had taken place, he uttered 
(9): 
(9) We lost our crew! 
On his own account, the astronaut at the receiving end was at first unsure whether his 
colleague was telling him that the crew were missing, that they had been unable to find 
them and so couldn’t carry out the testing, or if he was in fact telling him that they had 
all died.71 The difficulty, of course, concerned the conventional polysemy of the verb 
lose; whether his colleague in the control centre had intended to convey ‘become unable 
to find’ or ‘be deprived of (someone) through death’, both of which were compatible 
with the overall (linguistic and extralinguistic) context. However, when his colleague 
continued ‘There has been a fire!’, in an agitated voice, it started to dawn on the 
astronaut what was being communicated. Although the contextual information was still 
compatible with an interpretation on which his colleague was informing him that the 
testing had been unsuccessful due to two problems, (a) they couldn’t locate the crew and 
                                                      
70 The relevance-theoretic analyses outlined in this section do not specify the details of the pragmatic 
processes involved in the derivation of speaker meanings. Instead, they are intended to show that the 
comprehension of polysemy, even of the conventional kind, depends on a constructive pragmatic 
inferential process that forms hypotheses about speaker meanings on the basis of linguistic evidence and 
accessible contextual assumptions. I return in more detail to the specific pragmatic processes responsible 
for the construction of polysemy (that is, of the non-conventional kind) in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
71 Attested example from the British documentary film In the Shadow of the Moon (2007) directed by 
David Sington. 
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(b) there had been a fire, he inferred the causal-explanatory connection between the first 
and the second utterance and, taking the agitation in the speaker's voice into account, 
understood that what his colleague had intended to communicate by uttering (9) was 
that his three astronaut colleagues aboard the Apollo 1 had all died. 
On the relevance-theoretic account, the astronaut’s interpretation of (9) 
proceeds according to a comprehension heuristic, which is applied automatically to 
verbal input (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 613). According to this heuristic, the hearer (i) 
takes the decoded linguistic meaning, follows a path of least effort in considering 
interpretive hypotheses, and (ii) stops when the interpretation he arrives at satisfies his 
expectations of relevance. The interpretation the astronaut arrived at was more relevant 
than the other possible interpretation. Given the available contextual assumptions (e.g. 
‘There had been a fire’, ‘The control centre employee was agitated’, etc.) it was the most 
accessible interpretation (the least effort demanding), and it was the one that yielded the 
most cognitive effects (it provided a causal connection between the two utterances, and 
probably made the astronaut draw a great many contextual implications concerning the 
consequences for the crew’s families, future Apollo missions, and so on). The 
proposition that was explicitly expressed by the utterance in (9) was something along 
the lines of (10): 
(10) NASA was deprived, through death, of the crew of the Apollo 1 spacecraft. 
Arriving at this explicitly expressed proposition, including an interpretation of the 
polysemous verb lose, required a non-demonstrative pragmatic inference process geared 
to the recovery of the speaker’s meaning.72 
In the example above, recovering the speaker-intended meaning of the 
conventionally polysemous verb lose, involved a pragmatic process of disambiguation. 
                                                      
72 It might be argued that the disambiguation of lose in (9) can also be accounted for within a 
computational approach that takes lexical ambiguity to be resolved by the hearer choosing the 
interpretation that is coherent with the discourse context (e.g. Asher and Lascarides 1995; Lascarides, 
Copestake, and Briscoe 1996). On this approach, the ambiguity could be resolved by the application of a 
pragmatic rule or constraint that tells the hearer to choose the interpretation that maintains discourse 
coherence (in this case, it would involve retrieving the causal connection between the two utterances). 
However, I think the relevance-theoretic analysis is to be preferred for reasons of psychological 
plausibility, in that it accounts for the fact that a variety of contextual information, not only that which 
was linguistically expressed in the discourse context, can be used in forming a hypothesis about the 
speaker-intended meaning. 
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However, in the examples containing the verb open (11) below, there seems to be only a 
single linguistically-encoded meaning of the verb, and the more specific interpretations 
are to be derived by means of a pragmatic process that constructs occasion-specific 
senses in accordance with the hearer’s expectations of relevance:  
(11) a. Susan opened the door. 
b. Mary opened a bottle of wine. 
c. John opened a tin of beans. 
d. Peter opened the curtains. 
In these cases, the direct object of open indicates which concept the speaker intends the 
hearer to construct. Sometimes this requires little effort on the part of the hearer by way 
of pragmatic inference (e.g. in the ‘normal’ interpretation of opened the door, where 
Susan uses the door handle to open it), whereas in other cases, inferring the speaker’s 
intended meaning may demand more of the hearer’s pragmatic abilities (e.g. in a case 
where opened the door is used to convey that Susan picked its lock, smashed it open, 
etc.). 
A similar analysis can be given to Pustejovsky’s (1995a) examples of selective 
binding, where the meaning of an adjective is assumed to vary as a function of the 
semantics of the noun it modifies. These can be treated on the relevance-theoretic 
account as involving pragmatic specification of the concept linguistically-encoded by 
the adjective. For instance, the adjective good, discussed by Pustejovsky as subject to the 
process of selective binding, can be seen as encoding a very broad concept which, on 
most occasions of use, will have to be pragmatically adjusted in order for the hearer to 
arrive at the interpretation that was intended by the speaker. In this way, the concept 
that is communicated by good when it modifies, e.g. the noun book, would have, as a 
result of pragmatic specification, a narrower denotation than that which is encoded (e.g. 
‘good read’). However, unlike the generative lexicon, the relevance-theoretic approach 
predicts that good book may communicate different occasion-specific senses (e.g. a good 
book could be one that is easy to read, one that is entertaining, one of high academic or 
intellectual quality, one that is good to kill flies with, etc.), by treating lexical 
interpretation as a matter of adjusting the interpretation of individual words in 
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accordance with one’s context-specific expectations of relevance.73 I return to a more 
detailed consideration of this sort of pragmatic process in Chapter 4. 
On the relevance-theoretic approach, the interpretation of type shifting 
constructions such as the VP begin a book in (3) above, would proceed in terms of a 
pragmatic process that recovers the contextually appropriate event associated with the 
VP, rather than in terms of a lexicon-internal generative mechanism (cf. Pustejovsky 
1995a). In the case of (3), where the most accessible interpretation of the utterance ‘I’ve 
just begun a huge old book’ was that Mary had just begun dusting a huge old book, this 
would be the most relevant one the hearer could derive. It would be the interpretation 
that required the least processing effort, and gave rise to a set of cognitive effects of the 
expected sort (i.e. it provided an adequate explanation for Mary’s previous utterance of 
‘Hang on a minute!’). Thus, it achieved relevance in the way that the hearer might have 
expected it to do.74  
Given the dependence of polysemy comprehension on this constructive 
pragmatic inference process, geared to the recovery of the speaker’s meaning, I would 
like to suggest that pragmatics may play a more fundamental role in the development 
and motivation of polysemy in natural languages than has previously been recognised. 
In the next section, I discuss two hypotheses about the evolutionary basis for our ability 
to attribute speaker meanings, and suggest that the development and proliferation of 
polysemy in natural languages are best accounted for within an approach that takes 
language to have evolved against the background of an already existing cognitive 
capacity for attributing mental states to others. My suggestion is that the fundamentally 
pragmatic nature of polysemy has an evolutionary basis. 
                                                      
73 It is worth mentioning that the flexibility lacking in Pustejovsky’s account is allowed for in those formal 
semantic accounts that operate with a larger set of context-sensitive elements (i.e. extending beyond 
indexicals and linguistic ambiguity). For instance, Szabó (2001) postulates a variable in the semantic 
representation of the adjective good, requiring a pragmatic operation of saturation, which accounts for its 
different senses in, e.g. good knife, good weather, good book. However, any account that postulates such 
invisible indexical elements needs to be backed up by syntactic evidence that it is really there.  
74 It is compatible with this pragmatic account, however, that type shifting verbs such as begin come with 
some kind of semantic parameter indicating that their complement is an event or activity, in which case 
supplying the relevant event or activity to the proposition expressed by the utterance would be the result 
of a linguistically-mandated process of saturation. In any case, though, whether the process is a matter of 
saturation or a top-down, ‘free’ recovery of unarticulated constituents, the specific event or activity that is 
recovered in each case would be a matter for context and pragmatic inference. See Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed analysis. 
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3.5 An evolutionary story about theory of mind and language 
It is widely thought that language and theory of mind are made possible by biologically 
evolved mental mechanisms, which are both domain-specific and distinctive to humans. 
The uniqueness of human language is attested by the fact that no linguistic system of 
equivalent power appears to exist elsewhere in the animal kingdom. Humans also 
appear to be unique in their ability to attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to others, 
although there is some experimental evidence suggesting that chimpanzees and other 
primates may have some rudimentary metarepresentational capacities (Call and 
Tomasello 2005). The interdependence of language and theory of mind in humans 
suggests that they have co-evolved. However, given the view that language and theory of 
mind are distinct mental mechanisms, we may hypothesise that one of them developed 
first to a degree sufficient to enable the development of the other (Sperber 2000). This 
gives rise to two different hypotheses about the origin of the co-evolutionary process. 
On the first, language evolved first and subsequently provided the basis for the 
development of a theory of mind ability. On the second, the theory of mind, or the 
metarepresentational capacity,75 provided the foundation for the development of the 
language capacity (ibid.). In this section, I consider the implications of each of these two 
hypotheses about the evolution of language and theory of mind in humans for the 
development of polysemy. Drawing on arguments by Sperber (2000) and Carston 
(2002b), I will suggest that the second hypothesis (theory of mind-first) provides a 
plausible explanation of the development and motivation of polysemy in natural 
languages. 
According to the language-first hypothesis, the capacity for language preceded 
the metarepresentational ability in human evolution (cf. Dennett 1991). On this 
hypothesis, a metarepresentational ability might have developed as a result of our 
ancestors, already linguistically equipped to assign content to linguistic utterances, 
gradually becoming aware of the representational character of the linguistic utterances 
in their environment. At first, the domain of such an ability would be restricted to 
                                                      
75 Throughout his discussion of these two evolutionary hypotheses, Sperber (2000) uses the term 
‘metarepresentation’, by which he understands the ability to form and entertain representations of 
representations quite generally, including the ability to attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to others 
(the theory of mind). 
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linguistic utterances, then it would extend to other kinds of representations, and to 
mental representations in particular. This hypothesis meshes well with the view of 
linguistic underdeterminacy as convenient abbreviation, as discussed in section 3.3 
above. If language evolved first, it seems likely that there was a time in human evolution 
where our ancestors fully encoded their messages (and where their communication 
contained no implicatures), and explicit content was derived entirely via decoding.76 
The subsequent evolution of a metarepresentational capacity would have provided the 
communicators with a short-circuiting, effort-reducing tool, which saved them the 
laborious process of fully encoding and articulating their thoughts.  
Sperber’s (2000) main argument against the language-first hypothesis is that if 
ancestral language was entirely a matter of encoding-decoding, there must have been a 
radical change in the human linguistic mechanism at some point in its evolution. In 
order to consider this claim, it is useful to look at some characteristics of animal 
communication.  
The code model of communication is probably correct for most animal 
communication. Well-known examples of coded animal communication include the 
dances of honeybees (von Frisch 1976) and vervet monkey vocalisations (Struhsaker 
1967; Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980). While honey bees dance to convey 
information about the location and quality of food, vervet monkeys produce acoustically 
different alarm calls in response to different classes of predators (large cats, birds of 
prey, and snakes), which trigger specific escape responses among their conspecifics 
(leopard alarms make them run up into trees, eagle alarms cause them to look up, run 
into the bush, or both, and snake alarms make them stand on tiptoe, looking down at 
the ground). Early interpretations of vervet vocalisations took them as evidence that the 
vervet monkeys shared a semantic system of communication, by which they could refer 
to specific types of objects and events they encountered in their environment, and it was 
hypothesised that the alarm signals could be evolutionary precursors, or homologs, of 
human words (Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980; Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). This 
hypothesis has subsequently been questioned by many scholars, in view of the many 
                                                      
76 But cf. Millikan (1984, 2005), who would dispute the claim that this is the only way in which 
communication may proceed in a non-metarepresentational environment. See footnote 69. 
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radically different properties of human language, which indicate the possibility of an 
independently evolved, distinctively human, mechanism (Bickerton 1990; Hauser, 
Chomsky, and Fitch 2002; Tomasello 2008; Fitch 2010). Unlike vervet vocalisations, 
which have an innate, genetic basis (all individuals have the same basic vocal repertoire, 
including those raised in isolation or with other monkey species (Tomasello 2008)), the 
human lexicon is learned - it is only the ability to acquire a lexicon that is innately 
determined. Furthermore, while vervet vocalisations are situation-specific (the vocal 
calls appear to be tightly fixed to the triggering situation), human words are non-
situation-specific; they are rarely associated with specific functions, but can be linked to 
virtually any concept that humans can entertain (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002; 
Jackendoff 2002). As Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002: 1576) write, “[e]ven for the 
simplest words, there is typically no straightforward word-thing relationship, if ‘thing’ is 
to be understood in mind-independent terms”.  
This difference between the properties of human and animal signals is crucial. 
First, it may be taken to illustrate how the co-evolution of language and theory of mind 
in humans has shaped our public codes, in particular their lexical component, into 
being characteristically underdetermining of speaker-intended content (thus, providing 
a strong basis for polysemy). Second, it illustrates the limitations of communication that 
takes place in the absence of an ability to recognise the mental states of others (although 
other factors obviously play a role as well). For a species like the vervet monkey, where 
there has been a clear evolutionary advantage to having vocal calls tightly fixed to the 
triggering situation (allowing for faster and more efficient escape reactions), it seems 
plausible that the progress of evolution may have involved a drift toward increasing 
differentiation and specialisation of signals (thus univocality), as indicated by Seyfarth 
and Cheney (2003) in a more recent review of research on animal vocalisations:  
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Natural selection has favoured callers who vocalise in ways that change the 
behaviour of listeners and ultimately return benefit to the caller. Simultaneously, 
selection has favoured listeners who detect the links between specific calls and 
particular events, thereby extracting whatever information may be relevant to 
them. In many group-living species, where callers and recipients have 
overlapping reproductive interests, selection has favoured callers who give 
acoustically different vocalisations in different circumstances, thus allowing 
listeners to extract more specific information. (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003: 168)  
Thus, the properties of animal vocalisations seem, in evolutionary terms, to be a 
very long way from human-style communication. Sperber (2000: 123) argues that if our 
ancestors were such encoders-decoders, and had no mindreading abilities, “there is no 
sensible story of how the presence of utterances in their environment would have led 
them to discover their representational character, to metarepresent their content, and to 
use for this their own mental representations in a novel, opaque, manner”, and 
therefore, the language-first hypothesis must be rejected. 
According to the theory of mind-first hypothesis, the metarepresentational 
ability (specifically, the ability to attribute contentful mental states to others) preceded 
the capacity for language in human evolution. An advantage of this hypothesis is that 
there are independent reasons for the evolution of a metarepresentational ability 
(having to do with competition, exploitation and co-operation), and the possession of 
this ability would lay the ground for other forms of communication, for instance, 
pointing and pantomiming, quite independently from any language. To illustrate this 
point, Sperber (2000: 123-126) invites us to imagine a situation involving two of our 
hominid ancestors, Peter and Mary, and five different scenarios it may give rise to, in 
increasing metarepresentational complexity.  
In the first scenario, Mary is picking berries, and Peter happens to be watching 
her. Peter uses his metarepresentational ability and infers from Mary’s behaviour that if 
she’s picking berries, she must believe them to be edible. In this case, Peter would have a 
first-order metarepresentational belief:  
(12) Mary believes 
that these berries are edible. 
In the second scenario, Mary intends Peter to draw, from her behaviour, the inference 
that the berries are edible. Mary has a first-order informative intention: 
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(13) That Peter should believe 
that these berries are edible. 
In the third scenario, Peter is aware that by picking berries, Mary intends him to come 
to the belief that they are edible. Peter has a second-order metarepresentational belief: 
(14) Mary intends 
that he should believe 
that these berries are edible. 
In the fourth scenario, Mary intends Peter to become aware of the fact that she intends 
him to come to the belief that the berries are edible. Mary has a second-order 
informative intention (which is a third-order metarepresentation): 
(15) That Peter should believe 
that Mary intends 
that he should believe 
that these berries are edible. 
In the fifth scenario, Peter recognises that Mary intends him to become aware of the fact 
that she intends him to come to the belief that the berries are edible. Mary might achieve 
this by ostensively ensuring that she has Peter’s attention; e.g. by establishing eye 
contact with him, by picking the berries in a particular (perhaps 
stereotypical/exaggerated) way, etc. Peter comes to have a fourth-order 
metarepresentational belief: 
(16) Mary intends 
that he should believe 
that she intends 
that he should believe 
that these berries are edible. 
It is at this level of metarepresentational sophistication that communication proper 
takes place, although in (16) it does not involve the use of a code. Sperber argues that 
this is where the substantial change occurs: Instead of being restricted to using direct 
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evidence (physical actions/behaviour) to fulfil her first-order informative intention, 
Mary is now in a position to use symbolic cues (e.g. to mime the action of eating the 
berries) to fulfil her second-order communicative intention (i.e. to make Peter recognise 
her intention to inform him that the berries are edible). If Peter and Mary had shared a 
common code, Mary could have produced an utterance to achieve the same goal. For 
instance, she could have produced an utterance of the coded symbol good while pointing 
at the berries, on the basis of which Peter would be warranted in inferring that Mary 
intended to communicate to him that the berries were edible. 
This form of sophisticated metarepresentation is the normal situation in 
ostensive-inferential communication, as described in section 3.4.1, of which linguistic 
communication is the prime example. This ability, Sperber argues, is what made 
inferential communication possible, perhaps initially as a side effect, which then proved 
to be so highly beneficial that it created an environment conducive to the development 
of linguistic codes. From the development of a linguistic ability followed a co-
evolutionary mutual enhancement of the two abilities.77  
This evolutionary scenario fits well with the essentialist view of 
underdeterminacy, discussed and supported in section 3.3. Indeed, it offers an 
explanation for why the linguistic codes that modern humans have are not capable of 
fully encoding speaker meanings, as observed by Carston:  
                                                      
77 Some researchers claim that in addition to a developed theory of mind ability, human communication 
requires the ability to co-operate, that is, to participate in processes involving shared intentionality (e.g. 
Hurford 2007; Tomasello 2008). Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) see ostensive-inferential 
communication as taking place within a ‘mutual cognitive environment’, that is, against the background 
of a set of assumptions that is manifest to a group of individuals (where an assumption P is manifest to an 
individual iff she is capable of representing P as true or probably true), and in which it is manifest to those 
individuals that they share that set of assumptions with each other. Every manifest assumption in a 
mutual cognitive environment is ‘mutually manifest’. On this approach, communication involves the use 
of an ostensive stimulus in a mutual cognitive environment, where a communicator makes mutually 
manifest an intention to make some information manifest or more manifest to her audience, and where 
the communicative act itself provides evidence for the informative intention. Thus, within the relevance-
theoretic framework, the claim is that this is sufficient for communication to take place. 
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[P]ublic language systems are intrinsically underdetermining of complete 
(semantically evaluable) thoughts because they evolved on the back, as it were, of 
an already well-developed cognitive capacity for forming hypotheses about the 
thoughts and intentions of others on the basis of their behaviour. (Carston 
2002b: 30) 
On this view, the development of polysemy could be seen as being ultimately motivated 
by the evolutionary dependence of language on a pre-existing mind-reading ability. I 
will end this section with an (inevitably speculative) suggestion about how polysemy 
might have evolved in the early manifestations of human language, against the 
background of an already evolved capacity for attributing mental states (specifically, 
communicative intentions) to others. 
Suppose, in the very early days of language, our hominid ancestors possessed a 
lexical protolanguage, with a large learned lexicon of meaningful words, but no complex 
syntax (cf. Bickerton 1990; Jackendoff 2002). Most communication would then proceed 
in terms of ‘holophrases’, i.e. one-unit communicative acts, where the signals used had 
no internal structure (Tomasello 2008). If our ancestors had already developed an early 
form of metarepresentational theory of mind capacity, enabling a degree of intention-
reading, such one-unit communicative acts could be quite rich in content (i.e. speaker 
meaning). The following scenario is borrowed from Dennett (1991: 197). It is originally 
a story about how autostimulation (inventing new paths of internal communication) 
might enhance cognitive organisation but it can be adapted to illustrate how polysemy 
might have developed as well. Dennett invites us to imagine a hominid one day idly 
drawing two parallel lines on the floor of his cave. “[W]hen he looked at what he had 
done, these two lines reminded him, visually, of the parallel banks of the river that he 
would have to cross later in the day, and this reminded him to take along his vine rope, 
for getting across” (ibid). Now, adapting this scenario, imagine the hominid (Peter) had 
a friend sitting next to him (Mary), watching him draw the two parallel lines. Suppose 
there was already a word, pak, for riverbank in Peter and Mary’s language. After having 
become aware that the two lines reminded him of the riverbank, Peter looks at Mary 
and utters ‘Pak!’, intending to remind her that they have to cross the riverbank later that 
day. Mary recalls their impending expedition and correctly attributes to Peter the 
intention to draw her attention to this fact, and perhaps she will also draw the inference 
that Peter thinks it’s time to start preparing for the trip. Peter then repeats his utterance 
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of ‘Pak!’ in a more playful manner, together with a pointing at the drawing to 
communicate to Mary that it was this drawing that reminded him of the riverbank and 
so of their upcoming venture. Mary responds ‘Pak!’ back at Peter communicating to 
him that she recognises the visual similarity between the drawing and the banks of the 
river. Peter might then proceed by drawing a vertical line that crosses the parallel ones 
while uttering the word for vine, with the intention to inform Mary that they have to 
bring with them a vine rope to cross the banks. (Notice how this communicative 
exchange is inferential and metarepresentational through and through). 
This communicative exchange may have an additional consequence. Suppose 
that after having crossed the riverbank, having walked for a while, Peter and Mary 
decide (using holophrastic communication) to make camp for the evening. Peter 
gathers some wood to make a fire, which he throws rather carelessly into a pile on the 
ground. Mary, who doesn’t think this is a good way to arrange the wood, sits down by 
the pile and starts arranging the logs into a stack. She takes a pair of logs, places them 
side-by-side with a distance between them, then takes another pair of logs and places 
them side-by-side on top of the previous two, in the alternate direction. She looks at 
Peter so as to capture his attention, imitates the distance between the logs with her 
hands and utters ‘Pak!’. Having Peter’s previous use of the word fresh in mind (his 
showing her the visual analogy between the river banks and the parallel lines drawn on 
the floor of the cave, thereby communicating to her information about their crossing the 
river banks), assuming that Peter also remembers this use of the word, Mary intends to 
communicate to Peter that the logs should be arranged in parallel (alternating) lines 
when making a fire. Peter, who remembers their earlier communicative exchange (that 
is, he remembers his previous use of the word and is simultaneously aware of Mary’s 
familiarity with this use), infers that this is indeed what Mary intends to communicate 
to him. This may give rise to an extended use of the word pak, as a term describing not 
only the parallel banks of a river, but one that also has a more general and abstract 
sense, ‘parallel lines’. The relation between pak (riverbank) and pak (parallel lines) 
would, of course, be transparent to Peter and Mary but it might be opaque to new 
learners who encounter the meanings in distinct contexts. 
This little story is intended to show how the development of polysemy could 
arise naturally in an environment where the communicators are equipped with a 
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metarepresentational theory of mind ability, which allows for the code to underspecify 
their intended meanings. In contrast, in an environment where the communicators lack 
this ability, as in many forms of animal communication, there appears to be no reason, 
indeed no possibility, for polysemy to evolve. So, we may hypothesise that the direction 
of development of linguistic signals in a non-metarepresentational environment might 
be the opposite of their development in a metarepresentational context. In the absence 
of metarepresentation there might be a drift towards univocality (e.g. the development 
of acoustically distinct alarm calls in vervet monkeys for each distinct situation), while 
in the presence of metarepresentation there seems to be a drift toward polysemy, 
resulting from the more general phenomenon of underdetermination of speaker 
meanings by the language.  
3.6 Implications of the pragmatic approach 
In this chapter, I have argued that polysemy arises as a result of encoded lexical 
meanings being massively underdetermining of speaker-intended concepts.78 Given this, 
I argued that the comprehension of polysemy calls for an analysis in terms of the 
workings of the pragmatic inferential system, rather than in terms of linguistic 
operations over lexically encoded content. At the deepest level, then, polysemy is, using 
Sperber and Wilson’s (1998: 197) words, “the outcome of a pragmatic process whereby 
intended senses are inferred on the basis of encoded concepts and contextual 
information”. An upshot of this pragmatic approach is that it provides a basis for 
explaining how polysemy arises and develops, and what motivates its proliferation in 
natural language. I suggested, drawing on arguments from Sperber (2000) and Carston 
(2002a), that our metarepresentational theory of mind ability might provide the 
cognitive basis for polysemy, and that it might have developed as a result of the co-
evolution of the capacities for language and metarepresentation. More specifically, I 
                                                      
78 This view, is, in principle, compatible with two different positions on the relation between encoded 
concepts and speaker-intended, communicated concepts: (i) encoded concepts usually underdetermine 
the speaker-intended concepts, but in some cases, the encoded concept is also the one that is 
communicated by the speaker (e.g. happy in ‘How many happy people are there in the world today?’); (ii) 
encoded word meanings are highly abstract, schematic entities (rather than being actual concepts they act 
as ‘pointers’ to a conceptual domain, or bundles of information), from which the concept communicated 
must be pragmatically derived on each occasion of use. (i) is the position taken by Sperber and Wilson 
(1998), while the more radical view in (ii) is suggested by Carston (2002b: Chapter 5; 2010), as well as 
several others (Recanati 2004; Bosch 2007; Pietroski 2008; Pritchard 2009).  
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proposed that the component that allows us to infer speaker meanings from encoded 
linguistic meanings provides the motivation for polysemy in language. On this 
pragmatic account, polysemy poses no paradox, but is what we would expect from 
having languages that are not capable of fully encoding our thoughts.  
An implication of this pragmatic approach is that all instances of polysemy 
should, in principle, be traceable back to the operation of a pragmatic process. This, of 
course, is not in opposition to the existence of conventional polysemy (in a language 
community or in the lexicon of individual speakers), for which identifying the 
pragmatic process on the basis of which the polysemy was originally derived would be a 
matter of diachronic analysis. Code-based models of communication, which treat 
language comprehension as a mechanical process of encoding and decoding of linguistic 
signals, and polysemy to be generated according to linguistic rules that operate over 
semantic representations (as on Pustejovsky’s account), can at best give a synchronic 
account of polysemy (although, as I have argued, this is far from clear); they have 
nothing to say about the development of polysemy. The pragmatic inferential model of 
communication, however, which gives a more ‘organic’ account of the process of 
language comprehension, provides a framework in which the prospect for explaining 
polysemy development is much more promising.  
A further implication of the claim that polysemy is a fundamentally 
communicative phenomenon is that, in principle, we should expect not just words but 
any simple ostensive stimulus to be susceptible to polysemy (e.g. manual and facial 
gestures). One example might be the use that car drivers make of a single flash of their 
two headlights to another driver, which could (in England), mean at least the following: 
(a) go ahead in front of me; (b) thanks for giving way to me; (c) watch out – there is 
traffic police up ahead. The general meaning of this signal might be something like 
‘friendliness indication’, with the more specific meanings derivable on the basis of 
context (positioning of the cars on the road, whether or not one of the drivers has 
already flashed his/her lights, etc.). Another example might be smiles, which, depending 
on the context, can communicate a range of (related) feelings: amusement, affection, 
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sympathy, etc. (see Wharton 2009 for further examples of the use of gestures as 
ostensive/communicative stimuli ).79 
In this chapter, I have taken an essentialist position on linguistic 
underdeterminacy, espousing Carston’s (2002b) claim that the complexity and fine-
grainedness of the thoughts we can entertain and communicate make them impossible 
to fully encode, against a view that treats underdeterminacy as a matter of ‘convenient 
abbreviation’. However, I think that the essentialist position on linguistic 
underdeterminacy is fully compatible with the assumption that polysemy often is a 
matter of effort-saving convenience for the speaker, albeit not in a sense that entails the 
existence of eternal sentences. The very high level of polysemy in languages suggests 
that it is apparently easier for people to take old words and extend them to new 
meanings than to invent new words. This may be because, as Sperber and Wilson (1998: 
198) have pointed out, the stabilisation of a new word in a language is a slow and 
relatively rare process that has to be coordinated over a large group of individuals over 
time. The kind of small-scale coordination involved in communication is a less 
elaborate affair, and with our pragmatic abilities enabling us to form hypotheses about 
the speaker’s meaning on the basis of her linguistic utterances and highly accessible 
contextual information, there would, in most cases, be no need for a new word to 
describe something that may just as well be described by using an already existing word 
(with an extended meaning). For instance, many cases of metaphorically generated 
polysemy have the feel of being shorthand for concepts that could in principle be 
paraphrased (albeit not in a fully encoding way). Consider (17): 
(17) a. My dog always holds a ball in its mouth. 
b. If you blow across the mouth of a bottle you can often get a note. 
c. The village is located near the mouth of the river. 
d. They built a fire at the mouth of the cave. 
e. A car accident happened at the mouth of the tunnel. 
The ‘aperture’ sense of mouth in (17)b.-e. appears to be have been derived from the 
sense in (17)a. by way of metaphorical extension. Although clearly tokenings of this 
                                                      
79 Thanks to Robyn Carston for pointing this out to me. 
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general sense, each of (17)b.-e. expresses a different concept that could be paraphrased; 
for instance, ‘the opening for filling or emptying the bottle’, ‘the place where the river 
enters the sea’, etc. However, the metaphorical sense of mouth may be used to 
communicate these concepts in a considerably more succinct and efficient way. So far, I 
have not considered the details of the specific pragmatic processes involved in the 
derivation of new senses (hence giving rise to polysemy), which include the process of 
metaphorical extension of lexical meanings. It is to this topic I turn in the next chapter. 
  
 
110 
Chapter	  4 	  
RELEVANCE-­‐THEORETIC	  LEXICAL	  PRAGMATICS:	  THE	  HOW	  OF	  
POLYSEMY	  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I address the nature of the lexical pragmatic processes that are involved 
in the construction of polysemy. How do word meanings get extended to have different 
senses? 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the issue of linguistic underdeterminacy; 
the systematic gap between sentence meanings and intended speaker meanings. 
Bridging this gap during utterance comprehension can be seen as a matter of solving a 
variety of pragmatic subtasks. On the relevance-theoretic approach, where intended 
speaker meanings are taken to be derived inferentially from encoded linguistic 
meanings, these tasks can broadly be divided into the following: (i) constructing an 
appropriate hypothesis about the intended explicit content, or the explicature of the 
utterance (‘what is said’); (ii) constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended 
contextual assumptions, or the implicated premises;80 and (iii) constructing an 
appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions, or implicated 
conclusions (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 615). As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
arriving at a hypothesis about the explicit content of an utterance involves, in addition 
to a decoding of the linguistic expressions, resolution of ambiguities and indexical 
reference assignment, the application of other pragmatic enrichment processes such as 
resolution of ellipses (e.g. developing an utterance of ‘On the top shelf’ into a full 
proposition), interpretation of unarticulated constituents (e.g. specifying the location 
from where the person is leaving in an utterance of ‘Jane’s leaving’), and lexical 
adjustment (e.g. specifying the appropriate interpretation of open in an utterance of 
                                                      
80 The set of premises used in the interpretation of an utterance constitutes the context, which, in 
relevance theory, is seen as a psychological construct, as “a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the 
world”, and includes assumptions derived from the observation of the physical environment, the hearer’s 
encyclopaedic knowledge, memories and beliefs, as well as the preceding linguistic context (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: 15). 
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‘John opened the car’).81 How the hearer performs the task of adjusting lexical meanings 
in the construction of explicatures is the topic of this chapter. 
The last three decades have seen a growing interest in the interaction between 
semantic and pragmatic aspects of word meanings. A central question is how, and to 
what extent, linguistic underdeterminacy applies at the level of individual words. The 
field of study that has come to be known as lexical pragmatics explores the pragmatic 
processes that enable us to derive contextual meanings from encoded meanings of 
individual lexical items, and has attracted the attention of scholars from various 
disciplines, including philosophers (Grice [1967] 1989; Lewis 1979; Searle 1983; Travis 
1985; Recanati 1995, 2004), computational linguists (Pustejovsky 1995a; Copestake and 
Briscoe 1996; Lascarides and Copestake 1998; Asher forthcoming), pragmatists (Blutner 
1998, 2002; Carston 1997, 2002b; Wilson and Carston 2007), and psychologists 
(Barsalou 1987; Gibbs 1994; Glucksberg 2001; Murphy 1997a, 2002). As we will see in 
this chapter, the data for lexical pragmatics coincides in large part with the polysemy 
data. 
My aim in this chapter is to show how polysemy arises as a result of the on-line 
construction of occasion-specific senses by pragmatic processes that apply at the level of 
individual words, within the overall process of forming hypotheses about the explicit 
content of utterances. More specifically, I will outline how the relevance-theoretic 
approach to lexical pragmatics, according to which there is a single pragmatic process 
that adjusts the meanings of individual words in different directions (Carston 1997, 
2002b; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007; Vega-Moreno 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008), 
can account for the construction of occasion-specific senses during utterance 
comprehension. The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I outline the 
relevance-theoretic account of lexical pragmatics, focusing on two varieties of lexical 
adjustment, narrowing and broadening of conceptual content, which I claim are 
involved in giving rise to polysemy. In section 4.3, I suggest a reanalysis of Pustejovsky’s 
                                                      
81 Relevance theory does not, however, claim that the different subtasks involved in utterance 
comprehension are sequentially ordered (i.e. that the hearer first decodes the linguistic meaning of the 
utterance, then computes the explicit content, then decides on which contextual assumptions he should 
bring to bear, and then, finally, derives the implicated conclusions). Rather, it is assumed that utterance 
comprehension proceeds through a process of ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ of hypotheses about 
explicatures, contextual assumptions and contextual implications (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 617). I 
return to the issue of ‘mutual adjustment’ in section 4.2.1. 
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(1995a) cases of polysemy in terms of the relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatic account 
(section 4.3.1). I argue that this approach provides a simpler, more unified account, and 
avoids some of the problems associated with the generative lexicon theory, as discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Then, I discuss some further implications of the relevance-theoretic 
approach to polysemy, concerning the notion of sense relations and the role of 
pragmatic narrowing and broadening in lexical semantic change (section 4.3.2). Finally, 
I discuss the issue of prepositional polysemy, which is a major topic in the cognitive 
linguistics literature but has received little attention in relevance theory, and sketch a 
possible direction for a relevance-theoretic analysis of the multiple (related) meanings of 
one particular preposition (section 4.3.3). 
4.2 The pragmatic adjustment of lexical meaning 
In this section, I consider two varieties (or outcomes) of the contextual adjustment of 
encoded word meanings, lexical narrowing and broadening, and outline the relevance-
theoretic approach to lexical adjustment.  
Lexical narrowing (‘enrichment’, ‘strengthening’, ‘specifization’, ‘precisification’) 
is the case where the concept expressed by the use of a word has a more restricted 
denotation than that of the linguistically-encoded concept; that is, it denotes a proper 
subset of the linguistically-specified denotation (Atlas 1989; Bach 1994; Recanati 1995, 
2004; Carston 1997, 2002b, 2010; Levinson 2000; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Carston 
2007). Some examples are given below: 
(1) Susan needs a knife so she can start eating.  
(2) The blacksmith made a set of new shoes for the horse.  
(3) a. I’ve started collecting stamps. 
b. The books are collecting dust on the shelves. 
(4) cut the grass/one’s hair/a cake, etc. 
(5) It’s cold outside. 
(6) red car/apple/watermelon/hair/eyes, etc. 
(7) Sally drives/walks/types fast. 
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The noun knife in (1) is used to denote a specific kind of knife (‘table knife’), and thus 
picks out a subset of the more general, linguistically-encoded meaning of the noun. (2) 
is a similar case in which shoes is used to denote a specific kind of shoe (‘horseshoe’), a 
concept that is clearly narrower than the one linguistically-encoded. If the encoded 
meaning of the verb collect in (3) is taken to be ‘gather’, the meanings that are expressed 
in (3)a., ‘systematically seek and acquire’, and (3)b., ‘accumulate’, could both be seen as 
denoting subsets of the linguistically-encoded denotation. The verb cut in (4) conveys 
different actions depending on the object denoted by the complement (and the wider 
context of utterance), each of which would have a more restricted denotation than the 
encoded meaning. The adjective cold in (5) encodes a scalar concept. The degree of 
coldness expressed on a given occasion is contextually determined, and could be 
narrowed down to different degrees, depending on the situation of utterance. Each 
increase in the degree of coldness would contribute to a further restriction of the 
linguistically-specified denotation (e.g. the communicated meaning of cold in the 
expression cold weather uttered on a winter’s day in Norway would be narrower than 
the one communicated if uttered in the context of a holiday in Greece). In (6) the 
adjective red denotes different hues of red in describing a car, an apple, a watermelon, 
someone’s hair, eyes, etc., In each case, red communicates a concept that is more specific 
than that encoded by this adjective. Finally, in (7), the adverb fast expresses different 
concepts when it describes the action of driving, walking, typing, etc. In each case, the 
concept communicated has a narrower denotation than that linguistically-encoded by 
fast. 
Lexical broadening (or ‘loosening’) is the case where the concept expressed by 
use of a lexical item is more general than that which is linguistically-encoded; it denotes 
a proper superset of the linguistically-specified denotation (Sperber and Wilson 
1985/1986, 2008; Gibbs 1994; Recanati 1995, 2004; Carston 1997, 2002b; Glucksberg 
2001; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007; Vega-Moreno 2007). Relevance 
theorists talk about approximation, hyperbole, metaphor and category extension within 
the general type of lexical broadening. Here are some illustrations: 
(8) The U.S. states Wyoming and Colorado are rectangular. 
(9) It’s boiling outside. 
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(10) Bill is a wizard in finance. 
(11) The novel was slaughtered by critics. 
(12) a. The weightlifter complained that his weights were unbalanced. 
b. UN officials argued that the report was unbalanced. 
c. I knew how unbalanced Paula had been since my uncle died. 
(13) Joan has a cold and needs a Kleenex. 
The adjective rectangular in (8) is used to express ‘approximately rectangular’, 
representing a small departure from the linguistically-encoded concept (on the 
assumption that the concept which is encoded by rectangular is a strict geometrical 
concept). In (9) the adjective boiling is used hyperbolically to express ‘extremely hot 
(with regard to normal weather conditions)’, representing a further departure from the 
linguistically-encoded concept. The metaphorical use of the noun wizard in (10) 
represents a radical departure from the linguistically-encoded concept, contributing to 
the interpretation that Bill is very skilled and imaginative in financial matters. Similarly, 
the metaphorical use of slaughtered in (11), conveying that the novel was heavily 
criticised, also involves a radical broadening of the concept linguistically-encoded by the 
verb. In (12), the concept encoded by the adjective unbalanced is broadened when used 
to describe a report, as in (12)b. (expressing ‘biased’), or a person, as in (12)c. 
(expressing ‘mentally ill’). These broadened concepts are generally thought of as 
metaphorical extensions of the concept expressed in (12)a. (which is identical to a very 
close approximation of the concept encoded by unbalanced), but the broadenings have 
taken different directions. The example in (13) can be seen as an instance of ‘category 
extension’, in which the brand name Kleenex is used to denote a broader category of 
disposable tissues, including items from less salient brands. 
Lexical narrowing and broadening are typically given different treatments in the 
semantics and pragmatics literature. Moreover, it is not uncommon to analyse the 
different varieties within each type in different ways. Levinson (2000: 114), who works 
within a neo-Gricean framework, analyses a range of instances of frequently occurring 
lexical narrowing (e.g. the narrowing of and to mean ‘and as a consequence’ or if to ‘if 
and only if’ or gender stereotypes for ‘secretary’ or ‘fire fighter’) as cases of default 
inference. He takes these to be governed by a an informativeness principle (I-principle, 
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for short), which includes the following enrichment rule: “Amplify the informational 
content of the speaker’s utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to what 
you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended point”. On the basis of this rule, semantically 
general expressions automatically undergo narrowing in the derivation of a 
(generalised) implicature and are only restored to the encoded concept if the resulting 
implicature clashes with a salient contextual assumption. A different kind of approach is 
that of Pustejovsky (1995a), who, as we have seen in the previous chapters, analyses the 
contextual specification of evaluative adjectives such as good, fast, and so on, as being 
derived through a lexicon-internal process of ‘selective binding’, enabling them to 
modify only an aspect of the linguistically specified meaning of the head noun (e.g. good 
in good knife comes out as ‘good for cutting’). Within more philosophically oriented 
approaches, such as the indexicalist semantic account espoused by Szabó (2001) and 
others, the logical form of an evaluative adjective such as good is seen as containing a 
variable which needs to be contextually saturated.  
Lexical broadening, on the other hand, is standardly given different analyses 
depending on subtype (approximation, hyperbole, metaphor, category extension). For 
instance, following Lewis (1979), some philosophers of language analyse 
approximations of the kind in (8) as involving the contextual fixation of a standard of 
precision parameter, contained in the logical form of such expressions. Lasersohn 
(1999) proposes a different analysis, on which the denotation of linguistic expressions 
such as rectangular above are, relative to a given context, associated with what he calls a 
‘pragmatic halo’. The pragmatic halo of a given expression in a context C is the set of 
objects of the same logical type as the denotation itself (which is included in the set), 
each of which “is understood to differ from the denotation only in some respect that is 
pragmatically ignorable in that context” (ibid. 526), allowing, in this way, a deviation 
from what is strictly speaking true. On the other hand, hyperboles and metaphor are still 
quite widely analysed along Gricean lines (Grice [1967] 1989), as blatant violations of 
Grice’s first maxim of Quality (‘Do not say what you believe to be false’) which trigger 
the hearer’s search for a related implicature. A radically different approach is taken by 
cognitive linguists, who analyse metaphorical interpretations in terms of mappings from 
one conceptual (source) domain to another conceptual (target) domain (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 1999; Kövecses 1986; Lakoff 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
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Fauconnier and Turner 2002). The assumption is that knowledge from one conceptual 
domain is used to reason about another conceptual domain – this is called a ‘conceptual 
metaphor’. Much-cited examples are ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MONEY, LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY, etc. Such conceptual metaphors are taken to underlie linguistic metaphors (so, 
for instance, metaphorical utterances such as We’re at a crossroads in our relationship, 
Our relationship has hit a dead-end, We are going separate ways, etc. are instantiations of 
the underlying conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY). Although it has been extremely 
influential as a theory of metaphor in cognitive linguistics as well as in several other 
disciplines, the conceptual metaphor theory has received considerable criticism 
(Murphy 1996, 1997b; Stern 2000; McGlone 2001; Haser 2005; Vega-Moreno 2007). In 
particular, it has been pointed out that its implications for the representation of lexical 
concepts and on-line processing are unclear.82 
4.2.1 A single process of ad hoc concept formation 
Relevance theory stands out from the approaches mentioned above by its proposal of a 
unified account of lexical narrowing and broadening (including approximation, 
hyperbole and metaphor), treating them as outcomes of a single pragmatic inferential 
process that adjusts the meanings of individual words, in accordance with the hearer’s 
expectations of relevance (Carston 1997, 2002b, 2010; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson 
2003; Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008). The occasion-specific senses 
that are constructed on the basis of this pragmatic process are called ad hoc concepts, a 
term adopted (and adapted somewhat) from the psychologist Larry Barsalou (1983, 
1987).83 Thus, in lexical narrowing, the ad hoc concept will be more specific than the one 
                                                      
82 For instance, does it follow from the conceptual metaphor theory that many concepts are not 
understood directly but only with reference to a concept from a different domain? And how do speakers 
and hearers determine which of the properties and inferences associated with the source concept that are 
mapped onto the target, and how are they selected during on-line comprehension? Recently there have 
been some suggestions of how the cognitive linguistic and relevance-theoretic approaches to metaphor 
can be combined, despite some fundamental differences between them (Gibbs and Tendahl 2006; 
Tendahl and Gibbs 2008; Wilson 2009). I return to consideration of the cognitive linguistic approach, as 
well as the suggestion for a combination of the two theoretical frameworks, in Chapter 6 in connection 
with the discussion of metonymy.  
83 In a series of experiments, Barsalou (1987) found that people spontaneously construct novel, context-
dependent (ad hoc) categories in working memory (e.g. TOURIST ACTIVITIES TO PERFORM IN BEIJING, 
THINGS TO PACK IN A TOILET BAG, WHAT TO TAKE FROM ONE’S HOME DURING A FIRE, etc.). Once they were 
structured, the ad hoc categories functioned as coherent categories and exhibited typicality effects in a 
similar way as stable categories do. 
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linguistically-encoded, denoting a proper subset of the linguistically-specified 
denotation, while in lexical broadening (including approximation, hyperbole, metaphor 
and category extension), the ad hoc concept is broader, denoting a proper superset of 
the linguistically-specified denotation. And there are some ad hoc concepts that involve 
both narrowing and broadening of the encoded concept so that their denotation merely 
overlaps with that of the encoded concept. Before I turn to the details of this approach a 
brief consideration of the relevance-theoretic stance on encoded lexical meaning is in 
order. 
The general claim about lexical meanings in relevance theory is that they are not 
uniform entities. More specifically, Sperber and Wilson (1998) distinguish between 
three types of linguistic encodings: (i) words that do not encode concepts at all (but 
rather ‘procedures’, which constrain, or indicate, how the process of pragmatic 
inference should proceed, e.g. indexicals and discourse connectives, cf. Blakemore 1987; 
1992; 2002); (ii) words that appear to encode so-called pro-concepts, i.e. words that have 
some (underspecified) conceptual content but whose semantic contribution must be 
contextually specified (e.g. words like my, have, near, long); and (iii) words that may be 
said to encode full-fledged concepts (e.g. dog, horse, water). Their central assumption, 
however, is that most words, whether or not they encode full concepts, behave as though 
they encoded pro-concepts, since the concepts they are used to convey on different 
occasions are pragmatically determined on the basis of contextual relevance. 
For those words that encode full-fledged concepts, the claim is that they encode 
atomic concepts (in the sense of Fodor 1981, 1998). Relevance theory takes the Fodorian 
critique against decompositional (specifically, definitional) accounts of lexical meaning 
to be decisive (cf. Chapter 2), and the most plausible alternative to be a simple mapping 
from lexical form to mental concept (e.g. the lexical form rabbit encodes the 
unstructured concept RABBIT). A mentally represented concept, a constituent of the 
‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975, 2008), is seen as an address (or entry) in memory 
that may give access to three types of information: (i) the logical properties of the 
concept (e.g. one-way meaning postulates, such as RABBIT → KIND OF ANIMAL);84 (ii) a set 
                                                      
84 Recall the discussion of meaning postulates in connection with Fodor’s conceptual atomism in Chapter 
2. While Fodor (1998) denied the existence of meaning postulates (based, in large part, on Quine’s (1999 
[1953]) pessimism about the possibility of drawing a principled analytic/synthetic distinction), Horsey 
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of assumptions, or encyclopaedic information, about the denotation of the concept, that 
is, conceptually represented assumptions and beliefs, including stereotypes and culture-
specific information about the denotation, and also, in many cases, imagistic and/or 
sensory-perceptual representations (e.g. RABBITS HAVE FUR, RABBITS ARE EDIBLE, RABBITS 
HAVE FOUR LEGS, RABBITS LOOK LIKE THIS: [MENTAL IMAGE], etc.);85 (iii) the lexical (i.e. 
phonological and syntactic) information connected with the linguistic form that 
encodes the concept (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 85-93).  
In relevance theory, lexical adjustment resulting in the construction of narrowed 
or broadened ad hoc concepts involves taking the encoded concept and its associated 
logical and encyclopaedic information, together with a set of contextual assumptions, as 
input to the inferential process of constructing hypotheses about the speaker-intended 
meaning. Recall that relevance theory takes on-line utterance comprehension to involve 
the resolution of a number of pragmatic subtasks, including the construction of 
hypotheses about the explicit content, implicated premises, and contextual implications 
of an utterance. Typically, lexical adjustment in the form of the construction of ad hoc 
concepts is the result of a process of ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ of tentative hypotheses 
about explicit content, implicated premises and contextual implications, which are 
incrementally modified against the background of the hearer’s context-specific 
expectations of relevance.  
As a brief illustration of how this mutual adjustment process is assumed to work 
in an instance of lexical narrowing, consider the following example given by Carston 
and Powell (2006): 
                                                      
(2006) argued in favour of a psychological notion of meaning postulates, which accommodates people’s 
intuitions about analyticities. This is the view espoused by relevance theory, where the logical entry for a 
concept is seen as consisting of a set of deductive rules (or meaning postulates), which form part of our 
mental logic (our 'deductive device', cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Horsey 2006), and which apply 
reliably to any representation that meets their input conditions (e.g. the concept RED triggers the 
inference RED → COLOUR, the concept MOTHER triggers the inference MOTHER → PARENT, etc.). Such 
meaning postulates are thought to be content-constitutive of a concept, in the sense that someone could 
not be said to fully master a concept without also having completed the logical entry for that concept. It 
should be noted, however, that among relevance theorists there is not a perfect consensus as to the status 
and role of meaning postulates within the theory, nor as to whether the distinction between logical and 
encyclopaedic knowledge is warranted. 
85 With its distinction between logical and encyclopaedic information associated with concepts (Sperber 
and Wilson 1986/1995; Horsey 2006), relevance theory thus distinguishes itself sharply from the ‘purist’ 
atomist position now held by Fodor (1998), who, as already mentioned, denies any role for an 
analytic/synthetic distinction (in fact, denies that there is any such distinction).  
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(14) A (to B): Be careful. The path is uneven.  
The second part of A’s utterance is likely to achieve relevance for B by offering some 
kind of explanation as to why, or in what way, he should be careful. The concept 
encoded by uneven is very general (it is probably true of every path), but as B is looking 
for a particular kind of implication (e.g. he might trip over, he should take small steps, 
he should keep his eye on the path) he will narrow down the encoded concept UNEVEN 
so as to arrive at an interpretation that warrants the implication(s) that satisfy his 
context-specific expectation of relevance. The result is the construction of the ad hoc 
concept UNEVEN*, whose denotation is significantly narrower than that of the encoded 
concept. This process can be seen to rely on ‘backward’ inference from expected 
contextual implications to the explicitly expressed proposition containing the ad hoc 
concept.86 
Thus, in relevance theory, lexical adjustment in terms of the construction of 
narrowed or broadened ad hoc concepts is seen as emerging as a by-product of the 
hearer’s search for an interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, utterance understanding is taken to employ a 
dedicated comprehension heuristic, which provides the hearer with the following 
procedure for constructing a hypothesis about the speaker’s intended meaning (Wilson 
and Sperber 2004: 615): 
(i) Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects: Test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguation, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility. 
(ii) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 87 
                                                      
86 See Wilson and Sperber (2002) and Wilson and Carston (2006) for more detailed accounts of the 
mutual adjustment process and the role of ‘backward inference’ in lexical interpretation. 
87 The comprehension heuristic is jointly suggested by the Communicative Principle of Relevance, ‘Every 
act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance’, and the 
definition of optimal relevance: An utterance is optimally relevant if (a) it is at least relevant enough to be 
worth processing, and (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences. Thus, an optimally relevant utterance should achieve enough cognitive effects to be worth 
processing, and avoid causing the hearer any unjustifiable effort in achieving those effects. A consequence 
of this ban on wasted processing effort is that the first satisfactory interpretation is the only satisfactory 
interpretation, that is, if an utterance has a highly accessible interpretation which is relevant in the 
expected way, this is the only one that the hearer is justified in choosing (Wilson 2008). 
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The comprehension heuristic states that when the hearer arrives at an interpretation of 
the utterance that satisfies his expectations of relevance, this is where he will stop. 
Unless there is evidence to the contrary, this interpretation will be the most plausible 
hypothesis about the speaker’s intended meaning. However, given the non-
demonstrative nature of pragmatic inferences, this hypothesis could turn out to be false, 
but it is the best the hearer can do. 
As an illustration, consider the exchange in (15), uttered in the context of the 
extensive vaccination of the population against swine flu:  
(15) Bill: Has John had the vaccine yet? 
Susan: He’s already had flu. 
A schematic outline of how Bill might apply the comprehension heuristic in the 
interpretation of Susan’s utterance is given in the table below (where Bill’s interpretive 
hypotheses are found to the left and his basis for deriving them to the right):88  
(16)  
(a) SUSAN HAS SAID THAT [HEX HAS 
ALREADY HAD FLU]. 
Decoding of Susan’s utterance. 
Embedding of the decoded logical form 
into a description of Susan’s ostensive 
behaviour.  
(b) Susan’s utterance will be optimally 
relevant to Bill. 
Expectation raised by the recognition of 
Susan’s utterance as an act of ostensive 
communication. 
(c) Susan’s utterance will achieve 
relevance by answering Bill’s question. 
Expectation raised by (b), and the fact 
that this answer would be the most 
relevant to Bill at this point. 
(d) Someone who has already had swine 
flu doesn’t need to get the vaccine. 
First contextual assumption activated that 
satisfies the expectation in (c). Accepted 
as an implicit premise of Susan’s 
                                                      
88 See Wilson and Sperber (2004) and Sperber and Wilson (2008) for more detail and further examples of 
how the comprehension heuristic is thought to work. 
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utterance. 
(e) John has already had FLU* (‘swine 
flu’)89 
 
First interpretation of the explicit content 
(explicature) of Susan’s utterance, 
involving a narrowing of the encoded 
meaning of FLU to FLU* (‘swine flu’). The 
explicature in (e) would combine with (d) 
to satisfy (c).  
(f) John doesn’t have to get the vaccine. Implicature of Susan’s utterance, inferred 
from (d) and (e). Accepted as the 
intended implicated conclusion of 
Susan’s utterance. 
Bill decodes Susan’s utterance, and takes this decoded content (an incomplete logical 
form) as input to the inference process to follow, and assumes that her utterance is 
optimally relevant to him. Bill is interested in an answer to his question, that is, whether 
John has got the vaccine against swine flu, and thus expects Susan’s utterance to achieve 
relevance by providing him with this information. The first contextual assumption to 
come to Bill’s mind that satisfies this expectation is that ‘Someone who has already had 
swine flu doesn’t need to get the vaccine’. Bill takes this as an implicit premise of Susan’s 
utterance. The first interpretation of the explicit content of Susan’s utterance involves 
(in addition to the assignment of John as the referent of ‘He’) a narrowing of the 
encoded content of FLU to the ad hoc concept FLU*, denoting ‘swine flu’, i.e. a subset of 
the linguistically-specified denotation. The encoded concept would not achieve 
relevance in the expected way, as someone who has had flu but not swine flu would not 
be exempt from taking the vaccine. Together, the explicature ‘John has already had FLU*’ 
and the contextual assumption that ‘Someone who has already had swine flu doesn’t 
need to get the vaccine’ would satisfy the expectation that Susan’s utterance should 
provide an answer to Bill’s question. They would also form the basis for the derivation 
of the implicated conclusion of her utterance, ‘John doesn’t need to get the vaccine’, 
which Bill accepts as Susan’s implicated conclusion (the implicature of her utterance).  
                                                      
89 Ad hoc concepts are, by convention, marked with an asterisk. 
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As this shows, relevance theory treats the process of lexical adjustment as arising 
within the overall process of arriving at a confirmed hypothesis about the speaker’s 
intended meaning, a process which is driven by the hearer’s search for an interpretation 
that satisfies his occasion-specific expectations of relevance. Often, as already 
mentioned, the hearer may bring to the comprehension process a specific expectation of 
how the utterance will be relevant to him (i.e. the cognitive effects its processing is 
expected to yield). Here Bill expected Susan’s utterance to provide an answer to his 
question. This expectation contributed, via a ‘backwards’ inference process, to his 
identification of the explicature and implicated premise.  
The example in (15) involved lexical narrowing. In what follows I will illustrate 
how lexical broadening, including metaphor, is treated along exactly the same lines on 
the relevance-theoretic approach. Consider the following exchange:  
(17) Stephen: I wonder if John’s firm is going to make it through the crisis. 
Kate: I wouldn’t worry too much. John is a wizard in finance.  
Below is a schematic illustration of how Stephen might interpret the last part of Kate’s 
utterance, ‘John is a wizard in finance’ (again, the interpretive hypotheses are given to 
the left of the tableau, the basis for deriving them to the right). 
(18)  
(a) KATE HAS SAID THAT [JOHNX IS A 
WIZARD IN FINANCE]. 
Decoding of Kate’s utterance. Embedding 
of the decoded logical form into a 
description of Kate’s ostensive behaviour. 
(b) Kate’s utterance is optimally relevant 
to Stephen. 
Expectation raised by the recognition of 
Kate’s utterance as an act of ostensive 
communication. 
(c) Kate’s utterance will achieve relevance 
by providing an explanation for Kate’s 
previous assertion and as responding to 
Stephen’s worry. 
Expectation raised by (b), and the fact 
that such an explanation (and response to 
Stephen’s worry) would be most relevant 
to Stephen at this point.  
(d) John’s firm might not make it through Background assumption already activated 
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the current financial crisis. by Stephen’s previous utterance. 
(e) A wizard can make seemingly 
impossible things happen. 
Assumption activated by the 
linguistically-encoded concept WIZARD 
and the assumption in (d). Accepted as 
an implicit premise of Kate’s utterance. 
(f) John can make seemingly impossible 
things happen in finance, and will be able 
to take his firm through the crisis. 
Implicit conclusion derivable from (e), 
together with an appropriate 
interpretation of Kate’s utterance which 
satisfies the expectation of relevance 
raised by (c), by contradicting and 
(possibly) eliminating the assumption in 
(d). Tentatively accepted as an implicit 
conclusion of Kate’s utterance. 
(g) John is a WIZARD* in finance.  Interpretation of the explicit content of 
Kate’s utterance, where the meaning of 
the encoded concept WIZARD is 
broadened to include people who can 
make seemingly impossible things 
happen, which together with (e) would 
imply (f). Accepted as the explicit 
meaning of Kate’s utterance. 
(h) John is a WIZARD* in finance and will 
be able to take his firm through the crisis. 
First overall interpretation of Kate’s 
utterance, which includes a specification 
of its explicit content and implicature, 
that satisfies Stephen’s expectations of 
relevance raised by (b) and (c). Accepted 
as Kate’s intended meaning. 
As this shows, the metaphorical meaning of wizard, WIZARD*, having as its denotation 
people who make seemingly impossible things happen, is arrived at via a mutual 
adjustment of contextual assumptions, explicit content, and contextual implications 
guided by expectations of relevance. The broadened concept in (17) is inferred in 
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exactly the same way as the narrowed concept in (15).90 Thus, lexical narrowing and 
broadening are not seen as two functionally different kinds, but as involving the same 
processes of meaning construction, sometimes leading to a narrowing of the encoded 
concept, sometimes to a broadening. Furthermore, narrowing and broadening often 
combine in the construction of a single ad hoc concept. Consider Carston’s (2002b: 328) 
example in (19): 
(19) John’s a real bachelor. 
The denotation of the ad hoc concept BACHELOR* might include married men who 
behave like stereotypical bachelors (and so be broader than the linguistically-encoded 
concept), but exclude other men who are unmarried but do not satisfy certain 
stereotypical assumptions about bachelors, e.g., the pope (and so be narrower than the 
linguistically-encoded concept).91  
4.2.2 Implications of the relevance-theoretic account 
The unified relevance-theoretic account of lexical narrowing and broadening has several 
implications. First, it makes it possible to see different types of broadening as forming a 
continuum, ranging from literal uses through approximation and category extension to 
‘figurative uses’, such as hyperbole and metaphor. Strictly literal interpretations and 
metaphorical uses occupy each of the extreme ends of the continuum, with the other 
varieties of broadening falling into the space between them (with hyperbole being closer 
to the metaphor end, involving a greater departure from the linguistically-encoded 
denotation, and approximation closer to the literal end). For instance, the verb phrase in 
(20) below can be interpreted literally, as a hyperbole, or as a metaphor (Wilson 2003):  
(20) That book puts me to sleep. 
                                                      
90 The outlines of the on-line interpretive process leading to a narrowing of the linguistically-encoded 
concept in (15) and a broadening in (17) given here are, of course, very schematic, and there is obviously 
no claim that the hearer necessarily goes through exactly these inferential steps with exactly those 
premises and conclusions or that the process takes place in this particular order. 
91 In fact, Sperber and Wilson (2008: 95) claim that a combination of narrowing and broadening is 
involved in most metaphors, as in the example below:  
(i) Joan is an angel. 
Here they see the communicated meaning of angel, ANGEL* as involving both a narrowing of the 
linguistically-specified denotation to include only prototypically good angels, excluding harmful angels, 
angels of wrath or fallen angels, and a broadening to describe all very good, caring people. 
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And second, following from this, the relevance-theoretic account of approximation, 
hyperbole and metaphor as varieties of a single phenomenon of lexical broadening 
involves an abandonment of the traditional distinction between literal and figurative 
meaning, as it is conceived in classical rhetoric and in Gricean pragmatics.92 The claim is 
that the interpretations of approximation, hyperbole and metaphor require the exact 
same interpretive mechanism that is involved in the comprehension of literal 
utterances.93 Third, it follows from the unified account of lexical pragmatic processes 
proposed by relevance theory that lexical narrowing and broadening, including 
‘figurative uses’ such as hyperbole and metaphor, contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of utterances, that is, to their explicit content (explicature, what is said or 
asserted). This view (which Recanati 1993 calls 'truth-conditional pragmatics') 
represents a radical departure from the standard Gricean view, which posits a minimal 
semantics where the processes contributing to ‘what is said’ are confined to saturation of 
indexicals and disambiguation of linguistic ambiguity. Recently, however, there appears 
to be a growing agreement that processes of lexical adjustment contribute to the explicit 
content of utterances (Recanati 1995, 2004; Carston 1997, 2002b; Kintsch 2000, 2001; 
Stern 2000; Glucksberg 2001; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007; Sperber and Wilson 
2008). Wilson and Carston (2007) provide several arguments for a ‘truth-conditional 
account’ of lexical pragmatic processes. A first argument is the existence of neologisms 
that are derived via ad hoc concept construction.94 If such clearly pragmatically derived 
                                                      
92 However, this does not deny the fact that metaphors are often used as expressions of style, in order to 
create poetic effects, in relevance-theoretic terms. A poetic effect is “the peculiar effect of an utterance 
which achieves most of its relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures” (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995: 222). Metaphors are seen as particularly well suited to create such poetic effects. 
93 The view that there are no interpretive mechanisms specific to metaphor, that it requires the same 
mechanisms as those involved in the interpretation of literal utterances, is shared by several other 
scholars, working within different theoretical frameworks (see, for instance, Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Gibbs 1994; Kintsch 2000, 2001; Glucksberg 2001; Atlas 2005; Evans 2009). 
94 An example of such a neologism is the expression thorbjorned in the following utterance (attested: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/opinion/11brenner.html?ref=opinion): 
(i) Wow, those Scandinavians completely thorbjorned my hard-earned political capital. 
This utterance occurred in a New York Times commentary about the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
Barak Obama, to whom the utterance was attributed. The journalist was describing what she imagined to 
be Obama’s reaction to “receiving such a surprising and politically tone-deaf honor”. The coined verb 
thorbjorned (communicating the ad hoc concept THORBJORNED*, roughly paraphrasable as ‘destroyed’, or 
‘ruined’) is derived from the first name of the leader of the Nobel Peace Prize committee, Thorbjørn 
Jagland. As the verb thorbjorned has no meaning other than the pragmatically constructed neologism 
above, there would be no proposition expressed by this utterance unless the ad hoc concept 
THORBJORNED* is taken to contribute to its explicit content. 
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concepts are not taken to contribute to the proposition expressed by the utterances in 
which they occur, it is hard to see that there would be any proposition expressed at all 
by such utterances. A second argument is the evidence that it is pragmatically adjusted 
meaning, and not linguistically-encoded meaning, that falls within the scope of sentence 
operators such as negation, conditionals, disjunctions, etc. (e.g. ‘If John has already had 
FLU*, he doesn’t need the vaccine’, cf. (15) above). A third argument comes from the fact 
that lexical narrowing and broadening may lead to semantic change, so that for some 
people, a pragmatically derived lexical meaning may have become lexicalised (e.g. the 
metaphorical meaning of wizard in (17) above), requiring disambiguation, whose 
contribution to the explicit content of an utterance is widely agreed on. For other 
people, even within the same speech community, the same word may have only a single 
encoded sense and the others derived through ad hoc concept construction. Wilson and 
Carston argue that it seems implausible that one proposition would be expressed in the 
case where the hearer has two lexicalised concepts for a lexical form, and a different one 
in the case where he has only a single concept stored for the same lexical form, which 
points to ad hoc concepts also contributing to the proposition expressed. A final 
argument is that if lexical narrowing and broadening can combine in the interpretation 
of a lexical concept, as shown by (19) above, it seems implausible that only one of them 
(i.e. narrowing) should contribute to the proposition expressed (cf. Carston 1997).95  
Finally, the relevance-theoretic account takes the processes involved in lexical 
adjustment to be genuinely inferential, in as much as the hearer’s goal is to arrive at a 
warranted conclusion about the speaker’s intended meaning, with the encoded meaning 
playing an evidential role. For instance, as shown by (18) above, the move from the 
premise ‘Mary has said that John is a WIZARD in finance’ to the conclusion ‘Mary meant 
that John is a WIZARD* in finance’ rests on a non-demonstrative inference process that 
takes a set of premises as input and yields as output a set of conclusions which are 
wholly derivable from the premises. This is perhaps the most contentious aspect of the 
                                                      
95 The truth-conditional account of lexical pragmatic processes is supported by a number of experimental 
studies of metaphor comprehension. Specifically, these studies suggest that people understand 
metaphorical meanings as quickly and automatically as they understand literal meanings (Glucksberg and 
Keysar 1990; Glucksberg, McGlone, and Manfredi 1997; Gibbs 1992, 1994; Glucksberg 1998, 2001). This 
goes against the view that metaphorical interpretations depends on the prior computation of a ‘literal 
meaning’ or ‘what is said’, which is then rejected, triggering a second stage of retrieval of the metaphorical 
meaning.  
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relevance-theoretic approach to lexical pragmatic processes, in particular its 
implications for metaphor comprehension, which, on most (non-Gricean) accounts, is 
analysed as an associative (i.e. non-inferential) process, involving some kind of domain 
mapping (i.e. systematic correspondences between different cognitive domains), feature 
or domain activation, etc. (see, for instance, Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and 
Turner 1989; Recanati 1995, 2004; Kintsch 2000, 2001; Evans 2009).96 A central 
argument in favour of an inferential account of lexical pragmatic processes, and 
specifically of metaphor, is that it would be considerably more constrained than a non-
inferential account, which, it is claimed, could not avoid overgeneration (Wilson and 
Carston 2007).97 I cannot get into this debate in more detail in this chapter, and I will 
broadly follow the relevance-theoretic assumption that lexical adjustment (including 
metaphor comprehension) is an inferential process. However, I return to consideration 
of this issue in Chapter 6, in connection with my proposal for a relevance-theoretic 
account of metonymy.  
4.3 A lexical-pragmatic account of polysemy 
In the previous chapter, I argued that polysemy arises as a result of encoded lexical 
concepts being massively underdetermining of speaker-intended concepts, and that, at 
                                                      
96 An objection that is sometimes raised against inferential accounts of metaphor comprehension is that 
they are unable to account for so-called ‘emergent properties’, that is, properties that are conveyed by the 
metaphorical expression but which are not associated with any of the linguistically-encoded concepts in 
the utterance. A much-cited example is ‘My surgeon is a butcher’, in which the property conveyed by the 
concept BUTCHER* (that the surgeon is extremely incompetent, dangerous, etc.) is not standardly 
associated with either SURGEON or BUTCHER in isolation (see discussion in Wilson and Carston 2007). For 
proposals for a solution to this apparent problem within relevance theory, see Carston (2002b), Vega-
Moreno (2007) and Wilson and Carston (2006). 
97 This issue is part of a broader debate in pragmatics concerning whether ‘what is said’ by an utterance is 
derived by pragmatic processes that are fundamentally associative (Recanati 1995, 2002a, 2004, 2007) or 
inferential (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002b, 2002a, 2007). The philosopher François 
Recanati distinguishes between primary and secondary pragmatic processes, where the former are 
associative and local, and the latter are properly inferential and global in the Gricean sense. Metaphor, on 
Recanati’s account would be a primary pragmatic process, hence local and associative. On the other hand, 
relevance-theorists take utterance interpretation to be a wholly inferential process, with a unitary, on-line 
pragmatic processing system which derives explicit content (‘what is said’) and conversational 
implicatures in parallel, driven by the hearer’s search for an interpretation that meets his occasion-
specific expectations of relevance. As we have seen, this often involves a process of ‘mutual adjustment’, 
where a hypothesis about an implicature can both precede and shape a hypothesis about an explicature. 
Relevance theorists have claimed that Recanati’s distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic 
processes commits him to a sequential view of the derivation of implicatures, and hence makes him 
unable to account for the mutual adjustment phenomenon. 
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the deepest level, polysemy is the outcome of a pragmatic process whereby intended 
senses are inferred on the basis of encoded concepts and contextual information 
(Sperber and Wilson 1998). More specifically, then, given the account of lexical 
pragmatic processes outlined in this chapter, the claim would be that generally, 
polysemy is the outcome of a pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction, 
resulting in communicated concepts that have narrower or broader denotations than 
those linguistically-encoded. The construction of ad hoc concepts (i.e. polysemy) takes 
place within the overall inferential process of forming hypotheses about speaker-
intended meanings, which is driven by the hearer’s occasion-specific expectations of 
relevance. As argued in Chapter 3, this is the very same overall inferential process that is 
responsible for the disambiguation of conventional polysemy (i.e. where two or several 
senses have become established in the mental lexicon of speakers). However, in the case 
of on-line lexical adjustment, this process is genuinely constructive; it takes encoded 
concepts, logical and encyclopaedic information, together with a set of contextual 
assumptions as input, and outputs an occasion-specific concept, which is either 
narrower or broader than the linguistically-encoded concept or overlaps with it (i.e. is 
both narrower in some respects and broader in others). 
4.3.1 A re-analysis of the Pustejovsky (1995a) cases 
The framework for analysing lexical adjustment in terms of ad hoc concept construction 
outlined here allows us to fine-tune the pragmatic account of Pustejovsky’s (1995a) 
cases of polysemy (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). The relevant examples are repeated in (21)-
(23) below:  
(21) a. John baked a potato. 
b. John baked a cake. 
(22) a. Every chef needs a good knife. 
b. ‘American Pastoral’ is a good book.  
(23) a. Mary began reading a book. 
b. Mary began a book. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Pustejovsky analyses the verb bake as linguistically-encoding 
the change-of-state meaning which occurs in (21)a., and which is adjusted to the 
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creation sense in (21)b. by the generative process of ‘co-composition’. The application of 
this process is dependent on the semantics of the complement noun (which, in (21), 
turns on a semantically represented distinction between natural kinds and artefacts). 
However, on the pragmatic account pursued here, the creative sense of bake in (21)b. 
could be analysed as being arrived at through lexical broadening of the linguistically-
encoded change-of-state sense, in which its denotation is extended to include the 
various pre-cooking activities required to bring something into existence (e.g. cake, 
pizza, bread, etc.).98 In this case, an important step in the hearer’s construction of the ad 
hoc concept BAKE* will be his accessing of the encyclopaedic entry for the concept CAKE, 
which will contain assumptions about the way in which cakes come into being (i.e. as a 
result of a ‘creative’ process of baking). A crucial difference between the relevance-
theoretic pragmatic analysis and that given by Pustejovsky is thus the status of the 
information used to derive the creative interpretation of bake: whether it is seen as being 
encoded as part of the semantics of the noun or merely contingent, stored as part of the 
hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge. As argued in the previous chapter, a clear advantage 
of the latter analysis is that, instead of postulating default interpretations that can be 
overridden only in the case of explicit contextual evidence pointing to a different 
interpretation, it allows for the necessary flexibility in lexical interpretation (which is 
constrained, however, by the hearer’s expectations of relevance).  
A possible objection to the analysis of the creative sense of bake as an instance of 
on-line ad hoc concept construction may be that this sense appears, in fact, to have 
become conventional. If this is correct, the linguistic form bake would have two 
linguistically-encoded senses, with distinct denotations. This may well be so (at least for 
some people), in which case the pragmatic analysis given above can be seen as providing 
an account of the semantic relation between the two senses: the creation sense may have 
become conventional as a result of frequent and routinised broadening of the 
linguistically-encoded change-of-state sense. I return to the issue of semantic change 
and stabilisation of senses in the next section. 
                                                      
98 According to The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (1966/1985. Oxford: Clarendon Press), the 
basic sense of bake is ‘cook by dry heat’; thus, Pustejovsky’s assumption that the change-of-state sense is 
primary seems reasonable.  
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Turning now to Pustejovsky’s examples of ‘selective binding’ in (22), these can 
be analysed as instances of lexical narrowing giving rise to ad hoc concepts (as hinted at 
in the previous chapter). As I said there, adjectives such as good can be seen as encoding 
highly general concepts, which have to be narrowed into more specific ad hoc concepts 
on each occasion of use (e.g. ‘GOOD* knife’, ‘GOOD** book’, ‘GOOD*** mum’, ‘GOOD**** 
student’, etc.). Depending on the context, good may express different ad hoc concepts in 
describing one and the same thing (e.g. a ‘good job’ could be one that is well paid, offers 
interesting tasks, has an inclusive social environment, offers special benefits to the 
employees, gives a certain social status, and so on, each of which might involve a distinct 
ad hoc concept). As in the case of bake above, the pragmatic inferential process will take 
as input information stored in the encyclopaedic entry of other lexical concepts in the 
utterance in the derivation of the ad hoc concept. In the case of good, encyclopaedic 
information stored about the concept encoded by the head noun is of particular 
importance. However, this information is not restricted to a particular, linguistically-
specified purpose (e.g. ‘knives are for cutting’), but might include any information 
relevant to the interpretation of the speaker-intended meaning of the adjective, as 
shown by the following examples:  
(24) a. To become a member of Billy’s exclusive gang you had to have a good knife. 
b. This is a good knife for people with wrist arthritis. 
Here it appears that information such as ‘knifes can be used for stabbing people’, ‘knives 
can be designed in different ways’, etc. play an important role in the derivation of the ad 
hoc concepts communicated by good. In this way, by taking lexical interpretation to be a 
matter of adjusting the interpretation of individual words in accordance with one’s 
context-specific expectations of relevance, the relevance-theoretic approach accounts 
for, indeed predicts, that good may be used to communicate a number of different 
occasion-specific senses, far beyond those predicted by Pustejovsky’s account.  
Finally, let us consider the ‘type shifting’ constructions of the kind in (23). As 
already mentioned in Chapter 3, on the present account the speaker-intended event 
associated with the VP (e.g. ‘begin reading a book’) would be derived entirely by means 
of a pragmatic process, albeit not through ad hoc concept construction. I mentioned two 
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possibilities for a pragmatic analysis of ‘type shifting’ predicates. Either they could be 
analysed as instances of ‘free’ enrichment, where a constituent not expressed in the 
linguistic form of the utterance is supplied. Or, as De Almeida and Dwivedi (2008) 
suggest, the pragmatic derivation of speaker-intended meanings for type shifting 
predicates could be analysed as being structurally driven, that is, as a form of saturation. 
On this approach (which I tend to favour, due to the mandatory character of this 
process), the syntactic structure of sentences such as ‘Mary began a book’ are seen as 
containing an extra VP with an empty verbal head, as shown by (25) (de Almeida and 
Dwivedi 2008: 316):  
(25) Mary began [VP [V0 e] [NP the book]] 
Thus, the verbal gap that remains in the LF of such constructions has to be filled in 
(saturated) using information from the discourse context.99 This process, which is 
linguistically mandated and consists in supplying a missing constituent to the 
proposition expressed, would be very different from the (pragmatically induced) 
construction of ad hoc concepts from underspecified concepts output by the linguistic 
system.100 In fact, such ‘type shifting’ constructions appear to be significantly different 
from the other instances of adjustment of lexical meaning discussed by Pustejovsky 
(1995a), as well as those discussed in this chapter (to the extent that I am not convinced 
that they should be treated as instances of polysemy at all). 
An important motivation for a re-analysis of the Pustejovsky cases is the fact that 
the generative lexicon, in spite of its incorporation of considerable amounts of world 
knowledge into the lexicon (in the form of, inter alia, ‘qualia structures’), still leaves a lot 
of work for the pragmatic system to do in finding the interpretation that was intended 
                                                      
99 At no stage in the interpretation process, therefore, is it assumed that a ‘default’ interpretation (e.g., 
according to which Mary began reading a book) is computed and then cancelled by context. 
100 Recall my criticism of Pustejovsky’s type coercion mechanism in Chapter 2, where it was pointed out 
that the generative mechanism wrongly predicts that a VP such as begin a car should be interpreted as 
‘begin to drive a car’ due to telic information stored as part of the lexical representation for car (e.g. cars 
are for driving). On the relevance-theoretic account presented here, there would, of course, be no such 
prediction, but this account would also require an event to be supplied in cases such as begin a car (e.g. an 
utterance of ‘Bill began a car’ could be interpreted as ‘Bill began repairing a car’ in the context of a 
garage). However, a speaker using the VP begin a car to describe a situation in which someone began 
driving a car would not be optimally relevant, as the choice to use this expression rather than the 
conventional start a/the car, would, due to the extra effort of processing it would induce, send the hearer 
off searching for additional effects, which would not be part of the speaker’s intended meaning. 
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by the speaker (specifically, in overriding ‘default’ interpretations in contexts where 
another, ‘non-default’ interpretation was clearly intended). I claim that the wholly 
pragmatic, relevance-theoretic account is able to do this work, as well as that part of the 
interpretive work that a generative lexicon does adequately. The question, then, as I 
pointed out in Chapter 2, becomes whether we in fact need a generative lexicon or 
whether anything is to be gained by deriving some interpretations in one way (via 
generative linguistic mechanisms) and others in a distinct way (via pragmatic 
mechanisms). Certainly, considerations of theoretical economy would favour the 
unitary pragmatic approach. 
4.3.2 Polysemy, sense relations and lexical semantic change 
A consequence of adopting the relevance-theoretic atomist stance on word meanings is 
that there are two (complementary) ways of describing the representation of polysemy, 
which were outlined in Chapter 2: (i) In the cases where the polysemous senses have 
become conventional (i.e. stored in the mental lexicons of speakers), they would be 
represented as distinct lexical entries with the same linguistic form (e.g. BAKE1, BAKE2), 
on a par with homonymy. (ii) In all other cases, there would be a single encoded 
meaning of the word, and the differences in meaning between its uses in different 
contexts would be pragmatic adjustments to the encoded meaning (e.g. GOOD*, GOOD**, 
GOOD***). As we saw in Chapter 2, this model is compatible with the empirical evidence 
on polysemy representation.101  
A widely held objection to atomistic theories of word meaning is that they 
cannot capture intuitively semantic relations such as synonymy, analyticity, entailment 
and polysemy, which are thought to require complex lexical semantic representations. 
Focusing on polysemy here,102 the question is: if intuitions about semantic relations 
between the senses of conventionally polysemous words do not stem from the overlap 
                                                      
101 However, as we discussed, it is far from the only model compatible with the experimental evidence. 
102 In relevance theory, at least analyticity and entailment can be accounted for in terms of meaning 
postulates attached to concepts. See Borg (forthcoming: Chapter 5) for a different suggestion of how such 
semantic relations can be handled within an atomist framework without meaning postulates. 
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or sharing of features in their lexical semantic representations, where do such intuitions 
come from?  
I suspect there might not be a single answer to this question. First, in the large 
number of cases where the polysemy takes the form of pragmatically derived ad hoc 
concepts, the meaning relations between the distinct ad hoc concepts would be 
transparent to speakers/hearers. That is, we perceive a relation in meaning between the 
different uses of good (e.g. ‘good knife’, ‘good mum’) because they are derived 
(inferentially) from the same encoded concept. Second, in the case of conventional 
polysemy (which, on this account, would be stored in much the same way as 
homonymous senses), some intuitions may stem from our encyclopaedic information 
about the denotations of the different senses. For instance, if it is true that the two senses 
of the linguistic form bake are represented as independent entries, BAKE1 and BAKE2, the 
reason we perceive them to be closely related in meaning could be to do with the kind of 
information we associate with the two activities; both involve putting some initially 
inedible potential foodstuff into an oven and applying heat to it at a high enough 
temperature for a long enough time that it becomes edible. Other intuitions about sense 
relations could be reflective. For instance, the fact that we perceive a meaning relation 
between the different senses of a conventionally polysemous lexical item such as mouth, 
may be because we know that the mouth in (say) ‘mouth of a river’ has been 
metaphorically derived from the mouth in ‘mouth of a dog’; we are able to reflectively 
reconstruct the process of metaphorical extension from the primary sense to the 
extended sense. Finally, I think that the mere fact that the different senses are encoded 
by a single lexical form often leads us to anticipate that there is a relation between them. 
A kind of ‘null hypothesis’ appears to be that the different senses of a lexical form are 
related, which is revised only when we are presented with evidence that the multiple 
encoding is accidental (for instance, it seems possible that many non-linguists would 
think that there is a relation between the two meanings of bank).103 
                                                      
103 This point perhaps becomes clearer if we consider a cross-linguistic example: For instance, in 
Norwegian, there is a noun, måne, which is conventionally polysemous between the sense ‘moon’ and the 
sense ‘bald spot’. The latter is a broadened use, derived on the basis of a perceived resemblance between 
the shape of a bald spot and that of the moon. While the relation between these two senses is a matter of 
course for speakers of Norwegian, this may not be so for speakers of English (in which these two concepts 
are encoded by different lexical forms) unless they are made aware of it. 
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A related issue is the role of polysemy and pragmatic adjustment of lexical 
meanings in semantic change. Much fruitful research on semantic change has been 
conducted within the context of grammaticalisation theory (e.g. Fleischman 1982; 
Sweetser 1990; Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991; Hopper and Traugott 1993/2003; 
Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994; Traugott and Dasher 2002). The term 
‘grammaticalisation’ refers to the process whereby content words acquire grammatical 
functions, involving a shift in meaning from the specific to the schematic (e.g. the shift 
from purposive be going (to…) to auxiliary be going to), or existing grammatical 
expressions acquire further grammatical functions. A central focus in the literature on 
grammaticalisation is the general directionality observed for some kinds of semantic 
changes, and on developing accounts in which possible and impossible changes or 
directions of change can be predicted.104  
A hypothesis about semantic change in grammaticalisation theory is that its 
main driving force is pragmatic; that it is motivated by speaker-hearer interactions and 
communicative strategies (Hopper and Traugott 1993/2003; Traugott and Dasher 2002). 
Traugott and Dasher (2002) argue that pragmatic inferences that arise in specific 
contexts may come to be reanalysed as part of the conventional meaning associated with 
a given construction.105 Given the pragmatic account of adjustments to lexically-
encoded concepts outlined here, we should expect pragmatic narrowing and broadening 
of lexical meanings to play a role in semantic change. In historical linguistics, the 
categories of narrowing and broadening have long been part of traditional classifications 
of types of lexical semantic change. Some scholars consider them to be the principal 
kinds of semantic change, and other kinds (including hyperbole and metaphor) to be 
subtypes of them. Consider the examples in (26)-(34), given by Campbell (1998/2004: 
Chapter 9): 
 
                                                      
104 For instance, according to the hypothesis of unidirectionality of grammaticalisation, grammatical 
forms are taken to have developed from lexical forms, but the reverse change does not occur (cf. Hopper 
and Traugott 1993/2003). 
105 Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) emphasis is the typical direction of certain kinds of semantic change (so-
called ‘regular’ changes, which are observed cross-linguistically and repeatedly within a single language), 
and the pragmatic mechanisms (which they describe as ‘invited inferencing’ and ‘subjectification’) that 
they take to be responsible for their development. 
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Lexical narrowing:  
(26) Meat. The original meaning of this word was ‘food’ in general, which got 
narrowed into its current meaning, ‘food of flesh’. 
(27) Hound. Its current meaning ‘dog of a breed used for hunting (especially one able 
to track its prey by scent)’ comes from the Old English word hund, which meant 
‘dog’ in general. 
(28) Starve. The current meaning of this verb in English, ‘to suffer or perish from 
hunger’ has developed as a narrowing of the meaning of the Old English word 
steorfan, ‘to die’.  
Lexical broadening: 
(29) Dog. This word first appeared with the more specific meaning ‘(specific) 
powerful breed of dog’, which generalised to include all breeds or races of dogs. 
(30) Cupboard. In Middle English, the meaning of this word was ‘table upon which 
cups and other vessels were placed, a piece of furniture to display plates, a 
sideboard’, which got broadened into its current meaning in British English, 
‘closet or cabinet with shelves for keeping cups and dishes’. In American English, 
its meaning has been further broadened into denoting any ‘small storage 
cabinet’, and in parts of Canada, it is used to denote ‘wardrobe’ or ‘clothes 
closet’. 
(31) Terribly, horribly, awfully, etc. These words can all be said to have the meaning 
‘very’ in modern English, being used to intensify the meaning of the adjective 
they modify. As a result of being used as hyperboles, they have developed into 
having no synchronic semantic connection with their origins, terror, horror, awe, 
etc. 
(32) Grasp. The meaning ‘understand’ is seen as a metaphorical extension of the 
original meaning, ‘seize’.106 
(33) Dispose of, liquidate, terminate, take care of, eliminate, etc. Their ‘to kill’ 
meanings are metaphorically derived. 
                                                      
106 Sweetser (1990) showed that there is a cross-linguistic tendency for verbs of seeing and grasping to be 
metaphorically extended into verbs of understanding.  
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(34) Chill. The informal meaning ‘to relax, calm down’, is metaphorically derived 
from the original meaning ‘to cool’. 
Moreover, it is recognised by many scholars that semantic change must go through a 
stage of polysemy, in which related meanings of a word that emerged at historically 
different periods, coexist over time in a language, for individual speakers as well as for 
language communities (a phenomenon known as 'layering' in grammaticalisation 
theory, cf. Hopper 1991). The assumption is that a shift in the meaning of a word form a 
from meaning A to meaning B, goes through an intermediary stage in which both A and 
B coexist, as schematised in (35) below (adapted from Campbell 1998/2004: 266-267):  
(35) Stage 1: a means ‘A’ 
Stage 2: a means ‘A’ and ‘B’ (‘A’ > ‘A’, ‘B’) 
Stage 3: a means ‘B’ (‘A’, ‘B’ > ‘B’) 
This assumption about the progression of the process of semantic change is quite 
compatible with the relevance-theoretic account of lexical adjustment (and hence of 
polysemy), pursued in this thesis, where what starts out as an ad hoc concept in Stage 1, 
may become stabilised or conventional over time for individual speakers or within a 
language community, as in stage 2, as a result of frequent adjustment of the lexical 
meaning of a word in a specific direction (e.g. the broadening of the change-of-state 
sense of bake into the creative sense, as described in section 4.3.1 above). In such a case 
the construction of the ad hoc concept becomes progressively more routinised (a 
'pragmatic routine' or inferential shortcut develops, cf. Vega-Moreno 2007). A possible 
development from there is that the ad hoc concept takes over from the originally 
encoded concept, as in Stage 3 (e.g. as in modern English, where the ‘food of flesh’ sense 
of meat has replaced the general ‘food’ sense, or, to take a more recent case, where the 
derived sense of the word gay, ‘homosexual’ has almost entirely taken over from the 
original sense, ‘lighthearted and carefree’).107 
                                                      
107 A very interesting question is what factors contribute to pragmatically adjusted senses ‘catching on’ in 
a speech community, which ultimately lead to their stabilisation. The philosopher Ruth Millikan proposes 
an evolutionary account of the process of stabilisation of senses. In Millikan’s (1984, 2005) framework, 
linguistic items, or ‘language devices’, as she calls them, have proper functions, or purposes (in a similar 
way as tools have functions or purposes). A proper function is what accounts for the continuing 
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Furthermore, at the synchronic level, individual speakers may differ with regard 
to which senses of a word they have stored in their mental lexicons. For instance, for 
some speakers of English, the broadened (metaphorical) meaning of wizard, WIZARD*, 
may have become conventional (thus stored in their mental lexicons), and recognising 
this concept as the one intended by a speaker on an occasion of use would be a matter of 
disambiguation rather than ad hoc concept construction (cf. Chapter 3). For other 
people, even within the same speech community, wizard may have only one encoded 
sense (WIZARD), and the metaphorical sense (WIZARD*) would be derived through ad 
hoc concept construction. Thus, inferred senses may be ephemeral or stable, shared by 
few or many or by a whole language community. The construction of a particular ad hoc 
concept may be a first-time affair for one communicator and a routine inferential 
pattern for another, and the reason this is possible is our pragmatic ability. As Wilson 
and Carston write:  
One of the most important functions of pragmatic inference is to compensate for 
grammatical and lexical differences among members of a speech community, so 
that addressees with different encoded senses can end up with the same 
interpretations, albeit via different routes. (Wilson and Carston 2007: 241) 
4.3.3 Prepositional polysemy 
The cases of polysemy that we have looked at so far have been open-class lexical items 
(nouns, main verbs, adjectives and adverbs). However, within the cognitive linguistics 
tradition, the main focus of research on polysemy has been closed-class lexical items, 
                                                      
reproduction and proliferation of a language device. She distinguishes between two types of proper 
function, ‘direct stabilising proper functions’ and ‘derived proper functions’. A direct stabilising function 
is one that, “when performed, tends both to encourage speakers to keep using the device and hearers to 
keep responding to it with the same (with a stable) response” (Millikan 2005: 94). The stabilising function 
of a linguistic device is to contribute to its ‘conventional meaning’. It is what accounts for the ‘survival’ of 
the expression type in a language community; it is historically responsible for its reproduction. For 
instance, a direct stabilising function of the word elephant would be to produce representations of 
elephants in hearers’ minds. A derived proper function of a linguistic device token is derived from a 
speaker’s intention or purpose in using the linguistic device, and may involve the use of metaphor, irony, 
or other figures of speech. Using the word elephant to describe someone either big boned or not 
particularly graceful would be such a case. If, on Millikan’s account, there is repeatedly a conflict between 
the stabilising function and speaker purpose (or, speaker-intended meaning, on the account pursued in 
this thesis) for a linguistic device, this will result in either a change in function or the addition of a new 
function. If the same speaker-hearer pattern is reproduced long enough, the new use will become 
conventional; the result is a new stabilising function for a word. According to Millikan, a new meaning 
has been established in a public language “when the new meaning would continue to proliferate even if 
the old meaning were to die out” (2005: 193). 
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specifically prepositions (among many others, Lakoff 1987; Brugman 1988; Brugman 
and Lakoff 1988; Kreitzer 1997; Tyler and Evans 2003; Evans 2009). There has been 
little, if any, work on prepositions within the relevance theory framework. However, we 
might expect the underdeterminacy issue to be even more acutely manifested in the case 
of such closed-class items (which are few in number and new items cannot usually be 
added), than in the case of the open-class items we have discussed so far. Since speakers 
have a very limited set of linguistic resources at hand for expressing a very large 
(virtually unlimited) set of spatial relations (in addition to the set of abstract relations 
that they are used to express), pragmatic inference must presumably play a crucial role 
in the comprehension of prepositional expressions. 
Two questions in particular arise from this: First, given the analysis of the 
polysemy of open-class items as the outcome of an inferential process of ad hoc concept 
construction, can the (presumably massive) underdeterminacy relation that exists 
between the class of prepositions and the spatial and abstract relations that can be 
expressed by use of them be resolved in terms of the same type of pragmatic process? 
Second, given the three types of linguistic encodings specified in section 4.2.1 above 
(procedural meanings, pro-concepts, full-fledged concepts), what do prepositions 
encode? While it seems clear that their encodings are in some way conceptual (they are 
constituents of conceptual representations and, in most cases at least, they affect the 
truth-conditions of utterances in which they occur), they seem to be much more 
schematic and abstract than the conceptual representations encoded by lexical items 
such as flu, wizard, rectangular, bake, etc., which, on this account, are claimed to encode 
full-fledged concepts. In this respect, prepositions have more the flavour of so-called 
pro-concepts, i.e. schematic concepts that need to be pragmatically fleshed out into full 
concepts. 
As the issue of prepositional meaning could easily serve as the topic of a whole 
thesis, I will obviously not be able to do more than scratch the surface of it here. In the 
rest of this section, I will (briefly) consider the ‘Principled Polysemy’ approach to 
prepositional polysemy proposed by Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003). This approach, 
although different from the relevance-theoretic position in important ways, shares the 
assumption that the constructive role played by pragmatic inference in giving rise to 
polysemy must be built into an account of the phenomenon. I will end the section with a 
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tentative suggestion for a direction that a relevance-theoretic analysis of prepositional 
meaning might take. 
A reason for the interest in prepositions taken by cognitive linguistics is that 
they are considered particularly clear illustrations of the so-called ‘embodiment thesis’ 
(Johnson 1987, 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). This is the claim that meaning is 
grounded in our bodily experiences and interactions with the world, which allows us to 
conceptualise abstract areas of experience in terms of the familiar and concrete.108 As a 
consequence, linguistic meaning is also seen as being largely grounded in spatio-
physical experience, of which prepositions, expressing spatial relations that give rise to a 
range of non-spatial abstract senses, are prime examples. Recall from Chapter 2 the 
paradigmatic example of prepositional polysemy, over, repeated in (36) below: 
(36) a. The bird flew over the house. (‘above and across’) 
b. The painting is over the couch. (‘above’) 
c. The truck ran over the rabbit. (‘across’) 
d. Sarah lives over the hill. (‘on the other side of’) 
e. Mary nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. (‘covering’) 
f. I will read the papers over the weekend. (‘temporal’) 
g. John has a strange power over Mary. (‘control’) 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Brugman (1988; Brugman and Lakoff 1988) and Lakoff (1987) 
analysed over as a radial category composed of a range of distinct but related senses 
organised around a prototypical, or central sense (which, in their view, was the ‘above 
and across’ sense) in a lexical network structure. Their approach provided a full 
specification of the range of possible senses of over, all of which were taken to be stored 
in the long-term semantic memory of speakers. A common criticism of this full-
specification approach is its failure to distinguish between those aspects of meaning that 
                                                      
108 Thus, a central assumption about metaphors in cognitive linguistics is that they are shaped and 
constrained by our bodily experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For instance, spatial concepts of 
verticality are taken to be the ‘source domain’ of conceptual metaphors such as HAVING CONTROL OR 
FORCE IS UP, BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN, whose physical basis is our experience that 
“physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the victor in a fight is typically on top” (ibid. 
15).  
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are part of the word meaning proper and those that result from its interaction with the 
context (which Sandra 1998 called the 'polysemy fallacy').  
The ‘Principled Polysemy’ approach proposed by Tyler and Evans (2003) 
espouses the view that polysemous lexical items are represented in terms of sense 
networks centred around a prototypical sense, as well as the cognitive linguistic claim 
about embodied meaning. Their approach differs from the Lakoff-Brugman approach 
by distinguishing between established senses and uses of a polysemous word, thus 
allowing for many of the senses to be pragmatically inferred rather than fully specified 
in the lexicon.109 
Tyler and Evans (2003) seek to provide a methodology for distinguishing 
between distinct senses of a preposition, and for establishing the prototypical sense. In 
order to determine whether a particular use of a preposition counts as a distinct sense, 
they propose the following two criteria (Tyler and Evans 2003: 42-43; Evans and Green 
2006): A sense is distinct if (i) it involves non-spatial meaning and/or a spatial 
configuration between the trajector (TR) and the landmark (LM) which is distinct from 
that found in the word’s protoscene (i.e. the primary sense of the word, represented in 
terms of an idealised spatio-functional configuration);110 and (ii) there are instances of 
the sense that are context-independent, that is, which cannot be inferred from another 
sense and the context in which it occurs. To illustrate, consider the uses of over in (37) 
and (38): 
(37) a. The hummingbird is hovering over the flower. 
b. The helicopter is hovering over the city. 
(38) a. John nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. 
b. John nailed a board over the hole in the wall. 
In (37), over is used to express a spatial relation in which the TR (encoded by the 
hummingbird/the helicopter) is located higher than the LM (encoded by the flower/the 
                                                      
109 Evans (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the ‘state’ concepts expressed by the English prepositions 
in, on, and at, within the framework of his newly developed LCCM Theory (Theory of Lexical Concepts 
and Cognitive Models). I cannot get into the details of this analysis here, but I return to consideration of 
the LCCM theory as concerns its account of metonymy in Chapter 6. 
110 In Langacker’s (1987) terminology, the trajector (TR) is the primary focal element which follows a 
trajectory, and landmark (LM) the secondary focal (‘backgrounded’) element. 
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city). The same basic TR-LM configuration is expressed in both instances, and neither of 
them conveys any additional non-spatial meaning. Thus, they fail the criterion in (i) and 
should not be treated as distinct senses. However, according to Tyler and Evans, the 
sense of over expressed in (38) appears to be distinct. First, there is a primary non-
spatial element of ‘covering/obscuring’ to this sense, in which the LM (the hole in the 
wall/ceiling) is obscured from view by the TR (the board). Furthermore, the spatial 
relations expressed between the TR and LM are not the same as that expressed by over 
in (37); in (38)a., the TR and LM are horizontal with respect to the vantage point and 
the TR is physically below the LM, while in (38)b., the TR and LM are vertical with 
respect to the vantage point, and the TR is physically next to the LM (ibid. 43). Thus, 
criterion (i) is satisfied. Second, Tyler and Evans argue that the covering sense of over in 
(38) cannot be pragmatically derived from the primary sense (or protoscene), if the 
primary sense is taken to involve a spatial configuration between TR and LM in which 
the TR is higher than the LM. Thus, the criterion in (ii) is also satisfied.111 The claim is 
that unless we have the covering/obscuring sense already stored in semantic memory, 
the uses of over in (38) cannot be explained. 
The methodology for distinguishing between distinct senses of a preposition 
above relied on a primary sense (a protoscene) being established for the word. In order 
to establish the primary sense in a polysemy network, Tyler and Evans (2003: 45-50) 
propose the following set of criteria: (i) earliest attested meaning; (ii) predominance in 
the semantic network (the primary sense will be the one that is most frequently involved 
in or related to the other distinct senses); (iii) use in composite forms (failure to 
participate in composite forms, e.g. overcoat, is taken to be suggestive of a non-primary 
sense); (iv) relations to other prepositions (the sense that participates in a contrast set, 
e.g. prepositions of verticality, is a likely candidate as a primary sense), and (v) ease of 
predicting sense extensions (the primary sense should be the best predictor of other 
senses in the network). Based on these criteria, Tyler and Evans (2003: 65) identify the 
                                                      
111 However, Tyler and Evans (2003: 44) claim that in an utterance such as ‘The tablecloth is over the 
table’, the covering/obscuring sense can in fact be inferred from “the fact that the tablecloth is over and 
hence higher than the table, in conjunction with our knowledge that tablecloths are larger than tables and 
that we typically view tables from above the top of the table”. This would presumably explain how this 
sense came to be derived in the first place (which subsequently established as a distinct sense in the 
semantic network through routinisation). 
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‘above’ sense in (37) as the primary sense, or protoscene, of over. More specifically, the 
protoscene is described as a “spatial relation in which the TR is higher than but within 
potential contact of the LM”. In addition, they identify another 14 distinct senses (thus 
15 senses in total) that form part of the semantic network for over (see Tyler and Evans 
2003: 80 for details). 
Occasion-specific senses of over are constructed on the basis of the proto-scene, 
or any of the other distinct senses.112 An instance of such a contextually-specified 
meaning is the ‘above and across’ sense, illustrated by (39) below (Tyler and Evans 2003: 
69): 
(39) The cat jumped over the wall. 
In this example, the ‘above and across’ trajectory expressed by over should not be seen as 
being stored in semantic memory (as claimed by Lakoff 1987), but as being inferentially 
derived on the basis of the protoscene and our understanding of the action of jumping 
(e.g. that it involves motion and a trajectory), encyclopaedic assumptions about cats 
(e.g. their physical abilities), walls (e.g. that they provide vertical, impenetrable 
obstacles), as well as our knowledge about force dynamics (e.g. gravity).113 
In spite of some fundamental differences, Tyler and Evans’s Principled Polysemy 
approach is in many ways consonant with the relevance-theoretic approach to lexical 
adjustment, and with the analysis of polysemy proposed in this thesis. As mentioned 
above, the two accounts share the assumption that speaker meanings are, quite 
generally, radically underdetermined by linguistically-encoded meanings, and that 
pragmatic inference therefore plays a crucial role in the understanding of utterances. 
They also share the view that the hearer uses his encyclopaedic knowledge associated 
with the encoded concepts in the process of pragmatically inferring speaker-intended 
                                                      
112 The precise details of this process of constructing occasion-specific senses are not entirely clear to me. 
Is the assumption that the hearer must first disambiguate the meaning of the preposition (i.e. choosing 
the speaker-intended established meaning), and then construct a context-specific sense on the basis of the 
disambiguated meaning? 
113 Tyler and Evans (2003: 57) describe the inferential strategy used to arrive at this sense as one of ‘best 
fit’, in which the speaker chooses that preposition which “best fits the relevant (i.e. salient) conceptual 
spatial relation between the TR and LM at one point in the cat’s trajectory, which will, in turn, prompt the 
[hearer’s construction of] the appropriate entailments or inferences”. In relevance-theory, this strategy is 
captured by the presumption of optimal relevance. 
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senses of lexical items. In this way, both accounts emphasise the central pragmatic 
aspect of polysemy. However, while on the relevance-theoretic account this pragmatic 
aspect is fundamental to the existence of polysemy, on Tyler and Evans’s account it is 
ultimately grounded in the embodiment of meaning, that is, in our spatio-physical 
experience, which is taken to provide the fundamental conceptual structure from which 
other concepts are constructed. 
It is with regard to their positions on linguistic meaning in particular that the 
two approaches part company. First, relevance-theory does not subscribe to the claim 
that linguistic meaning is embodied. Rather, it takes a Chomskyan/Fodorian modular 
view of the linguistic system, and treats linguistic meanings as incomplete conceptual 
representations output by the linguistic system, and taken as input to the pragmatic 
inferential system. Second, as we have seen, the relevance-theoretic account does not 
postulate semantic networks to account for polysemous senses of a word. Although I 
take it that it is, in principle, possible that we store many distinct senses for a 
preposition such as over in our mental lexicons, I wonder if the range of spatial and 
abstract relations that are expressible by this preposition actually requires the 
postulation of 15 distinct senses for this word. Recall that Tyler and Evans’s (2003) 
argument for treating the covering/obscuring sense of over in examples such as ‘John 
nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling’ as distinct was that it could not be derived 
pragmatically from the primary ‘above’ (i.e. ‘the TR is higher but within potential 
contact of the LM’) sense of over, because the spatial relation expressed is, strictly 
speaking, that the board is below the hole in the ceiling. However, it seems that the 
contextual derivation of the covering sense is made impossible primarily by the decision 
to take the ‘above’ sense to be primary (and thus the assumption that the ‘covering’ 
meaning must be derived from this sense). 
A similar point is made by Fieke Van der Gucht and De Cuypere (2007), in their 
discussion of the Principled Polysemy approach. In contrast to Tyler and Evans they 
maintain a monosemy approach to the meaning of over, taking it to encode a more 
schematic meaning, a relation between a spatially ‘superior’ TR and an ‘inferior’ LM, 
which can be instantiated in more than one possible way in extralinguistic reality (ibid. 
746). The preposition thus exhibits a ‘structured polyvalence’ at the experiential level, in 
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the sense that the range of possible relations it can be used to refer to is constrained by 
the linguistic meaning, which is invariant in all its uses. They write,  
To assess the relation between the invariable meaning proper and the 
polyvalence of over, it is imperative not to interpret the specific configuration 
which holds between the TR and LM in a single – call it ‘prototypical’ – way, 
excluding other possibilities which then have to be accounted for by invoking 
polysemy or certain kinds of ‘extension’. (Fieke Van der Gucht and De Cuypere 
2007: 746). 
Furthermore, Fieke Van der Gucht and De Cuypere question the view that prepositions 
encode concepts in the same way as verbs, nouns, and adjectives do. Their claim is that 
in isolation, a preposition such as over does not mean, e.g., ‘on the other side of’ 
‘covering’, ‘control’ or ‘past’, rather, these meanings arise when over is interpreted in 
combination with other words in a sentence. Therefore, prepositions should rather be 
treated as encoding ‘instrumental meanings’, that is, relational meanings that can only 
be instantiated in grammatical combinations with other words. 
I suggest that this is also the direction that a relevance-theoretic approach to 
prepositional polysemy would probably take. Traditionally, there has been a distinction 
in relevance theory between conceptual and procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987; 
Wilson and Sperber 1993). While most lexical items encode concepts (e.g. flu, wizard, 
rectangular, bake) which figure in conceptual representations and affect truth-
conditions of utterances (i.e. explicit content), some expressions do not encode concepts 
(e.g. but, so, however, also, anyway, and, arguably, pronouns and various mood 
indicators and sentential particles); they are typically non truth-conditional and their 
meanings are procedural; they encode constraints on the inferential phase of 
comprehension. An intermediate case, as mentioned in section 4.2.1, is words that 
encode so-called pro-concepts, i.e. a schematic representation that requires contextual 
specification in order to make a fully conceptual contribution to the proposition 
expressed. Prepositions, then, could be seen as encoding such pro-concepts, say, in the 
form of a schematic representation of a spatial relation, which, in context, would trigger 
a process of construction of a relational meaning (an ad hoc concept), based on the 
preposition’s combination with other lexical concepts and their associated 
encyclopaedic entries, as well as accessible contextual assumptions (which, in spatial 
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uses, would often include assumptions derived from the immediate physical context). 
Sometimes the concept communicated will be narrower than the encoded conceptual 
meaning (which would arguably be the case in most spatial uses), sometimes it will be 
broader (as in more abstract uses). Consider the ‘covering’ uses of over again in (40): 
(40) a. The tablecloth is over the table. 
b. John nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. 
c. John nailed a board over the hole in the wall. 
Let us assume, for the sake of illustration, that over encodes a relation between a 
spatially ‘superior’ TR and an ‘inferior’ LM, as suggested by Fieke Van der Gucht and 
De Cuypere (2007). It is, I think, possible to argue that such a relation does in fact 
underlie all the uses of over in (40), but that, given our real-world knowledge about the 
objects that over is used to express relations between (i.e. between tablecloths and tables 
in (40)a., boards and holes in the ceiling in (40)b., and boards and holes in the wall in 
(40)c.), this relation is construed in different ways in the different uses in (40), so that, 
for instance, from the point of view of the speaker/hearer the board would strictly 
speaking be below the hole in the ceiling in (40)b., and next to it in (40)c. The broadened 
covering sense, then, could be seen as being inferred on the basis of the encoded 
meaning of over (from the fact that the TR is somehow ‘superior’ to the LM), in 
combination with encyclopaedic knowledge about the objects it relates (e.g. that 
tablecloths are typically larger than tables and are used to cover them, that a board can 
be used to cover up a hole in the ceiling/wall, etc.).  
The abstract ‘control’ sense of over (cf. Lakoff 1987), repeated in (41), could be 
seen as a further broadening of the encoded spatial sense, involving an abstract relation 
between a ‘superior’ TR (John) and an ‘inferior’ LM (Mary): 
(41) John has a strange power over Mary. 
In deriving this interpretation, the hearer will make use, inter alia, of encylopaedic 
information associated with the concept POWER, specifically, his knowledge that in the 
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domain of human relations, it involves the ability to direct or influence the behaviour of 
others.114 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the relevance-theoretic account of lexical pragmatics, 
according to which there is a single process that adjusts the meanings of individual 
words in different directions (giving rise to ad hoc concepts with either narrower or 
broader denotations than the linguistically-encoded denotations), and claimed that it 
provides an account of how new senses for a word (giving rise to polysemy) are 
constructed during on-line utterance comprehension. The overall claim was that 
polysemy is not such a paradox in the context of a fully functioning pragmatic system.  
I suggested a reanalysis of the Pustejovsky (1995a) cases of polysemy in terms of 
the relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatic account, and argued that, in contrast to the 
generative lexicon, the pragmatic approach predicts that lexical items are used to 
express a variety of occasion-specific concepts, which include but go far beyond the 
default senses predicted by Pustejovsky’s account.  
I then went on to consider the nature of sense relations in connection with 
polysemy, and suggested that our intuitions about relations between the different senses 
of a polysemous word may come from a variety of sources. I also considered some 
historical lexical data, which, combined with insights about semantic change from 
grammaticalisation theory, suggests that lexical narrowing and broadening may, via an 
intermediate stage of conventional polysemy, lead to semantic change. Finally, I 
discussed the issue of prepositional polysemy, a major topic in the cognitive linguistics 
research, which has received little attention in relevance theory, and sketched a possible 
direction for a relevance-theoretic analysis of prepositional meaning. A proper 
relevance-theoretic account of prepositional polysemy would, of course, have to be 
based on extensive empirical investigation into the range of possible uses of specific 
prepositions (cf. Tyler and Evans 2003), and should, ideally, also include some cross-
linguistic investigation. I hope to return to this topic in future research. 
                                                      
114 In Tyler and Evans’s framework (2003: 101), this ‘control’ sense comes out as a distinct sense, not 
derivable from the context. 
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I have claimed in this chapter that polysemy is the outcome of a pragmatic 
process of ad hoc concept construction, resulting in communicated concepts that have 
narrower or broader denotations than those linguistically-encoded. However, there are 
two important kinds of polysemy that I have not yet looked at, and for which it remains 
to be demonstrated that they can be given appropriate treatments within the present 
pragmatic framework. One is metonymy, which is the topic of Chapter 6, and the other 
is a set of cases which are often described as ‘systematic’ or ‘regular’ polysemy. This 
includes the kind of sense alternation that seems to be generated by a count or a mass 
use of a noun (e.g. the animal/meat senses of rabbit), and thus provides a good 
candidate for a linguistic-semantic analysis. I suggested in Chapter 3 that even in these 
apparently ‘systematic’ cases of polysemy, pragmatic inference is indispensable, but I did 
not suggest how a pragmatic analysis of systematic polysemy might proceed. This is 
what I aim to do in the next chapter. 
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Chapter	  5 	  
SYSTEMATIC	  POLYSEMY	  AND	  THE	  COUNT-­‐MASS	  DISTINCTION	  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have argued in favour of a wholly pragmatic account of 
polysemy. The view developed there is that polysemy arises as a result of the operation 
of a pragmatic inferential process of ad hoc concept construction, which yields 
hypotheses about speaker-intended senses on the basis of encoded senses, contextual 
information and relevance-based interpretive constraints. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the outcome of this process may be a concept that has a narrower denotation 
than the one linguistically-encoded (‘John OPENED* the bottle’), or a broader one (‘John 
is a WIZARD* in finance’). Compared with other more semantically oriented approaches, 
this pragmatic approach drastically downplays the contribution of the linguistic system 
in the production and interpretation of polysemy, whose role is seen as that of providing 
a minimal input or clue which the inferential system uses as evidence to yield 
hypotheses about occasion-specific, speaker-intended senses. 
A set of cases that may be seen as presenting a possible challenge to the 
pragmatic approach is so-called ‘systematic polysemy’, where the related senses of a 
word (usually a noun) are predictable on the basis of a general pattern of sense 
alternation observed for words denoting objects of the same category. Nouns are the 
most salient (and most discussed) examples of this type of polysemy, and I will 
concentrate on these in what follows.115 The generalisations involved in systematic 
polysemy have the following form: 
(1) If an expression has a use of type A, it also has a use of type A´.  
This type of polysemy goes by various names, including ‘regular polysemy’ (Apresjan 
1974; Kilgarriff 1992, 1995), ‘semantic transfer rules’ (Leech 1990 [1974]), ‘lexical 
                                                      
115 As to other parts of speech claimed to exhibit a type of ‘systematic’ polysemy, see for instance the 
recent paper by Kennedy and McNally (2010), suggesting that colour adjectives alternate between a 
gradable and a non-gradable sense, and Jackendoff’s (2002: Chapter 11) analysis of the causative 
alternation (e.g. The door opened/John opened the door) as a form of polysemy. See also the discussion of 
Jackendoff’s position in Chapter 2. 
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implication rules’ (Ostler and Atkins 1992), ‘logical polysemy’ (Pustejovsky 1991, 
1995a), ‘transfers of meaning’ (Nunberg 1996, 2004), ‘sense extensions’ (Copestake and 
Briscoe 1992, 1996), and ‘conversion’ (Gillon 1999). Here are some examples:  
(2) a. A rabbit jumped over the fence.  
b. We’re having rabbit for dinner. 
c. The model wore rabbit on the catwalk. 
d. After a tractor had run over the body, there was rabbit splattered all over the 
yard. 
(3) a. We have a pine in our garden. 
b. This table is made of pine. 
(4) a. Susan decorated the cake with a cherry. 
b. When the kids left, there was cherry all over the kitchen floor. 
c. Jill and Joan have a cherry in their garden. 
d. This table is made of cherry. 
(5) a. The newspaper is lying on the coffee table. 
b. The newspaper is up on the web. 
c. The newspaper announced staff redundancies. 
(6) a. Oslo is hosting the 2011 Nordic World Ski Championships. 
b. Cambridge voted conservative. 
c. Mary is reading Dostoyevsky on the tube. 
The noun rabbit is used to express the animal in (2)a., its meat in (2)b., its fur in (2)c., 
and unspecified ‘rabbit stuff’ in (2)d. The noun pine is used to refer to a tree in (3)a. and 
to the wood from the tree in (3)b. The noun cherry is used to denote the fruit in (4)a., 
stuff of the fruit in (4)b., the tree carrying the fruit in (4)c. and the wood from the tree 
carrying the fruit in (4)d. The noun newspaper is used to denote a copy of a newspaper 
in (5)a., its informational content in (5)b., and the organisation that publishes it in (5)c. 
In (6), the name for a place is used to refer to the organisers of an event taking place at 
that place in (6)a., the name for a place is used to refer to its inhabitants in (6)b., while 
the name of an artist is used to denote his work in (6)c. On the basis of these examples, 
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we may identify the following lexical alternation patterns, described by means of the 
formula in (1):  
(7) If an expression has an ‘animal’ use, it also has a ‘meat’/’fur’/’animal stuff’ use.  
(8) If an expression has a ‘tree’ use, it also has a ‘wood’ use. 
(9) If an expression has a ‘fruit’ use, it also has a ‘fruit stuff’/’tree’ use.  
(10) If an expression has a ‘publication’ use, it also has a ‘content’/’organisation’ use. 
(11) If an expression has a ‘place’ use, it also has an ‘organisers’/’inhabitants’ use; If 
an expression has a ‘writer’ use, it also has an ‘oeuvre’ use. 
And there are many more such lexical alternation patterns (see e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980: 38-39; Nunberg 1996: 117 for further examples). Much work in computational 
semantics has emphasised the need for an adequate formalisation of these observed 
regularities. The literature contains various suggestions of how they can be incorporated 
into the lexicon as a set of lexical inference rules, in this way avoiding a listing of all 
options for all words (Pustejovsky 1991, 1995a; Ostler and Atkins 1992; Copestake and 
Briscoe 1992, 1996; Boguraev and Levin 1993; Kilgarriff 1992, 1995; Kilgarriff and 
Gazdar 1995; Blutner 1998).  
On the face of it, the arguments for treating systematic polysemy as being 
governed by linguistic rules seem well-founded. The processes in question appear to be 
regular, productive and available in many languages. Their application appears to be 
restricted by the existence of synonymous terms in the lexicon, so-called pre-emption or 
blocking (cf. Blutner 1998, 2002), for instance, the existence of the form beef in English 
‘blocks’ the use of the form cow to refer to the meat of the animal. Some of them seem to 
affect syntactic behaviour, for instance, lexical alternations that rest on the count-mass 
distinction in English and in other languages with count-mass syntax, gender marking 
on the fruit for tree alternation in Romance languages (e.g. the distinction in Spanish 
between aceituna (‘olive’) and aceituno (‘olive tree’), and guinda (‘cherry’) and guindo 
(‘cherry tree’)). The challenge for the pragmatic approach, then, is how to account for 
the apparent systematicity of these processes of sense extension. Are they best handled 
as instantiations of lexical rules, as derived mainly through pragmatic inference, or 
perhaps as involving a combination of the two? 
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Systematic polysemy is often seen as having an affinity with metonymy, the 
process whereby an expression that conventionally denotes one object or property is 
used to denote another object or property that stands in a certain relation to it.116 A 
famous example is Nunberg’s (1978: 22) ‘The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20’, where 
ham sandwich refers to a customer in the context of a restaurant. Some of the sense 
alternations described as instances of systematic polysemy arguably involve metonymic 
relations between the different senses, (cf. (4)c., (5)c. and all the examples in (6)). For 
this reason, formal semantic accounts have proposed to treat not only these but also 
more creative cases of metonymy as having a non-pragmatic component (Copestake 
and Briscoe 1996). There is some evidence that creative cases may have grammatical 
effects, e.g., ‘The french fries is getting impatient’ (Nunberg 1996), where the agreement 
between the subject and the VP is determined by the referent of the NP french fries 
rather than by its syntax.117 From a communicative point of view, however, unlike the 
examples in (2)-(6), these creative cases of metonymy seem largely confined to 
referential uses (in a strong sense) and bear some relation to certain nicknames (e.g. 
‘Four Eyes is always reading math books’), a connection which I will pursue in the next 
chapter. 
In this chapter I have two aims. The first is to consider a well-developed formal 
account of systematic polysemy, proposed by Copestake and Briscoe (1996), and assess 
whether systematic polysemy can be adequately accounted for as instantiations of lexical 
rules. I conclude that, although such an account captures the regularities involved, it 
does not provide the interpretive flexibility required to handle the full range of data. 
Thus, my second aim is to show how the data can be reanalysed from the perspective of 
relevance theory, using the machinery laid out in the previous chapter. I will defend the 
view that, although the sense alternations that give rise to systematic polysemy clearly 
have a linguistic component, the contribution of the linguistic system to its generation 
                                                      
116 This assumption goes back to Apresjan (1974: 16), who saw regularity as a distinctive feature of 
metonymy, and ‘irregular polysemy’ as arising from metaphor. I will come back to this issue in Chapter 6. 
117 The cognitive grammar tradition (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987 and many others) usually 
makes no distinction between systematic polysemy that involves metonymic sense relations and 
metonymy more generally; the label ‘metonymy’ subsumes them both. In his pragmatic account, 
Nunberg (1996) takes the process of ‘predicate transfer’ to be responsible for the generation of systematic 
polysemy as well as creative metonymy. These accounts will be considered again in Chapter 6.  
  
 
152 
and interpretation is less central than is often thought. My conclusion will be that even 
in cases of systematic polysemy, the major interpretive work is done by pragmatics.  
The focus of this chapter will be instances of systematic polysemy that (in 
English) rest on the distinction between count and mass uses of nouns (and thus are 
perhaps the clearest candidates for a linguistic analysis), as exemplified by (2), (3) and 
(4) above. Towards the end of the chapter, I will look at a set of cases that appears to 
involve alternation in meaning between different aspects of the object denoted (e.g. 
between a physical object sense and an information type sense, newspaper, book, DVD, 
etc.), and suggest how they can be treated within the relevance-theoretic account. 
Metonymy, however, both of the systematic and the creative kind, will be the subject of 
Chapter 6. Since it is an unresolved issue in relevance theory (but see Papafragou 1996 
for an early relevance-theoretic account), I will devote the whole of that chapter to a 
proposal for a relevance-theoretic account of systematic and creative metonymy.  
5.2 Computational semantic accounts: The case of ‘grinding’ 
Copestake and Briscoe (1992; 1996: 36) propose a formal semantic framework in which 
sense extensions, that is, “predictable creation of different but related senses”, are 
represented as lexical rules. One such rule is ‘universal grinding’ (Pelletier 1975). The 
effect of this rule is to create from a count noun (denoting a physical object) a mass 
noun with properties appropriate for an unindividuated substance.118 This is a general, 
abstract rule that yields the mass senses of rabbit and cherry in (12) and (13) (cf. (2)d. 
and (4)b. above), as well as the uses of sun and shopping centre in (14) and (15) to 
denote unindividuated substances: 
(12) After a tractor had run over the body, there was rabbit splattered all over the 
yard. 
(13) When the kids left, there was cherry all over the kitchen floor.  
                                                      
118 Pelletier’s (1975: 456-457) original thought experiment involves a machine, the ‘universal grinder’ (not 
unlike a meat grinder), which chops up “any object no matter how large, no matter how small, no matter 
how hard”. Then, the idea is that we could take any object corresponding to any (apparent) count noun, 
let’s say man, put it into the grinder and ask what is on the floor at the other end of the grinder, and get 
the following answer: ‘There is man all over the floor’. Given that “there can be made a prima facie case 
that nothing is immune from the grinder treatment”, Pelletier concludes that count nouns having 
physical objects as their extensions can always be given a mass sense.  
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(14) We got quite dark from all the sun. 
(15) That’s a lot of shopping centre for a small town (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992). 
Copestake and Briscoe further posit a set of conventionalised sub-cases of the grinding 
rule, including a specialised ‘meat-grinding’ function that forms food-denoting mass 
nouns from animal-denoting count nouns, and one that forms fur-denoting mass nouns 
from animal-denoting count nouns. Kilgarriff (1992, 1995) proposes a similar 
specialised rule that yields the wood senses of tree-denoting count nouns. Together, 
these rules account for the examples in (16)-(18) below:  
(16) We’re having rabbit for dinner (chicken, turkey, moose, frog, etc.). 
(17) The model wore rabbit on the catwalk (mink, beaver, calf, lizard, crocodile, etc.). 
(18) This table is made of pine (cherry, oak, chestnut, birch, etc.). 
So the claim is that there is a set of lexical rules (the universal grinder and its various 
conventionalised sub-cases) stored in the lexicons of individual speakers that are 
responsible for generating systematic polysemy of the kind illustrated above. In other 
words, the shift in meaning that is observed in these cases (e.g. from an animal sense to 
a food sense), is assumed to have a wholly linguistic basis. Copestake and Briscoe do 
point out, however, that pragmatics may contribute to further contextual specification 
of the denotation, for instance, by providing the information that rabbit meat usually 
excludes the bones while the meat of whitebait does not.119  
What are the main arguments for taking this approach, and what are its 
advantages? Perhaps the most obvious advantage of the rule-based account is the 
explanation it offers for the apparent productivity of the sense alternations in question, 
i.e. the fact that they can be extended immediately to words that speakers encounter for 
the first time. For instance, if someone tells you that he saw an okapi in the Wild Animal 
                                                      
119 In the discussion to follow, it should be borne in mind that the primary goal of computational 
semantic accounts such as that of Copestake and Briscoe and others may not be to model how these sense 
alternations are manifested in actual communication, but to provide a formal account in which the 
process of operationalisation may be an end in itself. As such, the computational semantic accounts and 
the cognitive pragmatic account of utterance comprehension pursued in this thesis rest on substantially 
different methodological approaches. However, since the computational approach has proved to be so 
influential in accounts of systematic polysemy of the kind discussed in this chapter, it seems in my view 
appropriate to also assess its explanatory potential in accounting for how systematic polysemy is 
manifested in actual communication.  
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Park in San Diego last summer, and this was the first time you heard of the animal as 
well as the word for it, okapi, you would have no difficulty understanding an utterance 
of ‘okapi tastes a bit like horse’ (where okapi refers to the meat of the animal), although 
you would never have come across this use before. The computational semanticist view 
is that this suggests the existence of a productive rule, rather than several stored senses 
for a word (which they appear to see as the only alternative view).  
However, the apparent productivity of such sense extensions need not have an 
entirely linguistic basis, although it is indeed a possible explanation for it. An alternative 
explanation would be to take the example above to be a case of the hearer exploiting his 
knowledge about certain regularities in the world (e.g. that animals are in general edible, 
that an animal’s flesh is considered ‘meat’, etc.) in his interpretation of okapi as referring 
to the meat. Once he has learned that okapi is an animal, the inference from animal to 
meat would come quite naturally. This would also serve to explain the conventional 
cases. However, since this real-world distinction coincides with the grammatical 
distinction between count and mass nouns in English, there would also be a clear 
linguistic clue (i.e. that the noun occurs without a determiner) to this interpretation. I 
return to this point in section 5.3.2. 
Another seemingly compelling argument in favour of the rule-based account is 
the parallel one might draw between the conventionalised cases of grinding and 
derivational morphological processes. In particular, what Copestake and Briscoe see as a 
striking similarity is that both processes appear to be ‘blocked’ by the existence of an 
underived synonymous lexical form (Aronoff 1976; Briscoe, Copestake, and Lascarides 
1995), (Clark and Clark 1979 describe this as 'pre-emption by synonymy'). On this view, 
the existence of lexical forms such as veal, pork and mutton blocks the application of the 
meat-grinding rule, and thus explains why the following sentences strike us as odd:  
(19) ?Joan likes to eat calf (veal). 
(20) ?We’re having pig for dinner (pork). 
(21) ?Matt is preparing sheep for our anniversary (mutton). 
Such lexicalised forms can be analysed as lexical exceptions to the meat-grinding rule 
(Ostler and Atkins 1992; Copestake and Briscoe 1996), by analogy with exceptions to 
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morphological processes. For instance, Aronoff (1976) notes that the form *gloriosity 
does not appear in English (contrary to e.g. curiosity, atrocity, etc.), which he attributes 
to the fact that it would be synonymous with the existing form glory and therefore 
blocked from being generated. However, unlike most exceptions to morphological 
patterns, which are usually considered ill-formed and do not occur in normal language 
use, the derived forms of animal terms such as calf, pig, sheep and cow seem to co-exist 
happily with the lexicalised forms veal, pork, sheep, and beef. Consider the following 
examples:  
(22) There were five thousand extremely loud people on the floor eager to tear into 
roast cow with both hands and wash it down with bourbon and whiskey (passage 
from Tom Wolfe's The Right Stuff (1979), cited by Copestake and Briscoe 1996: 
38, my italics). 
(23) Hindus are forbidden to eat cow (?beef) (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992).  
Copestake and Briscoe explain such cases in terms of non-synonymy of the ground and 
the lexicalised forms; in (22) and (23) cow is possible because it is not synonymous with 
beef. Their proposal is that when such uses occur, “they either convey a negative attitude 
to the consumption of the meat on the part of the speaker or an entailment of extended 
denotation, where more of the cow … than is normally considered ‘meat’ is being 
treated as food” (1996: 38-39). They suggest that the utterances in (22) and (23) can be 
analysed as apparent violations of the Gricean maxim of Manner, that is, as choices of a 
less common or interpretable form from among different ways of expressing the same 
meaning, which, as they put it, “carries the (discourse) implication that the terms are 
not synonymous”. This gives rise to the interpretation that the speaker has expressed a 
negative attitude towards the consumption of the meat in (22), and the interpretation 
that the interdiction concerns the animal as a whole (due to its status in the Hindu 
religion) and not just its meat in (23).120 This use is clearly more informative than the 
                                                      
120 Nunberg and Zaenen (1992) propose a similar account, where such uses are explained in terms of 
apparent violation of the Gricean maxim of Quantity (roughly: Say as much as and no more than the 
communicative circumstances require) In the cases where the speaker has chosen to use the word cow 
instead of beef, the hearer is entitled to infer that she has some reason for using this vaguer term, as in 
(23). Unlike the computational semanticists, however, Nunberg and Zaenen do not think that the 
blocking phenomenon can be explained in entirely linguistic terms. Blutner (1998), working within a 
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possible utterance containing ‘beef’, which would not (at least not as easily) give access 
to this information. 
However, there are many uses of derived forms which appear to be difficult to 
explain in terms of apparent maxim violation. For instance, in (24) both pork and pig 
would be acceptable, and in (25) they seem to be used interchangeably:  
(24) Jews and Muslims don’t eat pork/pig. 
(25) As a general rule, I don’t eat pork. This can be awkward – I often go for the 
veggie option, to avoid having to explain why I don’t eat pig.121 
This does not mean that English speakers may not perceive the uses of pig in the 
examples above as being somehow more ‘marked’ than the conventional expression 
pork (although considerably less so than the uses of cow in (22) and (23)), to the extent 
that they may give rise to some additional “effects”. However, these uses seem so natural 
that, in my view, it is counterintuitive to assume that they represent (apparent) 
violations of a conversational norm (contrary to e.g. figures of speech, where this is 
more evident). Moreover, the uses of sheep and pig in (26) and (27) below are entirely 
conventional:  
(26) Kate [with a plate of food in front of her]: This roast sheep is the best I’ve ever 
had. 
(27) I love roast suckling pig. 
Copestake and Briscoe could argue that although these uses are conventional, they carry 
with them an entailment that it is the whole animal that has been roasted, and not just 
any unindividuated portion of its meat. This may be right, but in that case it seems that 
the entailment cannot be explained as resulting from the use of a derived form instead 
                                                      
neo-Gricean framework, treats examples like (23) above as instances of Horn’s (1984) ‘division of 
pragmatic labour’ (unmarked forms tend to be used for unmarked situations and marked forms for 
marked situations), explained in terms of a Q-principle (corresponding to the first part of Grice’s 
Quantity maxim (make your contributions as informative as required)) and an I-principle (subsuming the 
second part of Grice’s Quantity maxim (do not make your contribution more informative than required), 
the maxim of Relation and (possibly) all of the Manner maxims). 
121 Attested: http://www.inventio.co.uk/pigs.htm  
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of the lexicalised one, as the following derived uses may, given the appropriate context, 
carry the same kind of entailment (i.e. involving a whole roast chicken/turkey):  
(28) We’re having roast chicken/turkey for dinner.  
This is not to say that the lexicon may not be sensitive to the frequency of use of such 
(quasi-) synonymous forms as cow/beef, pig/pork, etc., to the extent that the use of e.g. 
cow instead of the more frequent beef to denote the meat of the animal may be 
interpreted as carrying some additional meaning. However, the effect does not have to 
come from a semantic restriction on the use of cow due to the existence of the lexicalised 
form. An alternative approach is to analyse the so-called blocking phenomenon in terms 
of conventions of use (what Morgan 1978 terms 'conventions about language') where 
the use of a non-lexicalised form in cases where there exists a lexicalised one (e.g. beef, 
veal, mutton) induces a greater processing load on the hearer’s pragmatic system which 
is then offset by the derivation of extra cognitive effects, rather than treating it as a 
semantic restriction on the application of a lexical rule. I return to this issue in section 
5.3.2. 
Another matter pointing to a pragmatic explanation of meat grinding cases is 
that whether a speaker chooses to use a ground or an unground form to refer to the 
meat of an animal appears to be governed by real world knowledge. Consider the 
examples in (29)-(31): 
(29) Wolves eat lambs (?lamb). 
(30) Snakes eat mice (?mouse). 
(31) In Africa, lions eat wildebeest, warthogs, zebras, buffalo and different types of 
antelope.122 
Here the nouns are all used in their plural (i.e. count) senses, which is the conventional 
way of talking about what animals eat. The uses of lamb and chicken in (32), however, 
are straightforward cases of meat-grinding: 
(32) Indians eat lamb and chicken (?lambs and chickens). 
                                                      
122 http://www.catalogs.com/info/gadgets/what-do-lions-eat.html  
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An intuitive explanation for the difference between these examples is the different ways 
in which humans and other animals get hold of their food. Unlike other carnivorous 
animals, humans usually do not hunt down the animals they eat themselves in their 
daily lives and, even when they do, they don’t devour the uncooked flesh. It seems that 
the use of a ground sense somehow entails that the meat has been prepared in some 
human-like fashion (which is why e.g. ‘wolves eat mutton’ would sound odd). This does 
not seem to be the case for the ‘unground’ forms in (29), (30) and (31), where although 
it is the meat/flesh sense that is being communicated, the count form of the nouns 
allows the hearer to access his representations of the whole animals (which may give 
access to assumptions about the animals being hunted down as prey). The question, 
then, is this: Given identical linguistic environments, is it reasonable to assume that the 
meat senses in (32) result from the application of a rule of meat grinding, while the meat 
senses in (29)-(31) are pragmatically derived?123 This asymmetry is, of course, possible, 
but one might ask if lexical inferences that are clearly influenced by world knowledge in 
this way are not better treated along pragmatic lines.124 
An argument that is often given in favour of treating systematic polysemy in 
terms of lexical rule application is the availability of default interpretations in 
uninformative (or ‘null’) contexts (Pustejovsky 1995a; Copestake and Briscoe 1996). For 
                                                      
123 Ostler and Atkins’s (1992: 84) discuss grinding applied to words denoting food items. This is only 
possible, they claim, when “the units of that food are not evident”, as in e.g. some egg, some crab, some 
salmon, some potato, typically referring to some food substance on a plate, etc. They further note that 
words denoting pulses appear to resist grinding, so rather than saying ‘Have some pea/bean/lentil’ a 
speaker would say ‘Have some peas/beans/lentils’. This they treat as a semantically-based constraint on 
the rule that turns food item denotations into food mass denotations (although, as far as I can tell, they do 
not specify what aspect of the semantics of pulse denoting word is responsible for the existence of the 
constraint). However, exceptions to this ‘constraint’ regularly occur. In appropriate contexts, the ‘ground’ 
senses of words denoting pulses are unproblematic, as in utterances such as ‘I just love refried bean 
smeared on a taco’ (http://eatingindallas.wordpress.com/2009/07/26/battling-breakfast-tacos), ‘I’d like 
the grilled salmon fillet with mashed pea’, ‘Can I have a side-dish of dhal, please?’, etc. How would these 
be explained in a rule-based account? As exceptions to a constraint on the application of a rule? In my 
view, the tendency to prefer the plural form of the pulse denoting noun over the mass form may rather 
have its explanation in the size of the food items in question - we seldom eat a single pea/bean/lentil/etc. - 
or anyway in some other real-world fact about pulses. In other words, this tendency appears to have a 
pragmatic explanation; one which obviously doesn’t exclude the possibility of such words occurring with 
a mass interpretation, as in the examples above. 
124 The examples in (29)-(31) are, of course, not exceptions to the rule of meat-grinding, as the direction 
of the lexical inference goes from animal-denoting count nouns to food denoting mass nouns, and not the 
other way around (i.e. from a food denotation to the use of a mass term), and so the rule of meat-grinding 
could still be valid. However, the examples do show that the basis for animal terms taking on food 
denotations cannot be entirely linguistic. 
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instance, the most accessible interpretation of (33) below seems to be the one according 
to which rabbit denotes ‘rabbit meat’ (and thus that Sam enjoyed but later regretted 
eating the rabbit):  
(33) Sam enjoyed but later regretted the rabbit (Copestake and Briscoe 1996: 42). 
Recall Pustejovsky’s analysis of such cases as type coercions, where a verb that 
subcategorises for an NP or a progressive VP syntactically, semantically requires a 
complement with an eventive interpretation. In the case where this requirement is not 
satisfied by the surface syntactic structure, a type-coercion operator changes the 
denotation of the NP from an entity into an event consistent with eventive information 
(represented in the form of a ‘telic role’) stored in the lexical representation for the noun 
(the so-called qualia structure). Copestake and Briscoe’s account of the semantic 
processing of (33) is similar, and involves the selection of an appropriate aspect of the 
meaning of the complement (in this case its telic role: rabbits are for eating (by 
humans)). This, they claim, explains the ‘default’ character of the eating interpretation 
and militates against a pragmatic analysis. As they write, “the meat-grinding sense of 
rabbit provides a telic role which allows the eating interpretation to be constructed. 
However, if the lexicon does not propose such a sense, it is unclear what it is about the 
context which allows pragmatic specialization of the interpretation” (1996: 42).  
I have two points to make about this claim. First, I cannot see how this explains 
the default character of the eating interpretation, when, on Copestake and Briscoe’s 
account, there are in fact three possible interpretations of rabbit made available by the 
lexicon: (i) the general ground sense (‘rabbit stuff’); (ii) the meat-grinding sense; and 
(iii) the fur-grinding sense. It is not clear to me why, on this lexicon-based account, it is 
the meat-grinding sense that is selected (which then gives rise to the eating 
interpretation), and not any of the other possible senses.125 Second, I think the argument 
                                                      
125 This shows a consequence of the account that Copestake and Briscoe themselves point out (1996: 56); 
that the lexical rules for sense extension lead to overgeneration. For instance, on their account, the 
sentence ‘Rabbit is expensive these days’ is, given the universal grinder, the rules of animal-meat grinding 
and animal-fur grinding, three-ways ambiguous between the general ‘rabbit stuff’ sense, the meat sense 
and the fur sense. While the overgeneration is in itself problematic (it does not seem psychologically 
plausible that all the senses are generated), there is also a question of how the ambiguity is resolved, that 
is, how hearers decide when one rule has prevalence over the others. A possibility would be to say that all 
three senses are initially generated by the linguistic system and then leave it to pragmatics to select the 
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that the availability of default interpretations in uninformative contexts shows the need 
for a semantic analysis considerably underestimates the fact that hearers rarely (if ever) 
come to the interpretation process ‘empty handed’, as it were. There are hardly any 
entirely context-free interpretations. Recall the relevance-theoretic view that one of the 
tasks the hearer has to solve in utterance comprehension is constructing a hypothesis 
about the contextual assumptions to be brought to bear in the process. This set of 
assumptions – a subset of his assumptions about the world – could include assumptions 
derived from the observation of the physical environment, encyclopaedic knowledge, 
memories and beliefs as well as the preceding linguistic context (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004). When the assumptions that the hearer may 
derive from the linguistic and extra-linguistic context are scarce, as in (33), he will have 
to rely more on information stored in his long-term memory in the interpretation of the 
utterance. The linguistic meaning of the utterance in (33) allows him to access 
information stored in long-term memory about the concept RABBIT, among which the 
assumption that ‘rabbits are delicious to eat’ would be highly accessible. This 
assumption, in combination with assumptions that the other concepts in the sentence 
may give access to (for instance, that ‘eating delicious food is an enjoyable activity’ 
which may have been made accessible by the concept ENJOY), leads to the eating 
interpretation being much more accessible that any of the other possible interpretations. 
This is what gives it a ‘default character’. However, its availability can be given a 
straightforward pragmatic explanation. 
5.3 A relevance-theoretic account 
In my proposal to follow for a (mainly) pragmatic account of systematic polysemy, I 
would like to start by considering a claim that Fodor and Lepore (2002: 117) make in 
their Compositionality Papers a propos the animal-meat alternation. Here they say, 
“Opportunities for polysemy arise from how things are in the world (or, anyhow, from 
how we take them to be)”. Fodor and Lepore are sceptical about the possibility of words 
being lexically polysemous. On their view, the reason that, e.g., lamb may be polysemous 
                                                      
correct one in the particular context. This would mean, however, that in the derivation of the ‘default’ 
eating interpretation of (33), pragmatics would have to intrude to yield the meat-grinding sense of rabbit, 
which in turn would allow for the eating interpretation to be constructed.  
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between the animal and the meat is that “lamb-the-meat comes from lamb-the-animal”, 
hence rests on a real relation among things in the world. Fodor and Lepore do not 
develop their view in any detail, but I think their claim is a deep one, which touches on 
what I see as the very essence of the polysemy phenomenon. I hope what I mean by this 
will become clear in the following sections.126  
The type of systematic polysemy giving rise to the animal-meat, animal-fur, tree-
wood (and so forth) alternations in meaning is, as we saw in the previous section, 
closely linked to the well-studied grammatical distinction between count and mass 
expressions in English (and other languages with count-mass syntax). There is a vast 
literature on this topic, the details of which I cannot get into here. However, in the next 
section I will give a brief overview of a set of issues that have been raised concerning the 
count-mass distinction, before I present the relevance-theoretic account in section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 The count-mass distinction and systematic polysemy 
According to common intuition, ‘count’ expressions describe individual entities (e.g. 
The horses were bought in the spring), or kinds of individual entities (e.g. Horses are 
animals), while ‘mass’ expressions describe portions of quantities (e.g. There’s some 
milk in the fridge), or kinds of quantities (e.g. Milk is healthy). Syntacticians have been 
interested in the morpho-syntactic characteristics underpinning the count-mass 
distinction. The usual view is that only count nouns admit of a contrast between the 
singular and the plural (e.g. horse/horses); mass nouns are almost always singular (e.g. 
milk, rice, advice, etc.). While count nouns can be modified by cardinal numbers (e.g. 
two horses) and by the quantifiers each, every, many, several, few and the stressed some; 
mass nouns occur with the quantifiers little, much, the unstressed some, as well as with 
measure phrases (e.g. a bottle of milk). Syntactically, common nouns are usually 
distinguished into count nouns and mass nouns by means of the feature [±count] (see 
for instance Gillon 1992, 1999).  
Many philosophers (from Quine 1960 and onwards) have been interested in the 
semantic aspect of the count-mass distinction, viz. the ways in which count and mass 
                                                      
126 In fact, the main implication of Fodor and Lepore’s claim, that what gets called polysemy is either a 
pragmatic phenomenon based entirely on how the world works, or it is standard homonymy, that is, a 
truly linguistic phenomenon where the same word form encodes two or several distinct meanings, is very 
much in line with the relevance-theoretic approach to polysemy maintained in this thesis. 
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expressions differ with respect to what they denote. Two criteria, those of cumulativity 
and divisivity of reference, have been proposed to distinguish the semantics of mass 
expressions from that of count expressions. The former criterion dates back to Quine 
(1960: 91), who noted that “mass terms like ‘water’ … have the semantical property of 
referring cumulatively: any sum of parts which are water is water”. Although describing 
a characteristic feature of mass expressions, it is not distinguishing of them as it also 
applies to plurals (i.e. count nouns).127 The second criterion of ‘divisive reference’, 
proposed by Cheng (1973: 286-287), states that for any stuff/entity referred to by a mass 
noun, any part of that stuff/entity is also denoted by that same mass noun. Although this 
criterion clearly has some intuitive appeal, Gillon (1992, 1999) points out that it seems 
to be refuted by Quine’s (1960: 99) earlier observation that “there are parts of water, 
sugar and furniture too small to count as water, sugar, furniture”: The denotations of 
many apparent mass nouns have parts that do not fall under the denotation of the same 
noun. Furthermore, there is a large class of words that appear to be count nouns, yet 
satisfy the criterion of divisivity of reference (e.g. stone, rock, cord, rope, etc.). So having 
divisive reference can neither be a necessary nor sufficient characterisation of a mass 
expression. 
The distinction between mass and count syntax raises two psychological issues, 
concerning (i) how the distinction maps onto conceptual representation, and (ii) how 
children acquire the link between count-mass syntax and non-linguistic ontological 
categories. Traditionally, the grammatical count-mass distinction has been linked to the 
conceptual distinction between objects and substances (Macnamara 1982). Physical 
objects are typically count (e.g. horse, man, rock, etc), while substances are typically 
mass (e.g. water, rice, air, etc.). However, several authors have noted that the 
grammatical count-mass distinction only partly corresponds to the ontological 
distinction between objects and substances (see e.g. Ware 1975; Link 1983; Gordon 
1985; Gillon 1992; Chierchia 1998; Pelletier and Schubert [1989] 2001). In English, for 
instance, count nouns also refer to abstract entities (e.g. promise, emotion) and events 
(e.g. competition, journey). Mass nouns also refer to abstract entities (e.g. love, beauty) 
                                                      
127 For instance, if the animals in my garden are rats and the animals in my neighbour’s garden are also 
rats, then the animals in our two gardens are rats (cf. Link 1983). 
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and groups of unindividuated objects (e.g. furniture, jewellery). A widely held view, 
which better captures the range of possible denotations of count and mass expressions, 
is that count-mass syntax corresponds to a distinction between the kinds of entities we 
perceive as individuals, and those we perceive as unindividuated entities (e.g. Bloom 
1994b) (where the notion of individual corresponds approximately to ‘discrete bounded 
entity’).128 
Already Quine (1960) addressed the problem of acquisition in connection with 
count-mass syntax and its link to non-linguistic ontological categories. He saw the 
ontological distinction between objects and substances as a cultural construction, and 
count-mass syntax as the means by which children learn to discriminate objects from 
substances. A logical consequence of this view is that there would be substantial 
differences in conceptual representation between children and adult speakers, and 
between speakers of English (and other languages with count-mass syntax) and speakers 
of languages that do not have count-mass syntax, as in classifier languages such as 
Chinese and Japanese (i.e. languages that contain morphemes whose function is to 
indicate the formal or semantic class to which items belong).129 Against such linguistic 
determinism, psychologists have argued that the acquisition of count-mass syntax 
presupposes rather than gives rise to such basic ontological categories (Bloom 1994a, 
1999; Papafragou 2005; Barner and Snedeker 2005, 2006), which may indeed have an 
innate basis. 
There has been much less focus on the contribution of pragmatics to the 
interpretation of an expression as having a count or mass denotation. Pelletier and 
Schubert ([1989] 2001: 274), following Ware (1975), reject the possibility of developing 
a pragmatic account of the count-mass distinction, on the grounds that “most times 
there is nothing that the speaker has in mind which would allow us to classify the use of 
                                                      
128 Some scholars do not think that this distinction adequately captures the semantics of mass terms 
either, as there seem to be cases where these denote discrete countable objects (e.g. furniture, jewellery, 
money). An alternative view is to treat the conceptual entity picked out by a mass term as being 
‘unspecified’ as regards quantification and measurement (Gillon 1992, 1999; Barner and Snedeker 2005, 
2006; Li, Barner, and Huang 2008). 
129 However, there is considerable controversy as to whether such languages in fact lack count-mass 
syntax (cf. Krifka (1995) and Chierchia’s (1998) view that all Chinese nouns are mass) or whether this 
distinction also appears in classifier languages under a different guise (c.f. Li, Barner and Huang’s (2008) 
distinction between ‘count-classifiers’ and ‘mass-classifiers’). 
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a noun phrase as either +count or +mass”. While I doubt that this is in fact correct, 
Ware’s argument is worth considering. 
 Ware’s point was the following. We cannot draw the count-mass distinction on 
the basis of speaker intentions, because (i) a speaker may have a determinate intention 
to refer to either an individual or substance of some kind, but the hearer need not 
recognise this intention for communication to be successful (e.g. the hearer may 
respond to a request for the candy without knowing whether the speaker is 
individuating or amassing), and (ii) the speaker herself may have an indeterminate 
intention, and so could use a definite singular NP with the intention to refer to 
something without a commitment to a count or mass denotation (e.g. if one Beethoven 
sonata was played, and the speaker says she liked the Beethoven, she does not have to be 
either using a count or a mass noun).  
Although both Ware’s scenarios indeed seem possible, they require that the 
contexts are such that making the distinction would not be considered relevant (i.e. it 
would be too costly in processing terms or not contribute to the cognitive effects of the 
utterance). For instance, (i) could occur in a context where a bowl of candy is manifest 
to both speaker and hearer, and where the speaker asks the hearer to pass her the candy. 
Since the NP the candy is ambiguous with respect to whether it is count (in the singular) 
or mass, the hearer cannot be certain if the speaker considers what is in the bowl a 
portion of candy (mass) or a group of individual pieces of candy, but this is irrelevant to 
his ability to respond appropriately to her request. Similarly, in the example involved in 
scenario (ii), where the speaker says she liked the Beethoven, the communicative context 
does not require of either the speaker or the hearer that the denotation of the Beethoven 
is specified as either mass (‘the music by Beethoven that was just played’) or as count 
(‘the sonata by Beethoven that was just played’), since there would be no doubt on the 
part of the hearer what the speaker is referring to, regardless of whether he construes the 
referent in the one or the other way (or indeed, leaves the issue indeterminate).130  
                                                      
130 The situation where a distinction is not grasped but where the communication is still considered good 
enough for practical purposes is in fact quite common. Another sort of example is the use of an NP such 
as The children where ‘children’ can be thought of in distinction from adults or as ‘children of so and so’ 
(even when they are adult) and there can be instances where we would not need to know which of these 
ways the speaker was construing some particular individual children when she says ‘The children will be 
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In addition, Ware (1975) describes a number of cases in which a count or a mass 
occurrence of a noun does not make a noteworthy difference to its interpretation (this 
concerns in particular abstract terms, e.g. ‘needing much more theory/many more 
theories’, ‘finding more truth/truths’, etc.), as well as cases where there seems to be no 
obvious real world fact to explain the tendency to use a noun with a count or mass 
determiner (e.g. we say ‘much whiskey/gin and orange’, but ‘many martinis/orange 
blossoms’). Ware’s overall conclusion (endorsed by Pelletier and Schubert), appears to 
be that since there are cases in which the count-mass distinction is not reflected in the 
speaker-intended meaning of an utterance, pragmatics is not useful in making the 
distinction. 
Of course, if the aim is to classify a noun as being (lexically specified as) either 
[+count] or [+mass], which is, as I understand it, Pelletier and Schubert’s aim, then I 
agree that pragmatics does not take us very far in the above examples. However, this aim 
appears to rest on the assumption that it is meaningful to speak of a count-mass 
distinction in the language existing independently of the real-world distinction between 
countable (individuated) entities and substances (unindividuated entities). I am not 
convinced that it is. In my view, rather than showing the inadequacy of a pragmatic 
explanation, Ware’s examples indicate that pragmatics may in fact have quite an 
important role to play in distinguishing between count and mass uses of words (or, as in 
the above cases, in not making a distinction at all). Recall the analysis of the definite 
singular NP the rabbit in (33) (‘She enjoyed but later regretted the rabbit’), which 
involved the activation of highly accessible encyclopaedic knowledge about rabbits (e.g. 
that rabbits are delicious to eat), which, together with assumptions activated by other 
concepts encoded by the sentence, gave rise to the interpretation that the rabbit was 
eaten, involving a mass use of rabbit. Note that the linguistic meaning of (33) is not at 
odds with a count interpretation of rabbit (e.g., that she enjoyed having the (live) rabbit 
but later regretted it, for instance, in a context where the referent has decided to buy a 
rabbit for her children - at first she enjoys having it (it’s cute, cuddly, etc.), but later she 
regrets it due to the amount of work involved in caring for it). In the absence of any 
                                                      
pleased’, that is, it won’t matter with regard to the hearer’s ability to recognise which individuals she is 
referring to. 
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syntactic clues, a crucial aspect of distinguishing between count and mass uses of nouns 
involves applying encyclopaedic knowledge about the entities they denote (and 
contextual information more generally) in their interpretation. 
This brings us back to our starting point. As I briefly touched on above, many 
syntactic approaches take the count-mass distinction to arise from common nouns 
being marked as either [+count] or [-count] in the lexicon. Underlying this assumption 
is the idea that some nouns are count nouns, while others are mass nouns; a noun either 
falls into the one or the other category and the basis for this view is rarely questioned.131 
However, several authors have noted that, in fact, most nouns (if not all) can be both 
count nouns and mass nouns (Pelletier 1975; Ware 1975; Krifka 1995; Gillon 1999; 
Pelletier and Schubert [1989] 2001). For instance, the mass noun water can be used as a 
count noun, e.g. in the context of a restaurant (‘Two waters, please’), abstract terms like 
love and hope can be used both as mass nouns and as count nouns (‘She needs some 
love’/’She’s the love of my life’, ‘There is not much hope left’/’My primary hope is that I 
will finish this thesis’), count nouns like sun, shopping centre and chicken can be used as 
mass nouns (‘We had a lot of sun at the beach’, ‘That’s a lot of shopping centre for a 
small town’, ‘Chicken is my favourite kind of food’). As Ware (1975: 384) puts it, “there 
are words with a double life – sometimes occurring as count nouns and sometimes 
occurring as mass nouns”. This raises several issues: Given the ability of nouns to occur 
as both count and mass, does it make sense to operate with a syntactic distinction 
between count and mass nouns? Shouldn’t the distinction rather be treated as pertaining 
to occurrences of entire noun phrases, where these are interpreted as being semantically 
count or mass, depending on whether they denote individuals or unindividuated entities 
(what Pelletier and Schubert [1989] 2001 term the 'semantic occurrence approach') (and 
in many cases, unspecified with regard to this distinction)? If so, where do our intuitions 
about single nouns being either count or mass (e.g. horse is count, water is mass) come 
from?  
                                                      
131 In light of this, it is easy to see the motivation behind rule-based accounts of the systematic polysemy 
that arises from the alternation between count and mass senses of a noun. If a noun is syntactically 
marked as either [+count] or [-count], then a lexical rule may operate to change the value of the feature, 
thus rules like ‘universal grinding’ and ‘portioning’ (a rule that converts food or drink denoting mass 
nouns into a portion of that substance, e.g. three beers) (Copestake and Briscoe 1996), or ‘conversion’ of 
count nouns into mass nouns and vice versa (Gillon 1999).  
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In the next section, I will outline a pragmatic, relevance-theoretic account of the 
class of systematic polysemy that rests on this ability of nouns to take on both count and 
mass interpretations. The account will be based on something like a ‘semantic 
occurrence approach’ to the count-mass distinction, as briefly described above. This 
allows for entire noun phrases to be encoded as having either count or mass denotations 
(or as being unspecified with respect to the distinction, as in (33) above), thus capturing 
what is clearly a morpho-syntactic dimension to the distinction, while not having to 
assume that nouns in themselves are syntactically either count or mass.132 The aim will 
be to show that pragmatics, often aided by syntactic clues, has a very constructive role to 
play in the interpretation of systematic polysemy involving alternations between count 
and mass interpretations of a single word. I will also suggest a possible answer to the 
question of where our intuitions about single nouns being either count or mass come 
from. 
                                                      
132 Pelletier and Schubert ([1989] 2001) is a survey paper in which they identify and discuss a range of 
problems associated with the count-mass distinction, and the ways in which these are manifested in the 
various syntactic and semantic approaches to it. As they see it, there are only two viable alternatives for an 
account of the count-mass distinction: (i) a ‘syntactic expression approach’, where COUNT and MASS are 
syntactic features which attach to nouns, and where ‘lexical extension’ rules may operate to change the 
count/mass feature and alter the semantic representation of the noun accordingly, and (ii) a ‘semantic 
occurrence approach’, where occurrences of noun phrases are interpreted as being (semantically) count 
or mass (depending on whether the entity it refers to is true of stuff or things, which is determined by the 
syntactic constructions) (ibid. 314). The first, syntactic account has the advantage of accounting for our 
intuitions about many nouns being ‘count nouns’ and many nouns being ‘mass nouns’. However, 
Pelletier and Schubert note that against this syntactic account it may be held that it is unclear what 
syntactic work the features actually do, when, “for every sentence which has a mass term in a given 
location, there is another sentence which has a count term in that position” (and vice versa); no 
constructions will be ruled out (ibid. 322). The only role of the count/mass features seems to be to direct 
the semantic translation process, which points to a semantic distinction rather than a syntactic one. The 
semantic occurrence account, on the other hand, in which Pelletier and Schubert take it that all nouns 
have a ‘comprehensive extension’, that is, being “true of kinds (of stuff or things), true of conventional 
kinds of servings, true of quantities (of stuff) and true of objects coinciding with quantities of stuff” (ibid. 
314), and that their precise denotations are determined by the syntactic constructions they enter into (e.g. 
the determiner a allows semantic operators to convert this ‘basic’ meaning of a noun into one that is true 
of individuals and kinds of individuals), our intuitions about the ‘count’ or ‘mass’ nature of many nouns 
is not accounted for. Although I think this account is certainly on the right track, I take it a step further in 
section 5.3.2, where, in the pragmatic account that I propose, much of the work of deciding on the precise 
denotation of occurrences of nouns is left to pragmatic inference. This allows us to assume that instead of 
having ‘comprehensive extension’, many nouns encode concepts that are mentally represented as 
denoting (kinds of) individuals or (kinds of) unindividuated entities (the count-mass distinction is thus 
primarily a cognitive-conceptual one), and that pragmatics, in combination with syntactic clues, operates 
to yield occasion-specific senses of nouns. 
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5.3.2 A (mainly) pragmatic account of systematic polysemy 
First some preliminaries. In relevance theory, which, as we have seen, is fundamentally a 
cognitive account of utterance interpretation, the distinction between linguistic 
semantics and pragmatics is seen as corresponding to different processes involved in 
utterance comprehension: linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 1993; Carston 2002b). Assuming a modular 
language input system in the sense of Fodor (1983), the process of decoding linguistic 
utterances is performed by a language perception module (or parser), which takes the 
linguistic stimulus as input, executes a series of grammatical computations (or 
mappings) and delivers a semantic representation as output (called ‘logical form’ in 
relevance theory),133 which then feeds the pragmatic inferential system.134 A central 
characteristic of Fodor’s input systems (in addition to, inter alia, their automaticity and 
informational encapsulation) is that they deliver shallow outputs. The structured set of 
concepts that constitute the logical form of an utterance is rarely (if ever) fully 
propositional. Carston describes the logical form of an utterance as a ‘template’ or 
‘schema’ for a range of possible propositions, which contain slots that have to be filled – 
a process that requires pragmatic inference (see Carston 2002b, Chapter 1, section 1.5.2 
for more detail). A consequence of the assumption that linguistic decoding and 
pragmatic inference combine in verbal comprehension is that there is no need to 
assume that all words necessarily encode full concepts, or that every concept 
communicated by an utterance could in principle have been encoded (Wilson 1998; 
Carston 2002b). 
Recall from the previous chapter that a mentally represented concept, a 
constituent of the ‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975, 2008), is seen as an address (or 
entry) in memory that may give access to three types of information: (i) the logical 
properties of the concept (e.g. a one-way meaning postulate such as HORSE → KIND OF 
ANIMAL); (ii) a set of assumptions, or encyclopaedic information, about the denotation of 
                                                      
133 This is, of course, a kind of abstraction since in actual on-line processing the decoded 
words/morphemes are delivered rapidly to the pragmatic processing system (which does not ‘wait’ to get 
the logical form as a whole). 
134 As mentioned in Chapter 3, in relevance theory, the pragmatic inferential system is also seen as being 
modular, perhaps constituting a sub-module of the more general theory of mind module (Sperber and 
Wilson 2002b; Wilson 2005), though in a somewhat weaker sense of ‘modular’ than Fodor’s.  
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the concept, that is, conceptually represented assumptions and beliefs, including 
stereotypes and culture-specific information about the denotation, and also, in many 
cases, imagistic and/or sensory-perceptual representations (e.g. HORSES HAVE MANES, 
HORSES ARE EDIBLE, HORSES HAVE FOUR LEGS, HORSES ARE USED FOR RIDING, HORSES LOOK 
LIKE THIS: [MENTAL IMAGE], etc.), and (iii) the lexical (i.e. phonological and syntactic) 
information connected with the linguistic form that encodes the concept (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: 85-93). As we saw in Chapter 4, the construction of ad hoc concepts 
(i.e. occasion-specific senses, narrower or broader than the linguistically-encoded 
senses) involves taking the encoded concept and its associated logical and encyclopaedic 
information as input, together with a set of contextual assumptions, using the relevance 
theoretic comprehension heuristic to derive warranted conclusions about the speaker’s 
meaning.  
Let us assume that our ability to discriminate between kinds of individuals and 
unindividuated entities is independent of count-mass syntax. This seems plausible, as 
there is little reason to think that speakers of e.g. Chinese or Japanese represent the 
world differently with respect to this distinction. There is also substantial evidence that 
early individuation capacities predate the acquisition of count-mass syntax in 
development (e.g. Papafragou 2005; Barner and Snedeker 2005).135 If we assume that the 
ability to distinguish between individuals and unindividuated entities is one of the 
means by which we carve up and make sense of the world around us, it seems 
reasonable that many of our concepts will be mentally represented as either individual-
denoting or unindividuated entity-denoting, in accordance with how we perceive (or 
categorise) the things they refer to in the world (independently of their natural-language 
counterparts). Given the short description of a mentally-represented concept I gave 
above, we can see the concept HORSE as being represented in the following way: 
 
                                                      
135 In psychology, a dominant theory of the nature of human object knowledge is the core knowledge 
hypothesis, proposed by Spelke and her colleagues (Spelke 2000; Spelke et al. 1994). This hypothesis states 
that our knowledge of the physical world stems from innate principles for reasoning about inanimate 
physical objects. This knowledge shares many of the properties of a Fodorian module by being 
experience-independent, domain-specific and informationally encapsulated. A possible hypothesis, then, 
is that our ability to recognise countable objects versus undifferentiated masses (like water, snow, etc) is 
part of this ‘core knowledge’. I return to this issue shortly in the discussion of ‘meaning postulates’ as a 
possible source of a conceptual count-mass distinction.  
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(34) HORSE 
Lexical entry: +N (... etc.) 
Logical entry: HORSE → ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN KIND 
Encyclopaedic entry: IS USED FOR RIDING, IS OFTEN DOMESTICATED, IS POPULAR 
AMONG YOUNG GIRLS, LOOKS LIKE THIS [MENTAL IMAGE], ... etc.  
The concept HORSE in (34) is associated with three types of information stored in its 
lexical, logical and encyclopaedic entries. The lexical entry contains information about 
the natural language counterpart of the concept (e.g. that the lexical form horse belongs 
to the category N). The logical entry associated with the concept consists of a meaning 
postulate (in the form of an inference rule), which applies reliably to any representation 
that meets its input conditions (i.e. the concept HORSE).136 The encyclopaedic entry 
contains a set of assumptions that represent the individual’s real world knowledge about 
horses (e.g. that horses are used for riding, are often domesticated, are popular among 
young girls, and so on). Similarly, the concept WATER may be represented 
(schematically) along the lines of (35), as associated with the tree types of information: 
(35) WATER 
Lexical entry: +N (... etc.) 
Logical entry: WATER → LIQUID OF A CERTAIN KIND 
Encyclopaedic entry: IS USED FOR DRINKING, IS NECESSARY FOR LIFE ON THE 
PLANET, FREEZES AT ZERO DEGREES CELSIUS, LOOKS LIKE THIS [MENTAL IMAGE] ... 
etc.  
On the basis of the representations in (34) and (35), there are two different ways in 
which we could see the concepts as being specified as denoting individuals or 
unindividuated entities.137 Either it could be seen as (i) following from the meaning 
postulate(s) associated with the concept, or (ii) being derivable form real-world 
knowledge of the denotation of the concept, stored in the encyclopaedic entry associated 
with it. I will consider each possibility in turn.  
                                                      
136 Of course, a concept can be associated with more than a single meaning postulate. 
137 Having argued that concepts, and not their natural language counterparts, may be mentally 
represented as denoting individuals or unindividuated entities, the lexical entries associated with the 
concepts would not contain any information that would allow us to make such a distinction. 
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As already mentioned, relevance theory has adopted the Fodorian, informational 
atomist stance on lexical meaning. On the view expressed in (i), the logical information 
(or meaning postulates) associated with a concept is hypothesised to be what allows us 
to determine that it denotes individuals or unindividuated entities. Explaining how this 
might work requires some elaboration. Unlike Fodor, who, in recent work, denies that 
any of the inferences a concept enters into is constitutive of its content (e.g. Fodor 
1998), relevance theorists take concepts to be associated with content-constitutive 
meaning postulates (see, in particular Horsey 2006 for a detailed defence of the need for 
supplementing Fodor's informational semantics with content-constitutive rules of 
inference).138 That a concept is associated with a meaning postulate means that a 
tokening of the concept, e.g. HORSE, will cause the activation of the associated meaning 
postulate(s), ‘HORSE → ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN KIND’, thereby tokening the concept 
ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN KIND. Assuming that the concept ANIMAL is associated with the 
meaning postulate ‘ANIMAL → LIVING KIND’, the concept LIVING KIND would equally be 
tokened as a result of a tokening of the concept HORSE). This is one of a large array of 
concepts that Horsey (2006: section 4.3.2) describes as ‘intuitive’, that is, concepts for 
which we have an intuitive grasp (e.g. HORSE, ANIMAL, WATER, LIQUID, etc.).139 He 
distinguishes between two types of intuitive concepts: those that are ‘perceptual’ and 
those that are ‘inferential’. Assuming a modular view of mental architecture (cf. Fodor 
                                                      
138 Horsey argues that the distinction between logical and encyclopaedic information associated with a 
concept should be seen as a psychological one, which does not coincide with the analytic/synthetic 
distinction in philosophy: “[T]he question of whether a given inference is supported by a meaning 
postulate or is represented in encyclopaedic knowledge is an empirical question which is to be 
determined by psychological investigation.” (ibid. 75). 
139 The notion of ‘intuitive concepts’ comes from Sperber (1997), who distinguishes between ‘intuitive’ 
and ‘reflective’ beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are beliefs derived from perception (including introspection), or 
are derived directly or indirectly from these on the basis of intuitive inference mechanisms, e.g. in the 
form of meaning postulates attached to concepts (e.g. HORSES ARE ANIMALS/WATER IS A LIQUID). They can 
also be acquired via communication (someone might tell you that e.g. OKAPIS ARE ANIMALS), which, in 
such cases can be seen as playing the role of experience by proxy (the individual might herself have 
formed this belief via perception or spontaneous inference, had she been placed in a position to 
experience its perceptual basis). Reflective beliefs are those that are entertained by virtue of being 
embedded in a validating context (which may involve reference to authority, to divine revelation, explicit 
argument or proof, etc.), and may be derived, inter alia, from communication (resulting in, e.g., a belief of 
the form: MARY [WHO I FIND RELIABLE] SAID THAT P) or conscious thought (e.g. THERE IS EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF P). Parallel to this is a distinction between ‘intuitive concepts’ (i.e. those which may appear in 
intuitive beliefs and inferences, e.g. concepts such as HORSE, ANIMAL, WATER, LIQUID) and ‘reflective 
concepts’ (i.e. those of which we have no intuitive grasp, but understand because we have (reflective) 
beliefs about them, e.g. the concept H2O, and which “are introduced by explicit theories which specify 
their meaning and the inferences that can be drawn on their basis”). 
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1983; Sperber 1994a), perceptual concepts are the outputs of sensory stimuli modules 
(broadly identified with so-called ‘basic level categories’, cf. Rosch et al. 1976), while 
inferential concepts are taken to be innate concepts which are introduced by inference 
rules (meaning postulates), and which are not part of the vocabulary of the perceptual 
mechanisms. As an example, Horsey gives the concept LIVING KIND, which can be 
introduced via the spontaneous inference ‘ANIMAL → LIVING KIND’, and which Sperber 
(1994a), on the basis of strong commonalities in living-kind classification across 
cultures, suggests treating as a domain-specific cognitive module. Much research in 
cognitive science indicates that there are several different cognitive domains that licence 
spontaneous inferences about entities relevant to them, and that the domains have 
many of the properties of a Fodorian module. It is argued that such domains plausibly 
include a naïve physics (Spelke 2000), a naïve biology (Atran 2002) and naïve 
psychology (Leslie 1987), and that they are part of the cognitive apparatus which makes 
knowledge acquisition possible (Sperber 1994a) (cf. the core knowledge hypothesis, 
mentioned in footnote 135). Along these lines, we may speculate that the concepts 
INDIVIDUAL and UNINDIVIDUATED ENTITY may be such inferential concepts, perhaps 
constituting submodules of the more general domain of naïve physics. For instance, the 
concept WATER, which, according to the meaning postulate given in (35) causes 
tokening of the concept LIQUID OF A CERTAIN KIND, may activate the concept 
UNINDIVIDUATED ENTITY via the spontaneous inference ‘LIQUID OF A CERTAIN KIND → 
UNINDIVIDUATED ENTITY’. In the case of the concept HORSE in (34), which is argued to 
activate the inferential concept (or conceptual module) LIVING KIND as a result of the 
tokening of the concept ANIMAL, there may be a further spontaneous inference activated 
by the concept ANIMAL, ‘ANIMAL → INDIVIDUAL’. In this way, the distinction between 
concepts that denote individuals and those that denote unindividuated entities can be 
seen as arising from meaning postulates attached to the concepts. 
A second option is to take the distinction between individuals and 
unindividuated entities to arise from encyclopaedic information stored about the 
denotations of concepts. As I have said above, the encyclopaedic entry attached to a 
concept contains information about the objects, events and/or properties which 
instantiate it. Typically, this entry contains information about prototypical instances of 
the concept (cf. the discussion of ‘prototypes’ in Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). For instance, 
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the encyclopaedic information about the denotation of the concept HORSE may contain 
information about what constitutes a typical horse, e.g. the kind of horse commonly 
used for riding (or the sport/show horse), and information about less typical instances, 
such as wild horses and small pony-sized horses (e.g. the Icelandic horse). For many 
concepts, we may also have an imagistic representation of the typical instances of the 
entities/properties they denote as part of the encyclopaedic entries attached to them (cf. 
the suggestion that physical object words may be associated with 3D model 
representations in Jackendoff 2002, as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.2.4). It may be 
argued, then, that the fact that we perceive the concepts HORSE and WATER in (34) and 
(35) as denoting individuals and unindividuated entities respectively may stem from 
imagistic representations of typical instances of horses and water stored in the 
encyclopaedic entries attached to the concepts. We ‘see’ horses out in the world as 
bounded countable individuals, and water as an unbounded entity. On this view (which 
I tend to favour over (i), due to its intuitive plausibility), the count-mass distinction has 
a perceptual basis. 
By arguing that the conceptual distinction between individuals and 
unindividuated entities can be seen as arising from either (i) the logical information 
attached to a concept, or (ii) an imagistic representation stored in the encyclopaedic 
entry of a concept, I hope to have shown that we can account for the intuition that some 
nouns are count nouns, while others are mass nouns, without having to assume that this 
is a linguistic property of nouns (thus avoiding the problems associated with a syntactic 
account) but rather to do with the kinds of things that they denote in the world. In my 
view, this offers a more psychologically plausible account: it explains that children and 
Chinese speakers may perceive horses as bounded countable entities and water as an 
unindividuated entity despite their ‘lack of’ count-mass syntax, and allows for many 
concepts, for which the classification in terms of individuals and unindividuated entities 
seems less relevant (as is the case for, e.g., abstract terms for emotions such as love, hope, 
grief, anger, and so on, plurals such as blues, wares, clothes, etc.), to be unspecified with 
regard to the distinction. 
However, this approach does not deny (the obvious fact) that, in languages that 
have it, count-mass syntax plays a central role in determining the denotations of nouns. 
But rather than taking count-mass syntax as being (somehow) prior to the conceptual 
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distinction between individuals and unindividuated entities, count-mass syntax can be 
seen as an instance of a conceptual (ontological) distinction being reflected in a 
syntactic distinction at the level of NPs. Let us assume, then, that count-mass syntax (as 
it is manifested at the level of NPs) maps onto semantic representation as schematised 
in (36):140 
(36) a. Count syntax → (KINDS OF) INDIVIDUALS 
b. Mass syntax → (KINDS OF) UNINDIVIDUATED ENTITIES  
These mappings allow a hearer to infer, on the basis of syntactic clues, that the entity 
denoted by the noun is either an individual or unindividuated (a substance).141 But 
instead of taking the nouns themselves to be either count or mass (which, on the basis of 
that syntactic feature, select specific determiners, can appear in the plural form, etc.) the 
view is now that it is concepts that are perceived as denoting (kinds of) individuals or 
unindividuated entities, and, independently of this, the language can encode NPs as 
denoting (kinds of) individuals or unindividuated entities.142 The normal case is, of 
course, an overlap between these two situations (with count-mass syntax allowing for 
the modification of nominal denotations by specifying cardinality, quantity, portion, 
amount, etc.), and so the concepts encoded by nouns such as horse, man, pencil, being 
mentally represented as denoting individuals, are most frequently used with count 
syntax, while the concepts encoded by nouns such as water, rice, and snow, being 
mentally represented as denoting unindividuated entities, are most frequently used with 
mass syntax. However, whenever a noun that encodes a concept which is perceived as 
                                                      
140 These mappings are thought to model the linguistic knowledge of adult language users. I remain 
neutral as regards the very contentious issue of how such mappings are acquired (for discussion, see 
Bloom 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Papafragou 2005; Barner and Snedeker 2005, 2006). 
141 For instance, if someone hears an utterance of ‘There’s much glurf these days’ without having ever 
come across the noun glurf before, he or she can infer that the denotation of the NP much glurf is an 
unindividuated entity. 
142 Krifka (1995) also considers the possibility of not distinguishing syntactically between count and mass 
nouns, but concludes that it must be done in order to account for what appears to him to be a syntactic 
difference, that mass-denoting nouns can be straightforwardly used as names of kinds (e.g. ‘Wine 
contains alcohol’), while count-denoting nouns need a definite article or pluralization to perform this task 
(e.g. ‘The bear/bears can be aggressive’). However, another way to see this is that count-denoting nouns 
can in fact be used without a determiner to name a kind, only that this would force a mass interpretation 
upon them (for instance, an utterance of ‘Bear is delicious’ would be possible given the appropriate 
context). So it seems that it is not whether the noun is syntactically defined as count or mass but rather 
how it occurs in the sentence that is the determining factor here. Occurring without a determiner and 
plural marker yields a mass interpretation. 
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denoting a (kind of) individual is used with mass syntax, or a noun that encodes a 
concept which is perceived as denoting a (kind of) unindividuated entity is used with 
count syntax, this gives rise to polysemy. Consider (37) and (38): 
(37) a. The horses are grazing in the field. 
b. Yesterday, I had horse for the first time. 
(38) a. The plants need some water. 
b. [To waiter]: I’ll have the hamburger and a water, please. 
In (37)a., the noun horse is used in a count NP to denote individuals, and in (38)a., the 
noun water is used in a mass NP to denote an unindividuated entity. There is thus a 
correspondence between the conceptual representations HORSE and WATER (being 
perceived as denoting individuals and unindividuated entities respectively) and the 
syntax of the NPs in which their natural language counterparts occur. In (37)b., where 
horse is used in an NP with mass syntax, the language parser outputs a concept, let’s say 
HORSE{unindividuated entity}, which comes with an instruction to the pragmatic 
system that its denotation is constrained to unindividuated entities. This concept 
provides a highly underspecified input to pragmatic processing. The relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic then operates to yield the speaker-intended concept (which is 
one among the various sub-tasks it performs in developing the logical form into a fully 
propositional string of concepts) resulting in the construction of the ad hoc concept 
HORSE*, paraphrasable as ‘horse meat’, which is narrower than the linguistically 
specified concept. The hearer constructs this concept on the basis of highly activated 
encyclopaedic information associated with the concept HORSE (e.g. HORSES ARE EDIBLE) 
and contextual information derived from the utterance situation (e.g. that the speaker 
went to a fancy restaurant last night). Similarly, in (38)b., where water is used with 
count syntax, the language parser outputs a semantic representation that is specified as 
an individual, let’s say WATER{individual}. The pragmatic processor then takes over to 
construct an ad hoc concept on the basis of the encoded concept, highly activated 
encyclopaedic assumptions associated with it (e.g. WATER IS DRUNK FROM CONTAINERS), 
and other contextual assumptions derivable from the utterance situation, say, from the 
fact that the speaker and hearer are at a restaurant where people are served glasses of 
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water. The communicated concept, WATER*, paraphrasable as ‘glass of water’, is 
narrower than the linguistically specified concept, denoting a subset of the set of 
individual containers of water. 
We are now (finally) in a position to account for the examples of systematic 
polysemy that we set out in the beginning of this chapter, under (2), (3) and (4), 
repeated below as (39), (40) and (41): 
(39) a. A rabbit jumped over the fence. 
b. We’re having rabbit for dinner. 
c. The model wore rabbit on the catwalk. 
d. After the tractor had run over the body, there was rabbit splattered all over the 
yard. 
(40) a. We have a pine in our garden. 
b. This table is made of pine. 
(41) a. Susan decorated the cake with a cherry. 
b. When the kids left, there was cherry all over the kitchen. 
c. Jill and Joan have a cherry in their garden.143  
d. This table is made of cherry. 
In (39), the unindividuated senses of rabbit are indicated by the mass syntax of the NPs, 
but their narrower, contextually appropriate interpretations, i.e. ‘rabbit fur’ (39)b., 
‘rabbit meat’ (39)b., and ‘rabbit stuff’ (39)c., are all derived by pragmatic inference, on 
the basis of encyclopaedic assumptions associated with the concept RABBIT (e.g. RABBITS 
ARE EDIBLE, RABBITS HAVE FUR, RABBITS ARE OF FLESH AND BLOOD, etc.). The wood sense of 
pine in (40)b. and of cherry in (41)d. arise as a result of the nouns occurring in NPs with 
mass syntax, encoding unindividuated pine and cherry concepts, combined with 
pragmatic narrowing. Importantly, this relevance-theoretic pragmatic account claims 
that the reason we can use rabbit to denote the senses in (39)b., (39)c., and (39)d., and 
pine and cherry to denote kinds of wood in (40) and (41) is first and foremost a result of 
what we know about the world (or what we perceive the world to be like), and not due 
                                                      
143 The metonymic extension from the meaning of cherry in (41)a. above to the tree sense of cherry is, of 
course, not accounted for here but will be addressed in Chapter 6. The alternation between the tree sense 
and the wood sense, however, follows the pattern described above. 
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to any such information being stored in the lexical entries for the words, although mass 
syntax provides an important clue to the interpretations. Examples like (33) above, 
however, where the syntax of the NP is unspecified as to whether it encodes a count or a 
mass concept, show that the choice of a count or mass interpretation for a concept can 
have an entirely pragmatic basis.144 
However, although they are pragmatically derived, the fact that we perceive such 
polysemies as being ‘systematic’ or ‘regular’ is, I think, due to several (independent) 
factors: One concerns the syntactic distinction between count-denoting and mass-
denoting NPs. The fact that our linguistic knowledge tells us that most (if not all) nouns 
can be used with both count and mass syntax, and that this syntactic distinction is 
paired reliably with a semantic distinction between individuals and unindividuated 
entities, gives rise to a sense of regularity. A second factor is the way in which this type 
of polysemy reflects certain regularities in the world. Fodor and Lepore make this point: 
Suppose it’s right that ‘lamb’ is polysemous between the animal and the meat. 
Surely that’s because lamb-the-meat comes from lamb-the animal. Surely there 
just couldn’t be a word that’s polysemous between lamb-the-animal and (say) 
beef-the-meat? Or between lamb-the-animal and succotash-the-mixed-vegetable? 
That there couldn’t may itself sound like a deep fact of lexical semantics. But no; 
it’s just the truism that, the less one can see what the relation between X and Y 
might be, the more one is likely to think of an expression that is X/Y ambiguous 
as homonymous rather than polysemous. (Fodor and Lepore 2002:117) 
Polysemous relations of the animal-meat, the animal-fur or the tree-wood kind indeed 
reflect highly regular and predictable states of affairs in the world. Because we know that 
there is an inherent relation between an animal and its meat/fur, and between a tree and 
its wood, we can easily infer, upon encountering a new kind of animal or tree, that the 
relation also applies to this instance (and in certain cases that it does not, for instance, if 
the animal in question has no fur). Since words for animals and trees are usually 
polysemous with respect to these relations, we can infer that the word for the new 
instance can also be used in this way. The view, then, is that the polysemy that the 
language exhibits in these cases is dependent on, and arises from our knowledge of 
                                                      
144 Presumably, this would be crucial in classifier languages such as Chinese and Japanese, which do not 
distinguish syntactically between count-denoting and mass-denoting NPs.  
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predictable real world relations, rather than being generated by the linguistic system on 
the basis of stored lexical information. 
A third factor that contributes to the perceived ‘regularity’ of this type of 
polysemy is, of course, that some of its instances have become conventional (e.g. lamb, 
chicken, oak, etc.), as a result of frequency of use and possibly other factors contributing 
to the stabilisation of senses (cf. Chapter 4). In such cases, the conventionalised sense 
may have acquired a conceptual address of its own, and would be associated with its 
own logical and encyclopaedic entries.  
An advantage of the pragmatic approach is that it allows for considerable 
flexibility of interpretation. Consider (42): 
(42) a. A chicken pecked the ground in the backyard. 
b. John brought home a chicken for supper. 
c. Corn-fed chicken is difficult to find these days. 
d. Corn-fed and inexpensive chicken is difficult to find these days. 
In (42)a., chicken is used in the stereotypical way to denote the live animal. In (42)b. 
however, it used in an NP with count syntax to refer to an individual chicken prepared 
to be eaten. This ‘meat’ sense of chicken represents a pragmatic narrowing of the 
linguistically-encoded meaning, by picking out a subset from among the set of chickens 
(i.e. the set of whole chickens prepared to be eaten). In fact, depending on the level of 
specificity required by the context, it could be narrowed down further to communicate, 
e.g., ‘a dead unplucked chicken’, ‘a frozen plucked chicken’ (like the ones you find in 
any Sainsbury freezer cabinet), ‘a cooked chicken ready to be eaten’ (as from a 
delicatessen), and so on. It is difficult to see how this ability of chicken (used in its 
individual-denoting sense) to take on both animal and meat senses could be analysed in 
an account based on lexical rules for sense extension. It is possible that the proponents 
of such an account would say that deriving the appropriate sense of chicken in (42)b. 
above is a pragmatic matter, and that they never intended their rules to account for such 
flexibility in meaning. If so, this would mean that only the rule-generated meat sense 
(e.g. the one that results from ‘meat-grinding’ on Copestake and Briscoe’s (1996) 
account) could be considered as ‘semantic’, while the meat sense of chicken in (42)b. 
  
 
179 
would come about as a result of pragmatic inference. This asymmetry does not arise in 
the pragmatic account, which I think points towards a more empirically adequate 
account. Concerning the mass uses of chicken in (42)c. and (42)d., they show that a 
property primarily associated with the live animal (‘corn-fed’) can be used with the meat 
sense of chicken, and that such a property can be conjoined with a property primarily 
associated with the meat sense (‘inexpensive’). The fact that we do not find these 
utterances the least incoherent may be due to logical and encyclopaedic information 
activated during our processing of them (e.g. a tokening of the concept CHICKEN causes 
tokening of the concept ANIMAL, as well as the activation of encyclopaedic assumptions 
about chicken-the-animal, e.g. CHICKENS EAT CORN; CORN-FED CHICKENS HAVE MORE 
FLAVOUR THAN OTHER CHICKENS, etc.).  
Finally, consider the uses of mink in (43) below:  
(43) a. A mink lives in the attic of our mountain cabin. 
b. I opened the cage and suddenly there was mink all over the place 
c. Mink is expensive these days. 
d. I wore my jeans and she wore a mink.145 
Let us assume that mink conventionally encodes two senses, the animal sense, MINK1, 
and the fur sense, MINK2 (where the MINK2 sense has become conventional as a result of 
the frequent narrowing of the mass use of the animal sense (‘mink stuff’) into the ‘fur’ 
sense). Thus, the MINK1 concept would be perceived as denoting a (kind of) individual, 
while the MINK2 concept would be perceived as denoting a (kind of) unindividuated 
entity. In (43)a., mink is used in the conventional way (in an NP with count syntax) to 
denote the live animal (MINK1), with a possibly narrower communicated meaning, 
paraphrasable as ‘wild mink’ (MINK1*). In (43)b, mink is used in the same sense, only 
with mass syntax to refer to an unindividuated entity of live minks, communicating 
(possibly) the ad hoc concept MINK1** (‘farmed mink’), which is pragmatically 
constructed on the basis of the semantic representation MINK1{unindividuated entity} 
output by the linguistic system. In (43)c., and (43)d. the noun mink is used to denote the 
fur sense, MINK2, but in different ways: According to our analysis of the fur sense as 
                                                      
145 Lyrics of ‘She Ain’t Pretty’ from the album Snow in June (1990) by the band Northern Pikes. 
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being established, in (43)c., mink is used in the conventional way (in an NP with mass 
syntax) to denote mink fur (MINK2). However, the count syntax of the NP a mink in 
(43)d. allows it to map onto an individual-denoting concept (MINK2{individual}), while 
pragmatic narrowing yields the communicated meaning, e.g. ‘mink stole’ (or the ad hoc 
concept MINK2*). The MINK2* concept can be seen as denoting a subset of the set of all 
individual mink furs. Although (43)b. (43)d. are not conventional uses of the noun 
mink, they do suggest that all that count-mass syntax encodes is an instruction that the 
concept output by the linguistic parser is specified as being either an individual or 
unindividuated. 
Returning to the ‘blocking’ cases discussed in section 5.2, these can be analysed 
within the current, relevance-theoretic account as involving an increase in the effort of 
processing on the part of the hearer, which is offset by an increase in the cognitive 
effects he may derive from the utterance. According to the Communicative Principle of 
Relevance (cf. Chapter 3) every utterance (or other ostensive stimulus) “creates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: §3). To be 
‘optimally relevant’, the utterance should be (a) at least relevant enough to be worth the 
hearer’s processing effort, and (b) the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s 
abilities and preferences. So, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance should try to do at 
least the following: achieve enough cognitive effects to make the utterance worth 
processing (cf. (a)), and avoid causing the hearer any unjustifiable effort in achieving 
those effects (cf. (b)). This ban on processing effort has two consequences. First, it 
implies that the first interpretation that the hearer finds satisfactory (for instance, if 
there is a highly accessible interpretation which is relevant in the expected way), this is 
the only one he is justified in choosing. A second consequence is that the extra 
processing effort demanded by any indirectness in an utterance should be offset by extra 
(or different) effects, which would not have been achieved by use of a more direct 
utterance. Consider again the examples in (22) and (23), repeated as (44) and (45) 
below: 
(44) There were five thousand extremely loud people on the floor eager to tear into 
roast cow with both hands and wash it down with bourbon and whiskey 
(Copestake and Briscoe 1996: 38). 
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(45) Hindus are forbidden to eat cow (beef?) (Nunberg and Zaenen 1992). 
In both cases, the use of cow with mass syntax instead of the conventional expression 
beef demands an extra (albeit relatively minor) effort of processing of the hearer, which 
is offset by extra cognitive effects (compared to the alternative utterances containing 
beef): In (44), it allows the hearer to draw implications about the speaker’s somewhat 
derogatory attitude towards the people consuming the meat, and in (45) about the status 
of the cow in Hindu religion. As to the utterances in (19)-(21), repeated below in (46)-
(48), it can be argued that the reason the utterances seem odd is that, without a more 
specific context, the extra processing effort that they require of the hearer is not offset by 
any extra (or different) cognitive effects that he may derive from them:  
(46) ?Joan likes to eat calf (veal). 
(47) ?We’re having pig for dinner (pork). 
(48) ?Matt is preparing sheep for our anniversary (mutton). 
Finally, in (49) and (50) ((24) and (25) above), the reason the uses of pig seem less 
marked than the one in (47) may be that in both cases the ‘pig’ sense has already been 
primed by the (linguistic) contexts (by the subject Jews and Muslims in (49) and the 
general subject matter in (50), ‘the speaker does not eat pork ’). In this way, the uses of 
pig do not necessarily require much extra effort to process, and hence the effects that 
might be drawn from them are quite minimal:  
(49) Jews and Muslims don’t eat pork/pig. 
(50) ‘As a general rule, I don’t eat pork. This can be awkward – I often go for the 
veggie option, to avoid having to explain why I don’t eat pig.’ 
(51) Kate [with a plate of food in front of her]: This roast sheep is the best I’ve ever 
had. 
(52) I love roast suckling pig. 
As to the utterances in (51) and (52) ((26) and (27) above), the uses of sheep and pig to 
refer to the meat of the animals are entirely conventional; there would thus be no extra 
processing effort required, and no extra effects obtained. 
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5.3.3 The book/window cases 
In this section, I will discuss a set of cases that seem to involve a regular alternation 
between distinct senses, but where the intuition is that the senses (somehow) belong to a 
single conceptual unit, and where there is no syntactic/morphological difference 
corresponding with different senses. I call these the book/window cases for convenience. 
As we are going to see, these cases raise some difficult issues. My aim here is not to 
provide a full account of the book/window cases, but rather to suggest a possible 
approach to them. Consider (53)-(56): 
(53) a. The book is sitting on the coffee table. 
b. John found the book interesting. 
c. That book with the gorgeous cover is really good. 
(54) a. John broke the window. 
b. Mary crawled through the window. 
d. The window is the most important part of a bedroom. 
(55) a. The school needs a refurbishment. 
b. The school announced that its GCSE results were the best it had ever received. 
c. John made many friends at school. 
(56) a. Ken spilled coffee on the newspaper. 
b. The newspaper told a story about an armed robbery that took place in London. 
c. The newspaper announced that redundancies would be made.  
In (53)a., the noun book refers to a physical object, in (53)b. it refers to an information 
type, and in (53)c. it denotes both. This alternation, between a physical object sense and 
an information type sense, extends to many other words denoting objects of similar 
type, e.g. DVD, pamphlet, newspaper, encyclopaedia, piano, radio, film, and so on. In 
(54), the noun window refers to a physical object in (54)a., an aperture in (54)b., and the 
two combined in (54)c. We find this alternation for the noun door, as well as for a 
number of objects similar to windows and doors, including porthole, jalousie, dormer, 
entrance, entry, exit, portal, hatch and so on. In (55), the alternation between a physical 
object (building) sense of school, as in (55)a., and an institution sense, as in (55)b., 
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which may also combine, as in (55)c., is exhibited by a number of other nouns, 
including church, parliament, castle, bank, etc. Finally, the uses of newspaper in (56) are 
interesting, as they involve an alternation between a physical object sense, as in (56)a., 
and an information type sense, as in (56)b., as exhibited by book above, as well as an 
alternation between a physical object sense and an institution (/organisation) sense, as 
exhibited by school in (55). Note that the three senses cannot combine (i.e. the 
combination of the senses in (56)a. and (56)c. has no extension). Other nouns that 
exhibit this kind of sense alternation are journal, magazine, periodical, radio, etc. The 
patterns of sense alternation exhibited by (53)-(56) can be schematised as in (57): 
(57) a. physical object/informational content 
b. physical object/aperture 
c. physical object/institution 
Let me start by considering what all these instances have in common. First, they can all 
be characterised as ‘regular’, in the sense that the patterns of sense alternation range 
over a large set of words, and can be extended to new words denoting objects of similar 
type. Second, they all have a physical object sense  which alternates with a sense 
denoting a property (more or less) intrinsic to the physical object denotation of the 
concept. Third, the sense alternations are largely constrained by real-world knowledge 
of the denotation of the nouns, as shown by the examples below involving the nouns 
book, radio, and computer, exhibiting the sense alternation in (57)a.: 
(58) a. John found the book/?radio/?computer interesting. 
b. The book/radio/?computer told a story about an armed robbery that took place 
in London. 
c. The book/computer/?radio contained compromising information.  
An utterance of ‘John found the radio/computer interesting’, as in (58)a., cannot be used 
to communicate that John found the informational content transmitted by the 
radio/stored on the computer interesting, but would rather be interpreted as pertaining 
to their technical details (in some way or other). The example in (58)b. shows that a 
book or a radio can tell a story about something, while a computer usually can’t, 
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presumably because we think of computers primarily as containers and not as 
transmitters of information. Hence (58)c. is fine with computer and book, but not with 
radio, which is an information transmitter, not a container.  
The book/window cases raise several questions. First, there is a question 
concerning whether they involve a single lexical entry or distinct lexical entries. For 
instance, Cruse (1995: 36) points out that the senses may give rise to independent truth-
conditions, as shown by (59) and (60): 
(59) A: Do you like the book? 
B: (i) No, I find the sentimentality nauseating. 
(ii) Yes, it’s magnificently produced – a pity the poems are such rubbish.  
(60) A. Do you like the church in this town? 
B: (i) No, it is in desperate need of refurbishment. 
 (ii) Yes, it’s got a liberal position on same-sex marriage.  
It is possible to conceive of a situation in which both of B’s answers in (59) and (60) 
were simultaneously true. Recalling Quine’s logical test for ambiguity mentioned in 
Chapter 1, this should indicate that the different senses of book and church are discrete, 
and hence involve distinct lexical entries. However, the following instances of ‘co-
predication’ are fully acceptable, that is, both senses of book and church are 
simultaneously modified by different predicates without giving rise to ‘zeugma’: 
(61) Roth’s new book has a clever plot and an eye-catching cover. 
(62) The church, albeit in desperate need of refurbishment, announced budget cuts 
next year. 
Cruse takes these diverging results to show that the senses of book (and hence of church) 
are discrete but the word is not ambiguous, that is, it is represented as a single lexical 
entry. Cruse’s view is that there is no sharp dichotomy between polysemy and 
monosemy but rather a continuum of degrees of distinctness, ranging from senses that 
are not distinct at all (e.g. the lexical form teacher, which could have either a female or a 
male referent), to senses that are fully distinct (e.g. homonyms such as bank), and 
presumably book and church fall into some middle position on this continuum. 
  
 
185 
Copestake and Briscoe (1996: 49) agree with Cruse that acceptable instances of co-
predication suggest the availability of a single lexical entry but deny that a strong 
zeugmatic effect is a valid diagnostic of distinct lexical entries for different senses of a 
word form. Thus, in their view, the uses of door and window below are instances of a 
‘single lexical structure’:  
(63) a. John went through the door and closed it behind him. 
b. John opened the door and walked through it. 
c. ? John walked through the door and slammed it behind him. 
d. ?? John took the door off its hinges and walked through it. 
(64) a. The window was broken so many times that it had to be boarded up (Nunberg 
1979: 150). 
b. Mary opened the window and crawled through it. 
c. ? Mary crawled through the window and slammed it shut. 
d. ?? Mary pulled the window off its hinges and crawled through it. 
Here, both the physical object and the aperture senses of door and window are modified 
by different predicates, giving rise to different degrees of acceptability. For instance, 
while the utterances in (63)a. and (63)b. both appear acceptable (with perhaps a 
difference in the degree of acceptability), (63)a. being slightly more acceptable than 
(63)b.), the utterance in (63)c. appears less acceptable and the one in (63)d. gives rise to 
a zeugmatic effect. Similar differences in degrees of acceptability can be observed for the 
examples involving window in (64). What causes such differences in the acceptability of 
co-predication? Intuitively, the difference appears to arise from the different types of 
events that the utterances describe. For instance, the sequence of events described in 
(63)a., that of walking through a doorway and closing the door behind oneself, is highly 
stereotypical, one that a person performs perhaps several times a day. This sequence of 
events may be stored as a ‘chunk’ in long-term memory, becoming highly accessible as a 
result of the activation of the concept DOOR. Thus, no anomaly is perceived in the 
processing of the utterance. Similarly, although window strictly speaking refers 
simultaneously to the glass and the aperture in (64)a., the fact that the utterance 
describes a highly conceivable sequence of events makes it seem perfectly natural. At the 
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other end of the scale, in (63)d., where the utterance is intended to describe the quite 
unusual event where John (for some unknown reason) goes through the trouble of 
pulling the physical door off its hinges before walking through the aperture it leaves, it 
seems that once the scenario where the physical door is being taken off its hinges is 
evoked and the referent assigned to door is the physical door (which the hearer is 
perhaps picturing as being placed facing the wall next to the aperture), it can no longer 
refer simultaneously to the aperture. The anomaly of (63)d. (and similar remarks apply 
to (64)d.), results from the ‘salience’ of the sequence of events evoked; in other words, 
from the application of world knowledge during the processing of the utterance. The 
degrees of acceptability of the utterances in (63) and (64) can also be seen as correlating 
with the amount of processing effort they require on the part of the hearer: The more 
stereotypical the sequence of events is, the less processing effort is demanded, whereas 
the more ‘marked’ (or salient) cases come with an increase in the cost of processing. 
I therefore agree with Copestake and Briscoe in that a zeugmatic effect does not 
necessarily indicate the presence of distinct lexical entries for the different senses of a 
word form, since whether an utterance (or sentence) is perceived as zeugmatic or not 
seems to depend to a large extent on the hearer accessing general world knowledge 
during his processing, and, furthermore, is a matter of degree (cf. my comment on this 
issue in Chapter 1). However, although I am generally sceptical about the ability of such 
ambiguity tests to determine whether a word form is associated with single or multiple 
lexical entries (as these tests cannot always distinguish between effects that are due to 
lexical encoding and those that arise from pragmatic processing), I also agree that the 
acceptability of co-predication, as shown by (61), (62), (63) and (64) above, is at least 
suggestive of the availability of a single lexical entry. 
So, assuming there is only a single lexical entry at play in the book/window cases 
(this also seems to be the dominant view in the literature, cf. Nunberg 1979; Cruse 1986; 
Pustejovsky 1995a; Copestake and Briscoe 1996), a second issue that these cases raise is 
what we could reasonably take their lexical representations to look like in order to give 
access to the different senses. The literature contains various suggestions. Pustejovsky 
(1995a: 91-95, 149-156) treats the book/window cases as so-called dot objects. For 
instance, the lexical representation of book is taken to include both the ‘physical object’ 
sense and the ‘informational content’ sense, as well as their combination, forming what 
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he terms a ‘lexical conceptual paradigm’. Other word forms exhibiting the same type of 
polysemy are seen as subtypes of this lexical conceptual paradigm (e.g. DVD, 
encyclopaedia, novel, etc.). Assuming a system of lexical inheritance, a word like novel, 
describing a subtype of book, inherits these properties (as well as a set of other 
properties associated with book), and thus exhibits the same type of sense alternation. 
As discussed in other chapters, there are a number of general problems with 
Pustejovsky’s generative account of polysemy, which I will not get back into here. More 
specifically, with regard to this idea that words such as book, window, newspaper, and so 
forth encode lexical conceptual paradigms, it has been argued that Pustejovsky seems to 
be doing little more than listing different senses under a single lexical entry, which it is 
one of the explicit goals of his theory to avoid (Fodor and Lepore 2002). However, 
although apt, this critique is somewhat unfair, since, unlike the Katz style sense 
enumeration lexicons, the system of lexical inheritance, together with the notion of dot 
objects, does allow Pustejovsky to capture the apparent systematicity and productivity of 
the sense alternations under discussion. His account predicts that words that are 
subsumed under a single lexical conceptual paradigm should exhibit the same kinds of 
sense alternations, and it predicts, by virtue of this information being encoded as part of 
single lexical representations for the words, the acceptability of the co-predications in 
(61), (62), (63)a., and (64)a., At the same time, however, it wrongly predicts that the 
zeugmatic sentences in (63)b. and (64)b. should be acceptable. If both the aperture and 
the physical object senses of door and window are encoded in the lexical representations 
of the words as part of a lexical conceptual paradigm, then there is no reason why the 
utterances should be unacceptable. Furthermore, in the case of newspaper (and words 
exhibiting a similar kind of sense alternation), for which Pustejovsky takes it that there 
must be a complex lexical representation enabling the derivation of the physical object 
sense, the informational content sense and the organisation sense, there is nothing in 
the theory to prevent the linguistic system from also generating the combination of the 
three senses, for which there is no corresponding denotation (i.e. there exists no object 
which is a physical object, an information type as well as an organisation, which may be 
called a newspaper). 
Cruse (1995, 2004) proposes a similar account of the encoded meanings of the 
book/window cases, where these are seen as giving access to a specific kind of bundle of 
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semantic properties, called ‘facets’, described as discrete components of a single sense. 
For instance, book encodes a [TEXT] facet and a [TOME] facet; church encodes a 
[PREMISES] facet and an [INSTITUTION] facet. These are independent in the sense that 
they can give rise to different truth-conditions by allowing only one of the facets to be 
interpreted as relevant, as in (59) and (60), and they allow modifying adjectives to attach 
to one or another of them, giving rise to ambiguous phrases (e.g. a new book could 
mean either ‘a new text’ or ‘a new tome’). However, words encoding facets are not in 
themselves ambiguous, cf. the acceptability of co-predication, as in (61) and (62).146 
While Cruse’s account provides a nice description of how some of the book/window 
cases may be associated with different senses (or ‘facets’), it is not particularly 
explanatory – for instance, it does not give any indication of what it is about such nouns 
that gives rise to their encoding of such ‘facets’, or about how these are 
processed/activated in communication. 
Pustejovsky’s and Cruse’s accounts represent what seems to be a dominant view 
in the linguistic semantic literature: that the sense alternations in question are to be 
given a linguistic explanation in terms of aspects of encoded word meanings. How 
might these cases be approached within relevance theory, on the assumption that 
encoded concepts are atomic, unstructured mental representations? Vicente and 
Martínez Manrique (2010) argue that the relevance-theoretic commitment to atomism 
and to inferentially derived ad hoc concepts encounters problems faced with ‘encoded 
polysemy’ of the kind I have been discussing in this section. They take window as an 
example, and claim that in order to account for its different senses in ‘He crawled 
through the window’, ‘The window is broken’, ‘The window is rotten’, ‘The window is 
the most important part of the bedroom’, there are only two possibilities available to the 
relevance theorist, neither of which is satisfactory: Either she could say that the word 
window encodes at least four different atomic concepts (e.g., WINDOW1, WINDOW2, 
WINDOW3, WINDOW4), an option which they claim requires a departure from the 
                                                      
146 It should be noted that Cruse (1986: 65-66) sees the window/door cases, as exemplified in (54), as being 
ambiguous, due to the zeugma that arises in examples like (63)b. and (64)b. He thinks that the apparent 
compatibility of the different senses as shown by (63)a. and (64)b., should not be accepted as evidence for 
a single encoding, rather, “each case must be examined carefully to determine whether there are special 
factors preventing the appearance of zeugma”. I think this point could equally well go the other way: there 
may be special factors that contribute to the appearance of zeugma, cf. the discussion of (63)b. above. 
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commitment to the view that words encode atomic concepts. Or she has to assume that 
a different ad hoc concept is communicated in each case (e.g., WINDOW*, WINDOW**, 
WINDOW***, WINDOW****), an option which fails, they claim, since the polysemy is 
‘encoded’ and therefore “does not depend on pragmatic processing”. According to 
Vicente and Martínez Manrique, the only way to account for the polysemy exhibited by 
window, is via a lexical decomposition approach of the kind proposed by e.g. 
Pustejovsky (1995a). If we take the lexical representation of window to contain the 
concept PANE, this would provide direct access to its meaning in an utterance of ‘The 
window is broken’.  
There are several comments to make about this critique from Vicente and 
Martínez Manrique. First, it is not clear what they take to be the evidence for the 
underlying premise that the apparent polysemy observed for nouns such as window 
does not depend on pragmatic processing; as far as I can tell, they simply assume this. 
Until they can provide some evidence to support this claim, their rejection of the 
possibility of giving a pragmatic account does not appear to have much force. However, 
there is a sense in which Vicente and Martínez Manrique are partly right when they 
claim that an analysis of the different senses of window in terms of ad hoc concept 
construction fails. As we have seen, the outcome of ad hoc concept construction is either 
a concept with a narrower denotation than the linguistically-encoded concept (a proper 
subset of it) or a broader denotation (a proper superset of it). If it is the case (which 
appears to be what is assumed by Vicente and Martínez Manrique) that in an utterance 
of ‘The window broke’, the concept expressed by the noun is WINDOW PANE, then it is 
true that this concept could not have been arrived at via narrowing or broadening - its 
denotation would be a sub-part of the encoded denotation, but not a proper sub- or 
superset of it - hence this would not count as an instance of ad hoc concept 
construction. In the next chapter, I suggest that sometimes (in metonymy, in particular) 
the outcome of ad hoc concept construction may not be a narrower or a broader 
concept but an entirely different concept. This may well turn out to be what happens in 
some of the book/window cases as well (which would account for the truth-conditional 
differences observed in some cases). I will briefly return to this option in the next 
chapter, where, despite the fact that the book/window cases are not cases of inferential 
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narrowing/broadening in the strict sense, I will consider how an ad hoc approach for 
them might go. 
Concerning the first option, that is, to take the word window to encode at least 
four different atomic concepts, I agree with Vicente and Martínez Manrique insofar as 
postulating different atomic concepts as being encoded by window is not a viable option 
for the relevance theorist; not because it would necessarily be at odds with conceptual 
atomism,147 but because it seems highly implausible that speakers should have a distinct 
concept for each of the uses of window above. As already mentioned, there is a strong 
intuition that the book/window cases involve a single conceptual unit,148 and there is 
therefore some intuitive appeal to the view that the different senses stem from complex 
representations associated with single lexical items. But does this have to be the case? 
Let us consider a different example, (which resembles the window case above): 
(65) a. The car is parked out back. (whole object) 
b. The car is green. (frame) 
c. The car has broken down. (engine) 
d. The car is unlocked. (door) 
e. The car smells of cigarette smoke. (interior) 
f. The groceries are in my car. (trunk) 
g. The car is leaking gasoline/oil/break fluid. (gasoline tank/oil tank/breaks) 
Each use of car in (65) can be said to denote a distinct object, all of which are part of a 
car (except (65) where the whole object is denoted), in much the same way as different 
                                                      
147 In her response to Vicente and Martínez Manrique, Carston (2010) points out that in relevance theory, 
the view is not that the mapping between words and atomic concepts is strictly bi-directional (that is, 
one-to-one; for every lexical item there is a single atomic concept and vice versa); rather, the view is that 
the repertoire of atomic concepts in our language of thought well exceeds the set of lexicalised atomic 
concepts. The mapping is more appropriately seen as unidirectional, that is, from a lexical item to a single 
atomic concept, but not vice versa. In the case of conventionalised (‘encoded’, ‘semantic’) polysemy, the 
consequence of this view is, as we have seen, that the different senses will be represented in much the 
same way as fully homonymous forms, that is, as distinct lexical entries (perhaps with a considerable 
degree of overlap in the encyclopaedic information they give access to). However, if we see the process of 
sense conventionalisation (or establishment) as being gradual, it is likely that there will be a stage at which 
a single lexical item can be said to ‘encode’ more than one atomic concept, which then, over time as a 
result of frequency of use, gradually part company and develop into separate mental files, but I cannot see 
why this should be an impossible situation for the conceptual atomist, so long as the concepts themselves 
are fully atomic. 
148 In fact, it seems that it is mainly linguists that are aware of the different senses of the book/window 
cases; they normally pass unnoticed to ordinary speakers (unlike, for instance, many metaphors). 
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aspects of a window are denoted in ‘He crawled through the window’ (aperture), ‘The 
window is broken’ (pane), ‘The window is rotten’ (frame), ‘The window is the most 
important part of the bedroom’ (whole object). Do we want to say that car, like window, 
is an instance of ‘encoded polysemy’, that the word is polysemous between all of these 
different senses? I think not. The uses of car in (65) seem to involve a kind of ‘economy 
of expression’: Instead of saying, e.g., ‘The car’s frame is green’, ‘The car door is 
unlocked’ or ‘The car’s interior smells of cigarette smoke’, and so forth, which would all 
be possible, but more costly ways of expressing the same meanings, the speaker can rely 
on the hearer’s ability to quickly and effortlessly figure out which part of the car she is 
referring to, which he does on the basis of what he knows about what actual cars are like, 
rather than on the basis of what he knows that the word car means.149 It also seems hard 
to think of any of the parts communicated by use of car in (65) without at the same time 
activating a representation of the whole car. Cruse (2000: 47; 2004: 115) sees the source 
of such nuances in meaning as different ‘ways of seeing’, or ‘perspectives’, being built 
into the lexical representation of a word (not unlike Pustejovsky’s qualia roles). He 
writes:  
[P]erspectives [can be explained] by analogy with looking at an everyday object 
from in front, from the sides, from behind, from on top, etc. All these different 
views are perceptually distinct, but the mind unifies them into a single 
conceptual unity. Something similar happens with meaning. 
I think this observation is essentially right. However, I do not think that this happens at 
the level of lexical representation but rather at a level at which linguistic knowledge, 
perceptual knowledge and general world knowledge are integrated. The sense 
alternations observed for book, window, school and newspaper as shown by (53), (54), 
(55) and (56) could be seen as arising from our encyclopaedic knowledge about actual 
books, windows, schools and newspapers, and the perspectives from which we see them, 
and not from our linguistic knowledge connected with the natural language items that 
encode representations of them. We know that tokens or instances of books are physical 
objects and have an abstract informational content of some kind, that most windows 
                                                      
149 Similarly, in the case of window, the speaker could have chosen to say ‘He crawled though the aperture 
of the window’, ‘The window glass is broken’, ’The window frame is rotten’, but this would be a 
unnecessarily laborious way of expressing these meanings, as the hearer will immediately access these 
interpretations in the absence of any evidence that a different interpretation might be intended. 
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can be opened, are usually made of glass and have a frame, that prototypical schools 
have premises (buildings) and are a kind of institution, and that prototypical 
newspapers are physical objects with an abstract informational content published by an 
organisation/company. This knowledge is part of our encyclopaedic information about 
the denotations of the concepts BOOK, WINDOW, SCHOOL, and NEWSPAPER, along with 
other information about the objects (e.g. that a book’s contents can be of high/poor 
quality, that books take a long time to write, are published by publishing houses, and so 
on and so forth). However, what gives this information a special status (which I think 
leads to the widely held view that it must somehow be lexically encoded) is the fact that 
it represents knowledge about properties that are, to some extent, intrinsic to (or 
defining of) them, certain aspects of which are often ‘highlighted’ (e.g. ‘The book has an 
interesting plot’ (content)).  
In addition to this conceptual knowledge of their denotations, it is, as I 
mentioned in section 5.3.2 above, likely that we have stored spatial/imagistic 
information about the objects in our long-term memory. Recall Jackendoff’s (1992b: 44; 
2002: 346-350) talk of spatial structure (SpS) in connection with physical object 
denoting lexical items. The SpS component of an object word’s meaning can be thought 
of as an imagistic representation of the prototypical instance of a category, in the form 
of a 3D-model, in a shape that allows for its recognition at different distances and from 
different perspectives. The SpS component is also thought to represent the moment-by-
moment appearance of objects as well as the integration over time of the shape, motion, 
and layout of objects in space, and possibly the forces among them. I think there is 
something very appealing about Jackendoff’s idea that object denoting words are 
represented partly in terms of an SpS structure. From a relevance-theoretic point of 
view, we can see this spatial information about an object being stored as part of the 
encyclopaedic information associated with the concept that encodes it.150 Some of the 
sense alternations we have been discussing in this section may have as their primary 
basis spatial information associated with the concepts encoded. For instance, the 
concept WINDOW, due to the activation of an SpS stored in its encyclopaedic entry, 
                                                      
150 As we saw in Chapter 2, however, Jackendoff’s view is that SpS is an actual component of lexical 
meaning, and not merely associated with it. 
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allows the hearer to ‘zoom in’ on different aspects of the SpS during the processing of 
utterances such as ‘The window is broken’, ‘The window is rotten’, etc. (a process that 
would, of course, be relevance-driven). Similarly, utterances such as ‘The book is heavy’, 
‘The book has a beautiful design’, ‘The school needs a refurbishment’, ‘Ken spilled coffee 
on the newspaper’, plus all the utterances involving car in (65) will activate spatial 
(imagistic) encyclopaedic information associated with the encoded concepts, allowing 
the hearer to ‘perspectivise’ his representation of the concepts.151  
On this highly suggestive approach, the meaning variation observed for window 
(and many of the other book/window cases) is not treated as an instance of ad hoc 
concept construction. Instead, window is treated as having a constant referential 
meaning across these different contexts, with some of its encyclopaedic information 
receiving extra activation in each case, resulting in the perception of the object being 
viewed from a specific ‘perspective’. This perspective can be derived from the linguistic 
meaning of the utterance, or from assumptions made available by the broader utterance 
context. The speaker does not have to encode the perspective from which she ‘sees’ the 
object she is referring to (for instance, by producing utterances such as ‘The 
informational content of the book is interesting’, ‘The school personnel/institution 
announced budget cuts’, ‘The window glass is broken’); she can rely on the hearer 
quickly accessing his representation of the object in which the relevant part would 
receive more activation, due to the real world knowledge he has stored about the object. 
So, in this sense, perspective taking is part of the overall pragmatic process of arriving at 
the intended speaker meaning (although it is, in many cases at least, not necessary in 
order to arrive at the proposition expressed).152  
                                                      
151 The notion of ‘perspective’ discussed here has much in common with Langacker’s notion of ‘active 
zones’ (1984, 1991). In Langacker’s terms, the part of a word’s profile (i.e. the entity or relation designated 
by the word) that is relevant or active in a given context is called its active zone. However, a crucial 
difference between the two is that while Langacker posits no clear-cut boundary between linguistic 
meaning and encyclopaedic knowledge, the relevance-theoretic view advocated here takes the 
perspectivising to happen at the level of encyclopaedic knowledge, and not at the level of encoded 
meaning. 
152 The reader will have noticed that this suggestive account implies a move away from the claim that 
polysemy is an instance of ad hoc concept construction as concerns the book/window cases. This is partly 
right. A reason for this is that I am not certain that we have to do with genuine polysemy in many of these 
cases (i.e. clearly distinct senses of a word). However, although it seems clear to me that the book/window 
cases cannot be analysed as instances of lexical narrowing in the sense of Wilson and Carston (2007), they 
do have an affinity with narrowing, as the different perspectives highlight more specific parts of the 
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In Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), I discussed Carston’s (2002b) arguments for the 
ineffability of thought and for taking an essentialist position on the question of linguistic 
underdeterminacy (‘for any given proposition/thought there is no sentence which fully 
encodes it’). Here a ‘thought’ was understood in its individualist, psychological sense (a 
more fine-grained notion of thought than ‘proposition expressed’) and such thoughts 
did not seem amenable to linguistic encoding. It was argued that the thoughts we have 
about ourselves, of people and of things around us, of our temporal and spatial locations 
at any given moment, will be different from the thoughts other people may have about 
the same entities, that is, our relation(s) to the referents will determine our mental 
representations of them. It is hard to see how such private representations could be 
encoded in natural language. Recanati (1993: 97) describes the kind of thought 
expressed by an utterance containing a referential expression as a de re thought. A de re 
thought has two dimensions: It has an objective truth-conditional content, that is, the 
singular proposition that the utterance expresses, plus a subjective content, ‘a mode of 
presentation of the reference’, which affects the cognitive significance of the object but 
not its truth conditions. So, for instance, relative to an utterance of ‘The car is parked 
out back’, two people may have de re thoughts that differ with respect to the mode of 
representation of the referent ‘car’, depending on their relation to it. I would like to 
suggest that the perspectives that the speaker invites the hearer to take on the referents 
of book, window, car, etc. in many of the examples we have been discussing in this 
section, have much in common with Recanati’s de re modes of presentation. In many 
cases, they do not seem to be truth-conditionally significant (e.g., the referent of book is 
a book even though we are talking of its contents)153, but they are cognitively significant. 
Perspectives, however, although clearly private in one sense, are partly shared between 
interlocutors, and, to some extent, they can be encoded (they are thus not entirely 
ineffable) (cf. the possibility of saying, e.g., ‘The window frame is rotten’, ‘The car door is 
unlocked’). Consider an utterance of ‘The window is rotten’ for which the hearer 
probably focuses in on the wooden frame of the window during the interpretation. We 
                                                      
objects. The book/window cases could also be seen as having an affinity with metonymy, by involving 
types of part-whole relations. I return to this possibility briefly in the next chapter. 
153 However, in the case of newspaper (and the set of similar cases) the distinction between the physical 
object sense and the organisation sense is clearly truth-conditionally significant. 
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can see the hearer’s activation of this perspective as resulting from the speaker 
exploiting what she can take to be a stable mental representation of the hearer’s.154 That 
is, the speaker can take for granted that the perspective she takes on the object she is 
referring to, is grasped by the hearer by virtue of the (encyclopaedic) information he has 
about the object, thus there is no need for a more specific encoding. It seems likely that 
we would find this sort of property highlighting for any physical object denoting lexical 
item of a certain frequency in the language. This is a way in which speakers can 
minimise the effort of production – we do not have to encode something that we can 
take for granted that people know about the objects we are referring to – which in turn 
reduces the processing load on hearers. 
Finally, consider the uses of the indexicals in (66)-(70) (similar examples are 
discussed by Nunberg 1978, 1993; Sag 1981): 
(66) [Pointing at a copy of The Sun]: Murdoch has owned that since 1969. 
(67) [Pointing at a copy of a periodical]: That is up on the web now. 
(68) [Holding up a copy of a book in a bookshop]: This is the best I have ever read.  
(69) [Pointing at the frame of a door, where the actual door has been removed for 
replacement]: The police smashed that open. 
(70) [Pointing at the local church]: They are liberal on same-sex marriage. 
In these utterances, the speaker is using an indexical in a way that exploits the hearer’s 
encyclopaedic information about the relevant object. In (66), the speaker is pointing at a 
copy of The Sun, and expects the hearer to infer that she is intending to refer to the 
organisation that publishes it, in (67) she is pointing at a copy of the periodical while 
referring to its abstract informational content; similar situations arise in (68)-(70). In 
these cases, it seems clear that once the physical objects are (ostensively) evoked in the 
contexts (e.g. a copy of The Sun, a periodical, a book, etc.), they give immediate access to 
stored information about them, otherwise it would not have been possible for the 
                                                      
154 Recanati (1993: Chapter 7) distinguishes between two types of de re modes of presentation: egocentric 
concepts and encyclopaedia entries. Egocentric concepts exist only by virtue of a ‘fundamental epistemic 
relation’ (i.e. one that presupposes acquaintance with the object) that holds between the individual and 
the object at time t, and cease to exist when the relation ceases to hold (e.g. ‘The man who keeps staring at 
me’). They are thus of an unstable and temporary character. In contrast, encyclopaedia entries are stable 
mental representations, which do not presuppose acquaintance with the object (e.g. ‘My sister’s piano 
teacher’). 
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speaker to use the indexicals in this deferred way and expect the hearer to understand 
what she is referring to. Furthermore, they show that the object itself activates this kind 
of knowledge quite independently of any natural language encoding. This is, of course, 
not an argument against the possibility of this knowledge being linguistically-encoded. 
Decompositionalists could say that it is doubly represented, once as general (language-
independent) encyclopaedic knowledge about the object and once as part of the lexical 
representation of the natural language item for the object.155 However, it is possible to 
argue against this possibility for reasons of economy; there is in principle no need for the 
lexicon to encode this information, and, furthermore, there is, as far as I can tell, no 
evidence for it being encoded either. Once mental representations of the objects are 
activated (be it via ostension, perception or natural language encoding), they give access 
to a range of information about the objects, which speakers and hearers take advantage 
of in communicating with each other.  
The deferred uses of the indexicals in (66)-(70) raise difficult questions 
concerning the distinctness of what we have called the different ‘perspectives’ we might 
take on objects such as newspapers, periodicals, books, doors and churches. In (66), (67) 
and (68), tokens (of a newspaper, periodical, book) are used to stand for their types, on 
the basis of which the hearer infers the intended referents. In (66), the type that the 
token is an instance of (‘the newspaper called The Sun’) is clearly distinct from the (type 
of) intended referent (‘Murdoch’s News Corporation’). Since the word newspaper can be 
used to refer to them both (albeit not simultaneously) I think that it is reasonable to 
assume that we have to do with genuinely distinct (metonymically derived) senses of the 
word in this case, and I will return to such cases in Chapter 6. In (67), however, it is not 
equally clear that the perspectives involve entirely distinct objects. In this case, the 
speaker is pointing to a (physical object) token of a periodical, which can be seen as 
‘standing for’ the type, and succeeds in referring to its (electronic) informational 
content. This type has physical object instantiations as well as electronic instantiations 
both of which contain the same informational content, and can be said to constitute 
different realisations of the same abstract object. In (68), a physical object token of a 
                                                      
155 Within encyclopaedic semantics (Langacker 2008), this would not be an issue since words are taken to 
encode encyclopaedic information; thus no clear-cut boundary is assumed between linguistic knowledge 
and general world knowledge. 
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book is used to stand for the informational content of the type, to which the speaker 
attributes the property of ‘being the best she has ever read’. In this case it seems clear 
that we have to do with a single conceptual unit. In (69), the aperture of a door is used 
to stand for the removed panel, and the reason the speaker can do this, it seems, is that 
she can assume that the hearer considers the aperture, the panel and the frame of the 
door parts of one and the same object (i.e. the door).156 Finally, in (70), the local church 
building is used to stand for the views of the church as an institution. This is a typical 
case of a metonymic relation (hence the senses should be referentially distinct) yet there 
is a feeling that the building and the institution are somehow different parts of a single 
(perhaps more abstract) object.  
We have argued that ‘perspectivising’ of communicated meanings of words such 
as book, newspaper, door, church and so on arise from properties intrinsic to, or closely 
associated with, their denotations (information about which is stored as part of the 
encyclopaedic entries for the encoded concepts), rather than from information stored as 
part of their lexical representations. It may seem that underlying this argument is the 
assumption that these words have physical objects as their denotations (for instance, 
book encodes the concept BOOK, which has as its denotation a physical object, a book, 
and the encoded concept activates a range of encyclopaedic information about this 
denotation). There would, I think, be good reason to take this view on the encoded 
meanings of these words. The physical objects are the most accessible meanings; they 
are usually the first to come to mind when hearing the words in isolation (they are 
something like Copestake and Briscoe’s (1996) ‘default senses’), and they are the first to 
be acquired (Bloom 2000). It is also hard to think of, e.g., a book or a newspaper without 
at the same time thinking about their physical instantiations.  
However, it also seems possible to think of the meanings of these lexical items in 
more abstract terms, where a word such as book, for instance, encodes an abstract type 
with different instantiations, e.g., bound books, audio books, e-books, etc., which, in 
view of the recent technological developments, may prove to be a more precise 
description of its denotation. A further, more extreme version of this abstract view of 
                                                      
156 Although, in the case of door (and similarly in the case of window and their relatives) it seems likely 
that there will be disagreement among people as regards what constitutes a door: Is it the whole object, 
including the doorway, the panel as well as the aperture, is it only the panel, and so on. 
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the meaning of these words is that they do not encode concepts with denotations at all, 
but, rather, something much more schematic and underdetermined (a pointer), which 
gives hearers access to the conceptual material mentioned above, from which they 
construct the contextually appropriate concept (which does have a denotation). This is a 
very interesting option, which is currently being explored in relevance theory (Carston 
2002b, 2010; Kjøll forthcoming) and by scholars working within different frameworks 
(Recanati 2004; Bosch 2007; Pietroski 2008; Pritchard 2009).  
However, in the final instance, the determination of the precise denotation of a 
word is (if at all possible) an empirical issue. And, given that it is sometimes hard to 
determine exactly what parts constitute objects of a given category (cf. the discussion of 
the examples in (66)-(70)), it is not surprising that word meanings may reflect this 
uncertainty. For instance, although we can be said to have the concept DOOR, we may 
still be unable to determine whether a door consists of an aperture, a frame and a panel, 
or just the frame and panel, or the panel alone, and so on; we can very easily distinguish 
school buildings from the people running the school, but we may be uncertain as to 
whether a school building without anyone running it would still count as a school (cf. 
‘This used to be a school’), yet there can be no doubt that the majority of us have the 
concept SCHOOL. So perhaps this lack of precision of encoded word meanings is 
something that we (that is, linguists and philosophers) will have to live with. 
Underspecified lexical entries are, however, compensated for by an efficient pragmatic 
system, which allows speakers to tailor their utterances in accordance with the 
knowledge that they can expect hearers to have (thereby minimising effort – there is no 
need for the speaker to encode something she can expect the hearer to have immediate 
access to), and which allows hearers to infer speaker meanings on the basis of encoded 
content and contextual assumptions, a process which is guided and constrained by 
considerations of relevance.  
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested a mainly pragmatic account of the systematic sense 
alternations involved in examples such as ‘John shot a rabbit/had rabbit for lunch’, 
usually seen as prime candidates for an analysis in terms of lexical rule application 
(where the effect of the lexical rules is to change the value of a linguistically marked 
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+count or +mass feature on a noun). I argued that such rule-based accounts do not 
provide interpretive flexibility required to handle the variety of interpretations that this 
kind of sense alternation may give rise to. Instead I proposed that our intuitions about 
some nouns being ‘count’ and other nouns being ‘mass’ stem from our mental 
representations of the concepts that are encoded by them, which may be perceived (by 
virtue of meaning postulates attached to the concepts or imagistic representations in 
their encyclopaedic entries) as denoting individuals or unindividuated entities (or 
indeed, be unspecified with regard to this distinction). I further suggested that the 
count-mass distinction as it is manifested in language could be seen as an instance of 
this conceptual (ontological) distinction being reflected in a syntactic distinction at the 
level of NPs (rather than at the level of individual nouns). The cases of ‘systematic’ 
polysemy would arise whenever a noun that encodes a concept perceived as denoting an 
individual is used with mass syntax, or when a noun that encodes a concept perceived as 
denoting an unindividuated entity is used with mass syntax. The pragmatic process of 
ad hoc concept construction would then operate to yield context-specific senses of these 
nouns (e.g. to specify whether a mass use of rabbit communicates ‘rabbit meat’, ‘rabbit 
fur’, ‘rabbit stole’, ‘rabbit remains’ etc.).  
In the last part of this chapter, I have discussed the systematic polysemy of 
nouns such as book and window, and suggested that their different senses could be 
analysed in terms of activation of encyclopaedic properties associated with the concepts 
(so-called ‘perspectivising’). I have also pointed out that many of the examples that were 
discussed under this section appear to have an affinity with metonymic uses of words, a 
topic to which I turn in the next chapter. 
  
 
200 
Chapter	  6 	  
METONYMY	  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about metonymy as a source of polysemy. Metonymy (derived from 
Greek metonumía, meaning ‘change of name’) is the case where an expression that 
conventionally denotes one object or property is used to refer to (or ‘stand for’) 
something that falls outside its conventional denotation but with a clear (associative) 
relation holding between the conventional and the metonymic denotations. Here are 
some illustrations:  
(1) The ham sandwich left without paying.157  
(2) Susan is reading another Woolf. 
(3) Jane is just a pretty face. 
(4) Peter is bringing the loudmouth with him to the cinema this evening. 
(5) John has married a free ticket to the opera.158 
In (1), uttered in the context of a restaurant, the speaker is referring to a customer who 
has ordered a ham sandwich, while the proper name Woolf in (2) is used to refer to a 
book written by the author Virginia Woolf. In (3) the predicate pretty face is used to 
describe Jane as being good looking (someone who ‘has’ a pretty face), and, helped by 
‘just’, to convey the implicature that she is a shallow and/or unintelligent person. In (4), 
the noun phrase the loudmouth is used to refer to a person who tends to talk too much 
and/or too loudly (and as such it allows the speaker to convey a negative attitude 
towards this person). In (5), the noun phrase a free ticket to the opera refers to someone 
who regularly receives free tickets to the opera, and, as a whole, the utterance may 
implicate that John’s marriage is in a difficult state or that his primary interest in 
marrying the woman was her ability get him free tickets to the opera.  
Such metonymies have been shown to pose a formidable challenge to semantic 
and pragmatic theory, and, although they have received increasing research attention 
                                                      
157 Example due to Nunberg (1978). 
158 Example due to Sperber (2007 [1975]). 
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over the last couple of decades, the mechanisms underlying them are not well 
understood. In this chapter, my main concern will be to suggest an answer to the 
following question: How are metonymic interpretations derived within the inferential 
process of forming and confirming hypotheses about intended speaker meanings? Two 
hypotheses concerning metonymy interpretation will be investigated: According to the 
first hypothesis, metonymic interpretations are derived by means of the process of ad 
hoc concept construction, as discussed in the previous chapters. The second hypothesis 
takes referential metonymy to involve a creative use of ‘naming’, closely related to 
nicknaming, as was proposed by Anna Papafragou (1996) in an early relevance-
theoretic account of metonymy. The overall aim of this chapter is to investigate the 
contribution of metonymy to polysemy. 
While a topic of long-standing interest in rhetoric, poetics and literary criticism, 
the study of metonymy has a relatively recent history in philosophy of language, 
linguistics and cognitive science, dating back to the pioneering approaches by Nunberg 
(1978, 1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Compared with metaphor, which has been 
intensively studied over the last 30 years, metonymy has received only moderate 
attention, and mainly so in the cognitive linguistics tradition (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Panther and Radden 1999; Barcelona 2000b; 
Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Taylor 1989/2003; Dirven and Pörings 2003), which 
analyses linguistic metonymies as reflections of underlying cognitive structures, in the 
form of ‘metonymic conceptual mappings’ (e.g. PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (2), FACE FOR 
PERSON (3)). I come back to these approaches in section 6.2.2. 
In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in the phenomenon 
from the point of view of philosophy of language and pragmatics. The recognition that 
metonymy cannot be analysed along traditional Gricean lines ([1967] 1989), as 
involving implicatures derived on the basis of the hearer having ‘said’ something 
patently absurd/false (e.g. in (1) above, that the object made of bread and ham is getting 
impatient), has led to several proposals for how metonymy can be accommodated at the 
truth-conditional level, hence within a compositional semantics (Sag 1981; Stallard 
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1993; Pustejovsky 1995a; Stern 2000, 2006; Stanley 2005).159 The challenge for more 
cognitively or pragmatically oriented approaches to metonymy (Nunberg 1978, 1979, 
1996, 2004; Fauconnier 1994 [1985]; Papafragou 1996; Recanati 1995, 2004; Ward 2004; 
Evans 2009), which are less concerned with the problems metonymy raises for semantic 
compositionality, is to explain the nature of the pragmatic process that leads to 
metonymic interpretations. Central questions are: What are the circumstances under 
which a speaker may take an expression a which refers to A and use it to successfully 
refer to B? What are the constraints on the possible relations between A and B? What is 
the cognitive and communicative motivation for using a metonymic expression, instead 
of a literal expression with a similar meaning? 
Most accounts distinguish between metonymy and metaphor. Traditionally, 
metonymy has been conceived of in terms of real-world contiguity relations (e.g. 
between ham sandwiches and their orderers), while metaphor has been taken to involve 
a resemblance relation between two entities (e.g. ‘Jane is (like a) princess’) (see e.g. 
Ullmann 1962). In the cognitive linguistics tradition, it is common to distinguish 
metonymy and metaphor in terms of mapping relations occurring within a single 
domain (metonymy) and across domain boundaries (metaphor). Some accounts, 
however, do not make the distinction; for instance, Nunberg (1996, 2004), treats both 
metonymy and metaphor as outcomes of a single process of ‘meaning transfer’. I return 
to this issue under section 6.2. 
The connection between metonymy and polysemy has long been recognised (e.g. 
Apresjan 1974; Lakoff 1987; Taylor 1989/2003; Pustejovsky 1995a; Nunberg 1978, 1979, 
1996, 2004; Bartsch 2002; Seto 2003). Apresjan (1974: 16) distinguished between 
‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ polysemy, and claimed that being metonymically motivated was 
                                                      
159 Unlike metaphor, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, is still quite commonly analysed as involving a 
blatant violation (a flouting) of the maxim of Quality which triggers the search for a related implicature 
(although the view that it contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance continues to gain 
support), philosophers of language and pragmatists now widely agree that metonymy is a local process 
that does not presuppose the prior identification of a proposition serving as input to the interpretive 
process. A possible exception may be Bach, who, according to Recanati (1993: 265) claims that “the 
absurdity of the ‘literal’ interpretation is what triggers the transfer from ham sandwich orderer”. See Bach 
(1994) for discussion. However, if metonymy contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance 
(i.e. to its truth-conditional content) it violates semantic compositionality, that is, the principle that the 
meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent parts, which is seen by 
many philosophers as the main problem in connection with metonymy.  
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a distinctive feature of the former, while the latter was typically metaphorically 
motivated. He described the polysemy of a word a with the senses Ai and Aj as being 
‘regular’ if, in a given language, there exists at least one word b with the polysemous 
senses Bi and Bj, being semantically distinguished in exactly the same way as Ai and Aj (cf. 
Chapter 5). The polysemy of a word a was called ‘irregular’ if the semantic distinction 
between Ai and Aj was not exhibited by any other word in the language. The connection 
between metonymy and ‘regular’ polysemy on the one hand, and metaphor and 
‘irregular’ polysemy on the other, arguably has some intuitive appeal. Recall from the 
previous chapter that many systematic sense alternations (such as ‘fruit for tree’, 
‘publication for publisher’, etc.) appeared to involve metonymic relations between the 
encoded and the communicated concepts.160 These obviously differ from poetic 
metaphors, which are usually one-off and thus clearly ‘irregular’ in Apresjan’s sense, but 
they also differ from ‘everyday’ metaphors (e.g. ‘Bill is a bulldozer’, ‘The critics 
slaughtered her new book’), which, although often conventional, cannot be said to 
involve any kind of ‘regularity’ in the above sense. However, there are numerous cases 
of so-called creative metonymy that are not obviously ‘regular’ either, as shown by the 
examples in (3), (4) and (5) above. Moreover, there are instances of metaphor, which, if 
not ‘regular’, appear to be at least semi-productive, such as for instance the metaphorical 
use of an animal denoting noun to describe some particular human characteristic (e.g. 
‘Peter is a lion/chicken/pig’), or metaphorical uses of (human) body parts to describe 
analogous parts of an inanimate objects (e.g. foot of a mountain/tree/table, mouth of a 
bottle/river/cave).161 Furthermore, if the cognitive linguistic accounts (e.g. Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980 and many others) are right about the existence of metaphorical 
conceptual schemes (e.g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES ARE PHYSICAL 
FORCES, etc., cf. Chapter 5), then there should in fact be a considerable amount of 
regularity in metaphorical use of language. 
                                                      
160 These gave rise to examples such as the following: ‘Joan and Jill have a cherry in their garden’, ‘The 
newspaper sacked its editor-in-chief’, etc. 
161 In fact, the apparent ‘productivity’ of the extension from animals to human characteristics has led 
some computational semanticists (e.g. Copestake and Briscoe 1996: 37) to suggest that, in addition to the 
pragmatic factors that clearly play a role in this process, there is a “core component to such processes 
which should be expressed in terms of a sense extension rule”. Although it should be clear from the 
previous chapter that I am sceptical about the feasibility of such an approach, I agree that there is a sense 
in which these metaphorical uses are different from more poetic metaphors as concerns their 
predictability in English (and probably also in a range of other languages). 
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In previous chapters, I have argued that polysemy arises as a result of a 
pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction, which operates at the level of 
individual words and whose outcomes are concepts with either a narrower or a broader 
denotation than those linguistically-encoded. As we have seen, relevance theory takes 
utterance comprehension, including the construction of ad hoc concepts, to be a wholly 
inferential process, with a unitary, on-line pragmatic processing system which derives 
explicit content (‘what is said’) and conversational implicatures in parallel, driven by the 
hearer’s search for an interpretation that meets his expectations of relevance. This often 
involves a process of ‘mutual adjustment’, where a hypothesis about an implicature may 
both precede and shape a hypothesis about an explicature. The process of mutual 
adjustment is, as we saw, a crucial component of the relevance-theoretic account of 
lexical interpretation (Carston 2002b, 2010; Wilson and Sperber 2002; Wilson and 
Carston 2006, 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008). As already mentioned, my aim in this 
chapter is to suggest an account of metonymy that brings it within the scope of this 
inferential theory of utterance comprehension. Most accounts of the comprehension of 
metonymy take it to proceed through some kind of associative (i.e. non-inferential) 
relation between the encoded concept and the speaker-intended concept, in the form of 
‘pragmatic functions’ (Nunberg 1978, 1979; Fauconnier 1994 [1985]; Ward 2004), 
‘domain mappings’ (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Croft 1993; Gibbs 1994; Radden and 
Kövecses 1999), ‘meaning transfer’ (Nunberg 1996, 2004), or ‘schema activation’ 
(Recanati 1995, 2004). To my knowledge, apart from Papafragou’s (1996) early 
relevance-theoretic account, there have been no attempts to investigate the extent to 
which the comprehension of metonymy may be explained inferentially, that is, as 
dependent on a non-demonstrative inferential process of constructing and confirming 
hypotheses about intended speaker meanings. As will be discussed in section 6.3 of this 
chapter, metonymy represents a challenge to such inferential accounts, since it appears 
to rely on arbitrary (i.e. associative) rather than inferential relations between linguistic 
meanings and communicated meanings, but the possibility of an inferential account is 
well worth investigating since it would provide both a more constrained account of how 
metonymy works and a more unified account of pragmatic processes overall.  
With this as my overall goal, the relevance-theoretic analysis of metonymy will 
be divided into three parts. I will start by discussing Papafragou’s (1996) formulation of 
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a preliminary account of metonymy in terms of metarepresentational (interpretive) use 
of language, in section 6.3.2. Then, I will suggest two possible ways in which a relevance-
theoretic account of metonymy may proceed: In section 6.3.3, I sketch an account of 
metonymic interpretations as being derived by means of the process of ad hoc concept 
construction. In section, 6.3.4, I suggest a different account that builds on Papafragou’s 
preliminary work, in which metonymy is treated as a form of creative naming, closely 
related to ‘nicknaming’, where a salient property of an individual is used to create a new 
name. The two accounts are compared, and their respective advantages and 
shortcomings discussed. However, before I turn to the relevance-theoretic account, I 
will look briefly at two other influential lines of approach to metonymy. The first 
analyses metonymy as an instance of (pragmatic) function application and dates back to 
Nunberg (1978, 1979), the second includes the wide range of approaches that have 
followed in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) original formulation of the 
conceptual metaphor theory. 
6.2 Previous approaches to metonymy 
6.2.1 Metonymy as pragmatic function application 
In a widely influential approach, Nunberg (1978, 1979) analysed metonymy as a 
subvariety of ‘deferred reference’, that is, as an instance of a more general process 
according to which a speaker may point at, name or describe some thing A with the 
intention to refer to some thing B. Consider (6)-(9): 
(6) He [pointing at a large footprint in the sand] must be a giant. 
(7) Murdoch has owned that [pointing at a copy of The Sun] since 1969. 
(8) The newspaper sacked its editor-in-chief. 
(9) The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
The idea is that each of the italicised expressions in (6)-(9) is interpreted via a referring 
function, which is “that function that the hearer (correctly) selects from among an 
infinitely large number of functions that take the demonstratum as arguments” 
(Nunberg 1979: 156), for instance, ‘A was made by B’ in (6), ‘A is published by B’ in (7) 
and (8), ‘A was ordered by B’ in (9). The correct referring function is chosen by a hearer 
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on the basis of its ‘cue-validity’, described as “the probability with which a given referent 
b can be identified as being in the value of a certain function f at a demonstratum a”, in 
more general terms, “the relative usefulness of a given description for purposes of 
identification” (ibid 160). Other things being equal, the hearer can take a rational 
speaker to have intended him to select the function that has the highest cue-validity for 
its referent, that is, the one that allows him most easily to identify the referent in terms 
of its relation to the demonstratum (which may well be its encoded meaning, as in e.g. 
‘The ham sandwich is being eaten’), in which case the correct function is the identity 
function. Which function has the highest cue-validity on a given occasion depends, of 
course, on a range of pragmatic factors. For instance, in (7) above, the high cue-validity 
of the function ‘A is published by B’ stems from encyclopaedic knowledge about 
newspapers; we know that there are companies that publish them and that these are 
owned by powerful individuals among whom Rupert Murdoch, the subject of the 
utterance, is one of the best known. In (9), uttered in the context of a restaurant, the 
function that maps food items into customers has a high cue-validity against the set of 
contextual assumptions shared by the waiters; the link between customers and their 
food orders provides an efficient means of referent identification. 
The idea that metonymy is generated by the application of pragmatic functions 
also shows up in the early work of Fauconnier (1994 [1985], in whose framework, 
pragmatic functions are called 'connectors'), and in Sag (1981), who outlines a formal 
semantic account geared at accommodating the context-dependency of metonymy in a 
strict compositional semantics. In Sag’s view, a formal semantic account is the only 
viable alternative to a Gricean treatment of metonymy as post-semantic inferences from 
absurdities, which, as he rightly observes, fails. We don’t seem to first compute the 
absurd ‘literal’ interpretation and then infer the metonymic meaning; rather, metonymy 
appears to be a local process, which does not presuppose the prior identification of a 
proposition serving as its input. If this is right, Sag argues, there would be no input for 
the Gricean inferential system to operate on the interpretation of metonymy.162 Sag’s 
                                                      
162 However, a more modern kind of Gricean account (e.g. Bach 1994; Levinson 2000) may grant that 
metonymy contributes to ‘what is said’ but still claim that the absurd strict-and-literal interpretation is 
entertained en route to the metonymic interpretation.  
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proposal is to introduce a sense transfer function into the logical language (L),163 which 
allows for a common noun (e.g. ham sandwich) to translate into L as a predicate (e.g. as 
denoting ‘ham sandwich customer’). This preserves semantic compositionality; once the 
denotation of the transferred sense is fixed, the compositional semantic process 
proceeds as usual. In (7) above, for instance, it would be the expression ham sandwich 
that has a shifted denotation, while the determiner the plays its normal semantic role. 
Sag emphasises that by itself, this procedure is almost entirely unconstrained and must 
therefore be paired with a pragmatic theory that places (perhaps drastic) constraints on 
which sense transfers are possible. 
In practice, then, Sag’s proposal leaves the interpretive work entirely up to 
pragmatics. For this reason, its ability to explain what is going on in metonymy beyond 
the application of sense transfer functions is limited (e.g. what triggers their 
application?, what are the contextual factors that license them?, where do they come 
from?, and so on). It seems then that this account could be viewed as an early version of 
a truth-conditional pragmatic approach but with all the crucial detail of how it could 
work missing.164 However, the idea that metonymy involves a kind of sense transfer 
rather than deferred reference was significant and has been taken over into recent 
treatments by Nunberg (1996, 2004). Consider: 
(10) I am parked out back. 
(11) The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
 Nunberg now treats examples such as (10) and (11) as instances of a more general 
process of meaning transfer, where “the name of a property that applies to something in 
one domain can sometimes be used as the name of a property in another domain, 
provided the two properties correspond in a certain way” (1996: 111).165 On this 
                                                      
163 Natural language sentences are translated into this logical language L, which captures their semantics. 
164 However, Sag himself did not consider the possibility of developing a ‘truth-conditional pragmatic’ 
account (cf. Recanati 1993). This is the approach favoured by contemporary pragmatic frameworks 
(Recanati 1993, 1995, 2004; Romero and Soria 2005, 2010), including relevance theory (Papafragou 1996; 
Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston 2010), as well as the approach taken here. 
165 This process is taken to apply to a whole range of ‘figurative’ uses of language, including metaphor, 
synaesthesia, synecdoche and metonymy. A consequence of this account is that it blurs the distinction 
between metaphor and metonymy, which are both derived according to the same process. As Nunberg 
(1996: 113) puts it, “metaphors and metonymy aren’t different types of transfer, they’re different 
conditions that can support a functional relation between properties”. 
  
 
208 
analysis, the subject of the sentence in (10) (which, according to Nunberg, we tend to 
think of as the target of the metonymy, that is, as denoting the car and not the speaker), 
is used in its conventional sense to refer to the speaker, while it is the predicate parked 
out back that has a transferred meaning, contributing a property of persons, “the 
property they possess in virtue of the locations of their cars” (ibid.). In support of this 
analysis, he provides the following examples:  
(12) a. I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes. 
b. ?I am parked out back and may not start.  
(13) We are parked out back. 
The examples in (12) are taken to show that a predicate conjoined to the sentence 
uttered in (10) may well describe the speaker, as in (12)a., but not so easily the car, as 
illustrated by (12)b., suggesting that the appropriate referent of I in these cases is the 
speaker, and not the car (and thus that the predicate parked out back has a transferred 
meaning).166 Similarly, a speaker would not utter (13) in a case where she has several 
cars parked out back.  
As concerns (11), Nunberg argues, contrary to his previous analysis, that the 
transfer applies to the noun ham sandwich and not to the entire NP (the referentially 
used definite description), and so “this is a case of meaning transfer, rather than 
reference transfer” (1996: 115). In support of this analysis, he provides examples such as 
the following,  
(14) That (*those) french fries is (*are) getting impatient. 
(15) The three ham sandwiches in the corner has (*have) asked for his bill. 
In (14), where the expression ham sandwich has been replaced by the plural french fries 
(denoting ‘french fries customer’) the demonstrative pronoun agrees with the number 
                                                      
166 A similar example (originally discussed by Jackendoff 1992a) in support of the predicate transfer 
analysis involves the use of a reflexive pronoun (Nunberg 2004: 357):  
(i) Ringo squeezed himself into a tight space. 
Instead of taking the subject to refer to a person and the reflexive to refer to a car (and thus facing the 
problem of explaining that the reflexive is not coreferential with the subject in this case), Nunberg treats 
them both as referring to a person, and the predicate squeeze x into a tight space as having a transferred 
meaning, “denoting the relation that people enter into in virtue of the maneuvers they perform with their 
cars” (ibid. 358). 
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of the transferred meaning and not with the number that is linguistically-encoded, 
suggesting that it is the expression french fries (and not the whole NP) that has a 
transferred meaning. Similarly, in (15), where ‘three ham sandwiches’ refers to a single 
male customer, the verb and the possessive agree with the transferred meaning and not 
with the linguistically-encoded plural of the NP. 
Nunberg’s meaning transfer account is quite a radical move from his previous 
account of metonymy in terms of deferred reference. First, the transfer is now taken to 
operate on the linguistic meaning of the expression thereby changing its denotation 
rather than being a case of a direct function on denotations. Nunberg (1996: 115) points 
out that an implication of the early analysis of cases like (11) (as a subtype of the more 
general phenomenon of deferred reference) was that the actual ham sandwich figured in 
the interpretation process. This point is perhaps best illustrated by cases of deferred 
indexical reference, as in (7), repeated as (16) below:  
(16) That [pointing at a copy of The Sun] is owned by Rupert Murdoch. 
In this case, the object of ostension (i.e. the copy of The Sun) provides the input to the 
referring function which yields the interpretation of that as referring to the company 
that publishes The Sun. Similarly, on the analysis of (11) as an instance of deferred 
reference, it is the actual ham sandwich that provides the input to the referring function 
which returns the customer as its output. On the current analysis of (11), however, the 
transfer operates from the linguistic meaning of ham sandwich to the contextual 
meaning ‘ham sandwich customer’, which then allows for the NP The ham sandwich to 
pick out the individual who has the property of being the ham sandwich customer. 
Second, meaning transfer is seen as a ‘linguistic’ process (presumably specified within 
the language faculty) with pragmatic constraints on its application, rather than an 
entirely pragmatic process, as was previously assumed.  
In my view, Nunberg is probably right in distinguishing between deferred 
reference (cf. (6) and (7) above), involving the use of a demonstrative or indexical, and 
‘meaning transfers’ that target the linguistic meaning of expressions to yield either a 
transferred meaning for a predicate, as in (10), or for a common noun, as in (11). 
Although the deferred cases and the meaning transfers may ultimately turn out to be 
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manifestations of a single cognitive mechanism (operating in the first type of case on a 
representation of the object referred to by the demonstrative or indexical, and in the 
latter case on the representation linguistically-encoded by the common noun or 
predicate), my focus in this chapter will be on the cases that Nunberg treats as ‘meaning 
transfers’, these being the ones from which polysemy may arise. On the other hand, I do 
not think there is sufficient evidence to warrant Nunberg’s claim that meaning transfer 
is a linguistic process. Recall that examples such as (14) and (15), where the metonymies 
appear to render the number clashes felicitous, are taken to show that the transfer 
applies to the meaning of the common nouns rather than to the reference of the whole 
NPs, and that we have to do with a linguistic (albeit pragmatically constrained) process. 
However, as Ward (2004: 268) shows, this cannot be the whole story, as on Nunberg’s 
account, (17)a. should be felicitous if the meaning transfer applies to the plural noun 
sunglasses:  
(17) a. *I wouldn’t mind going out with that sunglasses at Table 7. 
b. I wouldn’t mind going out with the sunglasses at Table 7. 
In this case, contrary to Nunberg’s predictions, it appears to be the number clash 
between the grammatically plural noun and the singular demonstrative determiner that 
renders the metonymy infelicitous, and that the absence of such a clash renders (17)b. 
felicitous. Thus, as Ward points out, it may be that the felicity of examples such as (14) 
and (15) is more likely to depend on “specific principles of English morphosyntax”, (as, 
in fact, Nunberg himself concedes (1996: 115)), than on the process of meaning 
transfer.167  
However, regardless of whether metonymy is treated as a kind of deferred 
reference or a meaning transfer (or as a more general process of pragmatic mapping, as 
Ward (2004) claims), the challenge for this type of account is to explain how the process 
that associates objects and properties in metonymic interpretations is constrained. I will 
end this section with a brief consideration of Nunberg’s (1996, 2004) recent suggestion 
                                                      
167 It should be noted that Ward’s (2004) main concern is to provide evidence against Nunberg’s claim 
that cases such as (11) involve a transfer of the meaning of the common noun rather than a deferred 
reference for the whole NP. I remain neutral on this issue here, but I will return to the question of 
whether metonymy involves actual ‘meaning transfer’ or just reference substitution in section 6.3. 
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of ‘noteworthiness’ as a pragmatic condition on meaning transfer. This criterion states 
that a “transfer is only possible when the property contributed by the new predicate is 
‘noteworthy’, which is to say one that is useful for classifying or identifying its bearer 
relative to the conversational interests” (2004: 349; see Clark and Clark 1979 for a 
similar view). Although the criterion is intuitively correct (for instance, the property of 
being a ham sandwich orderer in (11) above is clearly noteworthy in the sense that it is 
useful for the identification of the referent; indeed, all instances of successful referential 
metonymies will satisfy the noteworthiness criterion in this way), it is not particularly 
explanatory. What makes a property ‘noteworthy’ in the first place, that is, what is 
required for a property to be useful for the identification of a referent? And why do we 
find it ‘useful’ to refer to someone or something via a ‘noteworthy’ property instead of 
via a more literal encoding? These are, in my view, the questions that a pragmatic 
account of metonymy has to answer. As to Nunberg’s noteworthiness criterion, it is, as 
it stands, too vague and needs to be developed further in order to provide a proper 
explanation of what constrains metonymic uses of expressions. I return to this issue in 
section 6.3. My claim will be that being ‘noteworthy’ (i.e. useful for the classification or 
identification of a referent) is only one of the ways in which a metonymic expression 
may achieve relevance.  
6.2.2 Cognitive linguistic approaches to metonymy 
Cognitive linguistic accounts of metonymy build on the assumption, implicit in the 
accounts discussed in the previous section, that cultural/experiential factors license 
associations between different entities, and that such associations form the basis for 
metonymy in natural language. However, where Nunberg, Fauconnier, Sag and Ward 
left open the question of what the cognitive basis for such associations might be 
(whether in the form of ‘referring functions’, ‘connectors’ ‘sense transfer functions’, 
‘meaning transfers’ or ‘pragmatic mappings’) , cognitive linguists make a precise claim 
about their source: metonymic associations are one of the principles by which our 
knowledge is structured (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987 and many others). 
A central claim of mainstream cognitive linguistics is that tropes like metaphor 
and metonymy, rather than being ‘figures of speech’ (that is, purely linguistic/rhetorical 
devices) understood by contrast to ‘literal’ expressions, are ‘figures of thought’ (Gibbs 
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1994, 1999) which structure how we conceptualise the world around us (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). Lakoff and Johnson claim that our conceptual system is structured in 
terms of conceptual metaphors such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, HAPPY IS 
UP, and so on. In addition, they claim, the conceptual system contains metonymic 
concepts, as illustrated by (18)-(22): 
(18) PART FOR WHOLE 
We need some new faces in this organisation. 
(19) PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT 
Susan is reading another Woolf. 
(20) OBJECT USED FOR USER 
The violin is in a bad mood today. 
(21) INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE 
In 1773, the Parliament passed the Tea Act. 
(22) PLACE FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE 
Oslo is hosting the 2011 Nordic World Ski Championships. 
Thus, the use of metonymic expressions in language is seen as reflecting underlying 
conceptual metonymies. However, metaphor and metonymy are seen as different kinds 
of processes: While metaphor involves conceiving one thing in terms of another, and is 
analysed as a mapping from a source domain to a target domain (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Turner 1989), metonymy is the process 
whereby one entity is used to stand for another, and is seen as relating a vehicle and a 
target concept within a single domain or domain matrix (Lakoff and Turner 1989; 
Goossens 1990; Croft 1993; Taylor 1989/2003; Gibbs 1994; Kövecses and Radden 1998; 
Radden and Kövecses 1999). As concerns their communicative functions, referential 
metonymy is generally seen as providing an efficient (effort-saving) route to the 
intended referent (e.g. Langacker 1993), and metaphor as a means to “provide 
understanding” (cf. Chapter 5, Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987). 
An approach that has been foundational to much of the research on metonymy 
within the cognitive linguistics paradigm is Lakoff’s (1987) theory of knowledge 
organisation in terms of Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs). An ICM is viewed as a 
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relatively stable mental structure that represents an individual’s knowledge and beliefs 
about a particular domain of experience, and guides categorisation and reasoning 
relative to that domain.168 For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, Lakoff (1987: 70) 
suggests that the concept BACHELOR is defined against an ICM “in which there is a 
human society with (typically monogamous) marriage and a typical marriageable age”. 
This allows us to judge whether someone is a typical or less typical representative of the 
category BACHELOR (e.g. that a single heterosexual man in his 20’s is a typical bachelor 
while the Pope isn’t). Lakoff sees metonymy as an important source of such typicality 
effects. As an example, he discusses the stereotype of a housewife mother, which defines 
an (old-fashioned) cultural expectation about what a mother is supposed to be like. 
Lakoff sees social stereotypes of this sort as cases of metonymy; in this case the 
‘metonymic ICM’ HOUSEWIFE-MOTHER is used to ‘stand for’ or represent the category 
MOTHER as a whole.169 Importantly, this is all seen as taking place at the level of thought; 
the metonymic model exists independently of any natural language encoding. 
Croft (1993) takes a somewhat different approach and suggests that metonymy 
functions by highlighting one domain within a domain matrix (cf. Langacker 1987). 
Following Langacker, Croft takes the concept encoded by a word to be structured in 
terms of multiple domains, called the domain matrix of that concept. Consider (23): 
(23) a. Woolf committed suicide at the age of 59. 
b. Woolf is difficult to read. 
According to Croft, the concept WOOLF is defined against a domain matrix containing, 
inter alia, the domain of persons and the domain of creative activity. The ‘primary 
domain’ of a concept is that which defines its most central aspects; in the case of WOOLF 
this would arguably be the domain of persons. This accounts for the ‘literal’ use of Woolf 
in (23)a. In the metonymic use of Woolf in (23)b., Croft sees the shift of reference from 
the person to her work to be paralleled by a shift of domain within the domain matrix 
                                                      
168 An ICM is idealised in the sense that it is an abstraction over a range of experiences, and does not 
include knowledge about all possible real-world situations pertaining to its domain. 
169 Thus, Lakoff is working with a much broader and quite different notion of metonymy than the other 
accounts discussed to far. According to the definition of metonymy provided at the beginning of this 
chapter, the housewife stereotype would not count as an instance of metonymy, as it does not seem to 
involve an associative relation between disjoint sets (rather, it denotes a subset of the denotation of the 
concept MOTHER, i.e. it could be seen as an instance of narrowing). 
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for the concept, that is, from the domain of persons to the domain of creative activity. 
This, Croft argues, can be seen as a kind of ‘domain highlighting’, “since the metonymy 
makes primary a domain that is secondary in the literal meaning” (1993: 179).170  
Radden and Kövecses (1999), following Langacker’s (1993, 1999) claim about 
metonymy as a ‘reference point phenomenon’ (i.e. as a product of our “ability to invoke 
the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another” 
(1993: 5)), see metonymy as a mechanism for providing mental access to a desired target 
via another conceptual entity. They combine this view with Lakoff’s notion of ICMs in 
the following definition of metonymy:  
Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, 
provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same 
idealized cognitive model. (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 21) 
On this view, a metonymy provides a route of access to a particular target within a single 
domain. For instance, within the ‘Production ICM’, there is a metonymic relationship 
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (of which the metonymy ARTIST FOR OEUVRE is a subtype), 
which allows for the vehicle Woolf to provide access to the literary works of Virginia 
Woolf in (23)b.  
The work of Radden and Kövecses is descriptively interesting. They provide a 
‘typology’ of metonymy producing relationships (1999: 29-44) where these are described 
as occurring within specific ICMs (e.g. within the ‘Location ICM’ we find metonymies 
such as PLACE FOR INHABITANTS, PLACE FOR INSTITUTION, etc.). Furthermore, they 
describe a number of cognitive salience principles (e.g. HUMAN OVER NON-HUMAN, 
SUBJECTIVE OVER OBJECTIVE, etc.) that they take to govern the choice of metonymic 
vehicle (i.e. the particular access route), and which lead to ‘natural’ or ‘default’ cases of 
metonymy. In general, they suggest, the more such cognitive principles apply, the 
greater the cognitive motivation of a metonymy. Although producing a typology of 
various metonymy-producing relationships is clearly useful and an interesting goal in 
                                                      
170 It is unclear to me if Croft means by this that proper names such as Woolf have all this information as 
part of their literal meaning. As a word, Woolf is just a name that can be used for anything or anyone. 
Croft seems to assume that in this particular case, the name gives immediate access to the individual 
concept in our minds of the author to whom this proper name is linked, which seems right, but he needs 
to explain how we make this link from among the many other possible individuals that this name may be 
linked to (e.g. the man Leonard Woolf, my pet spaniel Woolf, etc.). 
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itself, it provides perhaps more by way of description than of explanation of what is 
going on in metonymy comprehension. As to the cognitive salience principles, they may 
well be able to explain why we choose one metonymic vehicle over another, but they 
cannot be taken to provide a motivation for speakers’ use of metonymy, as in most cases 
of metonymic use, there is an obvious and readily available paraphrase (e.g. ‘The novels 
of Woolf’, ‘The ham sandwich orderer’, etc.). I return to this issue in section 6.3, where I 
argue that an important factor motivating metonymic use is the reduction of processing 
effort it may involve. 
There is no doubt that cognitive linguistic approaches to metonymy provide 
illuminating and insightful analyses of a range of natural language metonymies, and 
shed light on the role of association in human conceptualisation. Indeed, some of the 
cognitive linguistic perspectives on metonymy may prove complementary to a 
relevance-theoretic analysis. Recently, there have been some suggestions of how the 
cognitive linguistic and relevance-theoretic approaches to metaphor may be combined, 
despite some fundamental differences between the two theoretical frameworks (Gibbs 
and Tendahl 2006; Tendahl and Gibbs 2008; Wilson 2009). In section 6.3, I will suggest 
that combining them may also prove fruitful in an account of metonymy, in particular 
with regard to the more ‘regular’ cases.  
However, as I see it, the cognitive linguistic approaches as described above 
equally have some shortcomings. The first concerns the fact that the distinction between 
metonymy and metaphor in most accounts rests on the notion of a cognitive domain or 
an ‘ICM’ (where, as we have seen, metonymy occurs within a single domain or ICM and 
metaphor between distinct domains), neither of which is well defined. How one decides 
to delineate a domain or ICM would therefore be crucial for the classification of a use as 
a metonymy or a metaphor.171 Second, as Papafragou (1996: 176) notes, the analysis of 
metonymy in terms of pre-existing cognitive structures disregards its connection to the 
outside world, and the fact that most ‘creative’ cases of metonymy involve a novel 
conceptualisation of an external entity, rather than an activation of a pre-existing 
                                                      
171 Also within the cognitive linguistics paradigm, the definition of metonymy as intra-domain mappings 
is subject to criticism. See for instance Haser ( 2005: 36ff. ) and Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) for 
discussions of the problem and suggestions for a solution to it, and Croft (2006) for a defence of the 
domain mapping account. 
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metonymic concept. Third, cognitive linguistic accounts generally pay little attention to 
the pragmatic aspects of metonymy, that is, why we use it and how metonymic 
interpretations are derived in verbal communication. As the reader will know, these are 
fundamental issues in the relevance-theoretic account, to which I will turn shortly. 
Before I do this, however, I would like to look in some detail at a recent approach to 
metonymy from the point of view of cognitive linguistics, proposed by Evans (2009), 
who addresses the issue of how metonymy (and tropes more generally) may be 
understood in language. 
Evans’s approach, termed the Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models theory 
(the LCCM theory), stands out among the cognitive linguistic approaches by virtue of 
(i) its distinction between linguistically-encoded content in the form of ‘lexical 
concepts’, and encyclopaedic knowledge in the form of ‘cognitive model profiles’ to 
which lexical concepts afford access, and (ii) its proposal for an account of the semantic 
composition process, or ‘linguistically mediated meaning construction’, that is, of the 
selection of contextually appropriate lexical concepts and the integration of these in an 
overall interpretation of an utterance. In LCCM theory, linguistic forms encode lexical 
concepts, the contents of which are highly schematic (abstracted from across usage 
events). These provide access to a range of cognitive models, or ‘cognitive model 
profiles’, described as ‘coherent bodies of multimodal knowledge of any kind’ (cf. 
Lakoff’s ICMs, Langacker’s and Croft’s domain matrices). The cognitive model profile 
of a lexical concept is seen as its ‘semantic potential’, and consists of a set of ‘primary’ 
and ‘secondary cognitive models’. The primary cognitive models for a lexical concept 
are those with which it is directly associated; that is, the association areas that constitute 
its ‘access site’, while the secondary cognitive models are indirectly associated via 
connections with the primary ones. Although these are not directly associated with the 
lexical concept, they form part of its semantic potential by being linked to its access site 
(ibid. 207). As an illustration, consider the linguistic form France (ibid. 76-81). In 
LCCM theory France encodes the lexical concept [FRANCE]. The primary cognitive 
model profile for this lexical concept consists of (at the very least) the cognitive models 
GEOGRAPHICAL LANDMASS, NATION STATE, and HOLIDAY DESTINATION, relating to 
knowledge about the specific geographical region known as France (as reflected in, e.g., 
an utterance of ‘France is hexagonal’), the nation state France (e.g. ‘France is an 
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important member of the EU’), and about France as a holiday destination (e.g. ‘We’re 
doing France this year’). These cognitive models provide the access site for the lexical 
concept [FRANCE]. In addition, each of them provides access to further cognitive models, 
constituting the secondary cognitive model profile for the lexical concept, as a result of 
chaining within the conceptual system. These secondary models may include NATIONAL 
SPORTS, POLITICAL SYSTEM, CUISINE (all of which are chained to the primary cognitive 
model NATION STATE), and which may themselves be chained to further secondary 
cognitive models (e.g. POLITICAL SYSTEM giving access to ELECTORATE, HEAD OF STATE, 
etc.), as well as many others (see Evans 2009: 207-209 for more detail).  
The focus of the LCCM theory account of figurative language (metonymy and 
metaphor) differs from that of most cognitive linguistic approaches; rather than being 
concerned solely with the cognitive representations underlying metaphors and 
metonymies in natural language, it aims to provide a theory of the understanding of 
figurative language. Like relevance theorists, Evans assumes that literal and figurative 
meaning arises from a single process of meaning construction. What distinguishes a 
literal and a figurative use of an expression/utterance “relates to that part of the 
semantic potential which is activated during the process of interpretation during the 
construction of a conception [i.e. a meaning]” (Evans 2009: 285). Consider (24): 
(24) a. France is a country of 26 regions. 
b. France said it would send two planes with humanitarian aid to Haiti. 
The utterance in (24)a. contains a literal use of the expression France, which, given the 
cognitive domain profile for the lexical concept [FRANCE] as outlined above, could be 
analysed in LCCM theory as activating a cognitive model NATION STATE within the 
access site of the lexical concept. In (24)b., where the expression France is used 
metonymically to stand for the French government, the lexical concept [FRANCE] would 
activate a cognitive model in its secondary cognitive model profile HEAD OF STATE (the 
access route would thus proceed from NATION STATE via POLITICAL SYSTEM to HEAD OF 
STATE). The distinction between literal and figurative meaning thus amounts to whether 
a lexical concept activates a cognitive model in the primary cognitive model profile 
(which leads to a ‘literal’ interpretation) or in the secondary cognitive model profile 
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(which leads to a ‘figurative’ interpretation). As a rule, the greater the length of the 
access route, the more figurative the use of an expression is likely to feel.172 The 
utterance comprehension process proceeds in the following (simplified) way: First, the 
process of ‘lexical concept selection’ ensures that the most appropriate lexical concepts 
associated with each linguistic item in the utterance are selected, on the basis of 
(linguistic and extra-linguistic) context (i.e. ambiguity resolution). Then, the process of 
‘fusion’ (which involves two compositional processes working together) enables (a) 
‘lexical concept integration’, that is, the construction of larger linguistic entities, driven 
by lexical knowledge, and (b) ‘interpretation’, that is, a matching between the cognitive 
model profiles of the lexical concepts which have undergone lexical concept integration, 
which is constrained by several principles. Among the range of cognitive principles that 
the LCCM theory proposes as governing the interpretation phase of language 
understanding (Evans 2009: Ch. 13) is the ‘Principle of Conceptual Coherence’, which 
requires that a non-match between the cognitive model profiles of lexical concepts 
undergoing interpretation is avoided, and the ‘Principle of Ordered Search’, which 
ensures that primary cognitive models are the first to undergo matching, and that, if a 
search in secondary cognitive models is necessary, it proceeds in a coherent way (i.e. in 
order of ‘distance’ from the point of lexical access). In (24)a., the literal interpretation of 
France results from a match between a cognitive model in the primary cognitive model 
profile activated by the lexical concept [FRANCE] and the meaning that has been assigned 
to the predicate ‘a country of 26 regions’ through integration and interpretation. 
However, the metonymic use in (24) results from a clash between all the cognitive 
models in the primary cognitive model profile for [FRANCE] and the meaning assigned 
to its predicate ‘said it would send two planes with humanitarian aid to Haiti’. Due to 
the Principles of Conceptual Coherence and Ordered Search, this triggers a search for a 
match in the secondary cognitive model profile for the lexical concept, where a match is 
                                                      
172 It is not entirely clear to me how this distinction between primary and secondary cognitive models is 
made: What makes, for instance, the cognitive models HOLIDAY DESTINATION and GEOGRAPHICAL 
LANDMASS more ‘primary’ than e.g. CUISINE? Which models are primary and which are secondary are 
likely to vary between individuals and between groups of language users, with the possible consequence 
that people will differ in their judgements of whether an utterance is an instance of ‘figurative’ use or not 
(given that the activation of a cognitive model or models within the primary cognitive models profile of a 
lexical concept is claimed to give rise to ‘literal’ interpretations and the activation of a cognitive model 
within the secondary cognitive model profile to ‘figurative’ interpretations). 
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found with the HEAD OF STATE cognitive model. France thus has a figurative meaning in 
(24)b. The choice of lexical concept selected for clash resolution is, of course, 
contextually determined, as stated by the Principle of Context-Induced Clash 
Resolution (ibid. 293):  
(25) Principle of Context-induced Clash Resolution 
In cases where clash resolution is required, the lexical concept whose secondary 
cognitive model profile is searched to resolve the clash is determined by context. 
This is achieved by establishing a figurative target and a figurative vehicle, on the 
basis of context. The lexical concept that is established as the figurative vehicle is 
subject to clash resolution. 
In (24)b., the utterance context, i.e. the immediate aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, as 
well as the linguistic context, in particular, the use of the verb say, select the lexical 
concept encoded by France as the figurative vehicle, while the figurative target, ‘the 
political leaders of France’ is found in the secondary cognitive model profile for this 
concept. 
Evans (2009: Ch. 14) analyses metaphor in the same way – as an instance of 
context-induced clash resolution activating cognitive model(s) in the secondary 
cognitive model profile of a lexical concept. On the LCCM theory account, then, 
metaphor and metonymy are simply different outcomes of a single process of meaning 
construction. The distinction between metaphor and metonymy relates to whether or 
not the figurative target and the figurative vehicle exhibit ‘alignment’: In metonymy, as 
exemplified by (24)b., the figurative target and the figurative vehicle are accessed via the 
cognitive model profile associated with a single lexical concept ([FRANCE]); there is thus 
an ‘alignment’ of the target and the vehicle in a single cognitive model profile, and the 
clash resolution site corresponds to the access route for the figurative target. In 
metaphor, however, at least those of the form ‘X is a Y’ (which are the only ones 
discussed by Evans), the situation is different: Here, Evans takes X to correspond to the 
figurative target and Y to the figurative vehicle, which is also the clash resolution site. 
He discusses the example ‘My boss is a pussycat’ (‘docile’). On the LCCM theory 
approach, the figurative target is the lexical concept [BOSS], while the figurative vehicle is 
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the lexical concept [PUSSYCAT], and the clash resolution takes place in the secondary 
cognitive model profile of this concept. However, referential metaphors such as ‘The 
wilting violet has finally gone home’ appear to present a problem for this way of 
distinguishing metonymy and metaphor, as in Evans’s terminology the figurative 
vehicle (‘the wilting violet’) and the target (the person of whom this property is 
predicated), would exhibit alignment in such cases; thus, they should be analysed as 
metonymies.173 
The LCCM theory represents, in my view, a new and important contribution to 
the cognitive linguistics enterprise by addressing the interaction between linguistic 
knowledge, encyclopaedic knowledge and utterance context in the processing of 
utterances. In particular, within this paradigm, it provides a new perspective on the 
nature of linguistic knowledge, by positing a principled distinction between the 
semantic information encoded by the language and non-linguistic encyclopaedic 
information, a perspective which has a clear affinity with the relevance-theoretic 
distinction between linguistically-encoded content and non-linguistic encyclopaedic 
information stored in long-term memory. As already mentioned, the LCCM theory also 
stands out by providing an account of figurative language understanding (and not just of 
the underlying conceptual structures which are held to provide the basis for figurative 
language), in which encyclopaedic knowledge (or cognitive models in LCCM theory 
terms) associated with encoded concepts play a central role. As such, I think LCCM 
theory provides a both valuable and insightful approach, which is, in many ways, 
consonant with the pragmatic account of lexical adjustment that I have been pursuing in 
the previous chapters. However, focusing on its account of figurative language 
understanding, the LCCM theory raises some problematic questions that might be taken 
into account in the further development of the theory. The first question concerns the 
                                                      
173 Evans follows the common practice of taking the target or topic of metaphor/metonymy to be the 
literal element to which the figurative predicate applies, so in the metaphor ‘My boss us a pussycat’, 
being a PUSSYCAT* applies to the boss, and in a metonymy such as ‘The ham sandwich want his 
sandwich now’, the property of being [in such and such a relation with a ham sandwich] applies to the 
customer. A (somewhat confusing) consequence of this view is that the notion of target needs to be 
distinguished from the notion of communicated meaning: although in the case of metonymy the target and 
the meaning communicated by the metonymically used expression are the same, in metaphor the target is 
another constituent of the sentence, thus distinct from the communicated meaning of the metaphorically 
used expression (e.g. PUSSYCAT*).  
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assumption that figurative interpretations arise as a result of a lack of conceptual 
coherence (a clash) between two or more primary cognitive models. Barring the issue of 
what it means in more precise terms for two or more cognitive models to be 
semantically (in)coherent, it is unclear to me how figurative expressions that do not 
appear to involve a clash in cognitive models would be explained on the LCCM theory, 
as illustrated by the metaphors below: 
(26) a. Mary is no angel. 
b. Not all lawyers are sharks. 
Presumably, the utterances in (26) would be interpreted as ‘literal’ on the LCCM theory 
account, activating cognitive models in the primary cognitive model profiles of their 
constituents, as they cannot be said to involve semantic incoherence of any kind. But 
such an analysis would miss the intended meanings of the utterances; that Mary isn’t a 
person of exemplary conduct, and that not all lawyers are vicious, aggressive and 
tenacious.174 Similarly, utterances containing so-called regular metonymies are likely to 
be analysed as ‘literal’ on the LCCM theory account:  
(27) a. Woolf is difficult to read. 
b. The local church is liberal on same-sex marriage. 
In (27)a., it seems reasonable to assume that a cognitive model along the lines of 
AUTHOR would figure in the primary cognitive model profile for the lexical concept 
[WOOLF], that is, as being directly associated with it,175 and that a cognitive model, say, 
INSTITUTION, is directly associated with the lexical concept [CHURCH] in (27)b. In view 
of my previous comments regarding such cases (cf. Chapter 5), treating them as literal 
may well be the correct analysis, but it is one that does not capture the intuition that 
there is (somehow) something less literal about instances like (27), and clearly literal 
utterances such as ‘Woolf is a famous Modernist writer’, ‘The local church is two blocks 
away’. 
                                                      
174 In fact, this problem is similar to the well-known critique of the Gricean account of figurative language 
in terms of violations of the maxim of Quality (truthfulness); metaphorical utterances such as those in 
(26) are trivially true and involve no violation of any maxim of truthfulness (Wilson and Sperber 1981). 
175 This is, of course, hard to determine as long as we do not seem to have any precise criteria for 
distinguishing between primary and secondary cognitive models (cf. footnote 172). 
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The second question concerns the cognitive motivation for metonymy and 
metaphor in LCCM theory. As we have seen, previous cognitive linguistic accounts have 
claimed that metonymy and metaphor in language reflect underlying conceptual 
patterns and that their function is mainly to provide understanding (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980; Lakoff 1987). Of metonymy, it has been claimed that it serves the function of 
providing an efficient (effort-saving) route to the intended referent (Langacker 1993; 
Kövecses and Radden 1998; Radden and Kövecses 1999). In LCCM theory, however, 
both metonymy and metaphor seem to imply an increase in the effort of processing 
compared to ‘literal’ utterances. They arise by virtue of a clash between primary 
cognitive models and result in the activation of secondary cognitive models associated 
with the lexical concepts encoded by the figuratively used expressions; thus, their 
interpretation involves a longer ‘access route’ than ‘literal’ interpretations do. It is, of 
course, correct that many poetic metaphors often demand an extra effort of processing 
on the part of the hearer, but it is not entirely clear to me what would be gained by 
inducing a longer access route, as claimed in LCCM theory, compared with using a 
literal expression which activates the intended domain directly (i.e. whose primary 
cognitive model profile includes the cognitive model intended for activation). This point 
is perhaps clearest in the cases of referential metonymies of the ‘ham sandwich’ kind, 
whose use is usually seen as motivated by the quick and easy identification of a referent 
in a given utterance situation that they enable. If, in fact, these involve an extra effort of 
processing on the part of the hearer, it is at least not obvious what motivates such 
referential uses in LCCM theory.  
The third question concerns the fact that figurative language use is entirely a 
matter of association in LCCM theory. As we have seen, relevance theorists (Carston 
1997, 2002b; Vega-Moreno 2004, 2007; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007; Sperber and 
Wilson 2008) have provided convincing evidence that metaphorical interpretations are 
largely derived via inference, and often depend on a process of mutual adjustment 
where interpretive hypotheses about explicit and implicit content are computed in 
parallel. In the next section, I argue that metonymic interpretations also arise within, 
and are dependent on, this process of inferring intended speaker meanings. 
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6.3 A relevance-theoretic approach 
As we have seen, relevance theorists claim that utterance comprehension, including the 
process of ad hoc concept construction, is inherently inferential, in the sense that it 
depends on a spontaneous inference process that takes as its premises the encoded 
linguistic meaning (embedded in ‘The speaker has said that…’) together with highly 
accessible contextual assumptions, and yields conclusions in the form of hypotheses 
about speaker-intended meanings, a process which is guided and constrained by 
(occasion-specific) expectations of relevance. Most accounts of metonymy (indeed, all 
of the accounts discussed so far), however, are associative, that is, they take metonymic 
senses to arise as a result of the activation of associative links between the object or 
property linguistically denoted and the speaker-intended object or property. As 
evidenced by the approaches discussed in section 6.2 above, metonymy lends itself easily 
to an analysis in terms of association. That this is so is hardly surprising; any two 
concepts could in principle be associated with one another provided that the context 
licenses the association. The challenge for associative accounts is to explain not just how 
a given association occurs (which, as we have seem, can easily be done by reference to 
pragmatic function application, domain mapping/highlighting/activation), but why it is 
that a particular association is selected in a given context and not any of the other 
possible associations that are equally licensed by that same context. Thus, they have to 
be paired with pragmatic constraints that are able to drastically reduce the number of 
possible associations on a given occasion.  
6.3.1 Lexical pragmatic processes: associative or inferential? 
Relevance theorists have criticised associative accounts of lexical pragmatic processes 
for being too unconstrained (Wilson and Carston 2007: 252-253). The view is that an 
inferential account, if empirically adequate, would be considerably more constrained 
and therefore preferable on theoretical grounds.176 However, there is much that 
indicates that association plays an important role in many instances of metonymy, and 
                                                      
176 The argument goes as follows: While all inferential relations are also associations between 
(constituents of) premises and (constituents of) conclusions, not all associations are inferential (that is, 
evidentially grounded or warranted). If only those associations that are inferential are exploited in lexical 
adjustment, this would considerably constrain which adjustments are possible on a given occasion. 
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relevance theorists have expressed doubts about the possibility of analysing metonymy 
in entirely inferential terms (Wilson and Carston 2007; Carston 2010).  
The question whether metonymic interpretations are associatively or 
inferentially derived is part of a broader debate in pragmatics concerning the nature of 
the pragmatic processes that contribute to the explicit content of an utterance (what is 
said, the proposition expressed): are they purely associative (e.g. Recanati 1993, 1995, 
2004) or inferential (e.g. implemented by a dedicated pragmatic mechanism that derives 
the explicit and implicit content of utterances in parallel, by forwards and backwards 
inference, resulting in a logical argument, as maintained by relevance-theorists)? For 
instance, Recanati (1993, 2004) makes a distinction between primary and secondary 
pragmatic processes. Primary pragmatic processes are responsible for computing ‘what 
is said’ (in Recanati’s extended sense of the term) by an utterance, and include ‘bottom-
up’, linguistically mandated processes such as saturation (indexical resolution), as well 
as ‘top down’, optional processes such as free enrichment, loosening and semantic 
transfer (in relevance theory terms: free enrichment and ad hoc concept construction, 
where ‘semantic transfer’ is Recanati’s term for metonymy). These pragmatic processes 
are ‘pre-propositional’ (i.e. do not involve the prior computation of a proposition 
serving as input), unconscious (in the sense that normal “interpreters need not be aware 
of the context-independent meanings of the expressions used” (2004: 23), nor of making 
the associative links), and inherently associative. Recanati writes (2002a: 113-114), 
“primary pragmatic processes (…) need not involve an inference from premises 
concerning what the speaker can possibly intend by his utterance. Indeed, they need not 
involve any inference at all” (emphasis in original). Secondary pragmatic processes, 
however, responsible for the derivation of implicatures, are properly inferential in the 
Gricean sense of the term; they are reflective and ‘post-propositional’, that is, “they 
cannot take place unless some proposition p is considered as having been expressed” 
(2004: 23).177 Secondary pragmatic processes satisfy the ‘availability condition’, 
                                                      
177 Millikan (1984, 2005), however, maintains an entirely non-inferential theory that treats language 
understanding as a form of perception, including both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ pragmatic processes. 
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according to which interpreters must have conscious access to what is said, what is 
implied, and to the inferential relation between them.178 
The existence of ‘mutual adjustment’ is a central relevance-theoretic objection 
against Recanati’s distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic processes 
(Carston 2002a, 2007), as described above. Carston writes: 
[H]ow can these two quite distinct types of process (local, associative, 
unconscious, subpersonal, in the one case; global, inferential, consciously 
accessible, person-level in the other case) interact in such a way as to effect 
adjustments to each other’s content? Specifically, how can implicatures, whose 
derivation takes ‘what is said’ as its input, affect the content of ‘what is said’? 
(emphasis in original) (Carston 2007: 24-25).179  
The metonymy phenomenon is particularly interesting in the light of this controversy 
between Recanati and the relevance theorists. As we have seen, it is widely agreed that 
metonymy contributes to the explicit content of an utterance. Thus, Recanati counts it 
among his primary pragmatic processes. In relevance theory, the prediction is that 
metonymic meanings are derived as part of the overall process of inferring speaker 
meanings on the basis of linguistic input. However, while relevance theorists have 
successfully shown that most of the pragmatic processes that Recanati counts as 
‘primary’ can be described in inferential terms, and involve a process of mutual 
adjustment of explicit and implicit content (including narrowing, broadening, ‘free’ 
enrichment, as well as ‘linguistically mandated’ processes such as disambiguation and 
indexical reference resolution) (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002b), it is not 
clear, as noted above, how far metonymy can be analysed in inferential terms, and to 
what extent it may depend on a process of mutual adjustment of explicit and implicit 
content. 
                                                      
178 This does not mean, Recanati (2004: 50) argues, that the inferential process itself must be conscious; it 
is sufficient that “the subject herself has the reflective capacities for making the inference explicit”, i.e. that 
she is, on reflection, capable of rationally justifying her interpretation.  
179 In response to this objection, Recanati (2004: Chapter 3; 2007) maintains that mutual adjustment of 
explicit and implicit content is compatible with his approach, because “in the actual mental process of the 
interpreter, there is no step-by-step, linear reasoning leading from the premises to the conclusion. Still 
(…) the inferential link is grasped by the interpreter, who can, on reflection, make it explicit” (2004: 50). 
Thus, the priority of explicit content is seen as a logical, and not a temporal matter. Carston (2007: 25) 
argues that this leaves Recanati without an account of the on-line derivation of conversational 
implicatures, since his secondary pragmatic processes turn out not to account for how they are derived in 
actual communication but rather for how interpreters may rationally reconstruct the interpretive process 
that led to the implicature derivation. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the possibility of developing an 
account of metonymy that accommodates it within a theory of verbal comprehension 
which takes speaker meanings to be derived inferentially on the basis of encoded 
linguistic meaning, contextual assumptions and considerations of relevance. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, I will approach this issue from two 
different angles: First, I will investigate whether metonymy can be brought within the 
scope of the relevance-theoretic account of lexical pragmatic processes (cf. Chapter 4), 
which takes occasion-specific lexical meanings to be understood in terms of ad hoc 
concept construction. Second, I will suggest how an early relevance-theoretic analysis of 
metonymy, proposed by Anna Papafragou (1996), which takes metonymic 
interpretations to arise from a creative process of ‘naming’, can be carried over to a 
more up-to-date relevance-theoretic account. As will become clear, both options have 
their advantages and, unfortunately, some shortcomings, which will be discussed. I will 
start, however, with a discussion of Papafragou’s early analysis. 
6.3.2 Papafragou (1996) 
Papafragou (1996) sketched an early relevance-theoretic account, where she analysed 
metonymy as a variety of metarepresentational use of language (cf. Noh 2000; Wilson 
2000) involving the introduction of a new name for a referent.180 She saw metonymy 
primarily as a way of economising on the processing effort required for assigning 
reference, but also, secondarily, as a means of achieving cognitive effects that would not 
be communicated by any literal paraphrase (e.g. by allowing the speaker to express a 
variety of attitudes toward the metarepresented content). For instance, economy of 
                                                      
180 It should be noted that Papafragou (1996) talks about metonymy in terms of interpretive use, as 
opposed to descriptive use of language (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), rather than in terms of 
metarepresentation. According to Sperber and Wilson’s definition (1986/1995: 224ff.), an utterance is 
used interpretively when its propositional form represents some other representation with a propositional 
form “in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms”, where ‘interpretive resemblance’ 
of propositional forms is defined as a sharing of logical and contextual implications. However, given the 
more recent development within relevance theory of the notion of metarepresentation as a category 
subsuming interpretive uses (cf. Noh 2000; Wilson 2000), and the fact that although Papafragou’s 
examples of metonymy clearly involve linguistic metarepresentation of some kind, it is not obvious that 
they are in fact cases of interpretive use (i.e. that they involve propositional forms sharing a set of 
implications). It therefore seems more adequate to speak of metarepresentational use of language in 
connection with Papafragou’s discussion of metonymy, rather than of interpretive use. Thus, the reader 
should be aware that the talk of ‘metarepresentation’ or ‘metarepresentational use’ in this section replaces 
the use of the notion ‘interpretive use’ in Papafragou’s paper.  
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effort provides the motivation for a use of the expression The ham sandwich to refer to 
the ham sandwich customer in the context of a busy café, while achieving cognitive 
effects would be the main purpose of the metonymic expression in an utterance of 
‘Watch out, the smelly breath is approaching’, when from the reference point of view, 
use of the person’s name (known to both speaker and hearer) would be the most 
efficient linguistic device to use. In this section, I will discuss the merits of this account, 
as well as some of the problems it raises.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, metarepresentation (representation of another 
representation) involves a higher-order representation, usually an utterance or thought, 
with a lower-order representation, either in the form of a public representation (e.g. 
utterances), a mental representation (e.g. thoughts), or an abstract representation (e.g. 
sentences, propositions), embedded in it (see Wilson 2000 for a range of examples). (I 
will leave aside the abstract representations, since they are not central to my purposes 
here.) As an illustration of how public and mental representations can be 
metarepresented, consider (28):  
(28) a. Jane enjoyed the dinner party. 
b. Jane told me that she enjoyed the dinner party. 
c. ‘I’ll enjoy this dinner party’, Jane thought. 
d. Jane enjoyed the ‘dinner party’. 
In (28)a., the expression the dinner party is used literally as part of a proposition the 
speaker holds to be true about a state of affairs in the world; this is what Sperber and 
Wilson refer to as descriptive use of language (1986/1995: 224ff.). The remaining 
examples contain metarepresentational uses of language: In (28)b., a public 
representation is being metarepresented; the expression she enjoyed the dinner party 
contains an explicit report of an utterance of Jane’s. This type of metarepresentational 
use, which involves quotation, achieves its relevance primarily by informing the hearer 
about the content of the original. (28)c. contains a metarepresentation of a mental 
representation, i.e. of Jane’s thought ‘I’ll enjoy this dinner party’, while in (28)d. the NP 
the dinner party is implicitly attributed to Jane (as reporting an utterance or thought of 
hers); the metarepresentational use enables the speaker to simultaneously express an 
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attitude of dissociation toward the descriptive content of the NP (perhaps the event was, 
in the speaker’s opinion, so meagre that it could hardly be called a dinner party).181 This 
type of use is termed echoic; it “achieve[s] relevance mainly by conveying the speaker’s 
attitude to an attributed utterance or thought” (Wilson 2000: 432).182 
A further type of metarepresentational use of language involves the naming of an 
individual or object, either with the purpose of coining a new name for something, as in 
(29) below, or of informing someone, who doesn’t already know it, of an established 
name or label for something, as in (30) and (31):  
(29) I name thee ‘Tabitha Hermione Lovell-Smith’. 
(30) That is called an ‘okapi’. (Compare with the descriptive use ‘An okapi ran past’.) 
(31) ‘Motor neurons’ form synapses with the muscles and command movements. 
These examples all involve ‘mention’ of referring expressions (as opposed to 'use', cf. 
Lyons 1977a). They are instances of linguistic metarepresentation but unlike the 
speech/thought reports in (28)b. and (28)c., and the echoic use in (28)d., where a 
content is attributed to someone else, they are non-attributive, in the sense that the 
recognition of the metarepresentational use as such does not involve the identification 
of the source of the metarepresented content (indeed, it may have no identifiable 
source).183 While the naming in (29) involves metarepresentation of form only (as 
proper names arguably have no semantic content), there is a sense in which the 
semantic content of the metarepresented expressions in (30) and (31) plays a role in the 
naming process (e.g. x is called an okapi because it belongs to the category of okapis), 
although they too, of course, involve metarepresentation of linguistic forms. This is, if I 
                                                      
181 A more fundamental kind of interpretive relation is that between utterances and thoughts: Sperber and 
Wilson (1986/1995: 230) claim that “every utterance is used to represent a thought of the speaker”. By this 
they mean that the propositional form of an utterance resembles the propositional form of the thought it 
is used to communicate.  
182 The relevance-theoretic view is that all varieties of metarepresentation, whether they involve public, 
mental or abstract representations, can be analysed in terms of a notion of representation by resemblance 
(Wilson 2000: 425). The resemblance relation may be of any type: perceptual, linguistic, logical, 
mathematical, conceptual, sociolinguistic, stylistic, typographic, etc. Thus, the attributive cases in (28)b., 
(28)c. and (28)d. all involve conceptual resemblance, that is, resemblance of content. 
183 Unlike the attributive cases, which require of the hearer the ability to attribute an utterance or thought 
to someone else (thus depend on his theory of mind capacity, cf. Chapter 3), the understanding of the 
cases of mention in (29)-(31) are not obviously linked to this intuitive metapsychological ability (see 
discussion in Wilson 2000: 437).  
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understand her correctly, why Papafragou (1996: 180) takes cases like (30) and (31) to 
communicate something like ‘individual that can be appropriately called okapi’, and 
‘things that can be appropriately called motor neurons’; the entities in question can be 
‘appropriately called’ such and such because of what they are and because of what the 
names introduced for them mean. The form of metarepresentation involved in such 
cases of ‘mention’ allows the speaker to focus the hearer’s attention on the word itself 
(instead of on the representation of the actual thing it encodes). 
Another form of naming may occur when an expression is used to pick out an 
entity that falls outside of its linguistically specified denotation. This happens in 
spontaneous dubbings (cf. Kaplan 1989 [1977]): 
(32) Hi, ‘gorgeous’! 
(33) What can I do for you, ‘love’? 
As with (30) and (31), the semantic content of the naming expressions in (32) and (33) 
plays a role; for instance, the use of ‘gorgeous’ in (32) can be unpacked as ‘you who can 
appropriately be called gorgeous’ (and so the speaker is, in a sense, attributing to himself 
the view that the addressee possesses the property denoted by the name and thus she 
can be appropriately called by it). However, unlike the examples in (30) and (31), the 
dubbings in (32) and (33) are referential, in that they serve to pick out the individuals 
who can appropriately be called ‘gorgeous’ and ‘love’.184 
Papafragou’s (1996: 181) claim is that creative metonymy is a variety of 
metarepresentational use of language that shares its central characteristics with the cases 
in (29)-(33) above: It involves the use of an expression to introduce a new name, as in 
(29)-(31), and the intended referent of this expression does not fall under its 
conventional denotation, as in (32) and (33). Consider the following examples, 
discussed by Papafragou: 
(34) Where is the brain now that we need him? 
(35) The violin is in a bad mood. 
                                                      
184 They could thus be seen as instances of simultaneous use and mention of a word, as discussed in the 
philosophical literature on quotation. 
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In both cases, Papafragou argues, an expression is used metarepresentationally to 
introduce a new name (‘the person who could appropriately be called the brain’ and ‘the 
person who could appropriately be called the violin’), and the intended referent of the 
expression used does not fall under its conventional denotation. 
In general, according to Papafragou, metonymy (at least of the referential kind), 
is motivated by the more general human cognitive tendency to identify individuals or 
objects on the basis of salient properties that they possess, which serves the purpose of 
reduction of cognitive effort in accessing referents. Given the view that concepts (for 
individuals and objects) give access to encyclopaedic information about their 
denotations, we can take it that salient properties (derived from perception, for 
instance) of a given individual or object (e.g. has-a-big-nose, violin-playing) translate 
into their encyclopaedic entries as highly accessible assumptions (e.g. ‘X has a big nose’, 
‘X is a violin-player in the quartet’). The idea, then, is that metonymy involves the 
metarepresentational use of an expression denoting a (contextually) particularly salient 
object/property “to give access to an individuating conceptual representation of an 
individual (or another object) through a highly accessible encyclopaedic assumption 
including the two” (1996: 181-182).  
More specifically, the comprehension of metonymy requires of the hearer that 
he first recognises the metarepresentational use of the expression, and then uses this as a 
starting point for pragmatically deriving the speaker-intended referent. Let us consider 
how he might proceed in the case of (35) (Papafragou 1996: 182-183): First, the hearer 
accesses the ‘literal’ interpretation, ‘The violin is in a bad mood’, as a sort of default 
hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning, which he then rejects on the basis of 
considerations of relevance: a rational speaker aiming at optimal relevance could not 
have intended him to derive this interpretation. Then, on the basis of the type of 
predicate involved, the hearer will form a new (approximate) hypothesis about the 
speaker-intended meaning which includes the expectation that the referent of the 
definite description is a person; he thus recognises that the definite description is being 
used metarepresentationally. The proposition he entertains will have something like the 
following form (where the metarepresentationally used constituent appears within 
quotation marks):  
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(36) The person that could appropriately be called ‘the violin’ is in a bad mood. 
This proposition requires additional fleshing out by the hearer in his search for a 
hypothesis about the speaker-intended meaning that satisfies his occasion-specific 
expectations of relevance; in particular, he must identify the individual whom the 
speaker is claiming is in a bad mood. Imagine that (35) is uttered at a concert with 
Anne-Sophie Mutter and the Trondheim Soloists. The assumption that ‘Anne Sophie 
Mutter is a violin player’ would be highly accessible (and it includes the salient property 
as well as the referent), and would thus warrant the hearer’s conclusion that the 
proposition expressed is: 
(37) Anne-Sophie Mutter is in a bad mood. 
On this account, then, the comprehension of referential metonymy in fact involves three 
steps: (i) accessing and rejecting the ‘literal interpretation’; (ii) identifying the 
metarepresentationally used expression, and (iii) forming a hypothesis about the 
speaker-intended referent. 
Let me start by describing what I think are the merits of this account. First, I 
think it captures a set of highly central characteristics of the metonymy phenomenon: It 
preserves the strong intuition that metonymy contributes to the proposition expressed 
by an utterance (i.e. its truth-conditional content). It has an account of how salient 
properties or objects are turned into highly accessible encyclopaedic assumptions and 
used to derive the intended referent of a metonymically used expression, instead of 
having to postulate an inventory of (often arbitrary) associative links between concepts, 
whose cognitive status remains unclear (are they part of our innate cognitive machinery, 
are they learned, are only some of them innate, and so on). The account further aims at 
capturing the crucial aspect of effort reduction involved in metonymically used referring 
expressions, by assuming that referential metonymies achieve relevance primarily by 
representing the most cost-efficient way of identifying a referent (but see my comment 
below). Treating metonymy as a subtype of the metarepresentational use of language 
also captures the fact that many referential metonymies have an affinity with nicknames 
(cf. the brain in (34)a. above, and the nickname ‘Brainy’). Second, the account situates 
metonymy within the more general human metarepresentational capacity, which helps 
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to explain how this sort of use of linguistic expressions arises. Such uses do not have to 
be taught or learned as they are a natural consequence of this more general 
metarepresentational capacity (Wilson 2000). In this way, the spontaneous character of 
metonymy in production and comprehension is accounted for, and the view that 
metonymy should represent some kind of isolated deviation from a linguistic norm is 
rejected.  
It should be clear from this that I think that Papafragou’s proposal represents an 
important step in the direction of a cognitively plausible account of metonymy, which 
could potentially form the basis for an up-to-date relevance-theoretic account (a 
possibility which I explore in section 6.3.4). Its greatest merit is perhaps that it takes 
seriously the fact that an appropriate treatment of metonymy must be consistent with a 
general account of utterance interpretation, a point which is often missed, by cognitive 
linguistic accounts in particular (with the notable exception of Evans 2009). However, it 
also raises some problematic issues, to which I now turn. 
As I mentioned earlier, the comprehension of metonymy on Papafragou’s 
account appears to involve three steps, the first of which is to access, and then reject, the 
‘literal’ interpretation of the metonymically used expression, based on the irrelevant 
(and usually false) proposition it would yield. This leads to the recognition of the 
metarepresentational use of the expression, which is the second step in the 
interpretation process. This way of construing the process seems to be at odds with a 
central claim about utterance comprehension in recent manifestations of relevance 
theory (e.g. Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004); namely, that it involves a mutual 
adjustment of explicit content, contextual assumptions and contextual implications in 
accordance with the hearer’s occasion-specific expectations of relevance (in the next 
section, I suggest how the process of mutual adjustment may contribute to the 
derivation of metonymic meanings). The view is that hypotheses about the explicit 
content of a given utterance, the contextual assumptions that should be brought to bear 
on its interpretation, and the cognitive effects it is expected to yield are incrementally 
modified, while a consequence of Papafragou’s account seems to be that such 
hypotheses must be computed in sequence: the hearer must first reject the ‘literal’ 
interpretation in order to ‘kick off’ the inferential process, whose outcome is the 
identification of the speaker-intended referent for the metonymically used expression. 
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In commenting on this issue, however, Papafragou (1996: 185) denies that this is the 
case: “[T]he search for a possible referent for the metonymic expression is seen as a 
local, i.e. sub-propositional, process. … my approach does not entail that the literal, i.e. 
descriptive, referent is necessarily computationally prior to the non-descriptive one.” 
The problem is that in practice, it seems that this is not what her account implies: Recall 
the analysis of (35). In this case, the hearer recognised the metarepresentational use of 
the referring expression on the basis of the incompatibility of its descriptive content 
with that of the predicate of the sentence. From this, he inferred that the speaker-
intended referent of the expression was an individual. How could he have achieved this 
without the prior computation of the ‘literal’ meaning of the whole utterance? 
Papafragou continues, “Usually, of course, the descriptive interpretation needs to be 
computed and ruled out, if only because it corresponds to the encoded meaning and the 
latter is needed as a starting point for any further processing (…)” (ibid.). But, on 
Papafragou’s account, this computation of the descriptive content in fact seems crucial 
to the recognition of the expression as being an instance of metarepresentational use 
(and hence an instance of metonymy): How, in the case of metonymy, can a speaker be 
expected to recognise the expression as being metarepresentationally used if not by 
contrast with its descriptive content, and the irrelevant proposition it would yield (thus 
by taking the ‘literal’ meaning of the whole utterance into account)? 
There is another, theory-internal issue that arises in connection with 
Papafragou’s three-step procedure for the interpretation of referential metonymy. 
Carston (1997; 2002b: Chapter 5) was the first in relevance theory to suggest a 
symmetrical treatment of lexical narrowing and broadening (including metaphor), as 
different outcomes of a single pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction, 
contributing to the proposition expressed by an utterance. As we saw in Chapter 4, this 
is now the common relevance-theoretic analysis of lexical adjustment (Wilson and 
Carston 2006, 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008). Previously, narrowing and broadening 
had been given quite distinct treatments: while narrowing was treated as contributing 
extra conceptual material into the proposition expressed (explicature), broadening (or 
‘loosening’, as it was called at that time) was treated as a case where the speaker chose to 
produce an utterance which was a less-than-literal interpretation of the thought she 
intended to communicate, on the assumption that this would make her thought more 
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accessible to the hearer than a literally used utterance would (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995: 231ff.). In these cases, the hearer was thought to recover the speaker-
intended meaning of the utterance only as implicatures. As Carston (1997) pointed out, 
a consequence of this approach was that utterances containing metaphorically used 
expressions did not communicate the propositions they expressed, unlike utterances 
involving lexical narrowing. 
On the ‘old’ relevance theory view, then, lexical narrowing, broadening and 
metonymy were treated as distinct processes (for instance, metonymy was seen as 
having more in common with irony and other clearly metarepresentational uses of 
language than with metaphor). However, on the assumption that the current relevance 
theory account of lexical meaning in context (including cases of metaphor and 
hyperbole), in terms of ad hoc concept construction is correct, one might at least 
question whether it is right that metonymy should involve the operation of an entirely 
different pragmatic process, given the many similarities between metonymy and those 
language uses that result in ad hoc concept construction. For one thing, both cases of 
lexical narrowing and (as has convincingly been argued) lexical broadening, contribute 
to the proposition expressed by an utterance (Carston 1997, 2002b; Wilson and Carston 
2006, 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008). As noted by Papafragou (and many others), this 
also appears to be the case for metonymy. For instance, it seems clear that the 
proposition expressed (i.e. the truth-conditional content) of an utterance of ‘The ham 
sandwich is sitting at table 20’ has a person and not a ham sandwich as a constituent. 
And, like narrowing and broadening, metonymy appears to contribute a concept to the 
mental representation of the proposition expressed. Second, as Papafragou (1996: 176) 
points out, there is much to indicate that metonymy and metaphor are related 
processes, given for instance that they can both be used in referential expressions and as 
predicates, with very similar effects, as shown by her examples in (38) and (39): 
(38) a. The pretty face just went out. 
b. The pretty doll just went out. 
(39) a. Maria is a divine voice. 
b. Maria is a nightingale. 
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Furthermore, it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether the use of an expression is 
an instance of a metonymy or a metaphor, as in (40): 
(40) The primary goal of Olympic athletes is to get on the podium. 
The metonymic interpretation would involve seeing the expression get on the podium as 
denoting a highly salient property of the whole event of winning a competition and so 
used to ‘stand for’ the communicated meaning ‘win an Olympic competition’. 
Alternatively, the expression could be interpreted metaphorically, as expressing the ad 
hoc concept [GET ON THE PODIUM]* (paraphrasable as ‘win an Olympic competition’), 
whose denotation would include actual instances of getting on the podium but also 
other manifestations of winning a competition that might not necessarily include 
actually appearing on the podium, such as ‘being in the best physical shape’, ‘being the 
mentally strongest’, ‘beating the other competitors’, etc.185  
In view of this, I think we might question the view that metonymy and metaphor 
should be the outcomes of entirely different pragmatic processes (although even on the 
differential treatment approach they would both, of course, be guided and constrained 
by the general pragmatic strategy of searching for an interpretation consistent with the 
presumption of optimal relevance). In particular, Papafragou’s account of metonymy in 
terms of a metarepresentational use of language and the recent relevance-theoretic 
account of metaphor in terms of ad hoc concept construction seem to imply that the two 
processes differ as to their computational complexity. While metaphor comprehension 
involves the development of a logical form constituent (output by linguistic decoding) 
into a communicated concept appearing in the proposition expressed, metonymy 
comprehension on Papafragou’s account proceeds from the decoded logical form to an 
‘intermediary’, approximate hypothesis about the speaker’s intended meaning 
containing the metarepresented material (as illustrated by the proposition in (36) 
above), which is then ‘pragmatically unpacked’ into a hypothesis about the proposition 
expressed. Thus, the comprehension of metonymy would seem to involve three layers of 
                                                      
185 However, a proponent of a differential processing view of metaphor and metonymy could argue that in 
this particular example, two different processing routes (the metaphorical broadening and the metonymic 
naming) eventuate in very similar results. 
  
 
236 
representation, while there would only be two such layers involved in the 
comprehension of metaphor.  
Finally, Papafragou’s three-step procedure for the interpretation of metonymy 
seems hard to reconcile with the view that referential metonymy represents the most 
cost-efficient way of identifying a referent. In my view, rather than reasoning from the 
descriptive content of the concept (x) to a metarepresentationally used concept with a 
‘naming’ function (‘the person/object that can appropriately be called ‘x’’), on the basis 
of which a referent (y) is identified (as a result of the activation of encyclopaedic or 
contextual information involving x and y), it seems more likely that the hearer 
(somehow) is able to reason directly from the encoded salient property (x) to an 
accessible encyclopaedic or contextual assumption including the property and the 
referent (y) (e.g. ‘the y that has an x’), on the basis of which the referent (y) is identified. 
Computing the intermediary proposition containing the ‘metarepresented material’ 
seems like a redundant (effort-demanding) step in the comprehension process. 
To me, there seem to be two possible ways in which a relevance-theoretic 
account of metonymy may proceed: Either we could take Papafragou’s early analysis as 
a starting point, and investigate whether her original idea that metonymic 
interpretations arise as a result of a creative process of ‘naming’ can be carried over to a 
more up-to-date relevance-theoretic account, one that avoids the problems described 
above. Or, we could take a different route and investigate the possibility of developing 
an entirely different relevance-theoretic account of metonymy in terms of ad hoc 
concept construction. I will now consider each possibility in turn, starting with the 
latter. 
6.3.3 Metonymy as ad hoc concept construction? 
As mentioned above, since Papafragou’s (1996) formulation of a preliminary account of 
metonymy as an instance of metarepresentational (interpretive) use of language, the 
development of the relevance-theoretic account of ad hoc concept construction has 
resulted in a kind of asymmetry between the theory’s treatment of lexical pragmatic 
processes such as narrowing and broadening (including metaphor), on the one hand, 
and its treatment of metonymy, on the other. In view of the affinity between metonymy 
and ad hoc concept construction (they target individual words or phrases, contribute to 
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the proposition expressed (explicature), and give rise to a continuum of literal and 
figurative cases186), and the fact that metonymy and metaphor may serve similar 
discourse functions (referential, predicative, etc.) and overlap in several ways (Taylor 
1989/2003; Goossens 1990; Papafragou 1996; Barcelona 2000a; Radden 2000), a unified 
treatment of them seems desirable on both empirical and theoretical grounds. In this 
section, I will sketch such an account. 
Previously, we have seen that relevance theorists describe the outcome of the 
process of ad hoc concept construction as either a concept with a narrower denotation 
than that which is linguistically-encoded (i.e. picking out a subset of it) or a concept that 
has a broader denotation (i.e. picking out a superset of the linguistically-specified 
denotation). While it seems clear that metonymy does not involve narrowing (e.g. the 
individuals who order ham sandwiches do not constitute a subset of the set of ham 
sandwiches), could it perhaps be analysed as a kind of broadening of the linguistically-
encoded meaning? Consider the following metaphorical utterance: 
(41) Jane is a princess.  
The view is that in interpreting this utterance, the hearer constructs the broadened ad 
hoc concept PRINCESS*, communicating ‘spoiled’ and/or ‘arrogant woman’, which 
includes actual princesses who satisfy the description and excludes those who don’t 
(which is why most metaphors also involve an element of narrowing, cf. Carston 1997; 
2002; Sperber and Wilson 2008). This can be illustrated as follows:  
(42) Jane is a PRINCESS*. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
186 E.g. from the literal ‘Woolf is a famous modernist writer’, to the less literal ‘Woolf is on the top shelf’ to 
the figurative ‘The new Woolf is coming to the party tonight’ (used to describe an up-and-coming female 
novelist). 
Encoded 
concept 
Communicated 
concept 
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Now consider the ‘ham sandwich’ example again (repeated below as (43) for 
convenience):  
(43) The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
An analysis of (43) in terms of ad hoc concept construction would imply that the hearer 
constructs the communicated concept HAM SANDWICH*, paraphraseable as ‘ham 
sandwich customer’, on the basis of the encoded concept HAM SANDWICH, contextual 
assumptions derived from the utterance situation (e.g. CUSTOMER X HAS ORDERED A HAM 
SANDWICH) and context-specific expectations of relevance (e.g. in the context of a busy 
restaurant, (43) might be expected to indicate to the waitress what she needs to attend to 
next). However, in this case, the ad hoc concept HAM SANDWICH* is not broader than the 
linguistically-encoded concept in the sense of having a denotation that includes or 
overlaps with the linguistically-specified one; rather, the concept communicated is 
entirely different from the one encoded, as can be illustrated in the following way:  
(44) The HAM SANDWICH* is getting impatient. 
 
  
 
 
 
So it seems that if metonymy is an instance of ad hoc concept construction, it 
contributes neither a narrowed nor a broadened concept (denoting a subset or a 
superset of the encoded lexical or phrasal concept nor a set that overlaps with it) but an 
entirely different concept to the proposition expressed by the utterance (Carston 2010). 
However, in a brief comment on metonymy and its connection to ad hoc 
concept construction, Wilson and Carston (2007: 253-254) suggest that many instances 
of (what seem to be cases of) metonymy may in fact be analysable in terms of lexical 
broadening, based on Nunberg’s (1996, 2004) reanalysis of cases such as (45) below as 
involving an extended meaning for the predicate parked out back rather than the first 
person pronoun having a ‘deferred reference’ (cf. Section 6.2.1): 
Encoded 
concept 
Communicated 
concept  
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(45) I’m parked out back. 
On a relevance-theoretic analysis, the predicate parked out back can be treated as 
communicating the ad hoc concept PARKED OUT BACK*, denoting the set of individuals 
who have their vehicles parked out back. However, this would not, I think, count as a 
genuine instance of broadening, as the denotation of the ad hoc concept is not a proper 
superset of the linguistically-encoded denotation (the set of things that are parked out 
back). Rather, the situation appears to be the one illustrated in (44) above (cf. the 
analysis of this example in Recanati 2004: 26).187 
Furthermore, Wilson and Carston’s suggestion is that if Nunberg’s analysis is 
correct, then many of the cases standardly treated as metonymies should be 
straightforwardly analysable in terms of lexical broadening based on ad hoc concept 
construction, including cases such as (46) and (47):  
(46) Which wide body jets serve dinner? 
(47) Nixon bombed Hanoi. 
While it is common to treat the NPs wide body jets and Nixon as metonymies for 
‘airlines’ and ‘the U.S. Army’, Wilson and Carston suggest instead that it is the 
predicates, serve dinner and bombed Hanoi, that have extended senses in (46) and (47). 
An argument in favour of this view is that in both cases, a conjoined predicate may take 
the encoded meaning of the NP as its subject, as shown by (48) and (49): 
(48) Which wide body jets serve dinner and can land on water? 
(49) Nixon bombed Hanoi and was later forced to resign from presidency over the 
Watergate scandal. 
On the broadening analysis, only the predicates serve dinner and bombed Hanoi would 
have extended meanings, while the remaining constituents of the sentence would 
                                                      
187 That is, unless we can conceive of a concept whose meaning is sufficiently abstract that it can 
incorporate entities that are in fact parked out back and individuals who are responsible for (strongly 
causally implicated in) bringing about the parked out back property of those entities. Such an approach 
would have an affinity with the superordinate concepts that Wilson and Carston (2006) suggest underlie 
the (basic) physical and (metaphorical) psychological senses of adjectives such as hard, rigid, cold, etc. 
The idea is that the superordinate concepts (e.g. HARD*, RIGID*, COLD*), which have both physical and 
psychological instances, have arisen through broadening of the basic physical sense of these adjectives.  
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receive more or less ‘literal’ interpretations. This also means that in (50) and (51) below, 
both predicates would have extended senses: 
(50) Which wide body jets serve dinner and offer a wide range of inflight 
entertainment? 
(51) Nixon bombed Hanoi and invaded Cambodia. 
Although I see the motivation behind it, I am not entirely convinced that the analysis in 
terms of broadening of the linguistically-encoded meanings of the predicates, instead of 
treating the NPs as metonymies, is the best way to account for these examples. For one 
thing, the analysis does not capture what appears to be a productive pattern according 
to which proper names (e.g. ‘Woolf’, ‘Nixon’) can be used to refer to properties 
associated with their bearers. For another, there seems to be something counterintuitive 
about the analysis on which the predicates of the utterances in (50) and (51) have 
extended senses, when it is likely that few speakers would perceive them as such; they 
seem like straightforward, (more or less) literal uses of expressions. Third, if the 
predicates in the examples above did in fact communicate phrasal concepts with 
broader denotations than the ones assigned to them by the grammar, it is not entirely 
clear to me what these broadened concepts would be.188 A problem with this is of course 
that if we take the subjects and not the predicates to have extended meanings in (48) and 
(49), it now seems that the predicates have different subjects, which does not seem likely 
in view of the ellipsis of the second subject constituent. However, it is not inconceivable 
                                                      
188 Perhaps the content of the phrasal ad hoc concepts SERVE FOOD* and BOMBED HANOI* in (46) and (47) 
above could be paraphrased along the lines of ‘have staff that serve food’ and ‘ordered his armed forces to 
bomb Hanoi’. However, this would look more like (quite unusual) instances of pragmatically supplied 
unarticulated constituents rather than ad hoc concept construction (where a linguistically supplied 
constituent is pragmatically developed). Indeed, Romero and Soria (2005, 2010) suggest an account on 
which metonymies are treated as instances of unarticulated constituents that have to be filled in by the 
context, triggered by the semantic or contextual anomaly of the literal meaning (e.g., in the interpretation 
of the utterance ‘The ham sandwich is getting impatient’ the concept HAM SANDWICH is enriched into the 
concept HAM SANDWICH CUSTOMER). Carston (2010) points out that this would be quite an unorthodox 
case of a pragmatically supplied constituent since it would not involve the usual process of pragmatic 
modification of a linguistically-given value (as in the provision of the location for ‘It’s raining IN OSLO’, 
for instance), but rather the pragmatic provision of the head value (CUSTOMER) for the linguistically given 
modifier. Adjuncts like location constituents or quantifier domain constituents are optional in as much as 
the phrase could stand without them, while arguments like ‘the customer (who ordered a ham sandwich)’ 
or ‘The book (by Woolf)’ are obligatory elements of a phrase. Carston is doubtful about free enrichment 
supplying arguments for the uttered element to modify and says that, at the least, it needs detailed 
justification. 
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that in the interpretation of (48) and (49), we (somehow) construe the subject referents 
in a way that is sufficiently general for both predicates to apply to them. Perhaps, due to 
the fact that the encyclopaedic information that the metonymies exploit is highly 
accessible, and likely to be activated every time the concepts NIXON and WIDE BODY JETS 
are accessed (it could even be accessed in ‘chunks’, so that, for instance, assumptions 
about Nixon the person are activated together with assumptions about his time as 
president of the United States, and head of the U.S. Army), two predicates can make 
reference to different aspects of this encyclopaedic information without there being any 
incoherence (or ‘zeugmatic effect’) perceived by the hearer.189 However, although I am 
sceptical about it, I remain open to the possibility that in the particular cases of (48) and 
(49), we may in fact have to do with extended meanings for the first predicates. 
Nevertheless, as Wilson and Carston point out, even on the analysis of (45), (46) 
and (47) as broadenings of the predicate meanings, there would still remain cases 
“which seem to involve genuine reference substitution and which are not 
straightforwardly reducible to lexical narrowing or broadening” (2007: 254). Examples 
are the following: 
(52) The saxophone walked out. 
(53) Downing Street refused to give an interview. 
In these cases, conjoining a predicate that makes reference to the linguistic meaning of 
the italicised expressions creates a strong ‘zeugmatic effect’: 
(54) ? The saxophone walked out and looked newly polished.  
(55) ? Downing Street refused to give an interview and was full of protesters. 
 So it seems that the shift in meaning targets the subjects and not the predicates. In what 
follows, I will assume that metonymies such as those in (54) and (55) represent a 
genuine category of cases that arise pragmatically through ad hoc concept construction. 
As argued above, I will take it that metonymy differs from narrowing and broadening in 
that the concepts (or phrasal concepts) communicated do not denote proper subsets or 
                                                      
189 This possibility was also evoked towards the end of Chapter 5. The examples in (48) and (49) are in fact 
not entirely unlike the book/window cases that I discussed there. I return briefly to these cases towards the 
end of this section. 
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supersets of the linguistically-encoded denotations, but have denotations that fall 
entirely outside the ones encoded by the metonymically used expressions. 
So, how would the construction of genuinely metonymic ad hoc concepts 
proceed during utterance comprehension? As I mentioned in section 6.3.2, it seems that 
in the interpretation of metonymy, the hearer is (somehow) able to ‘reason’ directly 
from the linguistically-encoded conceptual content of the metonymically used 
expression to an accessible encyclopaedic or contextual assumption which includes the 
linguistically-determined denotation and the speaker-intended meaning, on the basis of 
which the speaker-intended meaning is identified. As an illustration, consider the ‘ham 
sandwich’ example again (repeated here as (56) for convenience): 
(56)  The ham sandwich is getting impatient. 
Imagine that (56) is uttered at a café by one waiter to another (let’s say from Jane the 
waitress to Sam the waiter) during lunchtime, a very busy time of the day at this café. 
The waiters are running around trying to serve the customers their correct orders in 
time. Against this background, an anticipated conclusion of Jane’s utterance would be 
that whoever (among the customers) is getting impatient should be served his or her 
food as quickly as possible. The linguistically specified concept HAM SANDWICH would 
provide additional activation to an already highly accessible contextual assumption 
about ham sandwiches as possible orders at this café, and by a process of spreading 
activation, about customers having ordered ham sandwiches. Let’s say that at the time of 
utterance of (56) there is only one customer waiting for his order of a ham sandwich. In 
this case, the encoded meaning of HAM SANDWICH would activate the contextual 
assumption CUSTOMER A HAS ORDERED A HAM SANDWICH. The interpretation of ham 
sandwich as communicating the ad hoc concept HAM SANDWICH* (person who ordered 
‘ham sandwich’) allows Sam to identify customer A as the referent of the expression, and 
warrants the implicated conclusion that customer A should be served his food as quickly 
as possible. Below is a schematic outline of how Sam’s interpretation of Jane’s utterance 
in (56) might proceed (interpretive hypotheses to the left, the basis for deriving them to 
the right): 
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(57)  
(a) Jane has said to Sam [THE HAM 
SANDWICH IS GETTING IMPATIENT]. 
Decoding of Jane’s utterance. Embedding 
of the decoded logical form into a 
description of Jane’s ostensive behaviour. 
(b) Jane’s utterance will be optimally 
relevant to Sam. 
Expectation raised by the recognition of 
Jane’s utterance as an act of ostensive 
communication. 
(c) Jane’s utterance will achieve relevance 
by providing information relating to their 
current task of serving customers their 
lunch. 
Expectation raised by the overall context 
and the fact that this kind of information 
would be the most relevant to Sam at this 
point. 
(d) A customer who is getting impatient 
should be served his order as quickly as 
possible. 
First contextual assumption activated that 
satisfies the expectation in (c). Accepted 
as an implicit premise of Jane’s utterance. 
(e) A ham sandwich is a possible order at 
this café. 
A highly accessible encyclopaedic 
assumption that receives additional 
activation by the concept HAM SANDWICH. 
(f) Customer A has ordered a ham 
sandwich. 
Accessible contextual assumption, 
activated by the encoded concept HAM 
SANDWICH via the encyclopaedic 
assumption in (e). 
(g) The HAM SANDWICH* is getting 
impatient. 
First interpretation of the explicit content 
of Jane’s utterance, involving the ad hoc 
concept HAM SANDWICH* (‘person who 
ordered ham sandwich’), derived 
associatively from the contextual 
assumption in (f). This property is 
assigned to the referent, ‘customer A’. 
Accepted as the explicature of Jane’s 
utterance. 
(h) Customer A should be served his food. Implicature of Jane’s utterance. Satisfies 
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the expectation in (c). Accepted as the 
intended implicated conclusion. Logically 
implied by (d) and (g). 
Sam decodes Jane’s utterance and takes this decoded content (an incomplete logical 
form) as input to the inferential process to follow, and assumes that her utterance is 
optimally relevant to him. Given the particular context, Sam expects Jane’s utterance to 
achieve relevance by providing him with information relating to their current task of 
serving customers their lunch. The first contextual assumption to come to Sam’s mind 
that satisfies this expectation is that ‘A customer who is getting impatient should be 
served his order as quickly as possible’, which he takes as an implicit premise of Jane’s 
utterance. The encoded concept HAM SANDWICH provides additional activation of an 
already highly accessible encyclopaedic assumption, that ham sandwiches are possible 
orders at this café, which, together activates the accessible contextual assumption that 
‘Customer A has ordered a ham sandwich’. On the basis of this assumption, the ad hoc 
concept HAM SANDWICH* (‘person who ordered ham sandwich’) is associatively derived 
and assigned to the referent ‘customer A’, as part of the first hypothesis about the 
explicit content of Jane’s utterance ‘The HAM SANDWICH* is getting impatient’ (where 
the concept IMPATIENT will probably also be adjusted (narrowed) to an ad hoc concept 
IMPATIENT*, specifying the kind/degree of impatience of the customer), which Sam 
accepts as the explicature of Jane’s utterance. Together, the contextual assumption in (d) 
and the explicature warrant the derivation of the implicature in (h), which satisfies the 
expectation in (c), and is accepted as the intended implicated conclusion of Jane’s 
utterance.190 
In (57), the interpretive step from (a) to (f) would be associative; the move from 
[the speaker has said] HAM SANDWICH to [the speaker meant] HAM SANDWICH* does not 
rest on a logical or evidential relation between the encoded HAM SANDWICH and the 
communicated HAM SANDWICH*. However, the overall inferential process leading to the 
derivation of the implicature in (h) severely constrains the range of possible associative 
                                                      
190 In a case where this type of metonymy has become more of a coded or routine operation (which is 
indeed conceivable, e.g. among a group of employees at a busy café), there might be an immediate 
(associative) move from ‘The ham sandwich is getting impatient’ to ‘Customer A is getting impatient’.  
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relations that the encoded concept HAM SANDWICH may enter into. Moreover, the 
‘working out’ of the metonymic meaning takes place within a process of mutual 
adjustment of explicit and implicit content. In this particular case, an occasion-specific 
expectation of relevance, satisfied by the implicature, preceded and shaped the 
interpretative hypothesis about the explicature, containing the metonymic ad hoc 
concept. 
Consider another example, in which the mutual adjustment process also appears 
to play an important role in the derivation of the intended metonymic interpretation:  
(58) [The conductor]: Is everyone here? 
[An orchestra member]: The saxophone just left. 
In this case, assuming the orchestra member is aiming at optimal relevance, the 
conductor can take her utterance to achieve relevance by providing him with an answer 
to his question. A highly accessible assumption in the context would be that ‘if someone 
just left, everyone isn’t here’. The encoded meaning of saxophone (the concept 
SAXOPHONE) would activate assumptions about the person playing the saxophone in the 
orchestra, say, ‘Sally is the player of the saxophone’. The hypothesis that the explicit 
meaning (explicature) of the utterance is ‘The SAXOPHONE* just left’, involving the ad 
hoc concept SAXOPHONE* (‘player of the saxophone’, a property assigned to the referent 
Sally), warrants the derivation of the expected conclusion (i.e. provides an answer to the 
conductor’s question) ‘Everyone isn’t here’, that is, it allows for the interpretation to 
achieve relevance in the expected way. Thus, in this case, the hypothesis about the 
implicature (‘Everyone isn’t here’) precedes and shapes the hypothesis about the 
explicature, the derivation of which involves constructing the metonymic ad hoc 
concept.  
An advantage of the relevance-theoretic approach is that it can also explain how 
certain accessible associations are ruled out in the interpretation process, and why some 
metonymies do not work (in a given context). Consider the example in (59): 
(59) A. So who’s Mary’s new boyfriend?  
B. The red shorts in the corner. 
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Imagine that (59) is uttered at a party, where A has just been chatting with another party 
guest, C, and got into a discussion about football kits. During this discussion, A, an 
enthusiastic Liverpool supporter, tells C about the Liverpool children’s kit she has 
bought her son for his birthday, upon which C, an ardent Chelsea supporter, says that 
she absolutely hates that red kit, and in particular, ‘those ghastly red shorts!’. To A, 
therefore, the association between the concept RED SHORTS and the Liverpool football kit 
would have a high degree of activation at the time of B’s utterance of ‘The red shorts in 
the corner’, and is, in fact, likely to be more highly activated than the association 
between the concept RED SHORTS and the guy standing in the corner wearing an 
‘ordinary’ pair of red shorts. However, this association would yield a clearly wrong 
hypothesis about the speaker-intended meaning. The context-specific expectation of 
relevance that B’s utterance comes with, that is, that it should provide A with an answer 
to her question (i.e. picking out to her Mary’s new boyfriend), ensures that this initially 
accessed hypothesis is quickly rejected so that she tries out the next most accessible 
association, that is, the one between RED SHORTS and the guy standing in the corner 
(who is wearing red shorts), also made (perceptually) accessible in the context. This 
hypothesis is accepted as it contributes to B’s utterance achieving relevance in the 
expected way (i.e. as having the explicature ‘The RED SHORTS* (‘guy wearing the red 
shorts’) in the corner [is Mary’s new boyfriend]’). Thus, in this case, a strong association 
(RED SHORTS - LIVERPOOL KIT) is ruled out as part of the overall inferential process of 
arriving at a hypothesis about the speaker-intended meaning; the hypothesis it would 
yield is disconfirmed by a context-specific expectation of relevance. The important 
point here is that the inferential framework that relevance theory provides ensures that 
there are strong constraints on the associative relations that will be accepted by the 
relevance-based comprehension procedure.  
Consider also the following examples of metonymies that do not work in the 
given contexts: 
(60) [Professor to his students]: ?There are many good bodies in this university.191 
(61)  [Student to her fellow students]: The cream coat is in a bad mood today. 
                                                      
191 Example due to (Croft 1993: 181). 
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In (60), the expression bodies is not a well-chosen metonymy if the speaker’s intended 
referent is ‘students’. The associative link between students and their bodies leads the 
hearers to assume that this property of students is somehow central to the overall 
meaning of the utterance. More specifically, it may give rise to the assumption that the 
professor is openly declaring an interest in the bodies of his students, which might 
contradict other strongly held assumptions that the students might have about him (or 
anyway about what he would feel free to say openly). On the current account, the 
inappropriateness of this metonymy could be explained as a result of the encoded 
concept BODIES giving access to encyclopaedic assumptions about the metonymic 
referent which, if taken as premises in the inferential process, would yield a wrong 
hypothesis about the speaker-intended meaning. Overall, this could be seen as a case in 
which the extra effort required to process the metonymy sets the hearer off searching for 
extra effects, and those he arrives at would not be intended by the speaker.192 Compare 
with a case in which the professor utters ‘There are many good minds in this university’, 
with the intention to refer to the students; this metonymy would probably also lead to 
miscommunication, as the most accessible association is likely to be that between good 
minds and the academic staff; and the professor would be taken to refer to his colleagues 
rather than to the students. As to the metonymy in (61), imagine that it is uttered by one 
student to another while they are waiting for their professor in her office, and her 
cream-coloured coat is hanging up next to the door. This metonymy seems to fail 
because it is neither effort-saving nor likely to have any special effects. There would 
probably be several other far more salient properties that the hearer would associate 
                                                      
192 The choice of properties in synecdoche seems, in many cases, to be largely governed by stereotypical 
assumptions about the referents, to the extent that they almost appear to have a normative function. 
Consider the examples below:  
(i) We need some new heads in the Philosophy department. 
(ii) We need some new hands in the home for the elderly. 
In both cases, the italicised expressions are used as synecdoches to refer to people, but give rise to quite 
different assumptions about the referents. In (i), the use of heads evokes stereotypical assumptions about 
philosophers; that they are intelligent, talented, and so on, which may give rise to implicatures concerning 
the status of the department in need of such qualities. In (ii), the use of hands evokes stereotypical 
assumptions about caregivers in homes for the elderly; that they are caring, attentive, considerate, and so 
on, which may give rise to implicatures about the condition of the home in question (it may not be able to 
offer the required services to the patients, it may be in financial difficulties, and so on). Compare with 
‘We need some new heads in the home for the elderly’, which would automatically activate assumptions 
about the management of the home, not about the caregivers. The choice of a particular property to be 
used as a synecdoche thus seems to be partly governed by assumptions about what the referents ought to 
be like, which is what gives some of them a normative flavour. 
  
 
248 
with the professor and so he might not be able to make an immediate connection 
between her and the coat, although this connection is made available by the immediate 
physical context. It is hard to see how such cases of miscommunication or non-
workable metonymies could be properly explained within an entirely associative 
account. 
Finally, I would like to consider briefly how the ad hoc concept construction 
approach might be applied to some of the systematic sense alternations discussed in the 
previous chapter (the so-called book/window cases, cf. section 5.3.3), which seemed to 
rest on a metonymic relation between a physical object sense and a more abstract 
(institution or organisation) sense. Consider (62) and (63): 
(62) The newspaper announced staff redundancies. 
(63) This church has got a liberal position on same sex marriage. 
The ‘management of the publishing organisation’ sense communicated by newspaper in 
(62) could be analysed as being derived by means of ad hoc concept construction, on the 
basis of the encoded ‘physical object’ sense and encyclopaedic information activated by 
it, within the overall inferential process of forming a hypothesis about the speaker 
intended meaning. The ad hoc concept communicated, NEWSPAPER*, would have an 
entirely different denotation than the encoded concept. Similarly, the metonymic use of 
church in (63) could be treated as communicating the ad hoc concept CHURCH* (‘clerical 
leaders’), constructed on the basis of the encoded ‘building’ sense of the noun and 
encyclopaedic information that it gives access to, constrained by the hearer’s occasion-
specific expectations of relevance. 
However, with regard to the window cases, for which it was claimed that we 
‘zoom in’ on more specific aspects of the denotation depending on the context, these 
cannot as easily be treated in terms of entirely different ad hoc concepts being 
communicated (as pointed out in the previous chapter); at least, such an analysis would 
not capture the part-whole relation that is crucially involved in such cases. Consider 
again a couple of the examples from Chapter 5, repeated in (64):  
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(64) a. The window is broken. 
b. The window is rotten.  
The perspectives on window expressed in (64) cannot be analysed in terms of lexical 
narrowing of a general physical object sense of window, as the concepts communicated 
(let’s say, ‘window pane’, ‘window frame’) would be subparts rather than proper subsets 
of the linguistically-specified denotation. In view of this, my suggestion was to account 
for the intuition about different senses being expressed in (64)a. and (64)b. in terms of 
certain encyclopaedic information receiving extra activation, and treating the referential 
meaning of window as being constant across these uses. However, I also mentioned the 
possibility of treating this type of word as encoding not a full-fledged concept, but a 
much more schematic representation (a pointer), which gives access to the aspects of 
meaning exemplified in (64). On this approach, window could be treated as expressing 
genuinely different ad hoc concepts in (64)a. and (64)b., each of which would be 
inferentially constructed on the basis of encyclopaedic information made accessible by 
the schematic encoded meaning. A consequence of this analysis would be that the 
process of ad hoc concept construction would become obligatory in the comprehension 
of these words in context. I cannot get further into this issue here, but I think an 
approach along these lines deserves serious consideration. 
Some advantages and shortcomings of the account 
The account of metonymy in terms of ad hoc concept construction has an obvious 
advantage in that it allows for a unified treatment of metonymy, narrowing and 
broadening, as different outcomes of a single pragmatic process operating at the level of 
individual words (narrowing contributing a concept to the proposition expressed 
(explicature) which is a proper subset of the linguistically-specified denotation, 
broadening contributing a proper superset of the linguistically-specified denotation and 
metonymy an entirely different concept), and, as such, it captures the commonalities 
between them. Given that metonymy is an important source of polysemy, the account is 
also consistent with the overall claim in this thesis that polysemy arises as a result of the 
operation of a pragmatic inferential process, which yields hypotheses about speaker-
intended senses on the basis of encoded senses, contextual information and relevance-
  
 
250 
based interpretive constraints. The ad hoc concept construction account further meshes 
well with Nunberg’s (1996, 2004) claim that metonymy is an instance of ‘meaning 
transfer’ rather than ‘deferred reference’; the metonymic meaning appears as an ad hoc 
concept in the proposition expressed by an utterance, and arises as a result of a radical 
‘adjustment’ of the encoded concept (i.e. into an entirely different concept), on the basis 
of which the speaker-intended referent is picked out. 
Furthermore, the ‘regularity’ often observed in connection with metonymic uses, 
for instance, that referring to customers via their food orders may be a standard 
customer identification procedure among the employees of a café (and similarly, 
referring to orchestra members via the instruments they play among members of an 
orchestra, or to people via salient perceptual properties they possess quite generally), is 
also quite compatible with an account in terms of ad hoc concept construction. As we 
have seen, cognitive linguists take this ‘regularity’ of many linguistic metonymies to 
stem from underlying cognitive structures in the form of ‘conceptual metonymies’, and 
claim that the same is true of metaphor (c.f. ‘conceptual metaphors’ such as LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR, etc.). However, from a relevance-theoretic point of view, as 
indeed Wilson (2009) has suggested for metaphor, it is possible to see such regularities 
as cases where a repeated use of a linguistic metonymy that links different concepts 
together has set up a pattern of conceptual activation, or a ‘pragmatic routine’, with 
similar characteristics as the structures that cognitive linguists claim are instances of 
‘conceptual metonymies’ (e.g. FOOD ORDERS FOR CUSTOMERS, MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS FOR 
ORCHESTRA MEMBERS, BUILDING FOR INSTITUTION, etc.). Thus, the regularity observed 
could be seen as originating in the construction of ad hoc concepts for communicative 
purposes (which, if repeated often enough, might result in the setting up of systematic 
correspondences), rather than as surface reflections of underlying conceptual 
metonymies (Wilson 2009). 
However, a set of cases for which I do not think that the account in terms of ad 
hoc concept construction works very well is the metonymic use of proper names. If 
metonymy is a pragmatic process that targets the linguistic meaning of an expression 
and yields a context-specific concept on the basis of this meaning, then it is not clear 
what entity it operates on in the case of proper names, which arguably do not have any 
encoded semantic content. For ad hoc concept construction to work in these cases, a 
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referent has to be assigned to the proper name before the process can operate on a 
representation of this referent. This might work for fully established cases such as Woolf, 
Dostoyevsky and so on, but it is far from clear that it would work in cases where the 
referent of a name is unknown to the hearer and yet the metonymy goes through, as, for 
instance, in an utterance of ‘Needham is difficult to read’, where the hearer would 
interpret Needham as referring to ‘book(s) written by Needham’, regardless of whether 
or not he has ever heard about this author . In this case, the metonymy seems to be 
constructed on the basis of an established rule (e.g. AUTHOR FOR BOOKS) that might 
apply to any proper name given the appropriate contextual circumstances, rather than 
involving any kind of creative meaning construction. Note that this could not so easily 
be analysed as an instance of a pragmatic routine resulting from the repeated 
construction of ad hoc concepts linking authors and their books, as the new name itself 
would not be associated with any encyclopaedic information that might activate such 
systematic correspondences. 
A further issue that arises in connection with the account of metonymy in terms 
of ad hoc concept construction is the cognitive and communicative motivation for it. 
On this account, narrowing can be seen as being motivated by considerations of 
economy (i.e. the reduction of processing effort); there is in principle no need for a 
more specific encoding so long as the speaker can rely on her hearer easily arriving at 
her intended meaning. Broadening, on the other hand, is more often associated with an 
increase in effort which is offset by extra effects; using a metaphor, for instance, may 
enable the speaker to convey a range of (weak) implicatures, some of which may not 
even be amenable to natural language encoding (cf. Chapter 3). Metonymy, however, is 
not so easily motivated within this account. Compared with a literal encoding (which is, 
in most cases possible), it seems in fact often to involve an increase in effort, with no 
obvious gain in effects. In those cases where the metonymy involves a reduction of 
processing effort, this seems to be due to an already existing rule or ‘code’ for referent 
identification which has become established among a group of language users (or has 
developed into a code that is shared by the language community as a whole, e.g. AUTHOR 
FOR BOOKS). It appears, then, that in most cases, novel uses of metonymies must have 
some other motivation than contributing to a reduction of processing effort. This fact, I 
think, it better captured by the account that treats metonymy as a creative use of 
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naming, as was originally proposed by Papafragou (1996). In the final section to follow, 
I will sketch a different account of metonymy that builds on the early analysis discussed 
above. When appropriately modified, this account seems better suited to capture both 
the crucial aspect of processing effort reduction involved in metonymic use, as well as 
an important aspect of metonymy that has so far been largely ignored; the fact that it 
often involves an expression of attitude towards the metonymic referent.  
6.3.4 Metonymy as ‘naming’ revisited 
The main contribution of Papafragou’s (1996) account was to view referential 
metonymy as a variety of metarepresentational use of language involving a form of 
‘naming’, closely related to nicknaming, where a salient property of an individual is used 
to create a new name. In this section, I will suggest a way in which this idea can be 
carried over to a more up-to-date relevance-theoretic account. 
Recall from section 6.3.2 that, on Papafragou’s account, the comprehension of 
metonymy requires that the hearer first recognise the metarepresentational use of the 
expression, and use this as a starting point for pragmatically deriving the speaker-
intended referent. As I discussed, a problem with this account is that the recognition of 
the metarepresentational use (and hence of the metonymic use) seems to require the 
prior computation and rejection of the literal meaning of the utterance. This is what is 
supposed to trigger the construction of an ‘intermediary proposition’ containing the 
metarepresented material (i.e. ‘the x that can appropriately be called y’), on the basis of 
which the appropriate referent is identified. In my view, this problem can be avoided if 
we allow for mutual adjustment to play a role in the interpretation process. Consider the 
example in (58) again (repeated here as (65) for convenience):  
(65) [The conductor]: Is everyone here? 
[An orchestra member]: The saxophone just left. 
As argued in the discussion of (58) above, the conductor can assume that the orchestra 
member’s utterance will achieve relevance by providing him with an answer to his 
question. A highly accessible assumption in the context would be that ‘if someone just 
left, then everyone isn’t here’. As in (58) above, the encoded meaning of saxophone (the 
concept SAXOPHONE) would activate assumptions about the person who plays the 
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saxophone in the orchestra, say, ‘Sally is the player of saxophone’. The recognition of the 
expression The saxophone as an instance of naming with the purpose of picking out 
Sally (as the individual who can appropriately be called ‘The saxophone’), which would 
give rise to the explicature ‘Sally has just left’, warrants the derivation of the expected 
conclusion ‘Everyone isn’t here’, that is, it allows for the interpretation to achieve 
relevance in the expected way. Thus, the recognition of the metarepresentational use 
could be seen as taking place within the process of mutually adjusting the explicit and 
implicit content of the utterance, that is, as taking place independently of any prior 
computation of the literal meaning of the whole utterance.193  
I will now suggest how the communicative functions of metonymic uses can be 
captured on the current account. As we have seen, Papafragou (1996) takes metonymy 
to be motivated by a more general cognitive tendency to identify individuals on the 
basis of salient properties they possess. Let us assume, then, that in metonymy, a speaker 
names a referent by use of the word or phrase for a property she takes the referent to 
possess (e.g. ‘The [person that can appropriately be called] ‘saxophone’ has left), and 
which she either assumes is also highly accessible to the hearer (and thus might allow for 
efficient identification of the referent), or wants to make the hearer aware of (thus 
inducing cognitive effects that a literal utterance would not). Consider the following 
examples:  
(66) The red shorts in the corner is Mary’s new boyfriend. 
(67) The green tea is coming over to talk to us. 
(68) Peter is bringing the loudmouth with him to the opera. 
When uttered, for instance, in a context where Jane is wondering who Mary’s new 
boyfriend is, the metonymy in (66) can be seen as having a purely referential function. 
The speaker takes a property of the referent that is highly salient to her (i.e. his wearing 
red shorts), assumes that it is also highly salient to the hearer, and uses the linguistic 
expression for this property to name the referent, with the purpose of allowing the 
hearer to easily identify him (say among a group of people at a party). In (67), the 
                                                      
193 I am not denying that in some cases the recognition of a metonymic use may in fact take place as a 
result of computing (and rejecting) the literal meaning of the utterance. However, I do not think that a 
general account of metonymy can be built on this assumption.  
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function of the metonymy green tea may be entirely referential, for instance, in the 
context of a market where vendors can be easily identified on the basis of the type of 
product they sell. It is also possible to conceive of a context in which this metonymy 
would involve an expression of attitude toward the referent, say, at a party where the 
speaker and hearer have overheard the person in question asking for a cup of green tea 
instead when offered a glass of champagne. In such a case, the main purpose of the 
metonymic naming would be to allow the hearer to draw conclusions from it, for 
instance, that the coming conversation might turn out to be boring, and so on. In (68), 
the primary function of the metonymy loudmouth is to draw the hearer’s attention to a 
specific property of the referent (i.e. the property of talking too much in an offensive or 
tactless way). Using this expression to name the referent (by ‘holding up’, as it were, the 
property for the hearer to attend to it), allows the speaker to express her (negative) 
attitude toward him or her in an indirect way, an enables the hearer to infer that she 
wants him to know that she thinks that the referent possesses this property. 
On this account, then, metonymy achieves relevance either by representing the 
most cost-efficient way to identify an individual, as in (66), compared with using a 
direct encoding (e.g., ‘the man wearing the red shorts’). Or, in the cases where its 
primary function is to draw the hearer’s attention to a particular property of the 
referent, as in (68), the extra effort that may be required to identify the referent of the 
description is offset by extra effects that would not be achieved by use of a more direct 
utterance. (However, there may also be an element of effort reduction involved in these 
cases, as the metonymy represents an efficient way of getting across this additional 
meaning.)  
Broadly speaking, then, metonymies may serve two different communicative 
functions, which may give rise to two different situations. First, in cases where the 
naming serves the purpose of quick and easy identification of a referent, this typically 
gives rise to the establishment of productive ‘mini-codes’ for referent identification 
among sub-groups of language users. For instance, the members of an orchestra may 
have come to share the code INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER, which they use as an efficient way 
of identifying each other. Further examples are given in (69)-(71): 
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(69) Among café employees: FOOD ORDERS FOR CUSTOMERS (‘The french fries and a 
coffee has requested her bill’). 
(70) Among hospital workers: DIAGNOSIS FOR PATIENT (‘The arthritis is in room 205’). 
(71) Among university staff: ESSAY TOPIC FOR STUDENT (‘The explicit/implicit 
distinction will get a high mark’), DEGREE PROGRAMME FOR STUDENT (‘The PhD is 
getting on my nerves’). 
An example of a code for referent identification that has developed into one that is now 
shared by the (English) language community at large is that which allows us to use the 
name for an author to refer to the book(s) written by him or her.194 The productive 
character of such codes is what allows us to understand Needham in the example above 
as referring to the books written by the author Needham (even though we might never 
have heard of this author before), provided that there is sufficient contextual 
information to warrant a metonymic interpretation.195 It seems likely that a reason why 
some codes come to be shared by a language community as a whole is that the kind of 
conceptual relations they rest on are of more or less permanent character (such as, for 
instance, the relation between authors and their books, between copies of newspapers 
and the companies producing them, between churches and the clerical staff running 
them, etc., cf. Chapter 5), or the relation is an intrinsic one (for instance, that between 
humans and their body parts, between fruits and the trees producing them, etc.). It 
could thus be hypothesised that the more established a code is in a language 
community, the more we tend to think of the lexical items that activate it as being 
polysemous. Consider (72)-(75):  
(72) Mary is reading Dostoyevsky on the tube. 
(73) Cambridge voted conservative. 
(74) The newspaper sacked its editor-in-chief. 
(75) Jill and Joan have a cherry in their garden. 
                                                      
194 As noted by many cognitive linguists, the code AUTHOR FOR OEUVRE/BOOKS may be an instance of an 
even more general coded rule PRODUCER/CREATOR FOR PRODUCT/CREATION. 
195 That such interpretations are largely code or rule-based finds support in a recent experiment on the 
processing of such metonymies, conducted by Frisson and Pickering (2007). 
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These examples have been described as instances of systematic polysemy with a 
metonymic basis. I think that an important reason why we perceive this type of 
polysemy as being systematic is the regularity of the real-world relations that they 
describe. Indeed, all of the metonymies above rest on properties which, if not 
definitional, are at least highly central properties of the denotations of the vehicle 
expressions, to the extent that it may be hard to think of their denotations without at the 
same time thinking of this property. For instance, in (72), the property of being a writer 
is probably the most salient property that speakers associate with the name Dostoyevsky; 
in fact, they may be more prone to access a representation of his work than a 
representation of the actual writer himself upon hearing it. In this way, there is a sense 
in which Dostoyevsky is not only something ‘one might appropriately call’ a copy of one 
of his books; it is, as it were, something that that book is, by virtue of being written by 
him. Similarly, in the other examples, a (more or less) intrinsic property of a city is that 
it has inhabitants; a highly central property of a newspaper is that it is being published 
by someone; an intrinsic property of a fruit is that it grows on a plant of some kind, 
usually a tree. These facts, I think, are the main reason why we feel that the metonymies 
in (72)-(75) remain close to the ‘literal’ end of language use; treating them as 
instantiations of codes for referent identification shared by the language community as a 
whole, provides a possible explanation for this intuition. 
The account of metonymy as a form of naming can also deal with more creative 
cases of metonymy involving the use of proper names. Consider the following (attested) 
example:  
(76) A. Hope Leipzig went well. 
B. Leipzig hasn’t happened yet. (Leipzig = B’s talk at the Max Planck Institute in 
Leipzig).196 
In this case, A ‘names’ B’s forthcoming talk on the basis of a highly accessible property 
of it, namely, that it is going to take place in Leipzig. In this case, the function of the 
metonymy is clearly effort reduction (for both speaker and hearer); it works as a 
shorthand for a much more elaborate description. 
                                                      
196 Thanks to Robyn Carston for providing this example. 
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Second, the cases where the main purpose of the naming appears to be to 
highlight, or make the hearer aware of, a property that the referent possesses (and in this 
way potentially expressing an attitude toward the referent), have, to my knowledge, 
apart from Papafragou’s early discussion, so far received little attention in the research 
on metonymy. The main purpose of such metonymies appears to be to convey 
implicatures about the referent of the expression (cf. (68) above). Such cases are 
accounted for on the current account as metarepresentational uses in which the speaker 
is ‘holding up’ a property associated with the referent that she wants the hearer to attend 
to, and by the mere fact that she is doing so, she may succeed in conveying an attitude 
towards the referent in an implicit way. It is in these cases that the affinity between 
metonymy and nicknaming is particularly clear. My claim is that rather than giving rise 
to mini-codes for referent identification, metonymies thus motivated often seem to give 
rise to nicknames (e.g. ‘I saw Loudmouth the other day’, ‘Four Eyes is always reading 
math books’, ‘Where is Brainy now that we need him?’), which are sometimes 
precursors to proper names (e.g. the English and Scottish surname Sellar, originally 
used to name someone who worked in a cellar) and/or racial or social slurs (e.g. albino, 
redneck, redskin, camel jockey etc.), the latter cases invariably involving a strong 
expression of negative attitude.197  
An advantage of treating metonymy as a form of naming, compared with 
treating it as a case of ad hoc concept construction, is that metonymic uses appear to 
have a stronger motivation on this account (i.e. quick and easy referent identification 
contributing to reduction of processing effort/conveying extra effects that would not 
have been achieved by use of a literal encoding). The account also provides a 
straightforward explanation of the affinity between nicknames and metonymy, of why 
many slurs are metonymy-based, and (when appropriately modified) of the regular, 
                                                      
197 Interestingly, there is another productive linguistic strategy in English (and in Norwegian, and 
probably in other languages as well) for naming individuals on the basis of properties they possess, as 
illustrated by the following examples: 
(i) I was just told by Ms. Politically Correct that I should mind my language on that topic. 
(ii) Miss Selfish decided to keep the goods to herself. 
(iii) Mr. Computer Geek over there can help you with any IT-related problem. 
Here, the metonymic uses of the expressions are linguistically marked as dubbings by the presence of the 
titles, the capital letters (and special stress). The titles enable adjectives to be used directly as metonymic 
referring expressions. In addition to being referential, these cases often communicate an attitude toward 
the referent, for instance, (i) may imply that the referent is excessively politically correct. 
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code-like character of many metonymies. Furthermore, it can account for the same 
range of cases as the ad hoc concept construction account, as well as those involving 
proper names, which, as we saw in section 6.3.3, were not obviously analysable in terms 
of a process of meaning transfer targeting encoded word meanings. 
However, recalling Nunberg’s discussion in section 6.2.1, a consequence of 
pursuing the metonymy as naming account is a return to the view that the process is a 
matter of reference substitution rather than of meaning transfer. This would distinguish 
metonymy from other pragmatic processes that operate at the level of individual words 
and phrases, such as broadening and narrowing, which would involve the operation of a 
different pragmatic mechanism. In this way, some of the common characteristics 
between metonymy and ad hoc concept construction would not be captured.  
A more serious problem, however, is that the process of creative naming is in 
fact unlikely to be a distinctive feature of metonymy, as it applies equally to referential 
metaphors (and possibly to other cases as well). Compare the metonymy in (77)a. and 
the metaphor in (77)b, which were discussed in section 6.3.2: 
(77) a. The pretty face just went out. 
b. The pretty doll just went out. 
Here, both the metonymy and the metaphor are used to name a referent with very 
similar effects. Moreover, just like metonymy, referential metaphors make good 
nicknames, as illustrated by the following description of the former French president, 
Jacques Chirac:  
(78) In the three decades of his political career, the man they call ‘The Bulldozer’ has 
forged his own path and proved a thorn in the side of more than one French 
government.198  
There is also a clear connection between referential metaphors (79) and metaphorically 
based proper names (80):  
(79) The wilting violet seems like she’s ready to leave. 
                                                      
198Attested: http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/documentaries/profile/profile_jacques_chirac.shtml  
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(80) Violet, Rose, Iris, Daisy, etc. 
What conclusions may we draw from this? It seems that if we want to maintain an 
account of metonymy in terms of a creative process of naming, we must assume that we 
have to do with a broader category of cases, including referential metaphors (in the form 
of metarepresentational ad hoc concepts), and possibly other cases as well. On this view, 
metonymy would not be a natural kind, but rather a variety of uses of creative naming. 
As I see it, the most promising option would be to devise an account that is able to 
combine the constructive insights of the two approaches discussed here, that is, one that 
is able to capture the common features of metonymy, broadening (including metaphor) 
and narrowing, the regularity involved in many metonymic uses, as well as what seems 
to be an intrinsic connection between ‘figurative’ referential uses and 
metarepresentation, nicknaming and expressions of attitude. Much more needs to be 
said about this. I must leave the working out of such an account to future investigations 
within the relevance-theoretic framework. 
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Chapter	  7 	  
CONCLUSION:	  A	  PRAGMATIC	  ACCOUNT	  OF	  POLYSEMY	  
My aim in this thesis has been to show how the phenomenon of polysemy is intimately 
connected to, in fact overlaps with, cases of on-line contextual modulation of meanings 
due to pragmatic processes operating at the level of individual words. In this concluding 
chapter, I provide an overview of the central arguments presented in this thesis and 
discuss some of their implications for future work on polysemy/lexical pragmatics. I will 
also address some unresolved issues raised by my pragmatic account of polysemy. 
This thesis started out by identifying several issues that polysemy raises in 
semantic theory and semantic applications. The main questions were:  
(i) How should the phenomenon of polysemy be defined, and (if desirable) 
distinguished from homonymy (accidental multiple encoding), on the one hand, 
and contextual modulation of meaning, on the other? 
(ii) How are polysemous lexical forms represented in the mental lexicon? 
(iii) What is the cognitive-communicative motivation for the proliferation of 
polysemy in natural languages? 
(iv) How do lexical meanings get extended into several different meanings? 
I also pointed out that, in striking contrast to these difficult issues, polysemy is largely 
unproblematic from the point of view of communication; the ambiguity or 
indeterminacy that it creates is something that we handle effortlessly and unconsciously, 
for the vast majority of time. This has led some scholars to talk of a ‘polysemy paradox’ 
(Ravin and Leacock 2000; Taylor 2003). In what follows, I will briefly summarise my 
suggestions for how the questions I raised can be answered within the pragmatic 
account of polysemy that I have outlined in this thesis. Taken together, these suggested 
answers provide a possible solution to the paradox. 
Chapter 2 discussed the problem of polysemy representation. A first question 
was whether an adequate account of polysemy representation requires decompositional 
word meanings. A widely held view among proponents of this view is that word 
meanings must consist of complex representations in order to capture meaning 
  
 
261 
relations between words (e.g. synonymy, analyticity, polysemy). I started the chapter by 
considering several influential decompositional theories of lexical semantics, including 
Katz’s (1972) semantic theory, Lakoff’s lexical network theory (1987), Pustejovsky’s 
(1995a) generative lexicon account, and Pinker’s (1989) and Jackendoff’s (2002) theories 
of partial decomposition of lexical meanings. Their implications for polysemy 
representation were discussed. I then considered the conceptual atomist account 
maintained by Fodor (1998), and identified two ways of describing polysemy within this 
kind of framework, which posits unstructured (atomic) word meanings: either 
polysemous senses could be represented as separate lexical entries (PAPER1, PAPER2), with 
the same linguistic form (paper), or there could be a single encoded meaning of the 
word (cut - CUT), and the differences in meaning perceived between its uses in different 
contexts could be treated as instances of pragmatic adjustment of the encoded meaning 
(CUT*, CUT**, CUT***).  
I concluded that the existence of polysemy does not provide a very strong 
argument in favour of lexical decomposition. First, it is not always clear that polysemous 
sense relations are in fact captured by all decompositional theories. Second, for many of 
those decompositional theories where polysemous sense relations are captured, the 
problem is often that much of what we would consider aspects of lexical meaning in use 
is incorporated into the lexical semantics. Third, independent of the issue of polysemy 
representation, decompositional theories of word meaning are associated with a range 
of largely unresolved problems (e.g. the incompleteness of many decompositions, the 
vagueness of many concepts, the fact that we may be ignorant or mistaken about the 
properties we take the instances of a concept to have, etc.). Finally, in view of my 
discussion of Fodor’s atomist account, there is no obvious reason why a conceptual 
atomist approach combined with an adequate pragmatic theory should not be at least as 
able as decompositional theories to provide an account of polysemy. The view taken in 
this thesis was that word meanings are represented as unstructured atomic concepts, 
thus avoiding most of the problems associated with decompositional accounts, and that 
pragmatics can account for most of the variation in lexical meanings across contexts. 
A second question was whether polysemous lexical forms are represented as 
multiple lexical entries (sense enumeration) or as a single entry (core meaning). I 
examined some relatively recent psycholinguistic studies that apply experimental 
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methods in order to glean evidence from on-line processing that may bear on the 
question of whether polysemous lexical items are represented as multiple or single 
entries in the lexicon. The experimental evidence, although far from conclusive, 
indicated that not all instances of polysemy are represented in the same way. Rather 
than storing only a single core meaning or a total list of all the possible distinct senses, 
the lexicon may store some reasonable number of senses, and other senses are 
constructed in context on the basis of the stored senses. This result was compatible with 
the atomist approach to lexical meanings taken in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 examined the cognitive-communicative motivation for the 
proliferation of polysemy in natural languages. I argued that a solution to the problem 
of polysemy motivation has to take as its starting point the fact that polysemy is largely 
unproblematic from a communicative point of view. My hypothesis was that a 
pragmatic account that is able to explain how and why this is so, is also likely to shed 
light on the issue of what motivates the proliferation of polysemy in natural languages in 
the first place. I proposed a pragmatic account of polysemy within the framework of 
relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002b), in which polysemy 
arises as a result of encoded lexical meanings being massively underdetermining of 
speaker-intended meanings and is grounded in our pragmatic inferential ability to 
construct occasion-specific senses on the basis of encoded meanings and contextual 
information. I argued against more semantically-oriented approaches that although 
there is, of course, an important linguistic aspect to polysemy, it is, at the deepest level, a 
consequence of how communication works. I further suggested, drawing on arguments 
from Sperber (2000) and Carston (2002b), that our metarepresentational theory of mind 
ability might provide the cognitive basis for polysemy, and that it might have developed 
as a result of the co-evolution of the capacities for language and metarepresentation. 
More specifically, I argued that polysemy is fundamentally grounded in the component 
that allows us to infer speaker meanings from encoded linguistic meanings; this is what 
provides the motivation for polysemy in language. According to this pragmatic account 
polysemy poses no paradox, but is what we would expect from the fact that our 
languages do not fully encode our thoughts. 
In Chapter 4, I addressed the nature of the pragmatic processes that are involved 
in the construction of polysemy. I claimed that new senses for a word (giving rise to 
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polysemy) are constructed during on-line utterance comprehension by means of a 
single process of ad hoc concept construction, which adjusts the meanings of individual 
words in different directions (giving rise to ad hoc concepts with either narrower or 
broader denotations than the linguistically-encoded denotations, e.g. ‘John CUT* the 
cake’, ‘The steak is RAW*’, It’s BOILING* outside’, ‘The book was SLAUGHTERED* by 
reviewers’), in accordance with the hearer’s occasion-specific expectations of relevance 
(Carston 2002b; Wilson and Carston 2007). At the end of the chapter, I briefly discussed 
the issue of prepositional polysemy, and sketched how an analysis of the multiple 
(related) meanings of the preposition over in terms of ad hoc concept construction 
might proceed. It is a subject for further research whether such an analysis would be 
workable for the range of uses of over, and whether it could be extended to the other 
prepositions of English (or to the prepositions of other languages).  
In Chapter 5, I applied this relevance-theoretic approach to lexical pragmatics to 
cases of so-called systematic polysemy. The focus was the kind of sense alternation that 
appears to depend on whether a noun is used with count or mass syntax (e.g. John shot 
a rabbit/had rabbit for lunch). This type of polysemy is usually seen as a prime 
candidate for an analysis in terms of lexical rule application, where the effect of the 
lexical rules is to change the value of a linguistically marked [+count] or [+mass] feature 
on a noun. I argued that such rule-based accounts do not provide the interpretive 
flexibility required to handle the variations in meaning that this sense alternation may 
give rise to. Instead I proposed that our intuitions about some nouns being ‘count’ and 
other nouns being ‘mass’ stem from our mental representations of the concepts that are 
encoded by them. These may be specified, in terms of meaning postulates attached to 
the concepts or imagistic representations in their encyclopaedic entries, as denoting 
individuals or unindividuated entities, or, indeed, be unspecified with regard to this 
distinction. I further suggested that the count-mass distinction as it is manifested in 
language can be seen as an instance of this conceptual (ontological) distinction being 
reflected in a syntactic distinction at the level of NPs (rather than at the level of 
individual nouns). The cases of ‘systematic’ polysemy would arise whenever a noun that 
encodes a concept perceived as denoting an individual is used with mass syntax, or 
when a noun that encodes a concept perceived as denoting an unindividuated entity is 
used with mass syntax. The pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction would 
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then operate to yield context-specific senses of these nouns (e.g. to specify whether a 
mass use of rabbit communicates ‘rabbit meat’, ‘rabbit fur’, ‘rabbit stole’, ‘rabbit 
remains’ etc.). This way of approaching the count-mass type of systematic polysemy is 
largely unexplored in the literature. A possible direction for future research on this topic 
would be to investigate the feasibility of this mainly pragmatic account when applied to 
a larger set of data. 
In Chapter 5 I also discussed the systematic polysemy of nouns such as book and 
window, and suggested that their different senses (e.g. ‘The book is sitting on the coffee 
table/John found the book interesting’, ‘Mary broke the window/Mary crawled through 
the window’) could be analysed in terms of activation of encyclopaedic properties 
associated with the concepts (so-called ‘perspectivising’), the referential meanings of the 
nouns remaining constant across contexts. I also briefly evoked the possibility of an 
analysis of these cases in terms of ad hoc concept construction. Pursuing this option 
would require that these nouns be seen as encoding not full-fledged concepts, but more 
schematic representations, on the basis of which their different senses could be derived 
via pragmatic specification in terms of ad hoc concept construction. The possibility that 
all words encode nothing more than pointers to bundles of information (hence do not 
encode concepts) is currently being explored in relevance-theory (Carston 2002b, 2010; 
Kjøll forthcoming) and elsewhere (Recanati 2004: Chapter 9; Bosch 2007; Pietroski 
2008; Pritchard 2009). Although I have chosen to subscribe to the ‘traditional’ 
relevance-theoretic stance here, according to which most words encode atomic 
concepts, I remain open to the possibility that word meanings may in fact prove to be 
much less specific than this. For instance, with regard to the so-called book/window 
cases, treating them as encoding schematic representations might provide a compelling 
option, as it captures the fact that the precise denotation of such concepts is often 
surprisingly hard to pin down. A consequence of treating word meanings as schematic 
abstract entities in this way would be that the process of ad hoc concept construction 
would become both entirely general and obligatory in the comprehension of words in 
context; it would be triggered by underdetermined lexical-semantic representations in 
order to construct full-fledged concepts to the proposition expressed by an utterance. 
The question of whether words encode concepts or representations that are much more 
schematic is thus still very much an open issue in need of further investigation. 
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A cross-cutting topic of Chapters 2-5 has been whether the aspects of meaning 
that are involved in the construction of polysemy have a primarily linguistic or non-
linguistic basis. The question has been to what extent polysemy is a result of the 
operation of linguistic processes, and to what extent is it governed by pragmatic 
inferential processes applying at the level of individual words. As the question indicates, 
it is possible to see this as a difference of degree. While some approaches maintain that a 
considerable amount of linguistic knowledge is involved in the generation of polysemy 
(e.g. computational semantic accounts), other approaches, such as the pragmatic 
account of polysemy that I have been arguing for here, downplay the linguistic aspect 
and claim that polysemy mainly arises as a result of the operation of pragmatic 
processes over encoded word meanings, taking contextual information and 
encyclopaedic assumptions about the denotation of the concept involved as input to the 
inferential process. However, more than being a matter of degree, the difference 
between these two types of approaches is, in reality, to do with two fundamentally 
different conceptions of what a language is. The computational semantic accounts see 
the language as providing a rich code that enables speakers to encode and decode their 
thoughts in much detail, and pragmatics as a useful add-on to this linguistic capacity, 
operating primarily when some interpretation other than the default interpretation 
generated by the linguistic system is indicated by the context. By contrast, the pragmatic 
account pursued here sees the role of the linguistic system as being that of providing a 
minimal input or clue, which the inferential system uses as evidence to yield hypotheses 
about occasion-specific, speaker-intended meanings. As I have argued throughout this 
thesis, the assumption that a large part of the interpretive work involved in the 
processing of polysemy should be attributed to the linguistic system itself requires 
independent justification, given that we have an independently motivated pragmatic 
interpretation system, automatically activated by verbal utterances, which is capable of 
rapidly generating new senses in contexts.  
Finally, in Chapter 6 I discussed the phenomenon of metonymy, an important 
source of polysemy, where an expression that conventionally denotes one object or 
property is used to refer to or ‘stand for’ something that falls outside its conventional 
denotation, but with a clear associative relation holding between the conventional and 
the metonymic denotations (e.g. ‘The ham sandwich is getting impatient’, ‘Woolf is on 
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the top shelf’). I suggested two possible ways in which a relevance-theoretic account may 
proceed. First, I sketched an account according to which metonymic interpretations 
arise within the process of ad hoc concept construction, and where the range of possible 
associative relations that the encoded concept may enter into are constrained by the 
hearer’s occasion-specific expectations of relevance. Second, I sketched a different 
account in which metonymy is treated as a form of creative naming, closely related to 
‘nicknaming’, where a salient property of an individual is used to create a new name. As 
the discussion of metonymy revealed, it remains much of an open issue within the 
relevance-theoretic framework. Nevertheless, the accounts sketched go some way in 
explaining how metonymic interpretations are derived (and constrained) within the 
overall inferential process of utterance understanding. In particular, the ‘naming’ 
element, including the expression of attitude that often follows from it, involved in 
metonymic uses needs to be further explored. It can be explored either as part of an 
account of metonymy in terms of ad hoc construction, or as part of an account that 
treats metonymy as a sub-variety of a broader phenomenon of creative naming, 
including at least the referential metonymies and metaphors discussed in this chapter, 
and possibly other cases as well.  
As I mentioned in Chapter 6, recently, some researchers have begun to compare 
the relevance-theoretic and cognitive linguistic accounts of metaphor and to consider 
how they might be combined (Gibbs and Tendahl 2006; Tendahl and Gibbs 2008; 
Wilson 2009). Gibbs and Tendahl, for instance, suggest that, despite some fundamental 
differences, the two approaches should be seen as providing complementary rather than 
contradictory perspectives on metaphor. An interesting direction for future research 
would be to investigate whether a relevance-theoretic approach to the comprehension of 
metonymy might also be fruitfully combined with the cognitive linguistic approach to 
metonymy, in particular the cognitive linguistic claim about the existence of underlying 
metonymic concepts. A central question to be investigated is what role, if any, such 
underlying metonymic concepts play in the comprehension of metonymy. 
Finally, I would like to return briefly to the problem of polysemy definition 
addressed at the beginning of this thesis. The problem concerned how to distinguish 
polysemy from homonymy on the one hand, and pragmatic adjustment of lexical 
meanings, on the other. Given my account of polysemy as a result of pragmatic 
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adjustment of lexical meanings, the question becomes whether we really need the label 
‘polysemy’ at all. Perhaps it would be sufficient to posit a distinction between ambiguity 
(including homonymy and conventional polysemy), on the one hand, and pragmatically 
adjusted meanings, on the other, as this is the only distinction that has an impact on the 
way in which an utterance is processed, involving a process of disambiguation in the 
first case and ad hoc concept construction in the second case. Given the conceptual 
atomist stance on word meanings taken in this thesis, this would imply that speakers’ 
intuitions about sense relations would not be directly reflected at the level of lexical 
semantic representation, contrary to the common assumption in traditional linguistic 
semantics and in cognitive linguistic frameworks (whose account of polysemy is built 
around the existence of sense relations at the level of lexical semantic representation). 
Instead, as I suggested in Chapter 4, these intuitions may be due to several factors: 
While some sense relations may be transparent, as with clearly contextually derived 
senses, other intuitions about sense relations may be caused either by an overlap in the 
encyclopaedic information associated with concepts, by our ability to reflectively 
reconstruct the process of sense extension from a primary to a derived sense (as with 
many conventional metaphors), or by the mere anticipation of a relation between senses 
encoded by a single lexical form (cf. homonyms). In my view, the idea that sense 
relations are not represented as part of the lexical representation of a polysemous lexical 
form deserves serious consideration in future work on the topic. While nobody would 
dispute the fact that we have intuitions about sense relations, there is, as far as I can tell, 
no clear-cut evidence that these are directly reflected in the lexical representation of 
polysemous words. Until such evidence can be provided, it is necessary to consider 
other possible explanations for their existence. Furthermore, operating with a 
distinction between lexical ambiguity and ad hoc concept construction meshes well with 
the psycholinguistic evidence suggesting that not all instances of polysemy are 
necessarily represented in the same way. The assumption that there need not be a single 
representational format for the data falling under the label ‘polysemy’ is, I think, 
supported by the instances of polysemy investigated in this thesis, which, as we have 
seen, are to some extent heterogeneous. 
In conclusion, I hope to have shown in this thesis that the 
pragmatic/communicative aspect of polysemy is crucial to its existence and proliferation 
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in natural languages. While probably few would deny that pragmatics plays an 
important role in giving rise to different senses of a lexical form, this has, as we have 
seen, rarely been the focus of investigation in the research on polysemy, which tend to 
see it either as a linguistic reflection of how cognitive categories are structured or as a 
result of linguistic processes operating at the level of individual words (and pragmatics 
as useful add-on to these processes). While both these lines of research have provided 
important insights into the nature of polysemy, I think future work on this subject 
would benefit from taking the fundamental pragmatic aspect of the phenomenon more 
seriously. As I have argued in this thesis, the pragmatic perspective allows us to question 
common assumptions about the representation of polysemous lexical forms, and to re-
examine the role of the linguistic system in giving rise to several senses for a lexical item, 
which may be less central that previously thought. Ultimately, of course, these are 
empirical issues. I am optimistic that future experimental studies will provide us with a 
deeper understanding of how polysemy is represented and constructed during on-line 
pragmatic processing. 
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